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1. INTRODUCTION 
STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
Representative democracy is beset by a crisis of confidence. With its 
increasingly vocal critics and assertive opponents, growing 
numbers of citizens either take parliamentary democracy for 
granted or doubt its merits. In some EU member states, it seems to 
have become toothless yet at the same time it is noisier. Meanwhile, 
anti-parliamentarianism is on the rise. 
1.1 Decline in democratic freedoms 
Reports by Freedom House and others show that democratic 
freedoms have been in retreat for 13 straight years in many parts of 
the world, as more and more elected authoritarians emerge. In 
Europe too we are witnessing the rise of anti-democratic leaders, 
including some who have consolidated power beyond 
constitutional limits and continue to undermine the institutions that 
protect freedom of expression and association, and the rule of law. 
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has presided over 
one of the most dramatic declines of democracy ever charted within 
the European Union. Having worked methodically to deny critical 
voices a platform in the media or civil society, Orbán and his right-
wing nationalist Fidesz party comfortably defended their 
parliamentary supermajority in the 2018 elections. Soon afterwards, 
the government forced the closure of the Budapest-based Central 
European University, evicting its academic community from the 
country. In Poland, the conservative Law and Justice party, led by 
Jarosław Kaczyński, who plays a dominant political role despite 
holding no formal executive position, laid waste to the country’s 
legal framework in its drive to assert political control over the entire 
judiciary. This included attempts to force the retirement of Supreme 
Court judges and gain partisan influence over the selection of 
commission members. Both countries are in the crosshairs of the EU. 
The most emblematic, yet cumbersome, tool for defending the rule 
2  INTRODUCTION 
 
of law is the procedure of Article 7 TEU, which was triggered in 
December 2017 in the case of Poland (by the Commission) and in 
September 2018 in the case of Hungary (by the European 
Parliament). 
Meanwhile, attacks on media independence have spread to 
other European democracies. Austria’s new right-wing government 
put pressure on the public broadcaster, while Czech Prime Minister 
Andrej Babiš drew on closely allied media outlets to counter 
injurious scandals. The brutal mafia-style murder of Maltese 
investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia shocked the 
continent. She had been probing numerous cases of corruption on 
the island before a powerful bomb blew up her car near her home. 
In Slovakia, investigative reporter Ján Kuciak was killed in his home 
after uncovering corrupt links between government officials and 
organised crime. Bulgarian reporter Viktoria Marinova became the 
latest murder victim in October 2018, a year on from the most high-
profile killings. 
1.2 A crisis of efficiency and legitimacy 
In democracy’s historic heartlands we are also witnessing a shift in 
the perceptions and practice of democracy. The violent gilets jaunes 
protests in France, the fall of the Belgian government over the UN 
migration pact, the student-led climate protests inspired by 
Swedish teen activist Greta Thunberg and the Brexit deadlock in the 
UK are political crises that each have their own substantive origins. 
But they share an underlying weakness that is also visible in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and elsewhere in Europe: the 
inability of political representatives to make tough choices. There is 
a gulf between what citizens think and what they see politicians 
doing; between what they regard as vital and what in their view the 
state is neglecting: loss of purchasing power, corruption, migration 
and climate change, to name but a few. 
Every political system has to strike a balance between two 
fundamental realities: efficiency, i.e. the speed with which 
institutions can find effective solutions to problems, and legitimacy, 
i.e. the degree to which people support the solution (Manin, 1995). 
Representative democracy in Europe is undergoing a crisis of both 
efficiency and legitimacy. Coalition negotiations are taking longer 
than ever, especially in countries where complex alliances are 
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needed (at 589 days, Belgium holds the 
world record for going without a federal 
government). Parliaments can take 
months to reach long-term strategic 
decisions (e.g. investment in emerging 
technologies, choosing the right energy 
mix) and many governments appear powerless in the face of acute 
crises (e.g. eurozone debt, a spike in arrivals of refugees and 
migrants) and in the implementation of policy (e.g. large 
infrastructure projects).  
As a result, trust in the institutions of democracy is on the 
wane across Europe. In the autumn of 2012, Eurobarometer noted 
that only 33% of Europeans had confidence in the EU institutions – 
down from 50% in 2004. There was even less faith in national 
parliaments and governments, at 28% and 27% respectively. 
Political parties met with the greatest distrust of all: they scored an 
average of 3.9 out of 10 among EU citizens, followed by 
governments (4 out of 10), parliaments (4.2 out of 10) and the press 
(4.3 out of 10). Even if figures have rebounded somewhat since,1 
they are still among the lowest in decades, an indication that today, 
half to two-thirds of the population distrust the most important 
institutions of their political systems (Van Reybrouck, 2016).  
The declining trust in professional politicians in Europe is 
further evidenced by lower levels of voter participation (from an 
average of 85% in the 1960s to less than 40% in certain member 
states), falling membership of mainstream political parties and 
increasing electoral volatility (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2011; Van 
Biezen, Mair & Poguntke, 2012). Incidentally, the mistrust is mutual. 
Politicians assume that, on the whole, citizens are guided by other 
(i.e. less worthy) values than they are (Kanne, 2011).  
                                                        
1 See, e.g., https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-
/sdg_16_60 and Standard Eurobarometer 90 of autumn 2018: 42% 
Europeans trusted the EU, while only 35% trust their national government 
and parliament. Distrust in the national parliament (58%) and in the 
national government (59%) had decreased by 2% since spring 2018. Though 
still the majority, less than half of Europeans tended not to trust the EU 
(48%), and one in ten respondents answered that they didn’t know. 
In Europe, representative 
democracy is undergoing a 
crisis of efficiency and 
legitimacy. 
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People – especially in member states that are struggling with 
low growth and rising poverty levels – compare representative 
democracy unfavourably with the apparent successes of 
authoritarian regimes (Foa and Mounk, 2016). This has set the scene 
for the resurgence of populism. Charismatic individuals and fake 
prophets promise simplistic solutions to people’s grievances 
through radical policies that dismiss existing institutions and laws 
as either irrelevant or inconvenient. In a growing number of 
member states, electoral gains have propelled these populists into 
government. In Hungary, the most prominent case, this has led to 
majoritarian rule that erodes minority rights, further hollowing out 
the very fundaments of representative democracy which enabled 
the rise of the ‘strongman’ in the first place (Krastev, 2017).  
Of course, there is reason to be sceptical about the 
sustainability of this resurgent authoritarianism. In most cases, both 
historically and globally, these regimes become fragile when 
growth slows or ends, because they have no other sources of 
legitimacy. 
Another, less sinister, expression of discontent is reflected in 
the rise of a number of movements that are not satisfied with 
symbolic protest at the margins. These ‘neo-parliamentarians’ have 
sought to enter the system to change it from within. The Pirate Party 
that emerged in Sweden in 2006 as a platform for digital rights has 
become a political movement that aims to enrich representative 
democracy with direct democracy. It is a model that has been 
replicated elsewhere in Europe, to become the third largest party in 
Czechia and – briefly – Germany. Since its creation in 2009 by 
comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the anti-establishment, anti-
globalist, Eurosceptic and environmentalist Five Star Movement 
(M5S) became the largest individual party in the Italian 
Parliament in the 2018 general election and entered government. 
Despite its leader’s raucous populist rhetoric, the M5S seeks to 
improve the quality of representative politics by imposing new 
rules: no representatives with criminal records; no seats for life; no 
election of the same person for more than two terms. But the M5S is 
finding it hard to implement its agenda in a coalition government 
which is de facto led by the authoritarian Minister of the Interior, 
Matteo Salvini, who is riding the xenophobic wave that his Lega 
Nord helped whip up during the migrant crisis. 
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Given that the great challenges of today – migration, climate 
change, banking crises, offshore fraud – can no longer be dealt with 
adequately by national governments. How representative are 
national parliaments in their decision-making on EU matters? This 
question is the main focus of the present volume. 
1.3 This book 
Representative Democracy in the EU: Recovering Legitimacy is part of 
the ‘Towards a Citizens’ Union (2CU)’ project co-funded by the 
Erasmus+ Programme of the EU and is the product of a sustained 
collaboration with 20 renowned think tanks from the European 
Policy Institutes Network (EPIN). 
Building on the notion of increasing social, economic and 
political interdependence in a multi-layered European Union, we 
devoted the first volume to the question of whether a sense of 
solidarity and European identity could be rescued from the bottom 
up by empowering citizens to ‘take back control’ of their Union. Our 
research revealed, among other things, that people’s interest in 
exploring direct democracy has increased as a result of the EU’s 
polycrisis of recent years – although this trend is not widespread 
and is even absent in some member states. Yet, as Richard Youngs 
points out in his concluding chapter of our first volume, to move 
beyond being “a heavily instrumentalised wrecking-ball” the 
instruments of direct democracy would need to meet certain 
participatory preconditions to contribute 
to the quality of democracy overall. “As 
citizens make what experts consider to be 
‘wrong’ populist-fuelled choices, 
sympathy has resurged for the classical 
concept of elite-mediated governance” 
(Youngs, 2018). 
In this second book, we investigate how the relationship 
between the democratic institutions of the member states and those 
of the EU has changed as a result of a decade of crisis. Rather than 
assess the state of collective government (Van Middelaar, 2019), we 
focus on the role of parliaments. The national level lends itself best 
to a broad investigation of the health of representative democracy 
in Europe. That is why our project unpacks the theory and practice 
of voting and decision-shaping mechanisms (Part I) that affect 
How representative are 
national parliaments in 
their decision-making on 
EU matters?  
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citizens in an illustrative cross-section of member states. This 
analysis of the ‘Europeanisation’ of representative democracy at the 
national level (Part III) is complemented by an investigation of the 
state of parliamentary democracy at the EU level (Part II).  
On both levels, our focus is on polity rather than on policy or 
populism. The contributions examine issues of representation and 
deliberation from a constitutional, institutional and procedural 
perspective; the machinery and mechanisms that power European 
affairs and the tracks along which opinions and decisions are moved 
between the national and EU levels. As such, the changing nature of 
our political eco-systems and the (dis)connections within and 
between them will be discussed. 
The third and final publication will bring the lessons of 
volumes I and II together and offer ideas for how democratic 
institutions and processes can be enhanced to meet tomorrow’s 
challenges. The underlying assumption is that direct and 
representative democracy can go hand-in-hand to improve the 
quality of democracy in Europe. 
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2. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
UNDER PRESSURE: SHOCKS, 
AGENTS AND USERS 
DÍDAC GUTIÉRREZ-PERIS &  
HÉCTOR SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF 
This chapter assumes that representative democracy is under pressure from 
the numerous challenges it is facing: external shocks, external actors, 
internal actors and its own users. How should we understand the new 
limits of sovereignty, representation and responsibility in an 
interconnected world and how can the notion of interdependence offer 
alternative ways to address these challenges? 
Introduction 
One of the greatest thinkers on democracy, Robert Dahl (1989), 
defined democratic processes as “the most reliable means for 
protecting and advancing the good and interests of all the persons 
subject to collective decisions”. Participation in decision-making by 
citizens voting on decisions that affect them is a core element of 
democratic processes (Coglianese, 1990). Thus, representative 
democracy is how liberal democracies translate popular will into 
policy options. The representative system guarantees the same 
political rights to every citizen, preserving their individual initiative 
and autonomy. This is achieved by safeguarding individual rights, 
pluralism and minorities above those of majorities, as well as by the 
capacity of citizens to remove a government that does not fulfil their 
expectations or needs. However, Dahl also acknowledges that 
implementing democratic ideals is not as easy as it may seem in 
theory. The obvious criticism representative democratic systems 
face is that they can lead to unjust outcomes when a majority 
deprives a minority of its substantive rights or interests.  
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For some time at the end of the Cold War, transitions to 
democratic regimes appeared unstoppable: Fukuyama (2018) notes 
that the number of electoral democracies from 1970 to the first 
decade of this century increased from 35 to 110. At the same time, 
prosperity seemed to prove the advocates of democracy right, as the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty decreased 
dramatically from 42% in 1993 to 18% in 2008 (Fukuyama, 2018). In 
recent times, however, representative democracy has been called 
into question, or at least taken less for granted and regarded more 
critically than it used to be. A poll by the Pew Research Center (2017) 
shows that, despite the strong commitment to representative 
democracy in the European Union (EU) (37%), 42% of the 
population is moderately committed to democracy and 10% 
support non-democratic forms of government. Numbers at global 
level show less commitment to democracy: 23% are totally 
committed to democracy, 47% less committed and 13% not 
committed at all. In fact, at the beginning of 2017, more countries 
were heading towards non-democratic forms of government than 
the other way around (The Economist, 2018). At the beginning of 
2019, that trend seems to have stopped or paused (The Economist, 
2019). 
With this initial approach in mind, the chapter will set out the 
challenges facing representative democracy, and question whether 
it is the form of government every society desires and needs to 
reach. The chapter will also consider the dilemmas representative 
democracy has brought on itself, acknowledging the limitations as 
well as the opportunities for representative democracy today. This 
will lead to the examination and analysis of the state of 
representative democracy in European Union member states. 
2.1 Challenges 
Why is an idea that not so long ago seemed incontrovertible now 
being contested, struggling to maintain its relevance in people’s 
minds? Technological change is making workers feel irrelevant and 
fear for the future because the social elevator has stopped. 
Immigration (real or perceived) has created a loss of identity, with 
an inevitable backlash. Adding to this complex scenario, the 
increasing integration of social networks in our daily lives simply 
amplifies the consequences of everything – good and bad. It would 
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be a mistake to locate the origin of representative democracy’s 
deterioration in the financial crisis of 2008, but it was certainly a 
serious blow, given the way it affected primarily the United States 
(US) and the EU – the leading paradigms of liberal democracy – 
damaging the reputation of the system as a whole (Fukuyama, 
2018). The crisis has had lasting effects that have been more socially 
damaging than those of any previous crisis. Its management and 
aftermath have taken a heavy toll on social equality, for which the 
elites are blamed. The inevitable anger, frustration and fear are 
partially fuelling radical right-wing parties. Such parties tend to 
spring up during political and economic crises, and established ones 
become more relevant (Funke, Schularick and Trebesch, 2018). 
This paper has identified four challenges that contest the idea 
of representative democracy. The first is that posed by external shocks 
that cannot be controlled by governments elected through 
representative democracy. External actors who question the 
association between representative democracy and economic 
success, and/or offer an alternative model of government, represent 
the second challenge. Internal actors, in the form of political parties 
or civil society movements who use the rules of representative 
democracy to undermine it represent the third challenge. The fourth 
is the increasing number of users of democracy who do not see living 
under a democratic regime as indispensable. A process of 
deconsolidation of democratic regimes is underway, which goes 
further than mere citizen dissatisfaction with particular 
governments (Foa and Mounk, 2016). 
2.1.1 External shocks 
At least two external elements are placing stress on representative 
democratic systems. Both are driven to 
some extent by fear of the future. The 
first is the fear of losing economic status 
aggravated by inequality; the second is 
the alleged loss of traditional forms of 
identity due to rising migration flows 
into a country (either as a real situation 
or simply as a perceived phenomenon). 
They do not necessarily need to be real: 
The fear of losing economic 
status, aggravated by 
inequality and the alleged 
loss of identity due to 
migration flows, real or 
perceived, are placing stress 
on representative 
democracy systems. 
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the perception of them alone places the whole representative 
democratic system at risk.  
The economic crisis has exacted a heavy toll in terms of rising 
inequality. As well as the differences between countries in the global 
North and global South, Western countries are also affected from 
within. Reports show that the share of income held by the richest 
people is almost ten times that of the poorest and that the gap 
widened during the economic crisis. Wealth is also unequally 
distributed and the differences are greater than in income inequality 
(Eurostat, 2016; OCDE, 2017). Unemployment, particularly youth 
unemployment, have aggravated this situation, while 20% of the 
world’s billionaires have become increasingly rich (The Guardian, 
2018). Southern Europe, with its persistent high youth 
unemployment, is where economic inequalities have become most 
significant and where the gap between poorest and richest has 
widened the most (Darvas, 2018). One cannot fully exercise one’s 
political rights if there is economic inequality; as Fukuyama (2018) 
put it, equality under law does not result in economic or social 
equality. It follows that when the accountability of those 
representing the popular will is lower than before because power is 
exercised not only in parliaments but also in what are known as the 
markets, people’s confidence in representative democracy wanes 
(Vallespín, 2018).  
The second external shock is the perceived threat that 
‘uncontrolled’ migration flows represent to one’s identity. 
Conspiracy theories and diminishing political correctness have 
enabled radical right political parties to use migration as a 
scapegoat, regardless of what data and experts might say about the 
benefits of migration to society. Without hesitation, radical right 
parties in opposition and government treat the phenomenon of 
migration as a threat to supposedly homogeneous societies, 
blaming immigrants for practically everything and profiting 
electorally from it (Davis and Deole, 2018). Several examples of 
governments elected in representative democratic systems using 
these tactics can be found across Europe: from the Hungarian 
government accusing George Soros of funding refugees to invade 
Europe (Donadio, 2018); to the Alternative für Deutschland 
progressing from initial demands to leave the euro to become an 
anti-migration, anti-refugee party present in all of Germany’s 
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regional parliaments (Horn, 2016). 
The focus on migration as a threat 
drives the securitisation of the topic 
(Özerim, 2013), and ultimately 
questions the individual rights at the 
core of representative democracy. 
This results in a crisis of 
representative democracy that, as 
Cabrera (2018) has explained, uses verbal wars, conspiracy theories, 
and a systematic violation of institutions and non-written rules such 
as tolerance towards political rivals instead of violence or coup 
d’états. 
2.1.2 External actors 
The number of democracies is in retreat in every region of the world 
while authoritarian regimes are becoming more assertive 
(Fukuyama, 2018). China and Russia have always seen the 
promotion of (representative) democracy by the US and the EU as a 
way to interfere in third countries’ domestic affairs and expand their 
own influence. They share the belief that “weakening democracy 
can accelerate the decline of Western influence and advance both 
Russia’s and China’s geopolitical goals”. Russia promotes an 
illiberal way of governing while China is undermining democratic 
norms to enhance its “Leninist-capitalist brand of governance”. It 
questions the idea that economic growth goes hand in hand with 
liberal democracy (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2018). 
Russia has interfered at the very roots of representative 
democracy by trying to alter free and fair elections and thereby 
lessen the commitment towards democracy (Brattberg and Maurer, 
2018; Bentzen, 2018). It has favoured anti-EU parties and framed 
them as patriotic forces that protect national sovereignty from the 
‘usurper’ European Union in member states’ national election 
campaigns (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2018). It has acted as a 
host for political forces that do not believe in the EU, from both the 
right and the left, as well as interfering militarily in the EU 
neighbourhood by actively promoting the destabilisation of 
Ukraine. Russia approached Greece when the conflict with its 
creditors reached its peak and political leaders from member states 
Abusers of representative 
democracy use verbal wars, 
conspiracy theories, and a 
systematic violation of 
institutions and non-written 
rules, such as tolerance 
towards political rivals. 
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such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán admire Putin’s non-democratic 
way of governing (Bíró-Nagy, 2017). 
The assumption that economic growth creates middle classes 
that ask for more political rights, leading to a liberal representative 
democracy as the only way to channel these demands has proved 
wrong in China so far. The alternative model China defends has 
successfully sustained economic growth for more than 20 years, 
while avoiding the financial crises that have shaken Western 
countries. Not only are there no glimpses of democratisation in 
China, despite a growing middle class, but here is also little 
questioning of whether that is the path to follow. The model will not 
be questioned as long as the government-led economy continues to 
deliver sustained economic growth (Wu, Chang and Pan, 2017) and 
liberal professionals continue to benefit from this model of state 
(Goodman, 2013). The uninterrupted economic growth makes 
people in the West wonder how indispensable it is to live in a 
representative democracy and whether the Chinese political system 
would be better at achieving such growth (Horesh, 2015; Bell, 2018). 
Finally, China is an enormous investment powerhouse – seen by 
other states as an opportunity to finance their projects. Funding 
from China inevitably comes at a cost but it but allows third 
countries to bypass the conditions associated with access to EU 
funding. Thus, the EU loses some leverage when promoting 
democracy and rule of law in third countries. All in all, the 
increasing assumption is that there are no incentives to adopt 
Western-like models of society, government or economy because 
other models may better fit rulers’ aspirations (Mishra, 2014; The 
Economist, 2014). 
2.1.3 Internal actors 
In recent years, radical right parties have increasingly gained 
political power in EU member states. In some, they rule with 
absolute majorities (Poland, Hungary), in others they are part of a 
government coalition (Italy, Austria) and in the rest they have 
shaped the agenda by dragging mainstream political parties 
towards their views, particularly on the issue of migration 
(Germany, Finland). When these parties gain enough political 
power, they do whatever it takes to hold on to it. In Poland and 
Hungary, radical right parties in government are attempting to 
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dismantle checks and balances, curtail the freedoms of press and 
association and control judiciary 
power, while demolishg the 
opposition at the same time. In short, 
all the elements that are fundamental 
to a healthy representative 
democracy (Applebaum, 2018; 
Amnesty International, 2018). To 
these actors, the EU is a threat to 
national sovereignty. Regardless of 
the fact that, in practice, they devalue the idea of democratic 
representation, a formal strategy of supposedly abiding by 
European rules has often been used as a way to legitimise their 
retrenchment of rights. 
This kind of political force has always existed in EU member 
states. What has changed is that anti-EU forces do not want to 
openly ‘destroy’ or ‘end’ the EU any more. In fact, the uncertainty 
created by Brexit is a powerful deterrent and is boosting EU support 
(Grabbe and Lehne, 2018). Instead, they will keep taking advantage 
of the system to gain more funds, more visibility and ultimately 
more political power. Their final goal is to ‘take back control’, 
renationalising decisions now taken at European level, or regaining 
sovereignty from the EU in favour of the nation state to make it 
easier to implement an illiberal agenda. The challenge they 
represent to representative democracy today is even greater given 
the renewed capacity to build on a 
certain organisation of action as 
they staged in Koblenz in January 
2017.1 As the Spanish foreign 
minister recently put it – the 
internal opponents of a free, 
solidary and united Europe now 
have powerful allies from outside 
(Borrell, 2018). Moreover, as Applebaum (2018) has warned, these 
political forces do not hesitate to use “medium-size lies” that they 
                                                        
1 Radical right parties with a strong Euroscepticism leaning met in in the 
German city of Koblenz in January of 2017. The aim of the gathering was 
to discuss the Europe of the future, according to the organizers but it 
became more useful for visibility purposes. 
Radical right parties in 
government are attempting to 
dismantle checks and 
balances, curtail the freedoms 
of press and association and 
control judiciary power, and 
demolish the opposition. 
This kind of political force has 
always existed in EU member 
states. What has changed is 
that anti-EU forces do not 
want to openly ‘destroy’ or 
‘end’ the EU any more. 
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and their affiliated media repeat over and over to impose their view. 
They conceive of society as a monolithic block and see themselves 
as the only actors capable of interpreting its demands and of 
defending its national interests and identity. Such a view of the 
world and of the society they claim to represent leaves less and less 
room for pluralism and deliberation, which are essential, defining 
theoretical traits of representative democracy. 
2.1.4 Users of democracy 
The concept of democratic deconsolidation (Mounk and Foa, 2016) 
arises from the assumption that an ever-increasing number of 
people living under representative democratic regimes do not 
consider it indispensable to continue to do so. Fukuyama’s updated 
work provides a few examples, such as the two oldest democracies, 
the UK and the US, voting for Trump and Brexit, respectively, as if 
they did not care anymore. Grabbe and Lehne (2018) claimed that 
“many voters understand that the EU membership brings benefits, 
but many of them take for granted the legal system that delivers 
economic prosperity”. Former German Finance Minister, Wolfgang 
Schäuble has said that the biggest danger for (representative) 
democracy is taking it for granted, while the Spanish foreign 
minister has claimed that the losers of globalisation, feeling lost, 
would rather protect themselves in what they know best – the 
nation state – no matter what they have to give up (Borrell, 2018). 
What is more, those who did not think they would lose from 
globalisation – often conceptualised as the ‘middle class’ – blame 
both the elites for the loss of their former economic status (or that of 
their children in the future), and the poor, whom they believe are 
given special attention.  
Another type of fracture is further eroding representative 
democracy from within: the generational one. Since the Brexit 
referendum, more and more voices have 
blamed the final result on low youth 
turnout. While many young voters did 
fail to turn out on referendum day, it is 
often overlooked that a turnout of 73% 
of the population between 18 and 24 
years old would have been needed to 
reverse the result of the referendum (the total turnout was slightly 
Another type of fracture is 
further eroding 
representative democracy 
from within: the 
generational one. 
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lower), a level of participation that has not occurred in any recent 
election. From a more academic perspective, Foa and Mounk (2016 
and 2017) claimed that people born since the 1980s in the United 
States or in any member state of the European Union are less likely 
to answer “essential” when asked how important it is to live in a 
democracy. Although looking at the numbers of people who don't 
consider democracy to be essential, the situation is not worrying; it 
becomes so when looking at it comparatively. 
Indeed, people born in the 70s would say that democracy is a 
good thing as they grew older, while the opposite happens with 
people born in the 90s. The older they get, the less positive is their 
opinion regarding democracy. Other data exists on youth 
commitment to democracy but Foa and Mounk’s claim is that given 
how future decision-makers, citizens and voters think right now, 
democracy is not assured. According to them, 
“millenials have less faith in the democratic system (…), 
are more likely to express hostile views of democracy, 
[and] vote for anti-establishment parties and candidates 
that disregard long-standing democratic norms in ever 
greater numbers” (Mounk and Foa, 2016). 
Although the data is accurate, the conclusions have been contested 
by other academics (Inglehart, 2016), think tankers (Quero and 
Sánchez, 2019) and journalists (Koerth-Baker). Some millennials 
may not care too much about democracy but others cannot agree on 
how it should work. 
While they are difficult to interpret from a far-reaching 
perspective, the external and internal challenges to democracy 
should certainly raise concerns among member states and citizens 
who favour representative democracy as a system of governance. 
Most importantly, these challenges conceal two dilemmas at the 
core of what could be called the ‘engineering structure’ of 
representative democracy. In other words, these two dilemmas 
might be both part of the problem and part of the solution. 
2.2 The dilemmas for representative democracy 
As this chapter has shown, it is now commonly assumed that 
representative democracy can be added to the list of what European 
Commission President Juncker has termed a “polycrisis”. Public 
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opinion is showing clear signs of disenchantment and even rejection 
of democracy and it is also assumed that some of the current failures 
associated the crises of representative democracy (i.e. greater 
inequality and increased difficulty retaining economic sovereignty 
in a globalised world) are somehow connected – and are sometimes 
even the result of – this particular system of government. 
Such assumptions are now intrinsic to the academic debate 
about the crisis of representative democracy but at the same time 
they illustrate some of the dilemmas faced by political scientists 
when tackling this issue. As the earliest comparative theorists 
established (Krasner, 1983; Lipset, 1959) not all undesirable political 
circumstances result from the political structure in place and vice 
versa, and neither do all similar political structures produce the 
same policy results in all regions, countries and periods. Taking into 
consideration this initial proviso, this section will look at some of 
the dilemmas surrounding representative democracy nowadays, in 
particular: a) the dilemma posed by new forms of sovereignty in a 
globalised ecosystem; and b) how the notion of interdependency 
offers alternative ways to address the crisis of representative 
democracy. 
2.2.1 The new delimitation of (power) spaces 
It is widely recognised that the Westphalian order is showing 
serious vulnerabilities in an increasingly decentralised and hyper-
connected global environment (Gill and Cutler, 2014). The process 
of globalisation is transforming the traditional centres of political, 
economic and cultural power. It is no 
coincidence that most of the so-
called anti-establishment actors 
exploiting this centrifugal evolution 
are marketing their narrative as a 
means to ‘take back control’ and 
‘regain sovereignty’, because the place where sovereignty is 
exercised is in flux.  
The example of the eurozone crisis and the role played by 
financial powerhouses provides a different illustration of how post-
national economic forces can have a lasting effect. Besides the 
structural reasons that explain the vulnerabilities of Europe’s 
monetary ecosystem, the public debt crisis was strongly influenced 
Globalisation is transforming 
the traditional centres of 
political, economic and 
cultural power. 
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by a series of market reactions that were independent from national 
policies at the time. This particular situation has been studied at 
length since the crisis. Wolff (2018), for example, has recently looked 
at central banks in Europe and the problem of unelected power, 
while Müller et al. (2018) have put together a fascinating review 
showing that in the midst of the crisis several national news outlets 
were accusing other countries of the problems suffered by each 
nation during those years2. The ‘culprits’ were difficult to identify 
and name. A complex system of co-liabilities blurred the capacity to 
find straightforward answers and solutions. The case of Spain 
during those years is equally illustrative of the capacity of 
exogenous factors to influence national economy. In 2007, Spain’s 
national public debt accounted for 35% of GDP (half of Germany’s 
public debt at the time). Yet in subsequent years markets lost 
confidence in Spain’s bond market, which radically transformed the 
public debt balance of the country (which tripled the 2007 
percentage and took public debt beyond 100% of GDP in 2014). 
This shows how a globalised environment creates new 
boundaries for public and political responsibilities. That this new 
complexity applies to sovereignty and representativeness is a 
logical consequence. In fact, without a clear understanding of who 
is responsible for the unexpected political complications our 
societies face, it seems only natural for constituents to lose 
confidence in the system of representation meant to legitimise such 
a regime. In the early 1980s the literature focusing on European 
studies coined the concept of ‘output legitimacy’ to explain this 
particular problem. Because the European Union was always a 
project perceived to have less legitimacy that the old Westphalian 
states, it had to legitimise itself through policy results, hence output 
legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). In that sense, one of the consequences of 
the crisis of representative democracy is that this same concept 
seems to apply increasingly to national realities. Less and less 
perceived as the unique stakeholders of a fixed and sacred 
sovereignty, the legitimacy of national policymakers is assessed 
according to their capacity to bring operational and tangible results. 
This could be why trust in traditional political strongholds such as 
                                                        
2 The outlets analysed were from Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 
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national parliaments and national governments is plummeting (see, 
for example: European Commission, 2017). 
2.2.2 Governing interdependencies 
After acknowledging the ongoing redesign of responsibilities, 
sovereignty and representativeness in a globalised world, the 
question is how much progress has been made on innovative 
structures to govern interdependencies. Such research is only in its 
early stages, although it constitutes one of the most promising 
attempts to combine decentralised political realities with sustained 
democratic support (for a preliminary corpus see, for example: 
Christiano, 2010; Dworkin, 2013; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). The 
challenge of governing interdependencies means, in practice, 
imagining a set of procedures or benchmarks that can be used in 
contemporary policymaking to integrate the interdependency 
factor. This set of benchmarks has not been devised at European 
level yet, but other policy areas have paved the way. For instance, 
some policymakers are already using global indicators when 
regulating climate change and environment protection: nowadays 
it is common to have some sort of pre-assessment and evaluation, 
such as the combined use of Footprint indicators as a Footprint 
Family in Galli et al., 2012.  
The crisis has also pushed the EU towards some 
reinforcement measures regarding interdependencies at monetary 
and economic levels. Despite the fact that the system of governance 
emerging from the crisis is still dominated by the principle of 
conditionality (Nicolaïdis and Watson 2014) – see for example the 
rigour embedded in all policies surrounding the European semester 
– there is also a willingness to look further by using tools such as the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, which has a much more 
global and long-term vision of the survival of the eurozone. These 
innovative approaches provide some initial tools for 
acknowledging and incorporating the transnational liabilities 
between member states, which may result in an updated conception 
of representative democracy. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the different challenges faced by 
representative democracy. They have been summarised based on 
the sources from which they arise: international unpredictable 
shocks; external actors; internal actors; and users of democracy. The 
pressure from these agents on the legitimacy and support for 
representative democracy has never been greater. Yet, it is assumed 
that one cannot address the growing concerns without first 
addressing the two systemic changes underpinning the new 
globalised playing field: first, how to find the appropriate level of 
decision-making to remain efficient in terms of sovereignty, 
particularly at European level; and second, how to start thinking 
about a new roadmap to effectively implement the notion of 
‘governing interdependencies’ should representative democracy 
continue to be the preferred system of government in EU member 
states. 
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3. USES AND ABUSES OF VOTING 
AID APPLICATIONS 
DANIEL SMILOV &  
ANTOINETTE PRIMATAROVA 
The focus of this chapter is on transnational Voting Aid Applications 
(VAAs) as instruments intended to exert impact on European elections. 
Four VAAs, designed for the European Parliament elections in 2014, are 
subjected to a critical assessment with regard to their purpose and the 
informative value of the questionnaires as the core element of their design. 
VAAs create a perception that the voter is in the driving seat of politics: 
political parties are turned into transparent menus of policy options among 
which the rational voter makes an informed choice. This perception might 
be misleading. VAAs cannot function as a remedy for the ‘representative 
deficit’ (a high mismatch between the issue preferences of voters and the 
offers of parties). Nor can they affect the major trends in contemporary 
European politics, such as low trust in political parties and politicians, and 
low turnout in elections. The potential for their success lies primarily in 
their use as tools to address the ‘information deficit’ regarding European 
policies. 
Introduction 
Trust in political parties and parliaments – the major structures of 
representative democracies – is low across Europe. Eurobarometer 
surveys suggest that, on average, around 15% of Europeans have 
confidence in political parties. In general, these bodies operate in a 
low-trust environment and are under increasing pressure to get 
closer to citizens and voters. In order to bridge the gap with the 
electorate, parties and politicians adopt a number of strategies: 
internal democracy, citizen consultations, transparency, and 
lowering the cost of information for voters.  
This chapter will discuss one such strategy, which tries to 
simultaneously initiate discussion among potential voters, lower 
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the cost of the information they receive from political parties, and 
provide parties with valuable feedback on voter attitudes. VAAs are 
designed to provide voters with an interactive (online) platform 
through which they can make informed choices among political 
candidates. These platforms are based on a number of assumptions, 
some of which are fairly noble from a normative perspective but still 
may prove to be unrealistic. One such assumption is that of the 
‘rational voter’: people voting on the basis of rational arguments in 
favour of specific, well-defined policies. This assumption is very 
often hard to sustain. Thus, from the very outset the issue of VAAs 
needs to be approached with a certain degree of scepticism: while 
useful from a number of perspectives, these instruments are 
unlikely to affect major trends in contemporary politics, such as the 
low trust in parties and politicians, and low turnout in elections. 
Pressure for greater internal party democracy and citizen 
consultations through the introduction of online decision-making 
tools and platforms is on the rise. Social networks and digital 
technologies make electronic voting and online decision-making 
increasingly possible. These novel possibilities have the potential to 
increase the transparency of politics to unprecedented levels. Yet, 
up to now this has not led to a reversal in the negative trends 
regarding institutional trust in parties 
and politics in general. One 
hypothesis to explain this 
phenomenon could be that greater 
transparency and internal democracy 
might actually lead to the erosion of 
the authority of political bodies as 
effective and efficient decision-
makers. Also, the very idea of political 
leadership is being transformed, since 
the bias is increasingly in favour of 
politicians who are willing to follow every change in the mood of 
the public, rather than those who risk defending unpopular 
positions. 
These general considerations are an important background 
for the assessment of the performance of VAAs. They suggest that 
the lack of institutional trust could have deeper origins and more 
fundamental driving forces than normally assumed, and these 
Electronic voting has the 
potential to increase the 
transparency of politics to 
unprecedented levels.  
Yet so far it has not 
reversed the negative trends 
regarding institutional 
trust in parties and politics 
in general. 
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forces may not be seriously impacted by instruments that increase 
the possibilities for discussion and decrease the cost of information 
for the voters. 
The link between trust and politics is important at the national 
level, but it is even more pressing regarding supranational 
institutions. Elections for the European Parliament (EP), perceived 
as second-order elections, are characterised by lower turnout than 
national ones. Since their launch in 1979, they have been marked by 
a steady fall in turnout (from 61.99% in 1979 to 42.61% in 2014), a 
problematic development for representative democracy at the 
European level.   
The focus of this chapter is on transnational VAAs as an 
instrument intended to exert impact on European elections. The 
discussion of the potential role of VAAs with regard to European 
elections will be limited to a critical assessment of the purpose of the 
already existing pan-European VAAs and to the questionnaires as 
the core element of the design of any VAA.   
3.1 VAAs – a mushrooming phenomenon 
triggering a new strand of research 
3.1.1 VAAs as a mushrooming phenomenon  
The pioneering VAA in Europe was not an online but a paper-and-
pencil test. It was designed in the Netherlands in 1989 under the 
brand name StemWijzer (a play on 
words which means both ‘vote wiser’ 
and ‘vote indicator’). Based on the 
simple principle that all political 
parties can be placed on a left-right 
scale, it consisted of a booklet with 60 
statements and a floppy disk. 
Agreement or disagreement with the 60 
statements allowed parties to be placed on a one-dimensional scale. 
The tool had an educational purpose and its target groups were 
junior high-school students. In 1994, emerging information and 
communications technology (ICT) facilitated the first digital, and, in 
1998, the first internet based StemWijzer, which attracted 6,500 
users. In 2002, StemWijzer attracted two million users. In 2012 4.85 
The pioneering VAA in Europe 
was not an online but a 
paper-and-pencil test, 
designed in the Netherlands  
in 1989 under the brand name 
StemWijzer. 
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million Dutch voters (i.e. 40% of the Dutch electorate) used the 
application (of which 620,000 via smartphones). De Graaf (2010) 
provides further interesting insights into the “irresistible rise” of 
StemWijzer and its role, not so much as authoritative advice on how 
to vote but as a starting point for discussion in family, with friends, 
at classes, workplaces, cafes or in the streets, and last but not least, 
extensive discussions within the political parties.   
Nowadays, there are more than 30 VAAs in the Netherlands 
alone and there are hardly any European countries that do not use 
some kind of VAA or several competing ones for national and even 
regional elections.  
Attempts to design VAAs for the EP elections began in 2004 
and continued in 2009. For the 2014 EP elections, four transnational 
VAAs1 were operated in parallel throughout the European Union:  
• VoteMatch Europe – designed within the framework of a 
network working under the auspices of NECE, the initiative 
for Networking European Citizenship Education; 
• euandi (read EU and I) – successor to the EU Profiler from 
2009, both developed under the auspices of the European 
Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) based at the 
European University Institute (EUI) in Florence; 
• EU Vox 2014 – developed by a Swiss-Dutch consortium in 
cooperation with partners in member states; 
• Electio 2014 – developed by VoteWatch Europe, a think tank 
specialised in EU affairs, based in Brussels and operating in 
the online space. 
3.1.2 VAAs as a research topic 
The potential impact of VAAs on voter turnout and voting 
behaviour provoked a new strand of research within political and 
social science that is covered in its diversity by Cedroni and Garzia 
(2010) and Garzia and Marshall (2014). 
                                                        
1 The Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) supported both 
VoteMatchEurope and EU Vox 2014. VoteMatchEurope was further 
supported by the Grundtvig Programme of the European Commission and 
benefitted from the involvement of the German Federal Agency for Civic 
Education (Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung). 
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Unfortunately, technical issues of methodology and 
measurement have captured the minds of both designers and 
researchers to a very large extent. In many cases this has resulted in 
a neglect of the element central to all VAAs – the statements, as well 
as a neglect of their main role – to inform voters rather than to 
promise a ‘perfect match’ for ‘lazy voters’. On the occasion of the 
launch of the transnational EU Vox 2014 tool, The Economist (2014) 
has captured this problematic development in a rhetorical question: 
“But does this form of e-democracy lead to more participation in 
politics or just to the meaningless minimal-engagement that has 
become known as ’slacktivism’ or armchair activism?” 
Fossen and Anderson (2014) challenge the prevalence of the 
matching VAA model because of its basis – the normative 
conception of democracy offered by social choice theory: 
Democratic processes of decision-making, on this view, 
are a means of aggregating the preferences of individuals, 
in order to achieve outcomes that take the preferences of 
each into account in a fair way (…) In short, a well-
functioning democracy is a preference–aggregator, which 
turns individual preferences into collective policies. The 
good citizen (or, at least, the smart voter) is a savvy 
consumer, who is well informed about the options on the 
electoral menu and therefore competent to choose a political 
party that matches his or her preferences.” (authors’ 
emphasis).  
VAAs could, however, be based on alternative concepts of 
democracy – a deliberative or a contestatory one. Further 
developing the culinary metaphor, Fossen and Anderson suggest 
that a deliberative approach to VAAs should give users an 
opportunity to re-examine their own ‘political taste’ before making 
the final choice from the available ‘electoral menu’, whereas a 
contestatory approach could provide users with an opportunity to 
discuss ‘what belongs on the menu’.   
In contrast to the metaphorical approach of Fossen and 
Anderson (2014), Brighty et al. (2014) have analysed the possible 
impact of VAAs, and more specifically, that of the transnational EU 
Profiler designed for the 2009 European election on the basis of ‘a 
market analogy’. They argue that if faced with a high 
‘representative deficit’ (i.e. a high mismatch between the user’s 
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issue preferences and the parties’ offer), users of a transnational 
VAA “might be inclined to cast a vote for a party beyond their 
respective national confines”. If we go back to the culinary 
metaphor of Fossen and Anderson, we have to conclude that what 
Brighty et al. suggest is that if voters do not like the ‘electoral menu’ 
in their ‘national restaurant’, a transnational VAA could make them 
consider the opportunity to simply become a ‘party migrant’ and go 
to a ‘different restaurant’ in some other EU member state!  
One of the pioneering studies on the impact of statement 
selection on VAAs’ ability to match voters and parties (Lefevere and 
Walgrave, 2014) concludes: “Although the whole process of 
building a VAA may seem systematic and ‘scientific’ – especially if 
the calculation of the score for each party for a given user is done 
very carefully – the crucial selection of statements is mostly an 
unsystemic, not very transparent, and unreplicable process.” (authors’ 
emphasis).  
This brings us to the question about the substance of the 
electoral menu as presented in the questionnaires of the different 
transnational VAAs.  
To date, there is no comparative study on the selection of 
statements in transnational VAAs, but at least one is available on 
national VAAs. Van Camp et al. (2010) make an assessment of 
statements included in 26 different VAAs, on the one hand, on the 
basis of topicality, diversity of issues and representativeness for 
cleavages (criteria all VAA designers claim to have in mind). On the 
other hand, they study conformity of statements with four widely 
accepted standards for survey question formulation, namely that 
they should:  
• concern concrete policy choices instead of general ideological 
values; 
• should not be double-barrelled (not ask two questions); 
• should not include quantifications; 
• should avoid qualifications (add additional information). 
3.2 Transnational VAAs designed for the 2014 
European elections 
Some basic information about the four transnational VAAs is 
presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Basic features of VoteMatchEurope, euandi, EU Vox 2014 and 
Electio 2014 
VAA Operational 
in 
countries/ 
languages 
Ratio 
common/ 
national 
specific 
issues 
Visualisation Scale for 
level of 
agreement2 
Party self-
placement3 
VoteMatch 
Europe 
14 
countries4  
National 
partners 
promote the 
VAA under 
14 national 
brand 
names on 
individual 
websites in 
12 different 
languages  
20 
common 
issues 
formulated 
by 
statements 
(at least 15 
have to be 
included in 
the 
national 
VAA)  
Ca. 10 
national 
specific 
issues  
Ranking list of 
national parties  
Allows results 
to be checked in 
the other 
participating 
countries via 
the common 
website  
Three-point 
scale: 
‘Agree’–
‘neither-nor’–
‘disagree’ 
Involved 
when 
possible  
Euandi 28 countries, 
one 
common 
website in 
24 
languages 
operated 
without 
28 
common 
issues 
formulated 
as 
statements 
“Party 
Matching” 
match list that 
covers 242 
European 
parties 
“My political 
Space” (three-
Five point 
scale, from 
‘completely 
agree’ to 
‘completely 
disagree’ plus 
‘no opinion 
option’ 
Parties 
invited to 
place 
themselves 
via e-mail  
(response 
rate 55%5) 
                                                        
2 All four tools also additionally allow for weighting depending upon 
salience of the issues. 
3 Party-self placement refers to whether parties have been involved in 
placing themselves with regard to the issues included in the questionnaire 
(usually elaborated by experts) or the positions of the parties are the result 
of research conducted by the experts and covering party manifestos, official 
statements, etc. 
4 Austria (Wahlkabine); Belgium (De Stemtest); Bulgaria (Glasovoditel); 
Czechia (Volebni kalkulacka); France (Vote&Vous); Germany (Wahl-O-
Mat); Greece (VoteMatch Greece); Italy (VoteMatch Italy); Latvia (Pielaiko 
partiju); Netherlands (StemWijzer); Poland (Latarnik Wyborczy); UK 
(VoteMatch UK); Slovakia (Volebna kalkulacka); Spain (Elessiones.es);  
5 Regardless of the virtually fifty/ fifty ratio, euandi claims to be the only 
VAA tool to be based on party’s self-placement. 
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partnership 
with 
national 
institutions/ 
organisations 
2 national 
specific 
issues 
dimensional 
interactive tool 
structured 
around: 
economic left-
right; pro-anti 
EU integration; 
traditional-
liberal) 
“My political 
Europe” – 
allows 
matching with 
fellow users on 
a local, regional, 
national and 
even European 
level 
EU Vox 
2014 
28 countries 
One website 
in 24 
languages; 
provides 
access to 
national 
websites; 
promoted 
by national 
partners 
21 
common 
issues 
formulated 
as 
statements 
(6 of them 
obligatory 
for any 
national 
VAA) 
National 
specific 
issues (8 in 
the case of 
Bulgaria) 
Ranking list of 
national parties  
Two-
dimensional 
compass graph 
(political map 
going 
horizontally 
from ‘economic 
left’ to 
‘economic right’ 
and vertically 
from ‘social 
liberal’ to ‘social 
conservative’ 
Multidimension
al spider graph  
Five-point 
scale from 
‘completely 
agree’ to 
‘completely 
disagree’ plus 
‘no opinion 
option’ 
No 
involvement 
of parties 
Electio2014 28 countries 
One website 
in 24 
languages; 
operated 
without any 
cooperation 
with 
national 
partners  
20 
common 
issues 
formulated 
as 
questions; 
 
No 
national 
specific 
issues 
Allows to check 
closeness to the 
voting 
behaviour of 
individual 
Members of the 
European 
Parliament 
(MEPs), 
national parties 
and political 
groups in the 
EP  
‘In favour’ – 
‘Abstain’– 
‘Against’ 
Based on 
roll-call 
votes in the 
EP in the 
2009-2014 
period; 
Open for 
new 
candidates 
to place 
themselves 
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3.2.1 The retrospective Electio 2014 
There is an essential difference between Electio 2014, on the one 
hand, and the other three VAAs on the other.   
Electio 2014 is a purely retrospective tool, whereas the other 
three aim to refer to issues that are related to policies and/ or 
attitudes relating to future action, i.e. they aspire to be prospective. 
Electio 2014 is based on roll-call votes in the EP during the 2009-2014 
term. MEPs are voting on hundreds of items every week on both 
legislative and non-legislative issues, 
sometimes on specific paragraphs or 
amendments, and prospective VAAs can 
never be so specific. In terms of 
informativeness Electio 2014 and any other 
VoteWatch based on roll-call votes is bound to 
have greater added value than the prospective 
VAAs. Information about what MEPs are 
voting for not only allows insights into the EP’s role as co-legislator 
(a European institution that facilitates debate of the ‘political menu’ 
served by the Commission), but also into its potential to trigger 
debate about ‘what belongs on the political menu’.   
3.2.2 The prospective VoteMatchEurope, euandi and EU 
Vox 2014 
Many statements included in euandi and EU Vox 2014 are too 
vague in order to be regarded as policy proposals. Garzia et al. 
(2015) explicitly define that the 28 statements cover “a wide range 
of contemporary policy issues and political values in European politics” 
(authors’ emphasis).  
In the case of euandi, a further problem arises from the choice 
of the designers to keep as many statements as possible from the 
2009 EU Profiler, i.e. 60.7%. The longitudinal analysis of parties’ 
positions has been considered as more important than the topicality 
of the issues but because of this the euandi questionnaire cannot be 
considered as informative about the ‘electoral menu’, i.e. about 
what was at stake in the 2014 European election.    
A further striking difference is the rather low degree of 
explicit reference to the EU in euandi and EU Vox 2014. More than 
50% of the statements in these VAAs do not make any explicit 
Electio 2014 and any 
other VoteWatch based 
on roll-call votes  
is bound to have  
greater added value 
than the VAAs. 
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reference to either the national or the EU level of policymaking (see 
Table 3.2). For example, in the case of the contrast in euandi between 
issue 11 (Government spending should be reduced in order to lower 
taxes) and issue 12 (The EU should acquire its own tax raising 
powers) suggests that issue 11 should be considered as an issue of 
national policymaking rather than as an issue of EU policymaking. 
Since more than half of the issues included in euandi and EU Vox 
2014 have the same wording, this automatically disqualifies them as 
informative with regard to debate about the EU level of 
policymaking. Garzia et al. (2015) admit “the lack of concreteness on 
behalf of some of the statements” (authors’ emphasis). They offer as 
an explanation that this “represented the only way in which a 
common questionnaire of 28 statements could be fruitfully applied 
to as many as 28 different national political contexts” and go as far 
as seeing this “loss in concreteness” as something positive. The 
“high generalisability”, they claim, “makes some of the statements 
(e.g., “Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to 
accept our culture and values”, “European integration is a good 
thing”) especially useful for comparative party research. They do 
not seem to have any concerns about lack of informative value of 
these statements about the ‘electoral menu’ for the actual 2014 
European election. 
Table 3.2 Reference/lack of reference to the EU level of policymaking in 
euandi, EU Vox 2014 and VoteMatch Europe 
VAA Explicit 
reference to 
EU issues 
Explicit 
reference to a 
single 
member state 
No reference to 
either EU or a 
specific 
member state 
Euandi 45% 14.3%   53.6%   
EU Vox 2014 9.5%  33.3%  57.1%  
VoteMatch 
Europe 
95%  None 5%   
 
The different level of concreteness of the three questionnaires can be 
illustrated also by a comparison with regard to the double-barrelled 
nature of criteria and use of quantifications and qualifications (see 
Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3 Double-barrelled questions and questions with quantifications 
and qualifications6 in the common questionnaires of euandi, EU Vox 
2014 and VoteMatchEurope 
VAA Double-
barrelled 
questions 
Questions with 
explicit or 
implicit 
quantifications 
Questions 
with 
qualification 
Euandi 28.6% 53.6%  7.1% 
EU Vox 2014 19% 33.3%  9.5% 
VoteMatch Europe 5%  30%  5%  
 
The interest of the euandi and EU Vox 2014 designers has shifted 
from the original VAA purpose – to assist voters – towards a narrow 
research interest – how to profile the 
political parties in the 28 member 
states on the basis of the 
presupposition that they can be 
integrated into one pan-European 
model. Thanks to ICT, this approach 
offers attractive two- and 
multidimensional visualisation 
possibilities. But do these attractive 
visualisations provide potential 
voters with more useful and relevant information than the simple 
one-dimensional matching list? Researchers have expressed doubts 
about it. With regard to the 2009 EU Profiler, Louwerse and Otjes 
(2012) consider placing parties from different countries in one 
                                                        
6 It is not always easy to draw a line between the three categories. E.g. 
Question 12 in EU Vox 2014 “Cutting government spending is a good way 
to solve the economic crisis” can be interpreted as suffering from entailing 
both a double-barrelled nature, quantification and qualification. It 
combines in one single sentence both the formulation of a problem (open 
for both agreement and disagreement) and a proposal (likewise open for 
both agreement and disagreement) on how to resolve it. Hypothetically, 
one might agree with the formulation of the problem but disagree with the 
proposed solution in general or as a matter of degree. One might also 
disagree with the solution because of disagreement with the formulation of 
the problem. 
The interest of the euandi and 
EU Vox 2014 designers has 
shifted from the purpose to 
assist voters towards a narrow 
research interest, on the 
presupposition they can be 
integrated into one  
pan-European model. 
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model as problematic because they consider this neglects structural 
differences in the nature and the patterns of party competition in 
individual countries.  
Potential VAA users did not display any enthusiasm for the 
ICT inspired innovations of euandi and EU VOX 2014 either. The 
one-dimensional Wahl-O-Mat has been run in Germany for the 
European elections three times – in 2004, 2009 and 2014 –, the last 
time within the VoteMatch Europe project with the common 
questions at its core. The number of users that filled in the 
questionnaire is impressive: 897,000 in 2004, growing to 1,580,000 in 
2009 and reaching 3,890,000 in 2014. In contrast, in 2014, 39,744 users 
with an IP address in Germany chose to play the euandi, i.e. 99% 
less than the ones that played the Wahl-O-Mat.  
Compared to its predecessor, the 2009 EU Profiler, euandi 
demonstrated a notable decline in terms of users. Visitors to the 
website declined by 52.5% (from 2.5 million down to 1,186,744). The 
decline in unique user sessions was even more dramatic – 55.6% 
(from 900,000 down to 399,882).    
The situation with EU Vox 2014 is quite similar but still 
somehow better in absolute numbers. Out of 6.2 million users, 2.4 
million (38.7%) filled in the questionnaire. The objective of 
increasing user numbers to between 15 and 20 million was far from 
accomplished (Ramos et al., 2017). The fact that in contrast to 
euandi, EU Vox 2014 had national partners and promoters on the 
spot in the individual countries might explain part of its slightly 
higher success among potential users.   
3.3 The Bulgarian experience with “Glasovoditel” 
Glasovoditel started first (in cooperation with ProDemos, the 
designer of StemWijzer) as a platform for the general elections in 
2005. It has been run four more times for national elections and 
twice for the European elections in 2009 and 2014. Since its launch, 
Glasovoditel has partnered with the Bulgarian National Television 
(BNT) and other media outlets. Since 2013 at election time, 
Glasovoditel has been incorporated in the TV Show Referendum, a 
weekly programme for deliberative discussions on hot political 
topics between proponents and opponents. In cooperation with the 
well-established polling agency Alpha Research, Referendum 
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measures the impact of the live discussion on public opinion by 
polling a representative sample of people on the discussion topic 
both before and towards the end of the programme. In the case of 
Glasovoditel, representatives of the parties running in the elections 
are requested to vote in the studio on some of the key questions and 
have an opportunity to present their arguments for agreeing or 
disagreeing with the respective statements. The cooperation with 
BNT has proven crucial since the Referendum programme enjoys 
high popularity and is widely watched across the country. Because 
of the visibility it provides, parties and single candidates are more 
than willing to self-position themselves on the issues, something 
that has been rather problematic otherwise. Furthermore, the 
discussion in the studio allows for a much broader outreach than 
the internet tool. Online VAAs have the limitation, as observed by 
Ruusuvirta (2010), that “those who would benefit the most from the 
information in online voting advice applications are the least likely 
to seek it”. The popularity of the Referendum programme gives a 
chance to reach out to this audience. Last but not least, the format of 
Referendum goes beyond the intriguing “matching” component.  
For the EP elections in 2014, six out of the 31 Glasovoditel 
questions have been chosen. On three occasions the 18 registered 
candidates (parties and independent candidates), divided into three 
groups, had an opportunity to present and defend their positions. 
For the first round on April 29 Alpha Research polled the level of 
informedness about the election 
platforms of the parties and 
candidates. The shift was 
remarkable. Ahead of the discussion 
36.7% felt well informed compared to 
48.5% after the discussion (+11.8%).  
The deliberative element that 
should play a more central role in any VAA endeavour has been 
important throughout all phases of Glasovoditel as part of the 
VoteMatchEurope project. The national coordinators meetings 
within which the common list of 20 statements was elaborated were 
highly appreciated by all participants as a deliberative opportunity 
to Europeanise debates.    
The deliberative element that 
should play a more key role in 
any VAA endeavour has been 
appreciated as an opportunity 
to Europeanise debates. 
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Conclusions 
O’Neill (2002) has suggested that increasing transparency and the 
level of information available to voters does not automatically lead 
to increased trust in authority and politics in general.  
One way in which political actors respond to the lack of trust 
is by surrendering much of their claim to authority (Raz, 1986). The 
main idea is that neither parties nor politicians but the people 
themselves take the decisions, while the ‘authority’ only provides an 
infrastructure for the expression of the popular will. Transparency, 
together with internal democracy, is a key element of the public 
ritual of surrendering the claim to authority. Examples of such 
rituals are the following: 
• In political parties: introduction of full transparency of 
funding and advanced forms of internal democracy, such as 
primaries and online consultations with members on all 
major topics; 
• In parliaments: a movement towards ‘open parliaments’; 
• In expert bodies: online coverage of the meetings and setting 
up of consultative ‘citizen councils’, monitoring their 
performance. 
This chapter has explored one further instrument – the VAA – 
which could be understood as handing more power to the voter. 
Political parties are turned into transparent menus of policy options 
among which the rational voter makes an informed choice. In 
essence, the VAAs create a perception that the voter is in the driving 
seat of politics: that parties and 
politicians are not authorities but just 
mediators and transmitters of the 
voters’ will. 
This picture may be actually 
misleading. First, VAAs are by no 
means an instrument for all voters but 
mostly for those who are anyhow 
ready to invest time and effort in acquiring political information. 
From the perspective of outreach, it is doubtful / debatable that 
VAAs mobilise voters who otherwise would not vote. Secondly, 
VAAs are designed to stress the substantive differences between the 
programmes of the parties. This means they could either exaggerate 
VAAs create a perception  
that the voter is in the 
driving seat of politics: that 
parties and politicians are 
just transmitters of the 
voters’ will. 
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the importance of relatively minor policy differences or jump into 
the realm of abstract moral/political attitudes and values with 
tenuous links to concrete political choices. In short, they may 
produce differences where there are none in place and exacerbate 
value and identity-based divides. Third, VAAs, in order to be more 
effective, need to be combined with more traditional media like TV. 
In this way VAAs achieve broader coverage and reach groups (the 
elderly and less educated) that are otherwise left beyond their 
scope. With the development of online media this dependence may 
decrease, but it still has a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
VAAs.  
In the construction of a theory on the interplay between trust, 
openness and transparency in democracy, a distinction may be 
drawn between ‘trust in authority’ and ‘trust in mediators’. The 
authority is supposed to take a decision, while the mediator is 
supposed to transmit and express a decision taken by somebody 
else. Many contemporary political/governance bodies change their 
claim: they do not publicly claim authority but just to be mediators 
of decisions taken by the public.   
VAAs could be seen as an aspect of the transition from 
decision-making authorities to mediators. An actor may not be 
trusted to take a decision himself (to be an authority) but could be 
trusted as a more accurate mediator of public attitudes and deeply 
held convictions, whatever they may be. 
Certainly, the substitution of ‘the claim to authority’ with a 
‘claim to mediation’ does not eliminate the need for authority in 
public life. On the contrary, politicians and expert bodies continue 
to act as decision-makers. But the logic of public justification of these 
decisions is changed mainly in two directions. First, decision-
makers receive the opportunity to ‘hide’ beyond the will of the 
people. Second, pseudo-authorities emerge as social-network 
groups and pundits. As to the second, the self-organisation of civil 
society through social networks and the Internet has proven 
extremely vulnerable to manipulation by powerful commercial and 
political groups (as the Cambridge Analytica scandal shows). 
The critical assessment of the purpose of the four 
transnational VAAs designed for the 2014 EP elections and of the 
informative value of the questionnaires as the core element of their 
design does not support expectations that they might provide a 
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remedy for problems such as low trust in parties and politicians or 
low turnout in elections. The potential for any success of VAAs lies 
primarily in their use as tools addressing the ‘information deficit’ 
on policies.   
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4. EU PARLIAMENTARY 
DEMOCRACY: HOW 
REPRESENTATIVE?  
SOPHIA RUSSACK 
To what extent does the European Parliament really represent EU 
citizens? This chapter first briefly introduces the most crucial 
characteristics of the EP (with regards to its internal organisation, its 
rights and tasks, as well as the electoral procedure), and then highlights the 
most important differences between the EP and its national counterparts: 
how national parties translate into European groupings; the 
(dis)connection between the European executive and legislative branches; 
and electoral (dis)connections. Finally, it investigates the idea for 
institutional reform introduced to improve the representative character of 
the EP – the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. It finds that the attempt to 
transform the EU (as a hybrid sui generis entity) into a fullfledged 
parliamentary system does not make the EP a better representative of the 
EU electorate.   
Introduction 
EU integration is occurring against a background of established 
constitutional democracies (Fossum, 2015, p. 802). Therefore, 
representative democracy in a multi-level governance EU involves 
the national as well the EU level. To analyse the state of European 
democracy, both the national parliaments of the respective EU 
member states as well as the European Parliament (EP) need to be 
considered.  
National parliaments are affected by the development of a 
system of representation at the EU level (Fossum, 2015, p. 802). 
Their role in the process of European integration has changed over 
time and while they have always been responsible for holding their 
own national governments to account, since Lisbon they have also 
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been able to become more actively involved in EU decision-making. 
Next to the importance of national parliaments in the realm of EU 
democracy, the EU has established a system of democratic 
governing institutions at the European level, with the EP as the first 
and only directly elected supranational assembly in the world (Hix 
& Høyland, 2013, p. 171). While national parliaments and their 
involvement in EU affairs are investigated in the other contributions 
in this volume, this chapter focuses on their European counterpart. 
The point of departure is the assumption that the EP has a 
very different institutional ‘DNA’ compared to national 
parliaments. Observers should therefore not base their assessment 
of the EP and its democratic character on the same criteria as for 
national parliaments. The EU treaties prescribe that “the European 
Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s 
citizens” (Article 14 TEU). But how representative are the members 
of the EP and the institution as a whole? 
4.1 The EU’s representative democracy: the 
European Parliament 
4.1.1 Internal organisation 
The current Parliament consists of 751 seats, which is the maximum 
prescribed by the EU treaties, with a minimum of six and a 
maximum of 96 parliamentarians representing a single member 
state (Article 14 TEU, the exact distribution is regulated by a Council 
decision).1 Although MEPs are elected on their nationality, once 
elected and inside the EP, different dynamics are in play: they are 
organised in ‘political groups’, which are structured according to 
political orientation, not nationality. These political groups (mostly) 
correspond to the traditional left-right divide and are home to the 
parties elected at member state level. In the current 8th European 
Parliament, we find the European People’s party (EPP) as the 
traditional centre-right block, which comprises most European 
Christian Democrats and conservative parties; the traditional 
centre-left block which brings together European labour parties, 
Socialists and Social Democrats (S&D); the Alliance of Liberals and 
                                                        
1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 
32013D0312&from=EN  
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Democrats for Europe (ALDE); the European Greens/European 
Free Alliance, as well as the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left (GUE/NGL). Besides these five ‘established’ groups, the EP 
also includes party groups widely considered as Eurosceptic: the 
quite radical Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and 
the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF); as well as the more 
mildly Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). 
These political groups tend to be (to varying degrees) critical of the 
EU’s (supranational) powers or nostalgic for the protective role of 
the sovereign nation-state, although we also find such positions to 
the left of the spectrum. Differing attitudes towards EU integration, 
migration and national identity generate deep divides between 
these parties (von Ondarza & Schenuit, 2018, p. 6). 
The political groups are affiliated to so-called Europarties, i.e. 
transnational, extra-parliamentary federations of national political 
parties from several EU member states, united by political affinity. 
The Europarties and the political groups cooperate closely with one 
another, though they are not identical.2 Their relation to each other 
is similar to that of the parties and parliamentary factions at the 
national level. 
These political groups never display the same degree of party 
discipline as is customary at national level. We know that some 
groups show more party discipline (such as the EPP), some groups 
show less (VoteWatch). When it comes to MEPs’ decision-making, 
different dynamics are in play: not only the party affiliation, but also 
personal preference, nationality, as well as institutional interest all 
have an impact on voting behaviour. The coalitions are thus less 
rigid at the EU level. 
The EP’s long road to becoming co-legislators  
In terms of legislative agency and the power of democratic 
oversight, the European Parliament has undergone a remarkable 
development since its first elections in 1979. With every treaty 
change it has extended its competences and thereby developed from 
the “toothless Assembly” of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (which was consulted but could easily be ignored) to 
an genuine co-legislator with the Council in almost all policy areas, 
                                                        
2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/eu_parties_status.html  
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holding significant budgetary powers (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 
172). At the very beginning of European integration, only the 
Council and the Commission had decision-making powers, 
whereas the ‘Common Assembly’ (composed of 78 appointed 
parliamentarians drawn from the nine founding member states), 
which at its first session in 1958 renamed itself the ‘European 
Parliamentary Assembly’, only possessed advisory competences.3 
Therefore, the institutional balance used to rest only on the 
Commission-Council tandem and for a long time the EP had little 
relevance in the policymaking process (Wallace, 1985, p. 328).  
Subsequent changes from a bipartite to a tripartite system 
were mainly due to several rounds of treaty revision: with the Single 
European Act in 1987, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the legislative procedure was 
adapted, from the initial one of consultation then developing into 
co-decision. Neither the Nice Treaty, in 2003, nor the Lisbon Treaty, 
in 2009, introduced any major changes to the powers of the 
Parliament in the EU legislative process, but the Lisbon Treaty 
established co-decision as the new “ordinary legislative procedure” 
of the EU, which is now used for all areas of EU legislation. The 
Lisbon Treaty also introduced a unified budgetary procedure, 
under which the Parliament co-decides on the entire annual budget 
(Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 173). 
Besides the increased awareness of the need for a directly 
elected body at EU level, two further aspects led to an increase in 
the EP’s power. First, the collapse of the Santer Commission in 1999 
significantly damaged the standing of the institution and forced it 
to become engaged in a “self-conscious period of soul-searching 
about what its future role in the institutional balance should be” 
(Cram, 2002, p. 310). This has led to stronger parliamentary control 
over the Commission, with the aim of providing it with democratic 
accountability. Second, the increased application of QMV in the 
Council called for stronger parliamentary control: since the member 
states could find themselves in a situation in which they had been 
                                                        
3 On 30 March 1962, the Assembly changed its name to ‘European 
Parliament’. See J. Jacqué, “Parlement européen”, Répertoire communautaire 
Dalloz, December 2011, Art. 2. 
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outvoted, the demand for democratic legitimacy through the 
Parliament increased (Devuyst, 2008, p. 303).  
What instruments does the EP have to control the (quasi) 
executive? 
Not only has the EP been strengthened as an institution, the ties 
between the Commission and the EP were tightened to reinforce 
democratic control over the executive and to provide it with 
legitimacy: when entering office, the Parliament screens candidate 
Commissioners and approves the College of Commissioners 
(Article 17(7) TEU); during its term the EP has the capacity to hold 
the Commission to account by posing parliamentary questions 
(oral, written and ‘question time’) (Article 230 TFEU). Furthermore, 
Commissioners and the High Representative are obliged to report 
regularly to the EP and appear before committees. Ultimately, the 
Parliament even has the power to issue a no confidence vote against 
the Commission and thereby force it to step down collectively 
(Article 17 TEU and Article 234 TFEU). 
Still missing: the right of initiative 
Despite the significant increase in power in terms of legislative 
procedure and budgetary questions, as well as in exercising control 
over the executive, the EP lacks a central conventional 
parliamentary prerogative: the right of initiative, the right to 
propose new legislation. According to the treaties, the sole right to 
initiate legislative proposals lies with the European Commission 
(Article 17(2) TEU). Special rights of initiative for other institutions 
and the High Representative only apply in certain specific cases. 
The Parliament has an ‘indirect right of initiative’, with the right to 
invite the Commission to propose legislation, which, however, does 
not create an obligation on the Commission to do so. At the national 
level, both governments and parliaments are authorised to propose 
legislation. At the EU level, this right was granted to the 
Commission alone so that Community law-making would be more 
likely to arise out of the general interest, rather than that of specific 
member states, so as to avoid the dominance of larger member states 
(Devuyst, 2008, p. 252). Despite this solid reason, the non-existent 
right to propose new laws constitutes the most significant lack of EP 
power compared to national parliaments.  
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4.1.2 Elections 
Electoral system 
An important step in the empowerment of the EP were the first 
direct elections in 1979, which aimed to establish a ‘European’ 
electoral dimension to directly represent voters at European level, 
rather than only indirectly through their respective national 
governments (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1530). Nevertheless, there are still 
great weaknesses, as there is no uniform electoral rule for the 
Parliament. MEPs are elected from national lists, according to each 
country’s election laws, and national political parties have kept an 
iron grip on the electoral process. The EU treaties prescribe that the 
EP elections shall be held “in accordance with a uniform procedure 
in all Member States” (Art. 223 TFEU). However, the only obligation 
for member states is to use some form of proportional electoral 
system. Besides that, it is very much at the discretion of member 
states how exactly MEPs are elected. Regarding the ballot structure 
intra-party seat allocation, about half of the member states use an 
open list proportional representation or single transferable vote 
(candidate-centred system), the other half uses closed-list 
proportional representation (party-centred system) (Høyland, 
Hobolt, & Hix, 2019, p. 6). In 
candidate-centred systems voters 
can choose between candidates from 
the same political party. On the 
contrary, party-centred systems 
only allow voters to choose between 
pre-ordered lists of candidates 
presented by parties. As a result of this diversity in electoral laws 
and organisation, the EP elections can be described as 28 national 
elections rather than a transnational contest (Grabbe & Lehne, 2019). 
In order to change this, the idea to introduce so-called transnational 
lists have been floated. Such a list would contain candidates to be 
elected in a single constituency formed from the whole territory of 
the European Union. This would facilitate voting for candidates 
across member states and effectively give citizens two votes: one for 
their national or regional constituency, and the other for the EU writ 
large. First brought before the EP plenary in 2011, this proposal has 
repeatedly failed to obtain majority support. The latest failure was 
The diversity in electoral laws 
and organisation means that 
the EP elections are 28 
national elections rather than 
a transnational contest. 
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in 2018,4 meaning there is no transnational list for the 2019 EP 
elections. However, the idea probably will be put back on the table 
prior to the elections in 2024, as it is keenly supported by French 
President Emmanuel Macron and even backed by German 
Chancellor Merkel.5 
Second order national elections 
A dominant paradigm of research into EP elections is that they are 
of a ‘second order’ compared to national elections (Boomgaarden, 
Johann, & Kritzinger, 2016, p. 130). First, the turnout is generally 
lower; second, fringe and new parties (often Eurosceptic parties at 
the left and right ends of the spectrum) do better; third, government 
parties and established parties do worse; fourth, the issues at stake 
are usually national ones and the political actors dominating the 
electoral campaign are often national politicians not in fact standing 
for election. Finally, there is 
generally lower media attention 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2016, p. 130). 
These trends can be explained by 
three main issues. First, there is less 
at stake in European elections, 
which results in less politicised 
campaigns and less voter 
engagement. Second, because there 
is less at stake, voters vote more 
sincerely and have less incentive to 
vote strategically, which results in 
voting with the ‘heart’ (or ‘feet’) instead of the ‘head’. Third, 
national parties in government are punished because they tend to 
disappoint voters more than parties in opposition. The second order 
character of the elections; the grand coalition of the two biggest 
political camps; as well as the expansion of the power of the EP over 
                                                        
4 https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/ep-votes-against-
transnational-lists/  
5 “To put in place transnational lists for European elections as of 2024” is 
one of the agreed points of the Meseberg declaration of 19 June 2018: 
https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-
de/meta/startseite/meseberg-declaration-1140806  
The second-order character of 
the elections; the grand 
coalition of the two biggest 
political camps; and the 
expansion of the power of the 
EP are the three trends that 
have influenced the internal 
politics of the EP and the 
position of the Parliament in 
the EU’s institutional 
structure since 1979. 
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time are the three trends that have influenced the internal politics of 
the EP and the position of the parliament in the EU’s institutional 
structure since 1979 (Christiansen, 2016). 
Trend development: 2014 and 2019 elections 
The 2014 EP elections were expected to be different, because of the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidate) procedure 
(see section 4) and the fact that the sovereign debt crisis had made 
EU politics and governance issues more salient to the public. Yet, 
these European topics were still discussed from a national angle, 
and a ‘European perspective’ was lacking (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1534). 
Therefore, the results were not so different from those of previous 
election rounds: turnout hit an all-time low (42.6%), governing 
parties did not do well, and Eurosceptic parties made major gains. 
Neither the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten process, nor the 
increased politicisation around the EU, did much to change the 
second order nature of EP elections (Van der Brug, Gattermann, & 
De Vreese, 2016, p. 6).  
With regard to the 2019 EP elections, hopes have again been 
voiced that the current challenges (e.g. the refugee crisis and Brexit) 
will make EU affairs more salient for European voters. While this 
might hold true, it most likely will not have the effect that some wish 
for, i.e. that European voters become more substantially engaged 
with EU topics. In line with the second order argument, voters at 
best use the election to punish their national governments for 
actions related to those crises, rather than becoming engaged with 
the substance and the type of decisions that are taken by the EU 
institutions.  
4.2 The EP and national parliaments: different 
institutional ‘DNA’ 
As the other contributions in this volume show, the institutional 
design of parliaments varies widely. However, there are certain 
common standards. So, what marks the EP out, compared to 
(diverse) national parliaments? What makes the institutional (and 
political) difference? 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  53 
 
4.2.1 National parties and Europarties  
As explained in the previous section, Europarties and the 
corresponding political groups in the EP are an assembly of many 
national parties, rather than genuine transnational parties. These 
party groups have hardly any visibility 
for voters at the national level. When 
organising their campaigns, the national 
parties do not make much effort to 
change that or to explain how votes 
translate from the national to the EU 
level, because they campaign more 
successfully under their name and logo, 
which has presence and visibility among their respective 
electorates. As gaining as many seats and thereby as much influence 
as possible is the main driving force of parties, they have no 
incentive to relate to distant and broadly unknown EU politics.  
Second, the EP elections are not so relevant for national elites. 
The question of who will sit in the next national government will 
always be more important. Therefore, much less time and effort 
(and money) is invested in campaigns for EP elections than national 
ones (Grabbe & Lehne, 2019). The greatest perceived value of 
European elections is as a midterm poll for national elections, which 
is why national politicians campaign on domestic policy platforms. 
Hence, national political elites, in particular the national parties, 
have been unwilling to contribute to creating a pan-European 
democratic space (Grabbe & Lehne, 2019). 
Third, there seems to be a growing disconnect between 
national parties and the Europarties/political families, which 
makes it even more difficult for voters to understand the translation 
from national to EU level. According to the second order national 
elections paradigm, parties on the fringes (particularly Eurosceptic 
parties) in general perform better in European than in national 
elections, despite recent successes in some member states. However, 
for those parties it is often unclear which group they will join (or 
create) until after the elections. Eurosceptics in particular have 
reshuffled their groups in every legislative term so far, making it 
more difficult for voters to understand Europarties and the 
functioning of the EP in a broader sense. The established party 
Europarties and the 
corresponding political 
groups in the EP are an 
assembly of national 
parties rather than genuine 
transnational parties. 
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groups deliver more stability but, as argued above, not even these 
campaign in the name of the group. 
4.2.2 (Dis)connection between the executive and 
legislative  
Executive power being at stake is a key motivator for voting for a 
legislature. On the national level, the power balance in the 
parliament determines the composition of the government. At EU 
level, the EP is not constituted in an ‘government-opposition’ 
formation. Up until 2014 (and the debut of the Spitzenkandidaten 
procedure) there was no connection whatsoever between the 
outcome of the EP elections and the composition of the executive, 
the European Commission. What is primarily at stake is who will sit 
in the European Parliament, not who will ‘govern’.  
We find coalition building among the political groups. These 
coalitions, however, do not translate into the constitution of an 
executive but are instead ad hoc coalitions to pass legislation. The 
Commission cannot rely on majorities in the EP in the same way 
that national governments can rely on their parliamentary 
majorities, as arrangements are always on a case-by-case basis 
(Christiansen, 2016, p. 1001). 
In the past, the so-called grand coalition of the EPP and S&D 
always succeeded in obtaining a majority of seats, meaning that 
these two were able to pass legislation on their own. Furthermore, 
they traditionally shared the EU’s political and administrative top 
jobs among each other. This is predicted to change in the 2019 
elections: according to polls,6 the two big parties will need a third 
force (the ‘kingmaker’) to make decisions. In a more fragmented EP, 
with a Eurosceptic ‘opposition’, coalition building will be more 
important in the post-grand-coalition period that will follow the 
2019 elections. 
4.2.3 Electoral (dis)connection 
The EP is a legislature with (potentially) competing principles 
(Koop): the national and EU arenas. As Hix finds in his comparison 
to the House of Representatives in the US system of government, 
                                                        
6 See for instance https://pollofpolls.eu/EU  
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unlike in national parliaments, in the EP there is no powerful 
“electoral connection” (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 184). 
Usually (that is in national electoral systems) voters are able 
to hold incumbents accountable for their actions (Van der Brug et 
al., 2016, p. 1). On the EU level, however, things are different, as the 
national arena remains the dominant factor in the re-election of 
MEPs. Election and re-election have little to do with the (legislative) 
behaviour of individual MEPs inside the European Parliament, or 
the performance of the EU as a whole, but rather depend on the 
position of the MEPs’ national party in 
the domestic arena (such as the party’s 
governing status, the timing of the 
European Parliament election in the 
national electoral cycle, and the 
performance of the national 
government) (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 
184). Voters use the elections to either 
express support for a national party or 
use them to punish the national government (Van der Brug et al., 
2016, p. 1). On the flip-side, that means that there is a discrepancy 
between the elections and the (legislative) work of MEPs. They are 
unlikely to be punished or rewarded for their (legislative) actions 
inside the EP, which means that they are hardly accountable to the 
EU electorate. 
Along the line of this general trend, the electoral laws of 
individual member states affect how present and visible the MEPs 
are for their constituencies, deriving from differences in ballot 
structure and electoral systems (a candidate-centred versus a party-
centred approach). If we assume that re-election is the dominant 
goal of legislators in the EP and career ambition, if not the only 
factor, is an important one in shaping parliamentary behaviour, we 
can see that some MEPs are more motivated to reach out to their 
respective constituencies than others. And that is for the following 
reason: due to the low salience of EP elections, voters are largely 
unaware of the day-to-day activities of MEPs and therefore need to 
be convinced by candidate characteristics and campaign activities 
(Høyland et al., 2019, p. 6). Therefore, MEPs in candidate-centred 
systems are more likely to spend time in their constituencies (and 
less on legislative activities) as there is a greater need to spend time 
Election and re-election 
have little to do with the 
(legislative) behaviour of 
individual MEPs, but 
depend on the position of 
the MEPs’ national party 
in the domestic arena. 
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developing a constituency profile to ensure re-election. Party 
leaderships, on the contrary, take notice of politicians’ legislative 
activity, less so of their performance in their constituencies. In party-
centred systems, politicians have less interest to spend time in their 
constituencies, because it matters little for re-election; rather they 
need to remain on good terms with the party so as to be put on the 
list again (Høyland et al., 2019, p. 2). 
Hence, we find a lack of an electoral connection to the 
European Parliament. This prevents a genuine accountability of the 
EP to the EU electorate and raises doubts about the representative 
character of members of European Parliament. 
4.3 The Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidate) 
procedure  
To make the EP elections more genuinely ‘European’ by facilitating 
campaigns around European issues and steered by European 
politicians is a permanent, seemingly unreachable, goal. Many ideas 
to go beyond the second order/national election model have been 
floated, such as the above-mentioned transnational list, attempts to 
increase the visibility of European political parties, or the 
harmonisation of electoral practices across member states.7 One 
novelty in the recent past was the introduction of the 
Spitzenkandidaten system. For the 2014 elections, most party groups 
appointed Spitzenkandidaten (German for lead candidate) agreeing 
that the candidate of the party group winning the most seats in the 
elections would become the president of the European Commission. 
Up until then, the European Council nominated this candidate 
behind closed doors. In 2014, according to the Spitzenkandidaten 
procedure, the votes of the citizens translated (indirectly) into 
choosing who would become the president of the Commission – 
meaning executive power was at stake for the first time in EP 
elections. 
                                                        
7 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-union-of-
democratic-change/file-reform-of-the-electoral-law-of-the-eu  
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This procedure is copied from national parliamentary 
systems (in particular the German example), in which the citizens 
do not directly elect the head of state, but instead the members of 
parliament – who in turn elect the head of 
the executive. To give some electoral 
certainty, the respective parties announce 
the candidates to head their respective 
lists with the promise that this person 
would be chosen as head of government 
in the event of electoral victory. The lead 
candidate procedure is a good example of 
a national institutional practice that has 
been applied to the EU level in the 
expectation of similar positive effects, 
while ignoring the different setting of the EU. In other words, the 
lead candidate procedure exemplifies the different institutional 
DNA of the European Parliament. 
4.3.1 Expectation  
By aiming to make executive power the prize in the EP elections, the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure seeks to raise awareness for those 
elections and European issues in general. The idea is that the 
different candidates launch a pan-European election campaign in 
order to introduce themselves to citizens in all member states and 
present the position of their EU-level political groups (Schulze, 
2016, p. 24). The personalisation of candidates can generally (that is 
at national level) enhance elections by informing and mobilising 
voters. This was also expected to happen with the EP election: the 
nomination of Spitzenkandidaten was expected to personalise the EP 
election campaign and then in turn boost voter turnout (Schulze, 
2016, p. 24). It has been suggested that open and rival candidacies 
for the position of Commission president would liven up the 
electoral competition and “allow a greater connection between 
voters” preferences and the EU institutions (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, 
p. 553). In short, the aim was to increase the stakes of the European 
elections and personalise European politics, thereby increasing 
voter turnout and ultimately strengthening democratic (input) 
legitimacy. 
The lead candidate 
procedure is a good example 
of a national institutional 
practice that has been 
applied to the EU level in 
the expectation of similar 
positive effects, while 
ignoring the different 
setting of the EU. 
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4.3.2 Effect 
However, this system did not have any tangible effect. As 
mentioned above, voter turnout hit an all-time low and research has 
shown that voters were largely unaware of a) the lead candidate 
system as such (i.e. that their vote indirectly translated into the 
choice of Commission president) and b) the individual candidates, 
particularly outside their own home countries (Hobolt, 2014).8 The 
awareness of indirect support for one candidate was highest in 
Luxembourg, France and Germany and (74.8%, 63.3% and 60% 
respectively). Awareness was significantly lower in northern and 
eastern countries (35.2% on average), with the lowest level of 
knowledge in the UK, at 13.9%. Unsurprisingly, this study shows 
that knowledge of specific candidates was highest in the home 
countries of the (key) candidates: about 55% of voters in 
Luxembourg and 25% in Germany and Belgium could name one or 
more candidates. However, in the other member states the average 
was 8.2%. Again, the UK took the rear with only 1.1% of voters being 
able to recognise a candidate.9 
No true competition 
The debates around key policy issues (such as migration) were not 
shaped by the lead candidates, but rather by anti-establishment and 
Eurosceptic parties (Hobolt, 2014, pp. 1536–1537). “Neither pre-
election campaigning nor post-election decision-making delivered 
greater party-political competition or a genuine choice between 
rival political programmes” (Christiansen, 2016, p. 1007). Instead, 
the 2014 elections perpetuated the long-term trend of close 
cooperation between pro-integrationist parties at the centre of the 
political spectrum.  
                                                        
8 Based on an AECR-commissioned post-election survey in 15 member 
states, where voters and non-voters were asked directly after the elections 
about the degree of awareness of the political parties and candidates at the 
European level. Found in (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1536). 
9 These low numbers for the UK are partly explainable by the opposition of 
all three main British parties to the lead candidate system and their refusal 
to let the candidates campaign (Christiansen, 2016). 
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No good campaign 
Candidates were more prone to campaign in countries where they 
were already known, and where it was hoped their appearance 
would have a positive effect on the electorate (Schmitt, Hobolt, & 
Popa, 2015). Furthermore, bigger member states were in higher 
demand, as the population size matters in terms of campaigning: 
the bigger the country, the more seats in the EP up for grabs. 
Germany by far, but also France and Belgium were therefore the 
most attractive countries to campaign in (Christiansen, 2016). 
Furthermore, studies on visibility and media coverage for the 
candidates have shown that the media did not promote the system: 
the EP elections were in general not very present and the 
Spitzenkandidaten appeared more as a “side issue” (Schulze, 2016).  
So, the Spitzenkandidaten system had no positive effect on 
turnout, nor on the second order national election character of the 
EP elections. It therefore proved unable to improve either the 
representativeness or accountability of the EP. Hence, the system is 
no democratic success; the only effect it triggered was institutional 
in nature, as the EP successfully enhanced its own influence in 
selecting the Commission president and therefore slightly altered 
the EU’s interinstitutional dynamic (Hobolt, 2014). In the 2019 
election campaign, most political groups have selected a candidate 
to campaign across Europe. However, the system seems to have lost 
its momentum. It is significantly weakened institutionally 
compared to last time because one of most important political 
groups, ALDE, is not participating while one of the most important 
EU leaders, Macron, is not supporting it. Ironically, both are 
intertwined.  
Assessment 
The Spitzenkandidaten system implicitly promotes the 
‘parliamentarisation’ of the EU and a federal model of European 
democracy, in which the EP receives a democratic mandate from the 
electorate to select the executive – and the ultimately hold the 
executive accountable. Hence, the Spitzenkandidaten system was an 
attempt to build a quasi-parliamentary system (Hobolt, 2015, 1537). 
The EU, however, is not a genuine parliamentary system. The 
institutional setup of the EU as a hybrid polity entails structural 
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limitations in which key areas of decision-making remain in the 
hands of national governments as “constituent actors” (Fabbrini, 
2015, p. 573). Therefore, the Commission is in no way the 
‘parliamentary government’ that advocates of the Spitzenkandidaten 
process had expected. A parliamentary government implies 
political fusion and institutional interdependence between the 
legislature and the executive (Fabbrini, 2015, 532). 
The Spitzenkandidaten system does not really help to close the 
gap between the legislative and the executive branches, also because 
the system itself is institutionally 
illogical: the procedure only extends to 
the Commission president, not to the 
whole executive – the appointment of the 
other members of the college follows a 
different logic: even if the president 
attributes their portfolios, they are 
selected by their respective national 
governments. Another institutional 
‘flaw’, which exemplifies further the gap between the legislative 
and executive, is the fact that the candidates that run for 
Commission presidency are not required to stand for EP elections. 
The Lisbon Treaty even excludes this option by stating that 
members of the college are not allowed to hold any other offices 
(Art. 245 TFEU). The parliamentary status of the executive’s 
members is, however, a “crucial tenet of the parliamentary model” 
(Fabbrini, 2015, p. 578). A further key element for a genuine 
parliamentary democracy is that voters should be able to assess the 
performance of individual MEPs, which is hardly the case at the EU 
level, as this analysis has shown.  
Conclusion  
In an attempt to ascertain the state of representative democracy at 
the European level, this chapter investigated the European 
Parliament by looking into the main institutional differences 
compared to national parliaments, and the Spitzenkanididaten 
procedure as a way to elect the president of the European 
Commission. 
Despite lacking a right of initiative, the European Parliament 
has expanded its scope of responsibility enormously, obtaining 
The Spitzenkandidaten 
system does not really help 
to close the gap between 
the legislative and the 
executive branches, also 
because the system is 
institutionally illogical. 
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significant powers regarding the EU budget, law-making, as well as 
control over the executive. And despite the growing importance of 
this institution, the elections to the European Parliament continue 
to suffer from the traditional second-order national election 
phenomenon, which is characterised by low turnout and 
notoriously little interest in European issues and European 
politicians. This is a trend which has held since the very first direct 
elections in 1979 and, drawing on the experience of 2014, there 
seems little chance the 2019 elections will be any different, as neither 
more salient issues (such as the sovereign debt or migration crises) 
nor the Spitzenkandidaten procedure have appeared to have any 
significant impact. 
The EP’s DNA is significantly different to that of national 
parliaments. Above all, the missing links between first, national 
parties and Europarties and second, the EU’s legislative and 
executive, and third, MEPs and their constituencies create a major 
gap between the EP and EU citizens. This gap is so wide that it 
prevents the EP from properly representing the European 
electorate.  
The Spitzenkandidaten system was introduced to improve the 
representative character of the EP, but has remained without effect 
as it has not increased the visibility of EP elections or created a 
greater electoral connection. Its lack of success further exemplifies 
the yawning gap between the EU and its citizens. Mechanisms such 
as the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, and more generally the attempt 
to ‘parliamentarise’ the EU (a hybrid sui generis entity), do not do 
justice to the sophisticated institutional structure of the EU and 
therefore do not make the EP a better representative of the EU 
electorate.  
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5. THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF 
EU AFFAIRS IN AUSTRIA’S 
PARLIAMENT 
STEFAN SCHALLER, PAUL SCHMIDT & 
SUSAN MILFORD-FABER 
In Austria, the Europeanisation of the national political debate is a lengthy 
process. This also holds true for the parliamentary dimension. The two 
chambers of parliament in principle have a strong say in EU matters, but 
only partially make use of it. First and foremost, it is the governmental 
majority that defines the country’s European agenda.  Nevertheless, in 
recent years, parliament has positioned itself as a guardian of subsidiarity 
and bridged the gap between the national and the European level by 
strengthening interparliamentarian cooperation and granting members of 
the European Parliament the right to speak in dedicated sessions. Yet more 
effort, resources and confidence are needed to raise its level of involvement 
and to demonstrate to citizens the impact an active national parliament can 
have in shaping the European integration process. 
5.1 Parliament after the 2017 national elections 
The Austrian Parliament has two chambers, which jointly represent 
the legislative power, the National Council (Nationalrat) and the 
Federal Council (Bundesrat). The National Council consists of 183 
members, elected by the people for a term of five years. Its main task 
is legislation. The Federal Council represents state interests on a 
federal level and to this end participates in legislation. It is currently 
composed of 61 members who are elected by the provincial diets 
(Landtage) for the duration of the legislative period of the province 
concerned. Its composition may thus change after every provincial 
diet election.  The Federal Assembly consists of the members of the 
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two chambers and meets every six years for the swearing-in of the 
federal president.1 
Parliament exercises political,2 legal3 and financial4 control 
over the executive power. As the government is usually supported 
by a majority of members of parliament, the control function is 
mainly exercised by the opposition. On behalf of the National 
Council, the Court of Audit monitors the financial management of 
the government, enterprises under its control and other entities.5 
The Ombudsman Board investigates alleged or suspected 
grievances and abuses on the part of the administration and submits 
annual activity reports to the National and Federal Council.6 
In the latest parliamentary elections in October 2017, the 
conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) received 31.5% of the 
votes (+ 7.5pp compared to 2013), second came the Social Democrats 
(SPÖ) with 26.9% (same as 2013) while the right-wing Freedom 
Party (FPÖ) could gain support of 26.0% (+ 5.5pp) of voters. The 
liberal NEOS could reach 5.3% (+ 0.3pp). With the Liste Pilz7 (4.4%), 
which split up from the Green Party, a new political force entered 
parliament, while the Greens failed to pass the threshold needed to 
be represented in the National Council. Following these elections, 
the grand coalition of SPÖ und ÖVP, in power for nearly 11 years, 
was replaced by a coalition of ÖVP and FPÖ.  
                                                        
1 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/NRBRBV/. 
2 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/KONTR/POL/. 
3 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/KONTR/RECHT/index.shtml 
4 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/KONTR/FIN/. 
5 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/KONTR/RH/. 
6 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/KONTR/VA/. 
7 In December 2018, the Liste Pilz changed its name into JETZT – Liste Pilz. 
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Figure 5.1 Seats in the National Council 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Seats in the Federal Council 
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The 2017 election results8 reflect a shift in the political spectrum 
towards right-wing and conservative parties. A post-election 
analysis of SORA9 showed significant differences in voting 
behaviour: both the ÖVP and SPÖ performed better among older 
voters while the FPÖ and Greens were stronger among the young. 
Among blue-collar workers, the FPÖ came in first, among white-
collar workers and self-employed persons the ÖVP. The same is true 
for voters with a secondary school diploma or university education. 
While nearly two-thirds of voters in rural regions voted for ÖVP 
and FPÖ, the SPÖ was strongest in provincial capitals and Vienna. 
5.2 European dimension of the national parliament 
The legal framework for parliament’s participation in EU matters is 
defined in the Federal Constitution, the EU treaties,10 the rules of 
procedure of the National11 and Federal Council12 and the Federal 
Act on Information in EU matters.13  
Constitutional law gives the National and Federal Council the 
right to be fully informed in due time by the government on all EU 
projects. Legislative proposals by the European Commission are 
directly transmitted to parliament. Legislative and non-legislative 
proposals, draft decisions, recommendations, agendas, press 
releases, European Parliament resolutions, Green and White Papers, 
opinions from national parliaments and minutes of Council 
                                                        
8 See www.bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Nationalratswahl_2017/ 
start.aspx. 
9 SORA Institute for Social Research and Consulting (2017), “Austrian 
Parliamentary Election 2017” (www.sora.at/en/topics/electoral-
behavior/election-analyses/nrw17-en.html). 
10 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Protocol (No 1) on the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union, Official Journal C 326/47, 26 October 2002 (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/ 
TXT&from=EN). 
11 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/RGES/GOGNR/). 
12 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/RGES/GOBR/. 
13 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/RGES/EU_Information_Act/ 
EU_Information_Act.shtml. 
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meetings are accessible in an EU database14 (mostly) open to the 
public. Parliament regularly publishes press releases on its activities 
and debates on EU matters (2017: 196) – a number increasing to 314 
in 2018 reflecting the impact of the Austrian EU presidency -  as well 
as a special newsletter (“News from the European Union”) relating 
to official EU projects, documents and proposals (2017: 235 / 2018: 
237).  
Federal ministers present an annual preview of their EU 
agenda on the basis of the Commission’s work programme and the 
respective EU Council presidencies in the National15 as well as 
Federal Council’s committees.16 Twice a year, the Federal Ministry 
for European and International Affairs provides advance 
information on key EU projects in the making. Special information 
in writing may be called for in preparation of a sitting of an EU 
committee or at the request of a parliamentary group or party. 
The government has to reach agreement with the Main 
Committee of the National Council before nominating the 
respective members of the European Commission, the Court of 
Justice of the EU, the Court of Auditors and the board of governors 
of the European Investment Bank. Regarding future members of the 
(EU) Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions it has to inform both parliamentary chambers.17 A formal 
hearing of candidates though is not provided, usually the 
governmental majority prevails. 
                                                        
14 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/. 
15 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/index.shtml?FBEZ=FP_001& 
NRBR=NR&VHG=III&VHG2=BEU&LISTE=Anzeigen&listeId=101. 
16 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/index.shtml?jsMode=& 
xdocumentUri=&filterJq=&view=&NRBR=BR&GP=XXVI&VHG=III-
BR&VHG2=BEU-BR&SUCH=&listeId=101&LISTE=Anzeigen&FBEZ= 
FP_001. 
17 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Article 23c 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf). 
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5.2.1 National Council 
Prior to European Council meetings, members of the government 
give statements on subjects dealt within the European Council. 
Four times a year the National Council plenary can hold 
debates on EU matters of topical interest (“Aktuelle 
Europastunde”)18 to provide information for the general public. The 
subject is determined by each political party following a principle 
of rotation. The following table shows the various aspects debated 
since 2010. The topics reflect the main European developments e.g. 
the economic and financial crisis or the challenges of migration. 
While oppositional parties preferably make use of it to criticise the 
government, parties in government wish to present their efforts and 
successes in tackling the challenges. 
Table 5.1 Topics of plenary sessions devoted to EU matters 
Date Topic Introduced 
by 
In government 
or opposition 
Government SPÖ/ÖVP (since 11 January 2007) 
April 2010 Euro crisis SPÖ Government 
September 
2010 
Asylum and 
migration 
ÖVP Government 
January 2011 Euro liabilities FPÖ Opposition 
May 2011 Euro crisis  BZÖ Opposition 
September 
2011 
Corruption in the 
EU 
Greens Opposition 
November 
2011 
Youth 
unemployment 
SPÖ Government 
January 2012 Debt crisis ÖVP Government 
May 2012 Sustainable 
investment in 
Europe 
Greens Opposition 
                                                        
18 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PLENAR/index.shtml?FBEZ=FP_007 
&NRBRBV=NR&R_SISTEI=ST&STATT=ASEU&LISTE=Anzeigen&listeId
=1071&SUCH. 
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September 
2012 
Referendum on 
debt union 
FPÖ Opposition 
November 
2012 
No to higher EU 
contributions 
BZÖ Opposition 
January 2013 Growth, 
employment, 
equity and 
sustainability 
SPÖ Government 
May 2013 Business locations 
Europe and 
Austria 
ÖVP Government 
January 2014 Dual training 
system and youth 
guarantee 
SPÖ Government 
May 2014 Rural 
Development 2020 
ÖVP Government 
September 
2014 
EU sanctions 
against Russia 
FPÖ Opposition 
November 
2014 
Monetary policy 
of the ECB 
Team 
Stronach 
Opposition 
January 2015 TTIP Greens Opposition 
May 2015 Bankruptcy law 
for member states 
NEOS Opposition 
September 
2015 
Refugee crisis ÖVP Government 
November 
2015 
Refugee crisis SPÖ Government 
January 2016 Refugee crisis FPÖ Opposition 
May 2016 TTIP/CETA Greens Opposition 
September 
2016 
Border protection Team 
Stronach 
Opposition 
November 
2016 
Future of Europe NEOS Opposition 
January 2017 European 
transport policy 
SPÖ Government 
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May 2017 EU budgetary 
policy  
ÖVP Government 
September 
2017 
Glyphosate Greens Opposition 
Government (ÖVP/FPÖ) (since 18 December 2018) 
January 2018 Austrian EU 
presidency 
ÖVP Government 
May 2018 A people’s Europe SPÖ Opposition 
September 
2018 
External border 
protection 
FPÖ Government 
November 
2018 
Austrian EU 
presidency 
Liste Pilz Opposition 
 
EU related parliamentary questions (all accessible online)19 reflect 
the broad range of topics of the Austrian EU debate. In autumn 2018, 
parliamentary questions were submitted 
e.g. on the consequences of a ‘hard Brexit’ 
for Austria, the government’s plans 
regarding a common European asylum 
policy and its position on the European 
Parliament’s vote to trigger Article 7 
against Hungary and, of course, Austria’s EU Council presidency. 
EU matters were also a reason to censure motions against the 
government as a whole and against individual ministers. During the 
last three legislative periods (since 10/2008) the following EU-
related motions were introduced – and all turned down by 
government majority.20  
 
  
                                                        
19 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/JMAB/. 
20 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PLENAR/index.shtml?jsMode=& 
xdocumentUri=&filterJq=&view=&MODUS=PLENAR&NRBRBV=NR&
GP=XXVI&R_SISTEI=EI&EING=UEAM&SUCH=&listeId=1071&LISTE=
Anzeigen&FBEZ=FP_007. 
EU-related parliamentary 
questions reflect the broad 
range of topics of the 
Austrian EU debate. 
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Table 5.2 Motions of censure concerning EU matters 
Date Topic Introduced by 
July 2011 European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
BZÖ 
October 2011 ESM BZÖ 
July 2012 ESM BZÖ 
July 2012 ESM FPÖ 
February 2013 EU Multiannual 
financial framework 
BZÖ 
April 2013 Tax evasion in EU Greens 
June 2015 Human rights at 
EU’s external 
borders 
Greens 
September 2015 External border 
security 
FPÖ 
 
Austrian members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are also 
members of their respective parliamentary groups at home. Since 
2015, they have the right to deliver 
five-minute statements in plenary 
debates and can take part in selected 
committees. On the initiative of the 
president of the National Council21 
“outstanding personalities of 
European and international political life” may address the plenary22 
as was the case in April 2016 when UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon was invited to speak on sustainable development goals. In the 
National Council’s EU main committee, Presidents of the European 
                                                        
21 Bundesgesetz über die Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates [Federal 
Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Austrian National Council], Article 
19a (www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Bundesnormen/NOR40170792/ 
NOR40170792.pdf).  
22 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2015), “Morgen in Kraft: Rederecht für EU-
Abgeordnete im Nationalrat” [In force tomorrow: Right to speak for 
Members of the European Parliament in the National Council], 31 July 
(www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2015/PK0872/index.shtml). 
Since 2015, “outstanding 
personalities of European and 
international political life” 
may address the plenary. 
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Parliament Jerzy Buzek and Martin Schulz discussed with 
parliamentarians. EU commissioners regularly visit Parliament to 
exchange views with selected parliamentarians. 
While a two-thirds majority voted in favour of MEPs’ active 
participation in parliamentary debates, FPÖ and the Eurosceptic 
and free-market oriented Team Stronach refused consent, with the 
argument that it would be an “unnecessary submission to the EU”, 
“contradictory to the system” and “assumedly against the 
constitution” if only those MEPs who were part of a parliamentary 
group were granted the right to speak to the plenary. However, the 
FPÖ expressed support for MEPs sharing their expertise during 
committee deliberations.23 
Also, the Federal Council can organise debates on EU matters 
of topical interest in its plenary and can invite Austrian MEPs and 
outstanding personalities of European and international political 
life to deliver a statement.24  
5.2.2 The EU committees 
In the National Council the competence to deliberate on EU projects 
and adopt opinions is, in principle, vested in the Main Committee, 
namely the Main Committee on Matters of the European Union.25 It 
deals with changes in primary law and items on the agenda of the 
European Council. The committee is composed of 21 members and 
is chaired by the President of the National Council.  
For deliberations on other EU related questions the Main 
Committee elects a Standing Sub-Committee consisting of 21 
                                                        
23 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2015), “Nationalrat: FPÖ und Team Stronach 
gegen Rederecht für EU-Abgeordnete” [National Council: FPÖ and Team 
Stronach against the right to speak for Members of the European 
Parliament], 20 May (www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2015/ 
PK0526/index.shtml). 
24 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2015), “Europaabgeordnete erhalten 
Rederecht im Bundesrat” [Members of the European Parliament get the 
right to speak in the Federal Council], 7 May (www.parlament.gv.at/ 
PAKT/PR/JAHR_2015/PK0493/index.shtml). 
25 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVI/A-HA/A-HA_00001_ 
00823/index.shtml. 
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members.26 The sittings of these committees are open to the public 
unless the EU has ruled to the contrary or a majority of the 
committee so decides. Prior to debates on EU projects, ministers or 
ministry representatives may hold an introductory statement on the 
state of play and on Austria’s position.  
The EU committees can place debates on EU matters of topical 
interest on the agenda in which the competent federal minister is 
invited to answer EU related questions. Austrian MEPs can also take 
part in a consultative capacity in the committees’ deliberations. 
Every committee member is free to table motions. They may 
also adopt opinions in which they give binding instructions to 
individual members of the 
government for EU Council meetings. 
They can only depart from these 
opinions under rather strict 
conditions and after consulting with 
both committees.27 
Such opinions, however, 
according to Parliament, “are rare because in practice, it may be 
important for ministers to have some flexibility over their 
negotiating position in the case of difficult negotiations in the 
Council. As a result, the Committee tends to make 
recommendations rather than adopt rigid positions.”28  
The committees are entitled to set up communications 
(‘political dialogue’) addressing EU institutions on certain EU 
projects. The EU subcommittee may review drafts of European 
legislative acts. If it considers that a proposal is incompatible with 
the principle of subsidiarity, it may adopt a reasoned opinion. 
                                                        
26 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVI/SA-EU/SA-EU_00001_ 
00828/index.shtml. 
27 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Article 23e (3) 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf). 
28 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/PE/EUNationalrat/. 
 
Every committee member 
may also adopt opinions in 
which they give binding 
instructions to individual 
members of the government 
for EU Council meetings. 
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The EU Committee of the Federal Council29 (composed of 13 
members) deliberates on EU projects.30 All members of the Federal 
Council as well as Austrian MEPs can attend its sittings in an 
advisory capacity. Members of government or a representative may 
deliver introductory statements. The committee can adopt binding 
opinions to members of government, draft communications and 
(reasoned) opinions to exert subsidiary control.31  
Article 23g of the Federal Constitution states that “[t]he 
National Council and the Federal Council present their view in a 
founded comment to a drafted legal act in the framework of the 
European Union, for which reason the draft is incompatible with the 
subsidiarity principle.”  
They “may demand the competent Federal Minister to make 
a statement on the compatibility of drafts […] with the subsidiarity 
principle, which, in general, has to be presented within two weeks 
after the demand has been made. The Federal Council shall without 
delay inform the Provincial Parliaments on all drafts […] and give 
them the opportunity to make comments. When resolving a 
founded statement […], the Federal Council has to consider the 
comments of the Provincial Parliaments and to inform them on such 
resolutions.”32 
The National Council and the Federal Council “may resolve 
to raise claim against a legislative act in the framework of the 
European Union at the Court of Justice of the European Union for 
violating the principle of subsidiarity.” (Article 23h).33  
                                                        
29 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/BR/A-EU-BR/A-EU-BR_00001 
_00037/index.shtml. 
30 Parlamentsdirektion (2018), “Die Mitwirkung des Bundesrates in EU-
Angelegenheiten“ [The involvement of the Federal Council in EU matters] 
(www.parlament.gv.at/ZUSD/PDF/Broschuere_Die_Mitwirkung_des_B
undesrates_in_EU-Angelegenheiten_2018.pdf). 
31 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Article 23e (4) 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf). 
32 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Article 23g 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf). 
33 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Article 23h 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf). 
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The database of the platform for EU Interparliamentary 
Exchange (IPEX)34 lists 3 reasoned opinions, 21 communications 
(political dialogue) and 34 “important information of exchange” 
submitted by the Austrian National Council.  
Table 5.3 Reasoned opinions by the EU sub committee of the Austrian 
National Council 
May 2014 Single-member private limited liability companies 
May 2012 Transparency of measures regulating the prices of 
medicinal products for human use and their 
inclusion in the scope of public health insurance 
systems 
September 
2010 
Conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment 
 
Regarding the Austrian Federal Council the IPEX database depicts 
28 reasoned opinions, 62 communications (political dialogue) and 
35 “important information of exchange”. 
With regard to reasoned opinions, the Federal Council was 
one of the three most active legislative organs in the EU in 2016, as 
a report by the Austrian parliamentary 
directorate states.35 Also in 2017, the 
Federal Council was amongst the most 
active legislative organs according to a 
report by the European Parliament.36 
The topics of reasoned opinions by 
the Federal Council were manifold, as the 
                                                        
34 See www.ipex.eu. 
35 Parlamentsdirektion (2018), “Die Mitwirkung des Bundesrates in EU-
Angelegenheiten“ [The involvement of the Federal Council in EU matters], 
p. 8 (www.parlament.gv.at/ZUSD/PDF/Broschuere_Die_Mitwirkung_ 
des_Bundesrates_in_EU-Angelegenheiten_2018.pdf). 
36 European Parliament (2018), “Annual report 2017. Relations between the 
European Parliament and EU national Parliaments”, p. 26 
(www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/06b53435-5804-
442c-9ea1-1da23e6c882e/Annual_Report_2017_Relations_with_national_ 
Parliaments-web-EN.pdf). 
Regarding reasoned 
opinions, the Federal 
Council was one of the 
three most active 
legislative organs in the 
EU in 2016 and 2017. 
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following table shows. Issues related to environment, traffic and 
consumer protection were the main subsidiarity concerns raised by 
parliamentarians. 
Table 5.4 Reasoned opinions by the EU committee of the Austrian Federal 
Council 
June 2018 Enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer 
protection rules 
June 2018 Representative actions for the protection of the 
collective interests of consumers 
March 2018 Quality of water intended for human 
consumption 
July 2017 Charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of 
certain infrastructures 
May 2017 Internal market for electricity 
May 2017 Common rules for the internal market for 
electricity   
March 2017 Proportionality test before adoption of new 
regulation of professions 
March 2017 Introducing a European services e-card and 
related administrative facilities 
March 2017 European services e-card 
July 2016 Geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination 
July 2016 Enforcement of consumer protection laws  
March 2016 Information exchange mechanism with regard to 
intergovernmental  
agreements and non-binding instruments 
between Member States  
and third countries in the field of energy 
March 2016 Measures to safeguard the security of gas supply 
January 2016 Amendment of the directive 2008/98/EC on 
waste  
September 
2014 
Amendment on the directives on waste, 
packaging and packaging waste,  
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the landfill of waste, end-of-life vehicles, batteries 
and accumulators and waste batteries  
and accumulators and waste electrical and 
electronic equipment 
May 2014 Single-member private limited liability 
companies 
May 2014 Organic production and labelling of organic 
products 
November 
2013 
Measures concerning the European single market 
for electronic communications  
and to achieve a Connected Continent 
October 2013 Prevention and management of the introduction 
and spread of invasive alien species  
July 2013 Protective measures against pests of plants 
June 2013 Production and making available on the market 
of plant reproductive material 
March 2013 Opening of the market for domestic passenger 
transport services by rail 
June 2012 European statistics 
May 2012 Powers to be conferred on the Commission 
February 2012 Award of concession contracts 
December 2011 Common European Sales Law 
October 2010 Conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes  
of seasonal employment 
April 2010 Right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings  
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In a communication to the European Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament37 on the White Paper on the Future of 
Europe, the EU Committee of the Federal Council stresses that the 
EU has to regain efficiency and states that 
“the principle of subsidiarity must be 
strengthened across Europe” with greater 
emphasis being placed on this principle 
before any new legal proposal. It makes 
criticism that “the deadline of only eight 
weeks allowed for the parliamentary 
chambers of the member states to check a 
proposal for its compatibility with the 
principle of subsidiarity is too short” and 
proposes an extension of the deadline to 12 weeks. It remarks on the 
increasing number of delegated acts as “there is a risk of the 
European Commission being granted legislative powers that are 
due to the Council in conjunction with the Commission and, 
subsequently, the European Parliament”. Moreover, it calls for an 
intensified dialogue between the European Commission and the 
parliamentary chambers of the member states as “very often, it takes 
several months before the Commission reacts to communications 
and/or comment on issues of 
subsidiarity.” Although “the [EC’s] 
reactions are formally correct”, the 
committee “deplores the absence of a 
lively political exchange of certain 
proposals.” Finally, it notes that the 
Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC) “provides an appropriate 
framework for an active political discourse with members of the 
European Commission, which should be made use of much more 
intensively.”  
                                                        
37 European Affairs Committee of the Federal Council (2017), 
“Communication to the European Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament pursuant to Article 23f para. 4 of the Austrian 
Constitution” (www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/ 
082dbcc5600a39cc01600dd08bbe0385.do). 
 
The EU Committee of 
the Federal Council 
stresses that the EU has 
to regain efficiency and 
states that “the 
principle of subsidiarity 
must be strengthened 
across Europe”. 
COSAC “provides an 
appropriate framework for 
an active political discourse 
with members of the 
European Commission”. 
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The Federal Council also supports the initiative to introduce 
a ‘green card’ which should encourage national parliaments to 
provide the EU Commission with constructive and non-binding 
recommendations on EU policies or legislative proposals.38  
With these proposals the Committee’s position is pretty much 
in line with the recommendations set up in the final report of the 
Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less More 
Efficiently” in July 2018.39 
Both the EU committees of the National as well as the Federal 
Council are free to choose which EU documents they put on their 
agenda. The following table shows the remarkable increase of the 
number of EU documents deliberated upon – especially with regard 
to the Federal Council’s EU committee – following the 
establishment of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Table 5.5 EU documents on the agenda of EU committees in the Austrian 
Parliament 
 National council  Federal council  
XX. legislative period 
(15.1.1996-28.10.1999) 
145 17 
XXI. legislative period 
(29.10.1999-19.12.2002) 
112 10 
XXII. legislative period 
(20.12.2002-29.10.2006) 
108 8 
XXIII. legislative period 
(30.10.2006-27.10.2008) 
30 26 
XXIV. legislative period 269 176 
                                                        
38 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2016), “EU-Ausschuss des Bundesrats sucht 
proaktiven Dialog mit Europäischer Kommission” [EU committee of the 
Federal Council strives for a pro-active dialogue with the European 
Commission], 8 March (www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2016/ 
PK0212/index.shtml). 
39 European Union (2018), “Active Subsidiarity. A new way of working. 
Report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less 
More Efficiently”, pp. 12-13 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/ 
beta-political/files/report-task-force-subsidiarity-proportionality-and-
doing-less-more-efficiently_en.pdf). 
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(28.10.2008-28.10.2013) 
XXV. legislative period 
(29.10.2013-08.11.2017) 
142 190 
XXVI. legislative period 
(09.11.2017 - ) 
(latest update: 31.12.2018) 
56 58 
 
Due to the quantity and complexity of various EU matters, 
parliamentary committees can seek advice from experts within 
hearings, which are mostly open to the public. Additionally, each 
political party in the National Council nominates a member with a 
special focus on European affairs (Europasprecher).  
A parliamentary service on EU and international affairs is 
available to support parliamentarians’ political work by supplying 
special expertise. In 2016 the parliamentary administration drafted 
an assessment on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada stating that CETA 
had to be regarded as a mixed agreement. Compared to other 
European parliamentary research services (e.g. of the German 
Bundestag) the Austrian Parliament’s resources as well as the 
number of parliamentary staff are limited – even in relative terms.  
Critics argue that the Austrian Parliament could intensify its 
engagement to shape EU legislation and state that, for example, the 
National Council’s EU committee only met for about an hour a 
month during the latest legislative period. Hardly sufficient for an 
in-depth consideration of EU documents.40 These claims are 
contradicted by the chairman of the EU subcommittee in the 
National Council, for example, responding that “Parliament is one 
of those with the broadest rights of participation in the European 
Union and uses them as well”41 or by stating the active role of the 
                                                        
40 Addendum (2017), “Wie Österreich auf Mitgestaltung in der EU 
verzichtet“ [How Austria renounces to shape the EU], 16 November 
(www.addendum.org/politischeverantwortung/nationalrat-eu-fragen/). 
41 Lopatka, R. (2018), “Nationalrat ist eines der europapolitisch aktivsten 
Parlamente der EU“ [National Council is one of the most active parliaments 
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Federal Council EU committee in drafting reasoned opinions that 
also influenced the position of the European Commission, e.g. “with 
regard to the competition and concession directive, the directive on 
seeds or data protection.”42 
Another characteristic and point of criticism is that the two 
chambers of Parliament in principle have a strong say in EU matters, 
but only partially make use of it, as it is foremost the governmental 
majority that defines the country’s European agenda. Although 
parliamentarians have a ‘free mandate’ it is rare that they depart 
from so-called party discipline. 
5.3 The interparliamentary dimension 
To foster inter-parliamentarian cooperation, the Austrian 
Parliament is member of 47 bilateral parliamentarian groups. As 
part of the EU trio presidency, the Austrian Parliament signed a 
declaration of cooperation with its Estonian und Bulgarian 
counterparts.43 On the occasion of the Austrian EU presidency, 
Parliament dedicated a special sub-website to the “parliamentary 
dimension”.44 During the presidency Austria hosted the 
Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination 
and Governance in the European Union (SECG), co-presided over 
the Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol 
(JPSG) in Brussels45 and organised the Inter-Parliamentary 
                                                        
in the EU], 13 May (www.derstandard.at/2000079660289/Nationalrat-ist-
eines-der-europapolitisch-aktivsten-Parlamente-der-EU). 
42 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2017), “Zukunft der EU: Forderungen zu 
Partizipation, Subsidiarität und EU-Weiterentwicklung“ [Future of the EU: 
Calls for participation, subsidiarity and further development of the EU], 7 
November (www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2017/PK1112/). 
43 See www.parlament.gv.at/ZUSD/PDF/EU2018_Trioerklaerung_EE_ 
BG_AT.pdf. 
44 See www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/EU2018/index.shtml. 
45 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2018), “Kontrollausschuss zu Europol: 
Österreichischer Ko-Vorsitz bei interparlamentarischer Tagung in Brüssel“ 
[Supervisory committtee on Europol: Austria co-chairs interparliamentary 
conference in Brussels], 24 September (www.parlament.gv.at/ 
PAKT/PR/JAHR_2018/PK0994/index.shtml). 
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Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy.46 In January 2019, the 
Austrian Parliament organised the meeting of the Secretaries-
General of the  parliaments of EU member states followed by the 
Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliament in April. 
The Austrian Parliament is eager to increase cooperation, 
especially with the Western Balkan countries to consolidate 
democratic parliamentarism in the region and support their EU 
accession. As part of the EU presidency programme, the Austrian 
Parliament organised a conference on the Western Balkans’ EU 
perspective and the role of the parliaments, in Vienna (October 9).47 
In addition, it supported the implementation of ‘democracy 
workshops’ in Montenegro48 and Kosovo following the Austrian 
model that was established in 2008.49 In these workshops, young 
people learn about parliamentary democracy, European values and 
aspects of the EU in general. A scholarship programme for members 
of parliament administrations in the region is in the making.50 
The EU Council presidency was also an opportunity to 
highlight Austria’s role within COSAC. Vienna hosted the Meeting 
of the Chairpersons of COSAC where Austria inter alia presented 
                                                        
46 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2018), “EU-Ratsvorsitz: 
Interparlamentarische Konferenz für die Gemeinsame Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik am 11. und 12. Oktober” [EU presidency: 
Interparliamentarian conference on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy on 11 and 12 October], 4 October (www.parlament.gv.at/ 
PAKT/PR/JAHR_2018/PK1047/index.shtml). 
47 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2018), “EU-Erweiterungsperspektive für den 
Westbalkan: Begegnung auf Augenhöhe eingemahnt“ [The Western 
Balkans EU enlargement perspective: Call to meet at eye level], 9 October 
(www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2018/PK1075/index.shtml). 
48 See www.skupstina.me/index.php/en/citizens/demokratske-radionice. 
49 See www.parlament.gv.at/SERV/KJ/DEMWERK/DEMOKRATIEWERKSTATT/. 
50 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2018), “Sobotka: Das Friedensprojekt EU ist 
erst vollständig, wenn die Staaten des Westbalkans Mitglied sind” 
[Sobotka: The EU peace project will not be completed until the Western 
Balkan countries are members], 5 November (www.parlament.gv.at/ 
PAKT/PR/JAHR_2018/PK1214/index.shtml). 
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its EU presidency priorities51 The 60th COSAC meeting in 
November 2018 also focused on the Austrian presidency and a more 
transparent European Union. Parliaments should follow the 
recommendations outlined in the meeting’s conclusions “to make 
the outcome of COSAC work more visible, by encouraging them to 
share and support best practices […] within their Parliament and 
among the wider public”.52 This would help sharpen public 
knowledge of Parliament’s work and its efforts for more 
subsidiarity, which also could be key to better counter voices calling 
for more “direct democracy” at the expense of representative 
democracy.53 
5.4 European elections 2019 
Four out of five political parties represented in the Austrian 
Parliament are part of a political group in the European Parliament. 
In general, there is close coordination and alignment between 
political parties ‘at home’ and their 
representatives abroad. One can 
nevertheless remark that members of 
the FPÖ in the European Parliament 
(political group of ‘Europe of Nations 
and Freedom’) pursue a stronger and 
more openly Eurosceptic agenda than 
their counterparts in government, who committed themselves to a 
‘pro-European’ government policy stance. It is rather specific to the 
FPÖ that its head of delegation in the European Parliament also acts 
as secretary general of the party, which leads to a stronger domestic 
media presence compared to other ‘ordinary’ ‘MEPs’, who often 
                                                        
51 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2018), “Sobotka zu Ratsvorsitz: Es geht um 
ein respektvolles Miteinander im Interesse gemeinsamer Lösungen” 
[Sobotka on EU presidency: Mutual respect in the interest of common 
solutions], 9 July (www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2018/ 
PK0847/index.shtml). 
52 Conclusions of the LX COSAC (2018), www.parlament.gv.at/ZUSD/ 
PDF/EU2018_LXCOSAC_Conclusions_LX_COSAC_EN.pdf.  
53 For more information on the debate on direct democracy in Austria, see 
S. Blockmans and S. Russack (2018), Direct Democracy in the EU. The Myth of 
a Citizens’ Union, London: Rowman & Littlefield International, pp. 121-145. 
In general, there is close 
coordination and alignment 
between political parties 
‘at home’ and their 
representatives abroad. 
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deplore the poor portrayal of their work and political proposals in 
the Austrian mass media. 
Members of the ÖVP in the European Parliament (part of the 
European People’s Party) occasionally speak out against the 
Eurosceptic claims of the FPÖ and do this in a more open manner 
than their counterparts at home, who refrain from criticising the 
coalition partner in public. Recently, one could also detect 
differences in the stance of ÖVP members in the European 
Parliament e.g. on the question of cutting family benefits for EU 
workers whose children live abroad, which was decided by the 
government coalition. No member of the ÖVP’s delegation in the 
European Parliament is represented in the executive board of the 
party. 
The Austrian Social Democrats are represented by four 
members in the political group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists & Democrats. One of its members is also member of the 
executive board of the party. 
For smaller parties, alignment between their representatives 
at the domestic and European level seems easier to accomplish than 
within bigger parties, where the number of players in the political 
game is higher and competition in the internal decision-making 
process is stronger. In the case of NEOS, its only member in the 
European Parliament (part of the ALDE political group) is also 
president of the ‘NEOS Lab’ - a think tank and also their party 
academy - which implies a close connection between the domestic 
and the EU spheres. 
With Austria having held the EU Council presidency in 2018, 
European issues have increasingly become the focus of public 
attention. A recent ÖGfE survey shows that about a quarter of 
Austrians feel that their interest in European matters has increased 
since Austria took over the EU presidency, while their willingness 
to vote is similar to data collected prior to 2014.54 The post-
presidency period is seen as an opportunity to put the traditional 
EU debate in Austria on a broader footing and to stress that the EU 
elections are not of second order. Nevertheless, past European 
                                                        
54 Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (2018), “ÖGfE survey: 
High support for EU membership during the Austrian EU presidency”, 7 
November (www.oegfe.at/2018/11/07_survey/). 
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elections were dominated by national politics. Voter turnout in 2014 
was 45.4% (EU average: 42.6%) - considerably lower than in the 2017 
parliamentary elections (80%). The role and achievements of 
political groups in the European Parliament was scarcely 
highlighted in prior election campaigns. Yet, in 2014 there had been 
a clear commitment of Austrian political parties towards their 
European Spitzenkandidaten who also were present in the Austrian 
European election debate. Ahead of the 2019 EU elections, one can 
expect that there will be no fundamental change: political parties 
will promote their European candidates but the visibility of political 
groups will remain rather low.  
The previously sharp division between a pro-European 
government and the biggest opposition party pursuing an anti-EU 
or Eurosceptic line is no longer valid. Although the two government 
parties agreed on a pro-European stance, the closer we get to the 
election date, the more differentiated the respective EU positions 
will become. Even as a governing party, the FPÖ will seek to 
mobilise its target groups with an independent EU-critical 
discourse. Provocative statements regarding the President of the 
European Commission, calls for the maintenance of unilateral 
border closure, differences of opinion on the infringement 
procedure against the Hungarian government or ideas on a fast-
track asylum check on ships are just a few examples of the coalition 
stress test. 
As the upcoming European elections will be the first 
nationwide vote since the Austrian parliamentary elections in 
autumn 2017, there is a risk that domestic concerns will dominate 
the electoral campaign. 
Conclusions 
In the course of Austria’s EU 
membership, the legal prerequisites of 
parliament’s involvement in European 
Union matters have increased steadily. 
The two chambers of parliament in 
principle have a strong say in EU 
matters, but only partially make use of it, as it is foremost the 
government majority that defines the country’s European agenda. 
In the domestic political debate European issues are largely 
The two chambers of 
parliament have a strong 
say in EU matters, but it is 
the government majority 
that defines the country’s 
European agenda. 
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discussed from a national perspective. Therefore, any 
Europeanisation of national parliaments is a rather lengthy process. 
However, granting Members of the European Parliament the right 
to speak in the national parliament, inviting high-level European 
and international speakers as well as increasing face-to-face 
dialogue with representatives of European institutions is an 
important step.  
Regarding the issue of subsidiarity and proportionality and 
the drafting of reasoned opinions, the Austrian Federal Council is 
among the most active parliamentary chambers in the EU. Yet, the 
eight-week deadline to check a proposal´s compatibility with the 
principle of subsidiarity, as well as limited research services and 
staff, makes it difficult for parliamentarians to make full use of the 
possibilities granted by EU treaties and national law. 
Via an extensive documentation of its EU-related activities 
and a special EU database, the Austrian Parliament is eager to 
enhance its visibility and transparency. While these efforts were 
increased during Austria’s EU presidency, more should be done to 
raise public awareness of the Parliament´s role in EU affairs. 
Regarding cooperation with parliaments of the Western 
Balkan countries and exporting the idea of democracy workshops 
for young citizens, Parliament also works to strengthen the 
principle of parliamentary democracy and European understanding 
and values. 
In general, upgrading’ the role of national parliaments in the 
EU decision-making process is a meaningful initiative that could 
strengthen subsidiarity and narrow the often perceived gap 
between EU institutions and the national level. Nevertheless, the 
general public seems to have rather limited knowledge of the 
potential role of national parliaments as an active part in the EU 
decision-making process. At the same time, the expertise of many 
national or regional parliaments on EU issues seems rather limited. 
As long as this deficiency remains, there is the risk that key 
integration steps will be slowed down or even blocked based on 
purely domestic reasons rather than on fact.  
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6. BULGARIA: RISING AMBITION, 
FAILING PERFORMANCE 
ATANAS SLAVOV 
In recent years, EU issues have increasingly permeated national public 
discourse, largely due to the Bulgaria’s 2018 Presidency of the Council. 
The presidency was used skilfully by Bulgaria’s political leadership to shift 
public debate towards enlargement perspectives for the Western Balkan 
countries. Bulgarian authorities gained political credit with this diplomatic 
manoeuvre; they avoided a more critical review of national policies, such 
as continuing Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) 
monitoring; stalled judicial reform; the ineffective fight against high-level 
corruption; the stability of the banking sector. This allowed Bulgaria to take 
a seemingly pro-European stance during challenging times for the Union, 
as well as appear to be an important regional policy player.  
Beyond the initial positive impressions of the Europeanisation in 
Bulgaria, the real situation demands a rather sober and critical overview. 
Given the continuing obstruction of key structural institutional reforms); 
the inconsistency of Bulgaria’s foreign policy (its ambivalence towards 
Russia); undermining the emerging consensus on the need to defend the 
European values (in the cases of Poland, Hungary, Romania), Bulgaria 
still has an inconsistent pro-European image.  
This analysis engages with these themes and issues, while taking 
into account the institutional framework of deficient parliamentarianism 
where institutional checks and balances are often outstripped by informal 
political decision-making and bargaining with powerful lobbies. 
6.1 State of democracy in Bulgaria 
According to its constitutional framework, Bulgaria is a republic 
with a parliamentary form of government in which all fundamental 
principles of constitutional democracy are well established and 
protected, namely the rule of law, separation of powers, basic 
human rights, national sovereignty, political pluralism, political 
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and legal responsibility of the government, and the independence 
of the judiciary. In general, the substance of the Constitution is 
considered to be in line with existing European standards (Venice 
Commission, 2007).1 In the past decade some of the shortcomings in 
the functioning of key institutions (the judiciary) were highlighted 
and constitutional reforms have been undertaken to fix the existing 
problems (Venice Commission, 2015). These reformist policies, 
however, were often blocked by the entrenched organised interests 
of certain political and oligarchic elites.  
In the meantime, it became evident that the prevailing 
assumption that existing deficiencies could be fixed through 
committed reformist endeavours 
undertaken by the national political 
elite, aided by their European 
counterparts, is rather mistaken. This 
positivist assumption is challenged in at 
least two ways. First, the basic values, 
principles and procedures of 
constitutional democracy are often 
undermined or openly violated by 
powerful domestic institutional and 
political actors. This situation is rather habitual, not accidental. 
Second, deficiencies and loopholes in the legislation or institutional 
performance are often intended and purposeful, not a side effect of 
a rapid top-down Europeanisation process.  
More than a decade after the EU accession, Bulgaria’s 
constitutional democracy remains defective (Merkel, 2004) and 
semi-consolidated (Nations in Transit, 2018). Almost three decades 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bulgarian democracy is weakened 
not only by the burden of its post-communist legacy – there are still 
parallel power networks from former communist secret services 
and their oligarchic offshoots, but also due to persistent and 
systematic actions to impede, curb or dismantle the functioning of 
democratic or independent institutions (Ganev, 2007: 123-150) that 
keep government and politicians accountable. This state of affairs is 
most visible in the lack of proper independence of the judiciary, as 
well as the reported inefficiency at combating high-level corruption. 
                                                        
1 Full reference details are given in bibliography at the end of the paper.  
The basic values, 
principles and procedures 
of constitutional 
democracy are 
undermined or openly 
violated by powerful 
domestic institutional 
and political actors.  
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In recent years the conditions for a pluralist democratic 
government in the country were limited by an overall decrease of 
media freedom. According to the Nations in Transit 2018 report:  
Bulgaria’s media environment has deteriorated 
significantly in recent years, with an increase in hate 
speech and violence against journalists. Transparency of 
media ownership continued to be a serious problem, as 
was the fusion of media and politics, media monopolies, 
and lack of transparency of funding sources. Local 
government has been struggling with debt and 
dependence on central funding, which limited local 
independence and initiatives throughout the year. 
This critical account is corroborated by a continuous decline of the 
country’s performance in the World Press Freedom Index. The 2019 
Index ranks Bulgaria 111th (out of 180) for the second consecutive 
year, which is a significant drop in the past six years (down from 
87th in 2013). The conclusion of the report dampens Bulgaria’s 
ambition to be a regional leader: 
Corruption and collusion between media, politicians and 
oligarchs is widespread in Bulgaria. The most notorious 
embodiment of this aberrant state of affairs is Delyan 
Peevski... The government continues to allocate EU 
funding to media outlets with a complete lack of 
transparency, with the effect of bribing recipients to go 
easy on the government in their reporting, or to refrain 
from covering certain problematic stories altogether. At 
the same time judicial harassment of independent media, 
such as the Economedia group, has increased. Threats 
against reporters have also increased in recent months, to 
the extent that journalism is now dangerous in Bulgaria 
(2019 World Press Freedom Index). 
Lacking true media pluralism, disregarding truth and objectivity, 
increasing the use of political propaganda through major media 
outlets all pose a threat to democracy in this country.  
According to the 2019 Rule of Law Index, with its overall score 
(of 0.54) Bulgaria is the last among the EU member states and ranks 
54th globally (among 126 studied countries). It is noteworthy that 
this result is even worse than some non-European states (Botswana 
ranks 44th, Argentina 46th, while Mongolia is 53st in the world). In 
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the CEE region it is closer to Hungary (57th), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (60th) and North Macedonia (56th). 
The fragility of the democratic order in Bulgaria should be 
taken seriously, given that the whole region of Central and 
Southeastern Europe has suffered a continuous decline of 
democracy and the rule of law in the last decade (Freedom in the 
World 2018). Even more alarming, a leading EU scholar suggests 
that party politics at the EU level is only worsening the situation:  
In short, democratic leaders at the federal or union level 
may overlook concerns about the authoritarian nature of 
rule in member states so long as the local authoritarian 
delivers needed votes to their coalition in the federal 
legislature…Thus, enhancing partisan, democratic politics 
at the federal level may end up perpetuating autocracy at 
the state level (Kelemen, 2017: 216). 
Similar critical conclusions could be reached about the existing 
mechanisms of redistribution of EU funds to less economically 
developed member states; such fiscal transfers tend to create a large 
clientelist base in support of local authoritarian leaders (Kelemen, 
2017: 216). 
The decline of democratic and rule of law standards is a 
phenomenon not only in Bulgaria and Southeast Europe but also in 
member states that were once regional leaders in democratic 
consolidation (Poland and Hungary). These two countries are at the 
sharp end of EU procedures to safeguard the rule of law and the 
democratic values of the Union, which may lead to suspension of 
their voting rights in the Council of the EU according to Art. 7 TEU 
(Rule of Law, 2017; European Parliament Resolution, 2018). 
With Eurosceptic parties in the governing coalition, 
inconsistent government policies with respect to the EU agenda, a 
poor legislative process that undermines the constitutional 
protection of rights in favour of strong lobbies and oligarchs, 
Bulgaria’s performance is rather weak. The country is not prepared 
to take part in the hard choices to be made in the new five-year 
European institutional term.  
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6.2 The Bulgarian presidency of the Council: rising 
ambition  
6.2.1 The Bulgarian government perspective 
Last year was marked by a predominance of the European topics in 
domestic politics due to the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union that started on 1 January 2018. The government 
and its parliamentary majority embraced a pragmatic approach to 
Bulgaria’s presidency and tried to 
benefit politically from public support 
for the EU and from the official visits of 
EU leaders. The European policy 
agenda dominated national public 
discourse while providing common 
ground to seek political compromise 
among the major players in Bulgarian 
politics. There were no major gaps in the logistics or organisation of 
the events, which is an achievement in itself given the overall low 
performance of domestic institutions. The public image of the 
government, however, was affected by ongoing corruption 
investigations into the management of public procurement for the 
reconstruction of the main official conference venue for the 
Bulgarian presidency. Both the independent parliamentary inquiry 
committee and the Bulgarian Public Prosecution Office found 
sufficient evidence of corruption and abuse of public funds 
allocated to the reconstruction of the building and the external space 
(Parliamentary Report 2017). 
During the Bulgarian Presidency, the initial priorities of 
achieving consensus, competitiveness, and cohesion were reshaped 
to fit the changing political agenda of the Bulgarian authorities. 
Bulgaria’s political leadership shifted the policy agenda and public 
discourse to the enlargement perspectives of the Western Balkan 
countries. With this diplomatic manoeuvre, the Bulgarian 
government avoided the critical attention of European leaders to the 
national institutional shortcomings and deficiencies (continuing 
CVM monitoring, blockage of the judicial reform, ineffective fight 
against high-level corruption, stability of the banking sector). 
Second, it took a seemingly pro-European stance emphasising unity 
at challenging times for the Union and strengthening the EU 
The government and its 
parliamentary majority 
embraced a pragmatic 
approach to Bulgaria’s 
presidency and tried to 
benefit politically. 
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neighbourhood policy; third, it emerged as an important regional 
policy player, garnering positive attention and even praise from the 
leaderships of the Western Balkan countries. 
 Bulgaria’s diplomatic endeavours enabled the EU to appear 
stronger once more and welcoming to neighbouring countries after 
a long period of dissatisfaction and disenchantment on the part of 
older member states affected by rising national populist 
movements. (Guisto et al., 2013; Smilov, 2015). The official adoption 
on 17 May 2018 of the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans 
Summit highlighted the importance of EU enlargement perspectives 
for the Western Balkan countries. The aim was to strengthen their 
commitment to maintaining democracy and the rule of law in the 
region, emphasising respect for human rights and the rights of 
minorities, pursuing institutional reforms in line with European 
values and principles, along with combating corruption and 
organised crime, and countering terrorism and extremism 
(European Council, May 2018). 
 As regards the reinvigorated policies towards the Western 
Balkans, a specific achievement of the Bulgarian authorities are the 
improved relations with the Republic of North Macedonia. With the 
major political changes brought about in 2017 after negotiated snap 
elections, the new pro-European government led by Zoran Zaev 
changed the foreign policy orientation of the country and favoured 
good relations with neighbouring Bulgaria and with the EU. This 
move resulted in the signing of the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
cooperation agreement, which opened the way to intensified 
cooperation in all major fields (political, economic, and cultural). In 
the beginning of 2018, the parliaments of the two countries ratified 
the mutual cooperation treaty, thus opening the Euro-Atlantic 
perspective to Macedonia (BNA, 2018).  
The Bulgarian presidency was generally beneficial to 
deepening the country’s integration into European structures and 
initiatives. In December 2017 the country joined other member 
states in establishing PESCO on security and defence (PESCO, 
2017). In the EU area of freedom, security and justice, Bulgaria took 
part in the creation of a new powerful European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (EPPO) (Council Regulation, 2017). The Bulgarian 
government also took a decision to join the EU banking union en 
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route to the ERM II and, in the near future, to the eurozone (CoM 
Decision 2018).  
6.2.2 The parliamentary perspective 
If we shift focus from the executive branch to the involvement of the 
Bulgarian Parliament in ongoing debates on the future of the EU, 
we discover a rather different dynamic. It is caused by several 
factors that are simultaneously at play: first, in the Bulgarian 
practice of governance, the executive is often over-powerful due to 
the prominent role the prime minister usually plays in the ruling 
party (being its chairman/chairwoman) – this leads to undermining 
the autonomy of the parliamentary party group as regards the 
political decision-making process, and to overshadowing the 
parliamentary activity in general; second, some parties (the 
governing GERB party included) have very centralised internal 
decision-making process which concentrates powers in the figure of 
the leader and his/her closest aides; third, a lack of expertise among 
Members of Parliament with respect to the complex EU institutional 
and decision-making aspects; fourth, key parliamentary committees 
are dominated by representatives of the ruling party, which limits 
the opportunity and incentives for effective parliamentary oversight 
of the executive branch. These preconditions systematically affect 
Bulgarian parliamentarism in a negative way.      
The Bulgarian Parliament as a whole has important 
competences as regards EU institutional and policy issues (Rules of 
Procedure, 2017): 
• to participate in the process of assessment of the 
implementation of the EU policies within the area of freedom, 
security and justice, in the political scrutiny of Europol and in 
the assessment of the activities of Eurojust; 
• to make a motivated request to the Council of Ministers to 
submit to the Court of Justice of the European Union a claim 
on non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in a 
legislative act; 
• to participate in the procedures for revision of the Treaties of 
the European Union; 
• to consider applications for accession to the EU; 
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• to participate in the process of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation within the EU; 
• to receive reports from the government on the participation 
of the country in the decision-making process of the EU 
during the rotating presidency of the Council; 
• to hold a hearing with the prime minister on the position of 
the country in forthcoming meetings of the European 
Council. 
Formally, some of the Parliament’s competences on EU issues are 
assigned to the standing parliamentary Committee on European 
Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds. The legal basis of the 
Committee is well established in the Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure (2017) that have a binding force of law. The Committee 
consists of only nine members (half as many as the other key 
committees), and only two of them have adequate experience 
related to EU politics and affairs. In the composition of the 
Committee, the principle of parity is observed (two MPs from each 
parliamentary group - Art. 19 Rules of Procedure). Its key functions 
are:  
• to mainstream and coordinate the process of drafting of the 
Annual Work Programme of the National Assembly on the 
Matters of the European Union, which contains a list of the 
draft acts of the institutions of the EU in respect of which the 
Parliament exercises monitoring and control;  
• to hold debates on Framework Positions on draft acts of EU 
institutions, submitted by the national government, and on 
draft acts themselves;  
• to impose a parliamentary reservation on a draft act of an EU 
institution, included in the Annual Work Programme; 
• to prepare a reasoned opinion where a draft legislative act of 
an EU institution is found to be non-compliant with the 
principle of subsidiarity; 
• to conduct hearings of candidates who are nominated by the 
Council of Ministers for positions in EU institutions. 
The Committee is currently chaired by Kristian Vigenin – a 
representative of the major opposition party (the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party, member of PES), former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2013-
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2014), and former MEP. In fact, the specific work of the Committee 
related to EU issues amounts to only half of its annual activity, the 
other half being involvement in the ordinary legislative procedure 
on domestic legislation.2 It would not be unfair to consider the 
institutional dynamics and public outreach of the Committee’s 
activity as underperformance (compared to other parliamentary 
committees). The Committee is not recognised by the wider public 
as a central forum for political discussions as regards EU issues, nor 
is it accepted as a key parliamentary committee that can influence 
the outcomes of parliamentary debates (if compared to other bodies, 
i.e. the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Foreign Policy Committee 
or the Committee on Internal Security and Public Order, chaired by 
the ruling party). Hence, the diplomatic gesture to leave the 
chairmanship of the Committee to the opposition is of no real 
parliamentary significance and should not be regarded as a sign of 
mature parliamentarism.   
During the EU Presidency the Committee undertook two 
important activities. On 13 June 2018 it held a joint session with the 
Foreign Policy Committee focused on the ongoing debates on the 
future of the EU, initiated after the Commission’s White Paper on 
the Future of Europe that was launched in March 2017. During the 
joint session, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ekaterina Zaharieva was invited to present a report on the most 
recent updates in relation to Bulgaria’s position on the document 
and the discussions taking place at Council level (Committee 
Minutes, 2018). From the statements of the minister it is obvious that 
during the presidency of the Council, the parliamentary committees 
were not very active with respect to the EU affairs. During the 
Committee hearing, the minister emphasised the role of the 
Bulgarian presidency in streamlining the legislative initiatives with 
respect to increasing the political legitimacy of the EU through more 
inclusive and participatory instruments for European citizens, 
including the process of drafting and public consultations of the 
new European Citizens’ Initiative Regulation. Minister Zaharieva 
also emphasised the role of public consultations and citizens’ 
                                                        
2 An indicative fact of minor importance: the English section of the 
committee’s web page is empty (no information can be found). 
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dialogues initiated with respect to the proposals for reforming the 
EU.  
During the Committee hearing, issues related to the 
membership of the country in the Schengen area, joining the ERM II 
and the eurozone, and participation in PESCO and EPPO, were also 
discussed. The Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed her opinion 
that Bulgarian society convincingly chose the scenario of deepening 
European integration (to become part of the EU’s core) over the 
disintegration and weakening of the EU scenarios.  
The interaction of the Committee with government officials 
(public hearings, access to information) is indicative of the level of 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. According to Committee 
Chairman Vigenin, who is expected to be well informed on the 
issue, the situation with the much anticipated membership of the 
country in the Schengen area is as yet unclear – different 
interpretations circulate among different institutional stakeholders, 
while the Bulgarian government has not provided accurate and 
timely information to parliament or to society.  
During the public hearing Vigenin also pointed out that the 
Bulgarian Parliament lacks the necessary expertise with respect to 
the ongoing debate about the transformation of the EU, unlike other 
national parliaments in older member states. The deficits in 
expertise, claims Vigenin, are on both the political and 
administrative level and affect the understanding of key EU 
institutional features, such as the redistribution of competences 
between the European (supra-national), national and regional 
levels. During the debates, Vigenin also emphasised the levels of 
alienation of European citizens from the 
decision-making process at the EU level 
(Committee Minutes, 2018). 
The minutes of the Committee on 
European Affairs of the Bulgarian 
Parliament show that there is no clear 
institutional statement or any 
meaningful input into the discussion on 
the implementation of subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles. Bulgarian 
MPs have not consistently engaged in a creative political discussion 
about the need to reform the EU’s legislative procedure and how to 
Bulgarian MPs have not 
consistently engaged in 
discussion about the need 
to reform the EU’s 
legislative procedure and 
how to give national 
parliaments or regional or 
local authorities a stronger 
voice in the process. 
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give national parliaments or regional or local authorities a stronger 
voice in the process. Related parliamentary debates and discussions 
only present a rather selective and formal reflection on the work 
done by others and there is no significant contribution to the 
European debates on the issue.    
Notwithstanding the lack of public attention to the work of 
the Committee chaired by Vigenin, he himself was very active at EU 
level. Vigenin took an active part in the work of the Task Force on 
Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less More 
Efficiently” headed by Commission Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans. The Task Force included three members from EU 
national parliaments, three from the European Parliament and three 
from the Committee of the Regions. This working group was 
established in line with the statement of President Juncker in his 
State of the Union Address on 13 September 2017: "The European 
Commission must be big on the big things, and act only where it can 
achieve better results than Member States acting alone”. The main tasks 
of the group were defined as follows: make recommendations on 
how to better apply the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality; identify policy areas where work could be re-
delegated or definitely returned to EU countries; find ways to better 
involve regional and local authorities in EU policy making and 
delivery. The final report was presented to the Commission in July 
2018. The Task Force concluded that a new way of working on 
subsidiarity and proportionality is needed to allow local and 
regional authorities and national parliaments to make a more 
effective contribution to the EU policymaking and in the design of 
new legislation, including through extending the period of 
consultation up to 12 weeks (The Task Force Report, 2018). 
Speaking of the level of engagement with EU themes, it is 
worth noting that the 2018 Annual Work Programme of the 
National Assembly on EU Issues was adopted in October 2018 – 
after the EU Presidency (2018 Annual Work Programme). The 
Parliament states in the Work Programme that it will exercise its 
constitutional competence and oversight on several EU legal and 
institutional reform proposals. Among them are the proposals for 
the Multiannual Financial Framework, the Energy Union, 
broadening the competence of the EPPO, social rights issues and 
reforms, the enlargement process in the Western Balkans (especially 
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Serbia and Montenegro), the initiative of strengthening the rule of 
law in the EU, the initiative on enhancing the subsidiarity, and 
proportionality and better regulation in the EU. 
Participation in COSAC 
During the Bulgarian Presidency, the Committee on European 
Affairs of the Bulgarian Parliament hosted the Plenary Meeting of 
COSAC in Sofia from 17 to 19 June 2018. The publicly released 
synopsis of discussions highlighted several issues. First, focus was 
put on the need of further development of democratic legitimacy in 
Europe, especially with respect to rising national populism across 
the EU. Along these lines, the Presidency successfully completed the 
negotiations on the Regulation on the statute and funding of 
European political parties and European political foundations, and 
also streamlined the work on the European Commission’s proposal 
to reform the European Citizens' Initiative (COSAC Plenary 
Meeting 2018). Second, emphasis was placed on the work of the Task 
Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and Doing Less More Efficiently 
and the related discussions and consultations as regards the 
drafting of the report and final proposals for reform. It is 
highlighted that the existing Early Warning System is not sufficient 
to provide adequate time and space for reasoned opinions on behalf 
of the national parliaments (regional or local authorities). In the 
period of its operation this mechanism resulted in only three ‘yellow 
cards’; however, on all three occasions the Commission stated that 
the principle of subsidiarity had not been breached (COSAC 2018, 
Session V).  
During the Bulgarian presidency a special COSAC Working 
Group was founded (chaired by Vigenin) with the objective to 
provide a more inclusive approach and to give feedback on the 
work done by the Task Force. During the work of the Task Force, 
the Bulgarian Parliament voiced its opinions on certain matters 
related to the EU law-making process advocating more 
participatory approach that will give national parliaments an 
opportunity to be truly involved in the process. Similarly, as regards 
the European integration of the Western Balkans, the national 
parliament emphasised the positive role of the integration process 
for enhancing stability, economic development and social progress 
(COSAC 29th Biannual Report, 2018). 
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According to the COSAC report, the Bulgarian Parliament 
also believed that a more effective, focused and flexible cohesion 
policy must remain a priority policy in the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework, as it is important for promoting convergence 
between member states and for stabilising the immediate 
neighbourhood (COSAC Report, 2018:14). 
6.3 Domestic usages of EU membership: failing on 
performance 
The process of deepening Bulgaria’s European integration 
encounters several persistent problems. First and foremost, Bulgaria 
lacks a strategic vision of its engagement with the European agenda 
and reforms. The country has not 
produced a coherent understanding of 
its own place and role in the pluralist 
European public order, and it has not 
clearly defined its national strategy in 
reforming the EU (either towards more 
federal, or more decentralised system). The White Paper on the 
Future of Europe, produced by the Commission in 2017, has 
remained largely neglected by the Bulgarian political leadership, 
and neither have the institutions expressed a clear view or 
preference with respect to the different scenarios developed in the 
document. Bulgaria’s participation in different initiatives remains 
rather low-key and inefficient, and the country does not exercise 
leadership in any specific integration process. The political ambition 
to contribute to the EU accession of the Western Balkans is far 
beyond the country’s competence and the capacity of its current 
political leadership.  
The public image of the EU, as portrayed by the majority of 
the Bulgarian media, is far from positive. Anti-EU propaganda 
reached its peak in the past three years. 
It has exposed the vulnerability of 
Bulgarian institutions and society to 
Eurosceptic and populist rhetoric 
(Antidemocratic Propaganda Report, 
2018). In some media outlets, the EU is 
publicly associated with the inefficient 
institutional response to mass 
Bulgaria lacks a strategic 
vision of its engagement 
with the European 
agenda and reforms. 
Recent anti-EU 
propaganda has exposed 
the vulnerability of 
Bulgarian institutions and 
society to Eurosceptic and 
populist rhetoric. 
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migration, with imposing a new value system (described by some 
media outlets as ‘genderism’) opposed to traditional family or 
Christian values supported by the majority (as indicated by the 
fierce public debate about the failed ratification of the Istanbul 
Convention), as well as with limiting the discretion on policy issues 
of national political institutions. 
On key foreign policy issues Bulgarian institutions, including 
the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, have endorsed 
official positions that either openly or factually undermine the 
common European response to different sensitive policy issues: in 
the Skripal case, Bulgaria refused to expel Russian diplomats (and 
spies) in a gesture of solidarity with the UK and other EU states; the 
Bulgarian authorities continue to endorse strategic engagement 
with Russia in the field of energy supply, thus undermining the 
common EU rules and EU supported projects in the region; the 
ruling party GERB and the Bulgarian government officially support 
Orban’s Eurosceptic government, contrary to the prevailing 
position of other member states and EU institutions (Stanev, 2018).  
As regards relations between the major Bulgarian parties and 
their European counterparts, there are certain developments. The 
ruling GERB party, notwithstanding its domestic policies 
undermining the EU fundamental principles and values (the rule of 
law), has publicly supported the leading candidate 
(Spitzenkandidat) of the EPP, Manfred Weber, in the 2019 European 
Parliament elections. This double play of some EPP member parties 
is often tolerated by the EPP itself, thus raising strong criticisms of 
having double standards and advancing a semi-authoritarian 
political agenda in some countries (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria). In the 
autumn of 2018, the major opposition party BSP embraced a more 
populist platform (including anti-eurozone statements, anti-
immigrant policies and an anti-Istanbul Convention stance), openly 
opposed key PES official declarations and declined participation in 
the XIth PES Congress that took place on 7-8 December in Lisbon, 
though remaining a PES member (Gotev, 2018).  
The internal guiding principles and rules of the European 
parties are not sufficiently operational as regards their member 
parties. Whenever EU party rules and discipline face opportunistic 
domestic policies of their members, what remains is only a 
European veil covering a deeply corrupt domestic political process. 
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Conclusion 
In the context of declining rule of law and democracy standards in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria’s political leadership has at 
best an ambivalent role as regards the necessary institutional 
reforms that would place the country at the core of the EU (the 
eurozone and the Schengen area). Last year, during the Bulgarian 
presidency of the Council when the European issues dominated the 
public media landscape, some steps were taken in the right 
direction, notably the application to join the European banking 
union and the emphasis on the enlargement perspective for the 
Western Balkans. With domestic policy, however, no decisive 
reforms were undertaken to cope with the most persistent 
institutional problems connected to upholding the rule of law and 
combating high-level corruption. For eleven successive years 
Bulgaria has been monitored under the CVM, but the remaining 
specific reforms yet to be implemented outweigh the achievements. 
In the context of a rapidly changing European political 
landscape, Bulgaria’s growing leadership ambitions in the SEE 
region are doomed to face the chilling reality of unfulfilled promises 
and poor institutional performance. Relying on national populist 
and Eurosceptic parties to maintain the parliamentary majority, 
making flattering concessions to Orban’s regime, and refusing to 
implement key institutional reforms can hardly help the Bulgarian 
government stand firmly on pro-European ground. Without a clear 
and committed reformist agenda, executed by adequate political 
leadership, Bulgaria will continue to struggle with its institutional 
deficiencies that erode the rule of law and the democratic process in 
the country. Along with the political and strategic changes at the EU 
level, Bulgarian society also faces important political choices. It is a 
decisive period for the pro-European forces in the country. Either 
they will mobilise public support for a clear reformist agenda or the 
country will continue to slip towards the European periphery with 
its political uncertainty, volatile economies and persistent threats to 
democracy.  
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7. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN CZECHIA: A DISCONNECT 
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND 
EU LEVEL 
JAN KOVÁŘ, PETR KRATOCHVÍL & 
ZDENĚK SYCHRA 
Until recently, Czechia’s party system revolved around the two strongest 
parties. However, this system collapsed when it was replaced by the 
government of Andrej Babiš’s ANO movement, which represents the most 
recent embodiment of a series of populist parties in the last decade. 
Parliamentary control of the executive is theoretically strong, but many 
instruments are used ineffectively and even parliament’s strongest power 
(the no confidence vote) is rarely used successfully. The Czech Parliament 
has functional structures to deal with the EU agenda, but EU issues 
remain second-order ones. Moreover, when the EU agenda is debated, it is 
predominantly framed in domestic political terms. Political parties do not 
build systematic structures to ensure intra-party EU expertise and have 
only a limited number of expert staff at their disposal. There is relatively 
strong cohesion among Czech MEPs within political groups. However, 
they are often perceived as autonomous units within their parties. Overall, 
the Czech representative model is relatively functional at the national level, 
but it is clearly separate from the European level, and its ability to 
intervene in the EU’s dynamics is limited.  
7.1 The national context 
7.1.1 The representative model 
Czechia is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament. 
The parliament holds the legislative power according to the 
Constitution, even though other political actors (such as the 
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government or the regional assemblies) may also submit bills. The 
lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies (hereafter the Chamber), 
consists of 200 members, and the upper chamber (the Senate) 
consists of 81 Senators. Multiple asymmetries between the two 
chambers exist. Some of them have been already enshrined in the 
Constitution, such as the stronger powers of the lower chamber 
when bills are being adopted since an absolute majority of deputies 
in the Chamber can overrule a negative Senate vote on a bill. Other 
asymmetries are, however, a consequence of the historical evolution 
of the two chambers as the first election of the Senate took place only 
seven years after the Velvet Revolution, and the Senate is repeatedly 
attacked as a useless but expensive institution.  
Since the birth of Czechia in 1993, the country has had a total 
of 15 governments. Out of these, three were caretaker governments 
(January-July 1998, May 2009-July 2010, and July 2013-January 
2014). Three minority governments were approved in confidence 
votes (1996-98, 1998-2002, and the current government) and a 
further government relied on exactly one half of the deputies (2007-
09). Interestingly, all three of the minority governments were 
marked by concerns about backsliding from democracy as the 
normal functioning of the opposition was weakened. In particular, 
the period of the so-called Opposition Agreement between the Civic 
Democrats and the Social Democrats (1998-2002) is widely 
considered a period of non-transparent decision-making and 
deterioration in democratic standards.1 
If one puts aside the caretaker governments and those that 
failed to pass the motion of confidence, altogether ten regular 
governments have ruled the country. Out of those, six remained in 
power for more than two years and only four remained in place 
until the date of the regular parliamentary election. Having said 
this, some of the governments formally fell, but the same party (the 
Social Democrats) continued as the strongest coalition member 
                                                        
1 The time of this Opposition Agreement was marked by a number of 
irregularities of both a political and an economic nature. Allegations were 
widespread about burgeoning corruption, with prominent large-scale 
investments being allocated without transparent tenders and with dubious 
results. The Opposition Agreement led to a substantial decrease of overall 
trust in politics on the part of the public (cf. https://interaktivni. 
rozhlas.cz/data/volby-historie/1998_opozicni_smlouva/).  
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several times. For instance, although there were four consecutive 
prime ministers (PMs) from July 1998 to September 2006, all four 
were members of the Social Democrats. In this sense, the stability of 
government was somewhat lower than that in Germany and 
comparable to that in Poland, but still better than that in Italy or 
France. 
Basically, from the very birth of the independent Czech 
Republic in 1993, the model of coalition-building always revolved 
around the two strongest parties – the right-wing Civic Democratic 
Party and the left-wing Social Democratic Party. These two parties 
commonly needed additional coalition partners, usually from the 
political centre. Typically, the centrist Christian Democrats supplied 
the necessary votes. The dominance of the two biggest parties 
remained unchallenged for a long period of time: until the end of 
2017 all PMs (except for the caretaker ones) were members of either 
one or the other party. However, the situation has changed over the 
last decade with a series of new, supposedly ‘non-elite’ or even 
‘non-political’ parties/movements emerging and gaining 
substantial electoral support. Their key argument was that they do 
not conduct politics, do not belong to the old political elite and 
instead focus on practical things that have to be done. Finally, the 
most recent product of this development was the billionaire and 
former finance minister Andrej Babiš forming his government in 
late 2017, thus definitively ending the alternation of power between 
the Civic and Social Democrats.  
7.1.2 Political cleavages 
Political cleavages play an important role, especially as the notion 
of a consensual policymaking has never been strong in Czech 
politics. However, the right-left cleavage 
or the triangle of liberalism-socialism-
conservatism seems to be less useful in 
the Czech context. Instead, the current 
wave of populism is so strong as to 
replace traditional cleavages with new 
distinctions such as the elites vs. the 
ordinary people or politicians vs. those 
who ‘really work’.  
Populism is now so 
strong as to replace 
traditional cleavages 
with new distinctions, 
such as the elites vs. the 
ordinary people. 
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A recently instrumentalised cleavage is that between Prague 
and the rest of the country. As artificial as this division is, it has 
become a powerful motto of the populist movements whose 
members often launch diatribes against the “Prague café 
intellectuals” who are supposedly detached from the concerns of 
real people in the countryside. Behind this split lies the deeper 
problem of the stark socio-economic disparities that plague some 
regions. In spite of all its economic success, Czechia has a 
disproportionately high share of people who are caught in debt 
traps and almost ten percent of the adult population are burdened 
by seizure orders.  
This also explains the paradox of the dissatisfaction of large 
swaths of the population at the time of an economic boom. The 
country has been growing with impressive speed, with average 
wages rising faster than expected, and unemployment remaining 
the lowest in the EU. However, those faced with seizure orders 
remained largely untouched by the positive changes as their income 
could be legally re-channelled to debt settlement. To make things 
worse, these forgotten citizens were also those most likely to be 
affected by the robotisation of industrial production, which 
constitutes a disproportionately large share of the economy.  
In a development similar to that in other parts of Europe, the 
language of dissatisfaction has taken on a pronouncedly 
identitarian aspect. As a result, even economic concerns are often 
expressed in the language of cultural difference (“Muslim refugees 
taking our jobs”, “gender ideology of the rich liberals in Prague”, 
etc.). Although the religious divide had been fairly marginal for a 
long time, it has recently re-emerged as the Czech Catholic Church 
seems to have become a haven for the most conservative, 
homophobic, anti-EU, and counter-emancipatory elements in the 
society. Hence, religious language is often used by religious leaders 
to justify the refusal to accept refugees, or to attack “perverse gender 
ideology”. In this respect, it does not make sense to differentiate 
between socio-economic and cultural/religious factors, as the latter 
are used to exploit the problems directly related to the former. 
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7.1.3 Instruments to scrutinise the executive 
The Constitution gives the parliament strong powers to control the 
government. Among the many instruments for this, three stand out: 
votes of confidence and no confidence, 
investigating commissions, and 
parliamentary interpellations of 
government members. 
The most important of these are 
the vote of confidence and the vote of 
no confidence. Every new government 
has to go before the lower chamber of 
the parliament, asking for their 
confidence (article 68). Several 
governments in recent history have 
not received the confidence of the Chamber (such as the 
government of Jiří Rusnok and the first government of Andrej 
Babiš). However, as the Constitution does not set precise time limits 
for steps after the failure of a vote of confidence, policymakers, in 
particular President Miloš Zeman, have experimented with 
maintaining governments without parliamentary confidence in 
office. The complementary instrument is the vote of no-confidence 
(article 72). However, this instrument is used rarely. In fact, only one 
government fell following a vote of no confidence (the government 
of Mirek Topolánek in 2009). While the no confidence vote is 
regularly invoked by the parliamentarians, it is typically called for 
by opposition deputies who lack the sufficient numbers.  
Another tool of parliamentary control available to 
parliamentarians is the investigating commission, which may be 
established if at least forty deputies agree on its creation (article 30). 
Investigating commissions have been established frequently, over 
20 of them in the last 25 years. Most focus on economic matters and 
the involvement of political actors. In the last ten years, however, 
the commissions have also increasingly started to investigate issues 
related to the police and the prosecutor’s office, which indicates that 
there is a worrying development towards more attacks on the 
independence of these vital institutions.  
The third important instrument is the possibility of 
interpellations. Article 38 of the Constitution states that 
The Constitution gives the 
parliament strong powers to 
control the government, of 
which three stand out: votes 
of confidence and no 
confidence, investigating 
commissions, and 
parliamentary 
interpellations of 
government members. 
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members of the government are obliged to appear in 
person at a meeting of the Chamber, if it so resolves. The 
same applies to meetings of committees, commissions, or 
investigating commissions, in which case, however, a 
member of the government may have a deputy or another 
member of the government to appear in his stead if his 
personal participation has not been explicitly demanded. 
Article 53 adds that 
each Deputy has the right to interpellate the government 
or members of it concerning matters within their 
competence (...) Interpellated members of the government 
shall respond to an interpellation within thirty days of its 
submission.  
As a result, members of the government have long tried to avoid 
oral interpellations, instead opting for the less confrontational 
written replies to interpellations. Their practical impact in the form 
of direct interactions between the deputies and the ministers is thus 
limited.  
7.2 The EU dimension 
7.2.1 EU affairs-related structures in the parliament 
The Czech Parliament set up its EU affairs structures during the pre-
accession period. In the Chamber, the Committee for European 
Integration was set up in 1998, as was the European Integration 
Committee in the Senate. Following the EU accession, both 
committees were given their current respective names: the 
Committee on European Affairs (the Chamber) and the Committee 
on European Union Affairs (the Senate). Moreover, in the Senate the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security also deals with 
the EU agenda but only as regards the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (before the Lisbon Treaty it also examined third 
pillar dossiers). Article 10b of the Constitution envisages the 
possibility to set up a joint committee for the EU agenda of the two 
chambers. Nonetheless, such a joint body was never set up, 
although in the past there was a proposal for it by the Senate. 
Currently, the idea is for both chambers to have their own separate 
EU affairs committees. 
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Resolutions of the Chamber’s Committee on European Affairs 
are considered to be resolutions of the whole chamber if the plenary 
does not decide to discuss and alter them 
thereafter. This contrasts with resolutions 
of the other mandatory committees 
among the seven committees that must be 
established after each election, which 
only have recommendatory status and 
have to be adopted, amended or rejected 
by the plenary. Creation of the Senate’s 
EU committee is not mandatory. More 
importantly, its resolutions are not 
automatically taken as resolutions of the 
entire chamber but they have to be adopted, amended or rejected by 
the plenary. In any case, the EU affairs committees in both chambers 
play a crucial role as regards which documents may (and, in the case 
of the Senate, will) become the subject of the discussion of the 
plenary, and are thus the principal bodies of scrutiny of the EU 
agenda (Kovář and Sychra, 2018). 
The EU affairs committees of both chambers have relatively 
low numbers of members compared to other committees. The role 
of the chairperson in each committee is crucial since she/he is 
instrumental in selecting documents to be discussed, deciding about 
the submission of dossiers to the plenary (i.e. in the Chamber), and 
setting the frequency of meetings. This crucial role is underlined by 
research showing that in the periods when the given chairperson 
was missing, the respective committee fell into significant inactivity 
(Král and Bartovic, 2010; Kuta and Němec, 2015). The committee in 
the Chamber meets less frequently than either the other committees 
or the Senate’s committee, which has a roughly similar meeting 
frequency as the other committees. The EU affairs committees are 
supported in their day-to-day work by expert bodies. For the 
Chamber’s committee, it is the Department of EU Affairs of the 
Parliamentary Institute. In the Senate, it is the EU Unit of the 
Foreign Relations Department of the Senate’s Chancellery. 
Resolutions of the 
Chamber’s Committee 
on European Affairs are 
considered to be 
resolutions of the whole 
chamber if the plenary 
does not decide to 
discuss and alter them 
thereafter. 
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7.2.2 The second-order character of EU affairs in the 
parliament 
The parliamentary debate on the EU agenda at the plenary meetings 
does not attract significant interest either from deputies or political 
parties at large. Deputies are not much interested in EU issues and 
usually do not pay much attention to them. While parties and 
parliamentarians can use the existing procedures to scrutinise 
government handling of EU issues and to deliberate upon them, this 
does not really happen. The use of these instruments depends on 
their deployment by individual deputies (Kuta, 2015). For Czech 
parties, the EU agenda is still a second-order issue (Kovář and 
Hendrych, 2015). In particular, the Chamber’s plenary plays an 
extremely limited role in scrutinising the actions of the executive at 
the European Council meetings. No discussion is regularly held 
after the summits, the mandate is not discussed beforehand and the 
plenary does not possess a legal mandate. 
In 2010, the Chamber established a fixed EU affairs section in 
the plenary programme, which serves to discuss an EU agenda if 
such an agenda is submitted to the plenary. While the Chamber’s 
EU affairs committee may propose an EU agenda to be discussed at 
the plenary, the number of EU dossiers submitted remains quite 
low, slightly less than a half dozen annually. Moreover, if EU issues 
are submitted to the plenary, often only members of the EU affairs 
committee participate in the discussion (Kuta, 2015). Usually the 
resolutions adopted by the plenary are the same as previously 
adopted by the EU affairs committee, which underlines the limited 
role played by the plenary. Finally, there is a quantitative difference 
in terms of the intensity of EU affairs discussion between the two 
chambers. While the Chamber primarily focuses on domestic 
political issues and EU issues are very rarely debated in plenary, the 
Senate tends to focus on the EU agenda more intensively (Král and 
Bartovic, 2010). 
The low level of parliamentary interest in EU affairs is 
explained by several factors. First, with low interest in EU affairs 
among the general public and media, focusing on EU issues does 
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not bring electoral benefits, making them less attractive for 
parliamentarians and 
decreasing their willingness to 
invest in politicising EU issues. 
Moreover, the current chairman 
of the Chamber’s EU committee 
argues that EU agendas are 
often very urgent so there is not 
enough time for a plenary 
discussion and the EU affairs 
committee can speak for the 
entire chamber (Kuta, 2015; Kuta and Němec, 2015).  
The lower activity of the Chamber’s plenary is explained by 
the fact that its EU affairs committee speaks for the whole chamber. 
Therefore, there is no necessity for EU issues to be submitted to the 
plenary. In the Senate in contrast, a plenary vote is required for a 
resolution to be adopted and thus EU issues are discussed there 
more often. Moreover, unlike in the case of the Senate, there is a 
constitutional link between the government and the Chamber, and 
hence the Chamber leaves more leeway for the government to deal 
with the EU agenda, according to its division between government 
and opposition deputies. The government majority in the Chamber 
has an interest in preventing any discussion of EU issues that stem 
from the opposition and/or those that can create problems for the 
government (i.e. exposing division and/or decreasing public 
support). 
7.2.3 Mobilisation of EU issues: lacking an EU 
dimension  
The mobilisation of EU issues in the parliament is best characterised 
by a dominance of national over EU politics. Generally speaking, 
politicians debate EU issues predominantly from national points of 
view and frame the debate in domestic political terms. The 
parliamentary debate on EU affairs thus underlines the general 
trend in Czech EU policy: EU affairs are often seen as something 
detached where the EU is perceived as external to Czechia rather 
than being perceived as an integral part of Czech representative 
politics. 
With low interest in EU affairs 
among the general public and 
media, focus on EU issues does not 
bring electoral benefits. This 
makes them less attractive for 
parliamentarians and decreases 
their willingness to invest in 
politicising EU issues. 
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At the same time, EU issues are not among the important 
determinants of parliamentarians’ behaviour. Deputies’ behaviour 
in parliament is primarily determined by their 
government/opposition status and, secondarily, by their party’s 
ideological position. Regarding the EU affairs committees, party 
affiliation and, in particular, the party’s government/opposition 
status still determine parliamentarians’ voting behaviour, and the 
committees therefore remain firmly within the parties’ control. 
Moreover, EU issues are rarely politicised during committee 
deliberations beyond party affiliation and government/opposition 
status. Similarly, party membership and government/opposition 
status are the main determinants of voting behaviour at the plenary. 
In other words, it is primarily the party’s current position in the 
system that influences how its deputies will vote upon and 
deliberate the EU agenda. While the EU agenda is more politicised 
at the plenary, this is usually not related to the specifics of the given 
dossier but rather relates to the clash between government and 
opposition. In general, EU issues are raised based on domestic 
politics, and political parties prioritise loyalty to the 
government/opposition over substantive stances towards EU 
issues (Kuta and Němec, 2015; Strelkov, 2015). 
7.2.4 EU topics discussed in the parliament 
The EU-related topics discussed naturally vary depending on the 
context of the current EU agenda and Czech priorities. Recently, 
these have included, in particular, migration, Brexit, security policy, 
the multi-annual financial framework, economic and monetary 
union, the road traffic legislative package and institutional issues. 
The positions of both chambers on the individual substantive issues 
are, in general, in line with the positions of the Czech government. 
The character of the parliamentary debate on EU themes 
partly changed after the parliamentary elections in October 2017, 
following the dominant victory of the EU-critical ANO movement 
and the significant gains of the anti-immigration SPD movement led 
by Tomio Okamura. Despite its lower electoral gains, the 
Eurosceptic Communist Party strengthened its influence through its 
support for the minority government of Andrej Babiš. Against this 
background, the lower house began to criticise the EU more often. 
The most discussed topic has been migration/asylum policy, which 
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has been an obsessive element of the EU debate for several years. 
Czech MPs also advocate a much greater involvement of national 
parliaments in the EU agenda such as in the EU reform process, the 
legislative procedure or decision-making within the economic 
governance of the economic and monetary union (Kovář and 
Sychra, 2018). 
7.2.5 EU-related motions of censure 
So far there have been no EU-related motions of censure in the 
parliament, which reflects the fact that the EU agenda has a limited 
impact on parliamentary business. Moreover, party stances towards 
the EU do not play an important role in the government formation 
process. In fact, in the past government coalitions have been formed 
from ideologically significantly distant parties in terms of their 
positions on the EU dimension. The EU dimension is thus a fairly 
unimportant policy topic for parliamentary business, and parties 
exclude it from the political bargaining of coalition politics. 
7.2.6 Expertise on EU affairs 
A crucial condition for quality parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs 
and representation in EU politics is the availability and use of 
expertise. Unfortunately, the low interest in EU politics of Czech 
parties/parliamentarians means that even in cases in which 
expertise is available it is rarely used. Internally, Czech political 
parties are little interested in the EU agenda. They do not build 
systematic structures to ensure intra-party EU expertise and have 
only a very limited number of expert staff at their disposal. The 
parties also lack embedded functional processes that could handle 
EU issues on a routine basis. This leads to the lack of an expert 
background and skills to deal with EU 
issues (Kovář and Hendrych, 2015). 
Membership of the EU affairs 
committees is seen as a last resort by 
parliamentarians if they cannot become 
members of other committees and 
therefore only a few heavyweights join 
their ranks. This indicates that the EU agenda is considered to be a 
non-issue in the parliament (Král and Bartovic, 2010; Strelkov, 2015). 
Membership of the EU 
affairs committees is 
seen as a last resort by 
parliamentarians if they 
cannot become members 
of other committees. 
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The low profile of the EU committees means that their membership 
is not generated on the basis of EU expertise. Moreover, the far-
reaching range of specific sectoral dossiers that the EU committees 
have to deal with, together with the low number of EU agenda 
experts in political parties makes it difficult to draw members with 
relevant and sufficient expertise.  
In an ideal case, the EU affairs committees would consist of 
members with a special expertise in (a) particular EU policy area(s) 
for which they would serve continuously as rapporteurs. Over time, 
it would cultivate their expertise in the given policy area(s) and 
increase the expert basis of the committee’s work. In fact, this is the 
case in the Senate’s committee and it may partly explain why its 
committee is more active in scrutinising the EU agenda. However, 
the reserve of expertise in the political parties and the profile of the 
EU affairs committees would have to increase for this to become a 
usual practice. The lack of expertise within the EU affairs 
committees is party alleviated by the possibility to submit any EU 
dossier for consideration to another sectoral committee. While the 
Senate’s committee – whose members are more specialised in 
specific EU policy areas – regularly submits dossiers to other 
sectoral committees, this practice is not prevalent in the Chamber’s 
EU affairs committee (Král and Bartovic, 2010).  
Moreover, information is exchanged between 
parliamentarians in different committees mainly along party lines, 
not official committee lines, which further undermines the role of 
EU-related expertise. Also, there is a rather low inter-party dialogue 
on EU affairs, not only within each chamber but also between the 
two chambers (Strelkov, 2015). The two EU affairs committees have 
more or less regular contacts, in particular to deal with issues of 
mutual interest, but there is no permanent structured cooperation 
between them (Král and Bartovic, 2010). The members of the EU 
committees also have a relatively low impact on the remaining 
parliamentarians. Given the low general interest in EU affairs 
among backbenchers, one would expect members of the EU affairs 
committees to have influence on members of their party groups. 
Members of the EU affairs committees nevertheless have a quite 
limited impact on how each party votes as a whole on EU affairs 
(Kuta, 2015). 
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7.3 Influence of EU politics on national political 
realities 
7.3.1 Level of (dis)alignment with political groups in the 
EP 
Party groups in the EP show a high degree of cohesion (Hix, et al., 
2007) and this also applies to Czech MEPs. The 21 Czech MEPs (a 
relatively low number) are distributed across six political groups (in 
the 2014-2019 term), which dramatically limits the possibilities for 
an effective unified national position. Also in terms of political 
influence and committee chairing, Czech MEPs prefer cooperating 
within political groups as these are clearly more effective. 
Across political parties, Czech MEPs evince a high level of 
Europeanisation, which again is a common trait among MEPs 
irrespective of their nationality. In this sense, MEPs constitute 
autonomous units in their national political parties, being heavily 
influenced by the EU’s context and, on the other hand, having a 
limited impact on national policymaking. In a sense, Czech MEPs 
who disagree with their parties’ critical attitudes towards the EU are 
sometimes even seen as dissidents 
within their own parties. In fact, the 
MEPs often present a more complex 
picture of EU policies and their 
attitude is more constructive (Klekner, 
2017). The MEPs from ANO are a 
typical example, frequently serving as 
a counterweight to their party 
colleagues and, in particular, their own chairman Andrej Babiš. 
These two levels – the EU and the national – are often in such an 
irreconcilable conflict that two ANO MEPs left the movement: the 
Vice-President of the EP Pavel Telička and MEP Petr Ježek (ČTK, 
2017; 2018).  
This phenomenon is related to the interesting question of the 
values and programmatic compatibility of the ANO movement 
with its political group in the EP, which differs from those of other 
Czech political parties and their European families. ANO entered 
the ALDE group as a new political movement founded on liberal 
principles and a pro-European attitude, and in favour of deeper 
Czech MEPs who disagree 
with their parties’ critical 
attitudes towards the EU 
are sometimes even seen as 
dissidents within their 
own parties. 
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integration. The further development of ANO after 2014, however, 
shows a shift from the positive view of European integration 
towards catering to some of its more Eurosceptic voters. Although 
a considerable programmatic overlap still exists between them 
(mainly regarding economic liberalism), Andrej Babiš’s statements 
have become increasingly incompatible with ANO’s official 
programme. Babiš has moved to a generally critical tenor towards 
the EU, and in his case, European integration does not serve as an 
object of identification, but of ‘othering’. Migration is a typical 
example of a topic where Babiš claims that Czech values are 
different from European ones. Even in a broader perspective, 
ANO’s value orientation significantly differs from the values of 
ALDE, where human rights and the rights of minorities are 
staunchly defended. ANO’s ALDE membership is thus today a 
somewhat declaratory choice that does not match ANO’s real 
ideological position. It is the dissenting position of ANO’s MEPs 
and their compliance with ALDE’s views that make the continued 
membership of ANO in ALDE possible. 
7.3.2 The 2019 EP elections: promoting the EU dimension 
There is a weak link between Czech parties and the political groups 
in the EP. Czech MEPs are more likely to act as a useful liaison with 
their political parties in Brussels than as 
representatives of their political groups. In 
the national media, their activity is rarely 
presented in the context of belonging to their 
political faction, and it is almost invisible in 
terms of promotion of the political group. 
The affiliation of MEPs to the national political party is key, while 
the political group is seen as secondary. The political parties are not 
even trying to build systematic relationships with their political 
groups. The link is most visible in the conservative ODS, which 
seeks to promote its ‘new’ ECR group (originally part of the EPP) 
and thus strengthen its influence in the EP, together with the British 
Conservatives, who have made up the largest contingent in the 
ECR. Brexit represents a striking blow to this strategy and the 
position of ODS in the EP in the future. 
The weakness of this interconnection results from the 
pragmatic nature of their choice. This is further complicated by two 
There is a weak link 
between Czech parties 
and the political 
groups in the EP. 
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related factors. First, European politics represents an area that 
polarises the euro-sceptic public. Second, the EP represents a highly 
pro-integration institution that pushes forward the development of 
many EU policies. Therefore, much of its output is not perceived 
very positively by parts of the public. The political parties took this 
ambivalent character of the Czech relationship to the EU into 
account in the previous EP elections (Negrine, et al., 2011) and they 
will undoubtedly do so again in the electoral campaign in 2019. 
Although the political parties declare the European elections 
“important”, European politics is now a means for parties – 
especially the smaller pro-European parties – to define themselves 
against the ANO movement.  
The Spitzenkandidaten do not play any part in the campaign. 
For the media, the issue is fairly marginal, and neither do the 
political parties emphasise it. Only the MEPs sometimes refer to it. 
This logically attracts only minimum attention from the public. 
Surveys show, nevertheless, that the relationship of the Czechs to 
the Spitzenkandidaten system is not directly negative, but that Czechs 
do not link it to the deepening of democracy in the EU (Table 7.1). 
On the other hand, the 2019 elections create an interesting situation 
as the Czech MEP Jan Zahradil (ODS) is the ECR candidate for the 
post of Commission President. Theoretically, this could lead to 
greater popularity of the concept. Yet, the position of the ECR leader 
is paradoxical. He has refused the Spitzenkandidaten system, and the 
ECR is participating in it (for the first time) just for pragmatic 
reasons: namely its own promotion and broader presentation in the 
media (Bednárová, 2018). 
Table 7.1 Opinions on lead candidate procedure 
QA13.1 To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with each of the following 
statements regarding this process of 
electing the President of the European 
Commission depending on the results of 
the European Parliament elections? 
 
Total 
'Agree' 
Total 
'Disagree' 
Don't 
know 
     
It only makes sense if it is accompanied by 
a real debate about European issues and 
the future of the EU 
CZ 66 20 14 
 EU 
27** 70 15 15 
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It brings more transparency to the process 
of electing the President of the European 
Commission 
CZ 49 35 16 
 EU 
27** 63 22 15 
It represents significant progress for 
democracy within the EU CZ 45 40 15 
 EU 
27** 61 24 15 
It gives more legitimacy to the European 
Commission CZ 50 35 15 
 EU 
27** 60 23 17 
It prevents Member States' governments 
from choosing the best candidate for the 
job 
CZ 38 40 22 
 EU 
27** 46 33 21 
It has no real impact, it does not change 
much CZ 55 33 12 
 EU 
27** 45 39 16 
**Basis EU27 (This 2 question was not asked in the UK). 
Source: data from (Eurobarometer 89.2, 2018). 
 
7.4 Influence of the national parliament on EU 
politics 
7.4.1 Parliamentary input into the decision-making 
National parliaments can, within the Political Dialogue (PD), give 
comments and feedback on Commission proposals by submitting 
opinions. The Commission also uses the PD to respond to reasoned 
opinions received under the Early Warning System (EWS) when the 
thresholds for triggering the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedures 
have not been met. The experience with the PD so far shows that the 
Czech parliament ranks among the most active parliaments (Kovář 
and Sychra, 2018). Indeed, Czech parliamentarians clearly see the 
framework as one of the most efficient ways to influence 
Commission proposals. Table 7.2 shows that there are important 
differences between the two chambers of the Czech parliament. 
While the upper chamber is one of the most active chambers, the 
lower house is ranked at about the EU average in this respect (Kuta 
and Němec, 2015). 
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In the period 2007-2015, the Czech Parliament submitted the 
highest number of opinions within the PD out of all the parliaments 
(Raffaj and Kovář, 2016). When looking at temporal trends, it is 
evident that there has been a steep increase in the number of 
opinions submitted by the Czech Senate between 2007 and 2013. 
Since 2013 the number slightly decreased and has stagnated ever 
since (probably owing to the lower number of Commission 
proposals). In the initial years the lower house did not exhibit much 
interest in the PD: until 2015, it never submitted more than ten 
opinions. Since then, however, the Chamber’s activity in this regard 
has been on an upward trend. 
Table 7.2 Opinions submitted within the PD (2006-2017) 
 Lower 
Chamber 
Upper 
Chamber 
Total 
2006 1 2 3 
2007 0 9 9 
2008 1 11 12 
2009 1 27 28 
2010 3 29 32 
2011 5 43 48 
2012 10 46 56 
2013 8 64 72 
2014 5 41 46 
2015 10 25 35 
2016 19 46 65 
2017 17 53 70 
Total 80 396 476 
Source: European Commission, 2018.  
 
The experience of both chambers with the EWS shows that, based 
on the number of submitted reasoned opinions, the Czech 
parliament ranks closely below the EU average (Raffaj and Kovář, 
2016). While the most active parliament, the Swedish Riksdag, has 
submitted over sixty reasoned opinions, the Czech lower chamber 
submitted ten and the upper house eight (see Table 7.3). 
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Nevertheless, the number of submitted reasoned opinions of the 
Czech parliament causes both of its chambers to be ranked among 
the most active parliaments from the Visegrad (after the Polish 
Sejm). Overall, the parliaments of the states that joined the EU after 
2004 submit fewer reasoned opinions than the parliaments of other 
countries. Also, there is an increasing trend in the number of 
reasoned opinions submitted by both chambers. Finally, there is a 
relatively wide dissatisfaction with these platforms in both 
chambers. The related objections and possible improvements are 
discussed regularly in both chambers’ EU committees (Kovář and 
Sychra, 2018). 
Table 7.3 Reasoned opinions submitted within the EWS (2009-2017) 
 Lower 
Chamber 
Upper 
Chamber 
Total 
2009 0 0 0 
2010 1 1 2 
2011 0 0 0 
2012 1 0 1 
2013 1 2 3 
2014 1 1 2 
2015 1 1 2 
2016 4 3 7 
2017 1 0 1 
Total 10 8 18 
Source: (European Commission, 2018). 
 
7.4.2 Teaming up with other national parliaments? 
Formally, the Czech parliamentarians are well represented in 
international inter-parliamentary bodies. They are members of the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; 
there is also the Permanent Delegation to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the OSCE, the Permanent Delegation to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as the 
Central European Initiative. Within the EU, the parliament 
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participates in joint Parliamentary Meetings, the Conference of 
Speakers of the EU Parliaments and the Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the 
EU. However, none of these bodies is particularly visible in the 
public sphere, nor are there any recent political activities with Czech 
involvement on their part that are discussed in the media. 
The Czech Parliament’s cooperation with other parliaments 
within the EU varies considerably. A more intense formal 
parliamentary cooperation exists with neighbouring countries and 
especially in the format of the Visegrad. Also, delegated deputies 
regularly attend the meetings of COSAC. However, while COSAC 
meetings were discussed more intensely during the Czech EU 
Presidency in 2009, COSAC is currently almost invisible. 
Conclusion 
In response to the question about how functional the Czech 
representative model is and how it contributes to the EU´s 
dynamics, the answer is twofold. Overall, one can argue that the 
Czech representative model is relatively functional at the national 
level when it comes to domestic political issues. However, it is 
clearly separated from the European level and its ability to 
intervene in EU politics is limited; the interactions between the two 
levels are inefficient and full of misconceptions. This 
incompatibility not only causes problems in promoting Czech 
interests in the EU, it also has a significant impact on the perception 
of European issues in the Czech Parliament, especially in the 
Chamber. As a result, the EU-related questions remain second-
order issues. If they become relevant, they are discussed exclusively 
in terms of their impact on the national political agenda and remain 
cut off from the wider European context. This is also due to the 
absence of a deeper EU expertise within the political parties, which 
is often only provided by the parties’ MEPs whose positions and 
influence within the parties are limited. Under these conditions, the 
extremely low turnout in the EU elections and the Eurosceptic 
public mood is not surprising at all. The result is a considerable 
paradox: while Czech politicians continuously call for a greater 
involvement in EU policy, the established model undermines these 
efforts from the very beginning. 
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8. HOW FUNCTIONAL IS THE 
DANISH REPRESENTATIVE 
MODEL AND DOES IT INTERACT 
WITH EU DYNAMICS? 
MAJA KLUGER DIONIGI 
Denmark is often perceived as the odd one out in the EU due to its opt-outs 
and ostensibly Eurosceptic population. At the same time, when it comes to 
the implementation of EU directives and its mandate-based EU scrutiny 
system, the country’s record is unmatched. Denmark’s tradition of 
minority governments has increased the role of parliamentary actors 
because the government is forced to rely on support from opposition parties 
to establish parliamentary majorities for its EU positions. In practice, 
however, Denmark might not be the textbook example of parliamentary 
control, as the Parliament often gets involved too late in the process and 
few parliamentarians are active on EU-matters.  
This chapter examines formal and informal aspects of the role of the 
Danish Parliament in EU affairs. It does so by shedding light on Danish 
parliamentarians’ formal and de facto role in Denmark and in the EU.  
8.1 Danish EU scrutiny – a textbook example? 
The Danish Parliament is known for keeping a tight leash on its 
government when it comes to EU matters. In academic rankings of 
parliamentary strength in EU affairs, Denmark typically ranks 
highest and is often used as a textbook example of parliamentary 
EU scrutiny (e.g. Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea 2015; Winzen 2012).  
The Danish Parliament was the first one in the EU to 
introduce a mandate-based system, where ministers need to gain 
support for the government’s EU positions in the European Affairs 
Committee (EAC) ahead of Council meetings. This scrutiny model 
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has been a source of inspiration for countries joining the EU later 
on, such as Finland and Estonia.  
The Danish mandate-based system was established 
immediately after Denmark’s accession to the EU in 1973. It is a 
rather informal system, which is neither transcribed in law nor 
mentioned in the Danish Constitution. Instead, it consists of 
political agreements between the government and the EAC, 
described in a series of EAC reports. As political agreements can be 
more easily altered than laws or the Constitution, the system 
ensures flexibility and allows the work of the EAC to adapt to EU 
developments. This has been particularly important in recent years, 
where the Danish scrutiny model has been challenged by new 
developments, such as the rise of informal EU decision-making 
(trilogues) and new governance mechanisms (e.g. the European 
Semester). The EAC members have played a crucial role in 
developing the committee’s ability to hold the government to 
account, for instance by determining the type of information 
received from the government (Christensen, 2015). 
The Danish government is only obliged to obtain a mandate 
from the EAC ahead of Council-meetings on decisions of ‘major 
significance’. It is the prerogative of the government to decide which 
cases are of major significance. The EAC convenes with the relevant 
ministers on the Friday before a Council meeting and goes through 
the forthcoming Council agenda on a point-by-point basis. 
Ministers must present all items on the agenda that the government 
considers to be either of ‘considerable importance’ or ‘major 
significance’ – the EAC must be informed of the former and give a 
mandate on the latter. After the ministers’ presentation, members 
may ask questions.  
Voting on the mandate rarely takes place. Instead, the 
committee chair will confirm that there is no majority against the 
government’s mandate. The mandates are given orally. It is rare for 
the government not to win support for its position. This does not 
mean that EAC-members have little influence on the government’s 
position, but rather that their views are anticipated by the 
government ahead of the meetings.  
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What makes the Danish EAC particularly strong in EU affairs 
is not the mandate-based system 
alone, but the frequent minority 
governments in Denmark. This 
makes it virtually impossible for 
governments to ignore Parliament. 
The government must take the 
opinions of both the governing and 
opposition parties into account to 
ensure that it does not have a 
majority against its positions.  
Despite the Danish Parliament’s reputation as a robust 
scrutiniser of EU affairs, the practical workings of the mandating 
system have several shortcomings, most notably:  
• The centralisation of EU matters within the EAC implies that 
the expertise of the sectoral committees is not brought into 
play. 
• EU debates are depoliticised as the government often secures 
the necessary majority ahead of EAC meetings.  
• Recent EU developments, such as early agreements and the 
European Semester, challenge the Danish EU mandate-based 
system. 
Each of these aspects will be elaborated further below. 
8.1.1 Centralisation of EU matters 
The mandating system concentrates the powers in the EAC and 
gives a less prominent role to other parliamentary bodies, such as 
the plenary and sectoral committees. 
Plenary involvement on EU matters is 
rare as the EAC is authorised to speak 
on behalf of full Parliament.  
The plenary is usually only 
consulted when treaties need to be 
ratified and directives implemented. 
All parliamentarians can refer an issue 
to the plenary, either through interpellations or so-called Article 20 
questions (Article 20 of the Danish Constitution) – both of which 
concern putting formal questions to a minister to gain information 
What makes the Danish 
EAC particularly strong 
in EU affairs is not the 
mandate-based system 
alone, but the frequent 
minority governments in 
Denmark. 
The mandating system 
concentrates the 
powers in the EAC and 
gives a less prominent 
role to other 
parliamentary bodies. 
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or to foster debate in Parliament as a whole. Interpellations on EU 
matters and Article 20 questions are, however, used infrequently 
and account for about 10% of all parliamentary questions (Sousa, 
2009).  
Unlike other mandate-based EU scrutiny systems (such as the 
Swedish Parliament), the involvement of sectoral committees in the 
Danish Parliament is rather sporadic. The EAC remains the main 
and often sole forum for discussing EU matters. It is the prerogative 
of the EAC to ask sectoral committees for opinions on EU legislative 
proposals, green or white papers.  
Since 1994, EU memoranda from the government to the EAC 
are concurrently sent to the sectoral committees. This means that 
these committees are informed and can decide to issue a statement 
to the EAC. It is, however, the EAC that has the final say on EU 
matters and the right to issue opinions on behalf of Parliament. The 
lack of automaticity in involving sectoral committees means that 
their expertise is not used to the full.  
The centralisation of EU scrutiny in the EAC also has 
implications for the type of politics that occurs in the Danish 
Parliament on EU affairs. Whereas most other committees are 
characterised by a clear left-right divide and less stable coalitions, 
the EAC has stable coalitions and does not follow the traditional 
left-right cleavage. The main conflict line in the EAC is between the 
parties for versus against more EU integration. This is not 
necessarily a shortcoming, but shows that a very different political 
dynamic is at play in the EAC than in the rest of the Danish 
Parliament.  
8.1.2 EU debates are depoliticised 
The relationship between the government and opposition changes 
in the EAC because the government usually enjoys support from 
Parliament’s pro-EU groups (often referred to as the yes-parties). 
The yes-parties comprise the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, 
the Conservative People’s Party, Socialist People’s Party, and the 
Social Liberal Party.  
The consensus among the pro-EU parties is surprising given 
that EU integration has been and still is contentious for many 
Danish parties and has been a cause of internal conflict. It is, 
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therefore, interesting that internal party conflict on EU affairs is not 
reflected in the behaviour of the EAC members (Damgaard and 
Jensen, 2005). This suggests that these parties value solidarity to 
further Danish interests in the EU rather than let internal party 
politics get in the way of Denmark’s ability to exert influence in the 
Council (Christensen 2015; 2016).   
The Danish government usually secures a majority from the 
pro-European parties ahead of the EAC 
meetings, which contributes to 
depoliticising EU debates in the EAC. The 
mandate is de facto given behind closed 
doors ahead of committee meetings. This 
makes the debates in the EAC rather 
theatrical and puts a cap on the ability to 
have an open and genuine debate on EU 
issues during committee meetings. 
Consequently, the most active 
members in the EAC meetings are fringe parties. Those who 
challenge the government’s position in the EAC (which could be 
termed the real opposition) are the two most Eurosceptic parties in 
the Danish Parliament: the Danish People’s Party and the Unity List.  
Figure 8.1 shows how often parliamentarians from different 
parties take the floor (out of everyone taking the floor) during EAC 
meetings between September 2015 and 
August 2018. A clear picture emerges: the 
two most Eurosceptic parties in the Danish 
Parliament (the left-wing Red-Green 
Alliance and the right-wing Danish 
People’s Party) are among the most active 
parties in the EAC. Even though the Red-
Green Alliance only has one member of the EAC, it is the most active 
party in the EAC. 
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Figure 8.1 Party activity in the Danish EAC 
How often party representatives1 take the floor, 4 September 2015 and 28 
August 2018 (N=726 taking the floor in total) 
 
Note: The head of the EAC and the members from Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands are excluded. 
Source: Think Tank Europa’s own compilation. 
 
The Social Democratic Party has the second highest activity score, 
which is unsurprising given that it is the largest parliamentary 
party, with seven EAC members and the main opposition party. 
Even though the government often secures the support of the Social 
Democratic Party ahead of EAC meetings, its party members still 
feel the need to assert themselves in the meetings.  
The governing parties – the Liberal Party, Liberal Alliance, 
and the Conservative People’s Party – take the floor to varying 
degrees. The Liberal Party (the biggest governing party) ranks 
middle, while the two remaining small governing parties are at the 
very bottom. Perhaps the Liberal Alliance and the Conservative 
People’s Party feel that their voices are already heard and therefore 
have less of a need to take the floor. However, their inactivity masks 
the ideological differences between them. The Liberal Party wants 
to move Denmark as close to the EU core as possible and to abolish 
the Danish EU opt-outs. The Liberal Alliance, however, wants to 
                                                        
1 The number of seats of each of the parties in the EAC is as follows: Social 
Democrats (7), the Liberal Party (6), Danish People’s Party (6), Red-Green 
Alliance (3), Liberal Alliance (2), The Alternative (2), The Social Liberal 
Party (1), The Liberal Alliance (1), and Conservative People’s party (1).  
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maintain Denmark’s euro opt-out and has an unclear position on 
the other opt-outs. Before entering into government in 2016, it was 
a soft Eurosceptic party that wanted to reinvent the EU based on 
free trade. The party also advised Danish voters to vote against 
changing the Danish opt-out in justice and home affairs to an opt-in 
model in the referendum in December 2015. After entering into 
government, the party appears to have moderated its public 
criticism of the EU. 
The most pro-European party in Parliament – the Social 
Liberal Party – is also one of the least active parties in taking the 
floor during EAC meetings, probably because its views are reflected 
in the government’s mandates. 
A common complaint from EAC chairs is that only few 
parliamentarians show up to the meetings in the EAC other than the 
parties’ spokespersons. This is seen to be a combination of a busy 
parliamentary agenda, in which EU matters are not prioritised 
(Bræmer, 2014).  
The broad pro-EU consensus in the Danish EAC does not 
mean that the Eurosceptic parties’ voices are not heard. The Danish 
People’s Party is a supporting party in the Danish minority 
government and has an indirect influence on the government’s EU 
views. For example, the major governing party, Venstre (the Liberal 
Party) moderated its public enthusiasm for further EU integration 
after it became dependent on the Danish People’s Party for support. 
The Danish People’s Party has had an indirect but profound effect 
on the Liberal Party’s view on immigration and refugees (such as 
refugee burden-sharing in the EU). Before the Liberal Party came to 
power in June 2015, it announced that it wanted to place Denmark 
as close to the core of the EU as possible. After 2015, the party has 
not used this rhetoric publicly. At the same time, Prime Minister 
Lars Løkke Rasmussen has been vocal in reiterating that he does not 
want to enter into government with a party (i.e. the Danish People’s 
Party) that advocates a referendum on Denmark’s EU membership.  
8.1.3 Challenges to the Danish model 
The increase of early agreements in the EU challenges the Danish 
EU scrutiny model. Early agreements are concluded at first reading 
or early second reading during the ordinary legislative procedure 
and the compromise is reached during trilogue meetings (Dionigi 
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and Koop, 2017). The work of the EAC has traditionally focused on 
mandating the government prior to Council meetings, which is 
often too late if the Danish Parliament wants 
to influence the Council’s position and the 
compromise between the institutions.  
The Danish EAC has tried to adapt its 
scrutiny model to the increase of early 
agreements by introducing the possibility of giving an early 
mandate, where ministers must seek a mandate from the EAC 
before the Danish position is firmly established. In these cases, the 
government may need to come back to the EAC later in the process 
to seek a new mandate if the proposal changes fundamentally 
during EU negotiations. The problem with early mandates is that 
they give the government a lot of discretion because they are very 
loosely defined (Jensen and Martinsen, 2012). Despite all the good 
intentions, the EAC is often involved either too early in the EU’s 
decision-making process to tie the hands of the government (and 
ministers may forget to come back for a renewed mandate later in 
the process), or too late to change the compromise in the Council 
(Christensen, 2015).  
In 2015, the EAC asked the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to provide an overview of when the mandates are sought from the 
EAC. This request came about because the EAC chairman at the 
time was concerned about the committee’s late involvement in EU 
decision-making. The response from the government showed that 
25% of all parliamentary mandates were given less than a week 
before negotiations in the Council at ministerial level in the period 
between 2010 and 2014. In some cases, the mandate was sought after 
negotiations had already started with the EP (Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2015). 
Other EU developments, most notably the European 
Semester, sits uneasily with the Danish mandate-based model. The 
nature of the European Semester makes parliamentary oversight 
more difficult because of the mix of decision-making modes and the 
disembodiment of political authority. Because the European 
Semester follows an iterative step-by-step process, it is difficult to 
assess when significant decisions are taken and by whom (Dawson, 
2015).   
The increase of early 
agreements in the EU 
challenges the Danish 
EU scrutiny model. 
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Initially, the Danish EAC, in collaboration with the Finance 
Committee, wanted the mandating system to apply to the European 
Semester, but the government disagreed. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
when a mandate should be given in the process. The annual growth 
survey, published by the Commission, does not entail any binding 
government negotiations. The national reform programmes (NRPs) 
and stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) are already 
based on national budgetary negotiations agreed by Parliament. 
The country-specific negotiations, adopted by the Council later in 
the process, are not binding on Denmark. It therefore makes little 
sense to go against them by refusing to give a mandate (Rasmussen, 
2018).  
The Danish Parliament had to introduce new levels of EU 
scrutiny in order not to lose out in the European Semester. The 
Parliament and the government agreed to make a new scrutiny 
procedure called the national semester, in which the EAC and the 
Finance Committee hold three joint annual consultations with the 
government to discuss the annual growth survey, the NRPs and 
SCPs, and the country-specific recommendations. Unlike the 
mandate-based model, the national semester looks more like a 
document-based system, where Parliament is informed but cannot 
bind the government (Rasmussen, 2018).  
The introduction of the national semester as a new scrutiny 
model shows the flexibility of Denmark’s EU scrutiny model. 
Because it is based on political agreements between the government 
and the EAC, it can easily be adapted to new EU developments.  
8.2 Links to Members of the European Parliament 
The link between the Danish Parliament and the European 
Parliament (EP) is not particularly strong. The only institutionalised 
contact between the Danish Parliament 
and the EP is a monthly meeting 
between the EAC and the Danish 
Members of the EP (MEPs). Contacts 
between MEPs and national 
parliamentarians from sectoral 
committees are uncommon and usually the result of personal 
relationships. This again underlines the centralisation of EU-matters 
in the EAC.  
The link between the 
Danish Parliament and 
the European Parliament 
is not particularly strong. 
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Coordination between Danish MEPs and national politicians 
is further complicated by the fact that the Danish Parliament deals 
with the same cases much later than the EP. MEPs are involved from 
the very beginning of a proposal’s life, whereas the Danish 
Parliament is often involved when compromises between the 
institutions have already been found (Christensen, Roederer-
Rynning, and Scheelke, 2013).  
At the level of political parties, the contact varies between 
national politicians and MEPs depending on the party in question 
and whether the party is in government or in opposition. Research 
on Danish national parties’ link to their MEPs shows that the 
majority of MEPs from opposition parties are more or less left to 
themselves (see Christensen, 2015). The party at home does not 
generally seek to proactively influence their MEPs’ voting 
behaviour when they are in opposition domestically. A different 
picture emerges from governing parties. Here the contact is much 
more frequent and the government makes sure that their MEPs toe 
the party line. MEPs from governing parties will often be in daily 
contact with Danish civil servants, particularly from Denmark’s 
permanent representation to the EU, to be informed about the 
government’s views on pending legislation. Often, MEPs from 
governing parties will receive voting instructions from the 
government on cases of special national interest (Christensen 2015; 
2016).  
The representation of Danish national parties largely mirrors 
the Danish Parliament, with the Social Democratic Party and the 
Danish People’s Party also being the largest Danish parties in the 
EP. However, the Danish Liberal Party (Venstre) as the main 
governing party fared badly in the 2014-EP elections.  
8.3 Teaming up with other national parliaments 
The introduction of the yellow- and orange card procedures with 
the Lisbon Treaty has not markedly changed the Danish EU-
scrutiny system. The task of monitoring subsidiarity is a joint 
responsibility of the EAC and the sectoral committees. Every year 
the EAC selects a handful of proposals from the European 
Commission’s annual work programme subject to subsidiarity 
checks. The sectoral committees do the initial consideration, while 
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the EAC is in charge of submitting a reasoned opinion, when 
deemed necessary, to the Commission.  
Interviews with Danish EAC members show that they are 
sceptical about the usefulness of the early warning system (EWS) 
(see Christensen, 2015). This is partly 
because they view the procedure as 
cumbersome in terms of coordinating 
a common position between national 
parliaments within the eight-week 
deadline. Despite this, the first yellow 
card procedure (against the Monti-II 
legislative proposal) was instigated by the Danish EAC during 
Denmark’s EU presidency in the first half of 2012. National 
parliaments wanted the issue of the right to strike to remain a 
national competence. The then Danish EAC chair used a COSAC 
meeting in Copenhagen to coordinate the initiation of the yellow 
card procedure. The pressure was paramount for the Commission’s 
decision to withdraw its proposal. This suggests that the timing of 
COSAC-meetings and the entrepreneurship of an EAC-chairman to 
take the lead are crucial ingredients for the ability of parliaments to 
activate the yellow-card procedure.  
In 2014, the Danish EAC published a report with 23 
recommendations on how to strengthen the role of national 
parliaments in EU decision-making (Danish Parliament, 2014). The 
aim was to suggest ways in which national parliaments could play 
a stronger and more direct role in 
EU decision-making to encourage 
national politicians to engage 
themselves more in EU affairs and 
take responsibility for EU policy 
output. The Danish EAC advocated 
that national parliaments’ role 
should go beyond acting as 
guardians of the subsidiarity 
principle to give them the possibility to invite the Commission to 
table legislative proposals (i.e. by introducing a green card). 
The Danish EAC has suggested that if one-third of all national 
parliaments invites the Commission to put forward a piece of 
legislation, the Commission should consider it. If the Commission 
The introduction of the 
yellow- and orange card 
procedures with the Lisbon 
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changed the Danish  
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does not choose to do so, it must be duly justified. This proposal is 
inspired by the Council and the EP’s current treaty right to invite 
the Commission to table proposals. 
According to the Danish EAC, the green card is not about 
giving national parliaments a right of initiative. Rather, it is about 
giving parliaments the possibility to play a more proactive role in 
the EU by providing the Commission with ideas for legislation and 
an indication of their views.  
The current political dialogue, introduced by the Barroso-I 
Commission in 2006, between national parliaments and the 
Commission does go some way towards channelling the views of 
national parliaments to the Commission. Under the political 
dialogue all Commission proposals are transmitted directly to 
national parliaments, which are invited to respond to them through 
written correspondence. However, not all national parliaments, 
including the Danish, are entirely satisfied with the way in which 
the dialogue works. This is because they find that the Commission 
replies to them too late and in a very generic manner, which does 
not amount to a proper dialogue on the content of legislation (Jancic, 
2015; Rasmussen and Dionigi, 2018).  
Figure 8.2 The Danish Parliament’s use of political dialogue with the 
Commission compared with the EU average (frequency) 
 
Source: European Commission (2019). 
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The Danish EAC wants to take this further by using the untapped 
potential of the existing dialogue and requiring the Commission to 
give national parliaments’ opinions more consideration. 
Paradoxically, there does not seem to be a great willingness on the 
part of the Danish EAC to comment actively on the content of 
current Commission proposals as the Danish Parliament uses the 
political dialogue prerogative sparingly. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
there are fewer opinions and reasoned opinions between 2010 and 
2017 in Denmark than the EU average.  
Conclusion 
The Danish model of parliamentary control on EU matters is 
commended for being among one of the strongest in the EU in terms 
of government control. Indeed, the mandate-based model, 
combined with minority government, gives the Danish Parliament 
a particularly strong say in the government’s EU position.  
If we scratch below the surface, however, the Danish textbook 
example also comes with several limitations. First, the mandating 
system has led to a centralisation of EU debates in the Danish 
Parliament to the EAC and does not take advantage of the 
substantial expertise found in the sectoral committees. 
Consequently, EU politics is not mainstreamed in Parliament, but 
confined to the EAC.  
Second, although the EAC meetings are open to the public, 
the government almost always makes sure that it does not have a 
majority against its position before the meetings. This makes the 
system inclusive and exclusive at the same time. The government 
ensures broad involvement of the main pro-EU parties, while the 
Eurosceptic parties are largely sidelined and confined to asking 
questions during committee meetings.  
Third, the Danish representative EU model has come under 
pressure in recent years from both the increase in early agreements 
and the introduction of the European Semester. Most of the Danish 
EAC’s activity is concentrated on the later decision-making stages 
before ministerial meetings. This is problematic as the compromises 
inside the Council and between the co-legislators are reached much 
earlier in the process. Therefore, the government is increasingly 
trying to obtain an early mandate from the EAC. However, at this 
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stage, the mandate is often very loosely defined and gives the 
government considerable discretion. What is more, the government 
sometimes forgets to come back for a new mandate later in the 
process. Early agreements and the lack of transparency surrounding 
discussions in the Council’s preparatory bodies and trilogue 
meetings put the Danish model under strain.  
In other cases, it has been easier for the Danish EAC to adapt 
its scrutiny of the government to new EU developments. The 
European Semester is a good case in point. Here, the government 
and the EAC agreed to adopt a new scrutiny system (the national 
semester) to ensure the input from the EAC. 
The Danish EAC has long advocated a greater role for 
national parliaments in the EU by promoting the introduction of a 
green card for national parliaments, where they can suggest ideas 
for new legislation to the Commission. Despite these efforts, the 
Danish EAC’s activity in the political dialogue with the Commission 
has been below the EU average in recent years and there does not 
seem to be much appetite in practice to influence the content of the 
Commission’s proposals.  
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9. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN FINLAND - FUNCTIONAL WITH 
LIMITED POLITICISATION OF EU 
AFFAIRS 
JUHA JOKELA 
The Finnish Parliament is deeply involved in decision-making on EU 
matters. This is due to its constitutional right to determine Finland’s 
position on EU issues falling within the parliament’s competence. While 
parliament’s significant role provides a context favouring the 
‘normalisation’ and ‘domestication’ of EU affairs, this trend remains rather 
weak in Finland. The main reason for this has been a relatively strong 
national consensus on EU matters. While the consensus broke down at the 
height of the eurozone crisis, a new consensus seems to be developing 
despite the emergence of a major, openly populist and Eurosceptic party in 
the country. Finland thus provides an interesting example among EU 
member states of a relatively well-functioning representational system, 
with a strong parliament regarding EU affairs. The legitimacy challenges 
of this system seem to be largely related to the consensual political 
tradition. 
Introduction 
Finland joined the European Union at the same time (1995) as the 
country was strengthening its parliamentary system. Consequently, 
parliament was given an extensive role in EU affairs, culminating in 
its role in providing the government and its ministers with a 
political mandate in EU decision-making. Yet given its strong 
constitutional position, and streamlined policy processes, the 
functioning of the representational system in EU affairs also faces 
some important challenges. These relate to the consensual political 
tradition embedded in the multi-party system and a rather 
pervasive elite-driven national consensus on EU affairs. While this 
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consensus broke down most recently during the eurozone crisis and 
led to an intense yet rather narrow EU debate in parliament, a new 
consensus seems to be emerging on EU matters. This means that EU 
policies rarely appear as first-order issues in parliament, and they 
are often debated and decided behind closed doors in parliamentary 
committees overseeing EU affairs, rather than in open plenary 
sessions. Yet the recent re-politicisation of the EU has served to 
increase the legitimacy of the representational system in EU affairs. 
In order to expand upon this conclusion, this chapter will first 
discuss the main characteristics of, and some key developments in, 
the Finnish representational system. It will then elucidate how the 
representational system has dealt with EU affairs and decision-
making, and discuss related challenges. Finally, the chapter will 
analyse the influence of the EU on the Finnish political system and 
politics, and vice versa. It will argue that notwithstanding the 
challenges of representation, the EU is nonetheless deeply 
embedded in the Finnish political system and politics, and the 
country has aimed to highlight its potential contribution to EU 
decision-making also in terms of its representational system.    
9.1 Parliamentarism with semi-presidential 
features  
Finland’s representational political system is normally categorised 
as a semi-presidential system with a dual executive: the government 
and the president (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003; Raunio, 2012). 
Traditionally, the president’s 
constitutional powers have been 
strongest in foreign policy, and the 
government’s in domestic matters. 
Finland has, however, undergone a 
notable shift towards parliamentarism 
since the 1980s, and the role of the 
government has increased at the 
expense of that of the president. The 
latter has lost some significant powers, such as the exclusive right 
to appoint the formateur of a new government after parliamentary 
elections, and the right to dissolve parliament without a request 
from the prime minister. The political drivers of this process are 
embedded in the era of the distinctively long-serving and powerful 
Finland has undergone a 
notable shift towards 
parliamentarism since the 
1980s, and the role of the 
government has increased at 
the expense of that of the 
president. 
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President Urho Kekkonen. His strong position is often seen to have 
resulted from the national imperative to maintain good relations 
with the Soviet Union in the Cold War context. This highlighted 
personal contacts with Moscow and the role of the president. Yet 
the constitution also left room for interpretation, which presidents 
could use to their advantage. Without a strong system of checks and 
balances, Kekkonen was able to influence and even dictate domestic 
politics far beyond his constitutional powers (Raunio and 
Tiilikainen, 2003: 97). His successor, President Mauno Koivisto (in 
office from 1982–1994), and the political elite in general, favoured a 
move towards parliamentarism and limiting the powers of the 
president. This process started even before the end of the Cold War, 
and materialised in the constitutional reforms of the 1990s, also 
significantly affecting the new constitution in 2000. This drastically 
changed the nature of Finnish politics, with the government and the 
prime minister emerging as the key executive authority. The 
president, however, retained significant executive powers in the 
field of foreign policy, and the legitimacy of the office grew due to 
the change in the electoral system. Since 1994, the president has been 
elected by a direct popular vote.  
Membership of the European Union in 1995 also had some 
far-reaching implications for the Finnish political system. 
Importantly, it altered the exclusive executive powers of the 
president in the field of foreign policy. The 2000 constitution 
confirms that EU policy, including the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, falls under the competence of the government. 
Consequently, it enforces cooperation between the two executives 
by stating that foreign policy is led by the president in collaboration 
with the government. While this joint leadership has worked well 
in practice, disputes over some of the modalities related to the 
representation of Finland at the highest level in the EU have 
occurred. Referred to as “plate disputes”, 1 these culminated with 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the institutionalisation 
of the European Council, which required some further clarification 
of this relationship.  
                                                        
1 The term “plate dispute” derived from the question of how many dinner 
plates could be placed on EU dinner tables at the leaders’ level. 
148  REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN FINLAND 
 
Since the new Treaty came into force in 2009, European 
Council meetings have principally allowed only one representative 
per member state. The then president, Tarja Halonen, affirmed her 
right to participate in European Council meetings if the agenda 
included major foreign policy matters connected to her 
competences. Earlier, when dual representation was possible, a 
disagreement over who should make the decision on the Finnish 
representatives in European Council meetings had emerged 
between the president and the government. The potential 
constitutional dispute between the two executives in the late 2000s 
led to a constitutional amendment in 2012, which clarifies that the 
prime minister represents Finland in the European Council and 
other instances requiring the highest level of state representation in 
the EU. If the invitations allow more than one representative, the 
president can be asked to join the meetings. Moreover, the changed 
constitution also stipulates that in the event of a disagreement 
between the government and the president in matters of shared 
competence, the parliament’s position will be decisive in settling the 
issue.  
Recently, the dramatic shifts in the area of European security 
– heightened tensions between Russia and the West, including 
growing military tension in the Baltic Sea region, as well as the 
importance of bilateral ties in a more multipolar word – have again 
highlighted the role of the president in the Finnish system. Given 
the changed constitutional position of the president, this has not 
spilled over to domestic politics, but has rather underlined the role 
of the president in foreign policy, as well as the collaboration 
between the two executives in terms of the EU’s foreign, security 
and defence policy. Importantly, elected presidents continue to 
enjoy distinctly high approval and support ratings among the 
Finnish population.  
9.1.1 Parliament and the multi-party system 
The legislative power in Finland is exercised by a unicameral 
parliament comprising 200 deputies, and elected by the d'Hondt 
system of proportional representation at least every four years (the 
Constitution of Finland 1999/2011). This system is seen to slightly 
favour larger and established political parties, yet it does produce a 
multiparty system and coalition governments. Since the late 1980s, 
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a tradition of relatively stable majority governments has emerged 
concurrently with the shift towards parliamentarism. Until recently, 
governments have been formed around two larger parties, and have 
also included two or more smaller parties as junior partners. 
Ideologically, the traditional main parties can be characterised as 
centre-left (Social Democratic Party, SDP) or centre-right (Centre 
Party, KESK, and National Coalition Party, KOK), and coalition 
governments have often overcome the left-
right cleavage. Hence, the Finnish system 
has been seen to reflect a relatively strong 
consensus tradition and gravitation 
towards the political centre. In comparison 
with a close reference country, Sweden, it 
has not been characterised by a left-right 
block system. Interestingly, a periphery-centre (or rural areas versus 
southern cities) cleavage is still relatively strongly reflected in the 
party system, especially via the Centre Party. It has its roots and 
strongholds in rural areas, and the party’s continued salience which 
is often seen as an exception in the Nordic and EU contexts. 
At times, the Finnish consensus system has been criticised for 
obscuring political cleavages and fudging voters’ preferences as 
their preferred party might enter the government with a party from 
the opposite end of the political spectrum and, in so doing, 
compromise some of their key electoral pledges. In a related 
development, a move towards minority governments has been 
encouraged as a potential way of enhancing the system (Hyssälä 
and Backman, 2018). On the other hand, and with varying success, 
parties are being pushed to spell out their preferences and red lines 
in election debates. Moreover, the constitutional reform of 2000 also 
led to a political practice whereby the largest political group in 
parliament will make the first attempt to form a government and 
assume the premiership. Ultimately, and in light of the political 
trends in Europe highlighting political polarisation and 
fragmentation, the consensus tradition appears to bring some 
notable benefits. 
9.1.2 Populist challenger(s) in Finnish politics 
The Finnish political landscape has undergone significant changes 
since the late 2000s. The emergence of an openly populist and 
The Finnish system 
reflects a strong 
consensus tradition and a 
gravitation towards the 
political centre. 
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Eurosceptic party shook the foundations of the system based on 
three main parties, and a number of smaller, yet well-established 
parties. The rise of the Finns Party to the league of the largest 
political parties in the country is unprecedented in terms of speed 
and scale (Jokela and Korhonen, 2012).2 In its first parliamentary 
elections in 1999, the party gained 0.99% of the vote, which 
translated into one member of parliament. In 2011, it became the 
third largest party in Finland with 39 out of 200 seats in the Finnish 
parliament. In 2015, the party secured 38 MPs and entered the 
coalition government with the two centre-right main parties, the 
Centre Party and the National Coalition Party. During its first 
months in government, it had to accept the third Greek bail-out 
package, and then address the issue of more than 30,000 asylum 
seekers entering Finland during the winter of 2015–16. Due to the 
worrisome economic outlook, the government also pushed through 
politically difficult labour market reforms and austerity policies, 
and after seven months in government, support for the Finns Party 
dropped from 17.7% to 8.9% (Yle News, 2018).  
Eroding support led to some significant tensions within the 
party, which erupted in the party conference in 2016. The election 
of Jussi Halla-Aho as the party chair was seen to move the party 
towards far-right positions, particularly on immigration issues. 
Consequently, the coalition partners in the government refused to 
collaborate with the party under its new leadership, and the party 
split. The splitters formed a new group in parliament, and later a 
political party called Blue Reform, and continued in government. 
While support for the new party in government remained low and 
it did not secure any seats in the 2019 parliamentary elections.  the 
Finns Party in opposition made some significant gains. This is 
mainly due to the immigration debate, yet the party has also 
                                                        
2 Founded in 1995, the Finns Party is also known as the “True Finns Party” 
due to earlier unofficial translations used by the party. Yet the official 
translation since 2011 has been the Finns Party. The direct translation of the 
party’s Finnish name, Perussuomalaiset, would be “Ordinary Finns”. The 
Finns Party stemmed from the Finnish Rural Party, which has sought to 
defend the ‘small and ordinary’ citizen and has criticized ruling elites since 
1959. While the Finns Party has been associated with European populist 
trends related to Euroscepticism and immigration critique, the party’s roots 
are deeply embedded in the national context.  
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managed to offer an alternative in the climate change debate by 
questioning the calls for more ambitious national policies.  
Importantly, the Finns Party managed to retain its position as the 
second largest party in the country in 2019 parliamentary elections 
with 39 seats and 17.5% of the vote. 
Against this backdrop, the Finnish representational system 
has provided an example of a tradition in which political protest 
movements and new challengers are expected to enter the 
government should they continue to enjoy notable support. While 
in government, challengers have often lost support as governmental 
responsibilities call for difficult political compromises. This holds 
true also with regard to the emergence of the Finns Party. Yet its 
ability to reposition itself in the opposition after the party split in 
2017, and then regain support in 2019 parliamentary elections, is a 
novel development in Finland.  Interestingly, the Green Party and 
Left Alliance made major gains in the 2019 elections. This speaks for 
increasing polarisation and fragmentation with regard to the 
Finnish party system. 
9.1.3 The EU dimension: parliament deeply embedded in 
EU affairs, yet limited political debate 
At the heart of the Finnish parliament’s strong position on EU 
matters lies its constitutional rights to determine the position that 
Finland should take in EU decision-making on matters that fall 
within parliament’s competence (Parliament of Finland). In 
practice, this means ex ante political mandating of the government 
and its ministers representing Finland in EU decision-making. In 
legal terms, the ministers can diverge from the parliament’s 
mandate in the European and EU Councils, yet they should then 
seek support for this from parliament. This has not posed a major 
challenge as mandates often leave ministers with at least some room 
for manoeuvre. Moreover, and due to the majority government 
tradition, ministers can, in principle, rely on support in parliament, 
at least as long as they remain within the commonly agreed 
government position. Consultation with the government and 
parliament’s Grand Committee overseeing EU affairs has also taken 
place during European Council and EU Council meetings when 
there has been significant time pressure to reach a decision. Yet the 
early engagement of parliament in the policy-planning and 
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preparation stage also leads to a policy process in which parliament 
is usually aware of the policy options and politics surrounding them 
in the EU. In sum, Finland only has one position in the EU Council 
and that is the government’s position, which is accountable to 
parliament. To enhance this link, parliament is deeply involved in 
the process through the political mandating practice.  
Given its robust position in EU decision-making, it is 
nevertheless odd that EU affairs continue 
to be largely second-order issues, at least 
in open parliamentary debates. Issues 
such as taxation and the national budget, 
as well as key policies and reform 
processes related to healthcare, social 
security and education, continue to 
dominate the political debates in 
parliament. At times, the EU dimension 
plays a role in these, yet EU policies rarely feature as first-order 
issues in their own right in parliament. 
The reasons for this are manifold, and include both political 
and institutional aspects. In terms of the latter, EU policy-making 
takes place in parliamentary committees that convene behind closed 
doors. The Grand Committee has the overall responsibility for EU 
affairs, yet in the CFSP the Foreign Affairs Committee assumes a 
leading role. The Grand Committee is the largest of the 
parliamentary committees, including 25 out of 200 members of 
parliament. Other committees contribute to the work of these main 
committees on EU affairs and, in principle, parliament is therefore 
broadly involved in the EU decision-making process. The other 
sectoral committees also hear government ministers, civil servants 
as well as external experts such as representatives of interests 
groups, civil society organisations and the research community. Yet 
some MPs have suggested that EU policy matters require in-depth 
knowledge of the EU, which sets some limits on the committee 
work. Moreover, outside the government, the number of EU experts 
in the country is also somewhat limited. In response to the critique 
on the transparency of committee work in terms of openness (they 
meet behind closed doors), the committees have been encouraged 
to organise open hearings on major topical matters. These can be 
attended by citizens or followed on the internet. As confidential 
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proceedings have been seen as important for parliament’s 
committee work, it has recently been proposed that the expert 
hearing phases of the committee proceedings should be opened up 
(Hyssälä and Backman, 2018). 
Politically, EU matters very rarely spill over from the 
committee’s chambers to open plenaries in the form of real political 
debate. While institutional arrangements play a role, this is also 
because of a relatively broad national consensus on the country’s 
EU policy, and often on the EU’s sectoral policies. However, the 
eurozone crisis changed this (Raunio and Saari, 2017). The national 
consensus among the main parties broke down in the Grand 
Committee during talks on the first Greek loan package, and this led 
to a heated debate in the plenary. At the same time, the Finns Party 
was becoming a serious challenger to the main parties, and their 
tough EU critique contributed to these developments. Subsequent 
rescue packages and eurozone reforms also led to intense and open 
debate in parliament. The inclusion of the Finns Party in the 
government in 2015 has again led to more consensual proceedings. 
Moreover, the dramatic developments in the European security 
environment, and a more assertive Russia have yet again 
highlighted the role of the EU as a security policy arrangement for 
the Finns. In addition, as the future of the EU has also been 
questioned in terms of the increasingly visible disarray among the 
member states and their citizens, of which Brexit is the most 
dramatic example, the political parties seem to increasingly 
emphasise the need to consolidate the EU amid different types of 
anti-EU populist trends in Europe. Public support for the EU, and 
for the euro in particular, has remained stable in Finland. Indeed, 
support for EU membership increased after the victory of the Finns 
Party in 2011, and also after the UK’s EU referendum.  
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9.2 Influence of EU politics on political realities at 
the national level, and vice versa 
The EU became a key topic in Finnish politics in the early 1990s as a 
result of the membership debate and when the accession process 
subsequently got underway. The membership question was quickly 
and largely de-politicised among the leadership of the main parties, 
however, and a relatively broad national consensus on an active and 
constructive role in the EU and its decision-making emerged 
(Raunio and Saari, 2017). In this context, 
Finland has often been described as the most 
integrationist of its closest reference 
countries, namely the Nordic states. It has 
supported the transfer of competences to the 
EU level in consecutive EU treaty reforms 
and, unlike Denmark and Sweden, it has 
adopted the euro (Larsen et al., 2013; see also 
Jokela, 2013). The rapid emergence of the Eurosceptic Finns Party 
nonetheless suggested that the consensus among the parties was at 
least to some extent broader than it was among citizens, and the 
marginal position of Euroscepticism in the country could also be 
seen as resulting at least partly from the marginalisation of 
Eurosceptic voices in the parties. The EU has also continued to be a 
divisive issue within some of the main parties (Raunio and Saari, 
2017). 
Finland would, however, appear to be a rather favourable 
environment for the normalisation and domestication of EU affairs. 
This is seen to entail EU affairs being debated largely along the 
traditional political and societal cleavages reflected in parliament. 
Yet this development can hardly be regarded as a key characteristic 
of Finnish EU politics. Indeed, the low level of politicisation and 
debate regarding EU affairs seems to be typical of Finland despite 
the strong position of the parliament in EU decision-making. 
Moreover, notably when an EU matter has become a key political 
question, the main cleavage appears to have been formed along a 
political dividing line of “for” and “against” the EU. Yet 
transformations in European politics, including some notable 
transnational trends in the context of several severe EU crises, have 
also had implications in Finland and have resulted in the EU and its 
policies being re-politicised more broadly.   
A relatively broad 
national consensus  
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The level of alignment (or misalignment) with the European 
political families and political groups in the European Parliament 
has become slightly more visible in Finland. While this 
development has largely taken place within policy and expert 
communities, related media coverage might have had some modest 
broader effects. The reasons for the discussion on alignment relate 
mainly to the emergence of the Finns Party as well as to the recent 
media attention to the European People’s Party. To a lesser extent, 
a certain mismatch between the Finnish Social Democrats’ distinctly 
tough stance towards the eurozone rescue packages, such as the 
demand for bilateral collateral for the second Greek loan package, 
and S&D’s emphasis on solidarity have gained some attention. In a 
similar way, the Centre Party’s membership of the decidedly pro-
European ALDE under a federalist leader has raised some questions 
in Finland, as EU membership was a highly divisive question for the 
party in the 1990s, and it opposed Finland’s eurozone membership. 
The Finns Party made their first significant electoral gains in 
the 2009 European Parliament elections, when the then chair of the 
party, Timo Soini, secured a seat in the EP with a Eurosceptic 
agenda and a notable personal share of the vote. Importantly, 
Soini’s Euroscepticism has also drawn on his experience in EU 
decision-making and ‘Brussels’, as well as close links with other 
European Eurosceptic parties. The departure of the UK 
Conservative Party from the EPP provided an opportunity for Soini 
to align the Finns Party with an old and major European political 
party, although he also forged links with UKIP. However, his 
personal contacts have been seen as paving the way for the Finns 
Party to become a member of the European Conservatives and 
Reformist Group with two MEPs in the aftermath of the 2014 EP 
elections. In light of the Finns Party split in 2017, and with the UK 
Conservative Party now potentially leaving the European 
Parliament because of Brexit, questions have been raised in relation 
to the future European home of the party.  
The election of the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) for the EPP 
was also covered extensively in Finland as the party congress was 
arranged in Helsinki and former Finnish prime minister Alexander 
Stubb was in the race. The congress and election of the lead 
candidate also shed some light on the internal dynamics of the EPP 
as Stubb campaigned with a distinctly value-based liberal agenda. 
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He also demanded the expulsion of Victor Orban’s Hungarian 
Fidesz Party from the EPP if the party did not commit itself to the 
EU’s fundamental values. This exposed some notable internal 
divisions within the EPP to the Finnish media and the public, who 
have been rather concerned about developments related to the rule 
of law principle in some member states. Yet the lead candidate 
procedure, and the related election manifestos and campaigns, have 
received modest attention in Finland. Moreover, the EU elections 
have been largely framed in line with the potential implications of 
different types of populist challengers and the cleavage between 
‘for’ and ‘against’ the EU. By and large, the broader politicisation or 
domestication of EU politics and elections along national political 
divides is yet to be seen in Finland. On this note, arguments 
suggesting that in the European Parliament, Finland’s MEPs should 
first and foremost promote Finland’s (national) interests set by the 
government are present in EU debates.  
Importantly, and after the re-politicisation of EU affairs 
during the euro crisis, the national EU debate seems to be moving 
once again towards a traditional and more consensual pathway. 
First, the re-politicisation appeared to be rather narrow in 
substantive terms; in other words, it tended to focus on the euro 
crisis and did not spill over to other policy fields, yet some 
governance matters have been discussed in terms of the 
federalisation debate. Second, and in order to enter the government, 
the Finns Party had to accept the realities of the reformed eurozone, 
including the potential use of the European Stability Mechanism. 
However, the party argued that its blueprint could be found in 
Finland’s approach to the EU in general, and the eurozone reforms 
in particular. The government’s programme stipulated that Finland 
would not support further eurozone reforms that might lead to 
increased joint financial responsibility among the member states. 
This position, however, reflects a broader political consensus in 
Finland, and northern Europe. Against this backdrop, Finland has 
emphasised a gradual approach in completing the banking union. 
Moreover, Helsinki has become an active player in the so-called 
Hanseatic Group, consisting of eight northern EU member states. 
The group has underlined the national responsibilities of eurozone 
governments vis-à-vis their economies. Third, and while the 
government’s so-called middle-way approach to the future of 
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Europe debate has been criticised by the opposition for lacking a 
strong enough vision of the desired direction for the EU, no notable 
alternative approaches have been presented. In this context, the 
political debate on the EU has been more about Finland’s influence 
and the government’s active engagement in the Union, rather than 
the real substance of the reforms.  
The middle-way approach suggests that Finland does not 
support far-reaching and federalising proposals related to the 
future of the EU. Nor does it support rolling back integration. While 
more differentiated integration has been seen as a possibility by the 
government, Finland has suggested that this should take place 
within the current provisions of the EU Treaties, allowing a degree 
of differentiation. The Social Democrats, however, have recently 
signalled a somewhat more relaxed approach towards solidarity 
within the eurozone, which sparked some debate in parliament. The 
future of Europe theme as well as concrete reform proposals were 
nonetheless largely absent from the 2019 parliamentary election 
debates, which were dominated by healthcare, social security 
system reforms and education. Furthermore, the immigration 
debate was predominantly framed as a national question, although 
it has clear links to the EU. Even though EU election campaigning 
will take place at the same time as Finland is getting ready to assume 
the EU Council presidency, the close proximity of the parliamentary 
elections to the EU elections is seen as a hindrance to the latter for 
the most part.  
9.3 The Finnish Parliament, parliamentarism and 
the EU 
In the recent Treaty reforms, Finland and its parliament highlighted 
the two-level parliamentary system of the EU: (i) national 
parliaments providing legitimacy for and ensuring the 
accountability of national governments in EU affairs; and (ii) the 
European Parliament playing a similar role at the EU level in 
general, and for the EU institutions in particular. In this respect, the 
Finnish Parliament has also emphasised the need to work towards 
clarity in terms of these two levels of parliamentary legitimacy and 
scrutiny. Accordingly, UK demands for increasing the position of 
national parliaments and providing them with a role at the EU level 
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received a lukewarm reception in Finland. Similarly, a properly 
functioning and deep engagement of parliaments in national EU 
decision-making has been seen as a way to address the challenges 
of representational democracy in the 
EU. This argumentation has also been 
connected to the relatively low turnout 
in EP elections, and the fact that the EP 
has remained a rather distant 
representational institution for 
citizens. In this vein, Finnish 
parliamentarians and experts have urged other member states to 
examine the Finnish system and address potential challenges 
though national reforms. In this context, the Finnish parliament has 
also suggested that while the early warning system introduced in 
the Lisbon Treaty might have real value for national parliaments, in 
practice the utilisation of yellow and orange cards seems to be 
challenging, and its impact rather limited. Hence, the early and in-
depth engagement of parliament in the government’s EU 
policymaking has been seen to provide more adequate ‘early 
warnings’, efficacy and a real impact (see also De Wilde and Raunio, 
2018). The inter-parliamentary work of COSAC has also generally 
been seen as important in enhancing interlinkages and sharing best 
practices, rather than providing any true parliamentary scrutiny or 
legitimacy akin to parliament’s role in providing legitimacy for and 
guaranteeing the accountability of national governments. Against 
this backdrop, EU-related debates in the Finnish parliament are 
expected to be channelled to the EU level by the government, and 
parliament is deeply involved in national policy preparations. The 
increasingly powerful role of the European Council has also been 
noted by parliament, and it has highlighted its right to obtain 
information on the leader’s agenda and be involved in the policy 
planning of formal and informal European Council meetings. 
  
The Finnish Parliament has 
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Conclusions 
Given the recognised challenges of representational democracy, the 
Finnish system seems to be largely functional in terms of EU 
matters. The shift towards a parliamentary system that coincided 
with the country joining the European Union fortified a strong role 
for parliament in EU decision-making, and parliament has been able 
to defend and develop its engagement in EU affairs with regard to 
the developments in the EU’s political system. The relatively strong 
national consensus on EU affairs has nonetheless led to a rather 
limited political debate on these affairs in parliament, and 
highlighted consensus-building between the government and the 
opposition behind the closed doors of the parliamentary 
committees overseeing the affairs. The euro crisis served to break 
the consensus, however, and EU affairs spilled over from the 
committees to the public plenaries. While in substantive terms the 
debate was somewhat narrow, and focused on the rescue loan 
programmes and EMU reforms, this had broader implications as 
well, with the result that EU affairs clearly became a more political 
and debated question in Finland. The re-politicisation of EU affairs 
was closely linked to the emergence of an openly populist and 
Eurosceptic political party in the country, and hence the debate over 
EU issues was framed as ‘for’ and ‘against’ the EU in general, and 
some EU reforms in particular. Yet the dramatic shifts in the 
European security environment, and concerns related to the EU’s 
future amid Brexit and increased disarray among the member states 
and citizens, have contributed to the re-emergence of a more 
consensual approach. In this vein, this chapter suggests that even if 
the deep engagement of the Finnish parliament in EU affairs enables 
the normalisation and domestication of EU policymaking, EU 
debates along established political and societal dividing lines, 
which would connect with the electorate, are still somewhat lacking 
in Finland. Nevertheless, the deep engagement of parliament in EU 
affairs provides an interesting example and potential benchmark for 
other member states to study. Moreover, the re-politicisation of EU 
affairs, although primarily cast in terms of ‘for’ and ‘against’, can be 
seen as potentially increasing the legitimacy of the representational 
system of Finland. 
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10. THE BUNDESTAG IN THE 
MULTILEVEL SYSTEM: 
REPRESENTING GERMAN 
CITIZENS IN THE EU 
ERIK BRANDES, NICOLAI VON ONDARZA & 
FELIX SCHENUIT 
Germany’s political system is based on the representative model of 
democracy. Legally, the Bundestag is one of the most powerful legislatures 
in the EU and indeed worldwide. Its instruments to control the 
government are very strong, particularly in EU affairs. Since the Treaty of 
Lisbon, rights have been strengthened even further, notably through a 
series of legal challenges against the German government and the decisions 
it took during the eurozone debt crisis. Paradoxically, however, these 
strong national control mechanisms have led to a very sparse use by the 
Bundestag of European instruments at the disposal of national 
parliaments, such as the early warning mechanism. This strong national 
role of the Bundestag has been accompanied by an increasing integration 
between German national parties and their European counterparts. Due to 
the European Council's powerful role and the government's EU expertise 
vis-à-vis parliament, the Federal government remains centre-stage for 
German EU policy-making. 
10.1 Introduction 
The representative model of democracy is a key characteristic of the 
German political system. Following a long tradition of 
parliamentarianism and federalism, and inspired by the aim of 
avoiding a powerful presidency after the experience of the failed 
Weimar democracy, the fathers and mothers of the German 
Grundgesetz [Basic Law] established a strong role for the German 
bicameral legislature. For instance, neither the German Chancellor 
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nor the Federal President is elected directly by the citizens, but 
rather indirectly by the Bundestag and the Federal Convention, 
respectively. 
With regard to European integration, the role of 
representative elements and the role of the German Parliament in 
particular have often been debated, with parliamentarians 
repeatedly demanding more of a say. The eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis and decisions by the Constitutional Court provoked a 
substantial reform of the law that regulates how the Bundestag is 
dealing with political processes at European level (EUZBBG).1 Even 
though the Parliament has acquired new competencies in recent 
years, EU affairs in general are still of relatively low importance in 
Parliament and – with the exception of crisis situations – are not 
dealt with by leading members of the Bundestag.  
However, individual MPs and German parties, as pivotal 
channels of political representation, do interact with the EU-level in 
alternative forums. On the one hand, German national parties are 
strongly aligned with their European counterparts. One indicator 
for this are the increasingly intertwined career paths of politicians 
in Berlin and Brussels. On the other hand, German MPs were key 
figures in complaints before the Federal Constitutional Court, 
which has lasting effects on EU integration debates and eventually 
influenced the competencies of the parliament significantly. 
                                                        
1 See https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/euzbbg_2013/BJNR2170000 
13.html.  
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10.2 Representative democracy in Germany – the 
legal perspective 
10.2.1 Legal institutional power of the German 
Parliament 
According to its formal competencies, the German Bundestag is one 
of the strongest parliaments in the EU and worldwide.2 In addition 
to its legislative power, the Members of Parliament elect the 
Chancellor and control the 
government. One of the most 
important competences is its ‘budget 
sovereignty’ (in German: Budgethoheit). 
The German Bundestag is often 
defined as a ‘working parliament’ in 
which most of the legislative work is 
carried out in its 24 specialist committees. All political groups are 
represented in these committees in proportion to their respective 
seats in the plenary. Currently, six parties are represented by 709 
MPs in the Bundestag. According to the German mixed-member 
proportional representation system, 299 MPs are representing 
specific constituencies and 410 have been elected through party 
electoral lists. 
The German legislature is a bicameral system, with the 
Bundesrat as the complementary legislative body. The Bundesrat 
consists of delegates from the 16 German state (Bundesländer) 
governments, thus enabling the Länder representation in Germany’s 
federal system. Whenever a law agreed by the Bundestag touches 
upon the Constitution, the states’ finances, or their administrative 
competence, the Bundesrat has to agree with a majority before it can 
come into force. As the Länder are represented in federal law-
making through their governments and not through a senate-like 
institution, the German federal system has been labelled ‘executive 
federalism’. Thus, the Bundesrat bears some resemblance to the 
Council of the European Union. 
                                                        
2 In studies on legislature power, both Fish and Kroenig (2009), and 
Chernykh et al. (2016) ranked the German Parliament first in their global 
comparison. 
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10.2.2 The EU dimension: the Parliament’s power to 
shape EU affairs 
The way in which the Bundestag deals with European policy issues 
has changed considerably over the last ten years. The Lisbon Treaty 
– with its acknowledgement of national parliaments’ contribution 
for a “good function of the Union” (TEU, Art. 12) and new 
subsidiarity mechanisms, i.e. the yellow 
card, legal complaints against 
infringements (TFEU, Protocol 2) – 
contributed to a more intense debate 
about how the Bundestag deals with EU 
affairs. Moreover, subsequent 
judgments by the German 
Constitutional Court also increased the 
power of the Bundestag vis-à-vis the government in EU affairs, not 
least judgments connected to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
The crisis also changed the public debate of the role of German 
Members of Parliament considerably. First, the perception that 
budgetary sovereignty might be undermined with agreed crisis 
responses provoked German politicians to reflect on and question 
how MPs deal with political decisions made in Brussels. Second, the 
judgments of the German Constitutional Court shed light on the 
German representative model of democracy and its functioning in a 
multilevel system. 
The German Basic Law, Art. 23 (2,3) states:  
(2) The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Länder 
shall participate in matters concerning the European 
Union. The Federal Government shall keep the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat informed, comprehensively and at the 
earliest possible time. 
(3) Before participating in legislative acts of the European 
Union, the Federal Government shall provide the 
Bundestag with an opportunity to state its position. The 
Federal Government shall take the position of the 
Bundestag into account during the negotiations. Details 
shall be regulated by a law. 
The role of national parliaments in the EU already started to change 
with the Maastricht Treaty, which defined new participation rights 
(Callies and Beichelt 2013). The strengthening of these rights in the 
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Lisbon Treaty, together with important judgments of the German 
Constitutional Court, have led to a situation in which the Bundestag 
can no longer be regarded as ‘laggard’ in EU affairs, as it had often 
been described in academic literature 
(Höing 2013). Callies and Beichelt (2013) 
come to the conclusion that the 
Bundestag is now pursuing a proactive 
European policy role and was thus 
transformed from a ‘controller’ to an 
‘active policy shaper’. In particular, the 
Bundestag now has more rights, 
capacities and awareness of information, control and participation 
in EU affairs.  
There are a number of laws that govern the relationship 
between the EU and the German representative system, most 
notably the EUZBGL, the EUZBBG and the IntVG.3 While the first 
regulates how the 16 states participate in EU governance 
(particularly through the Bundesrat), the latter guarantees the 
Bundestag’s authority for further EU integration (including, for 
instance, the use of ‘passerelle’ clauses). The EUZBBG, finally, is the 
piece of legislation that regulates relations between the Bundestag 
and EU law-making. It contains specific provisions on the 
interactions between the Federal government and the German 
Parliament. As indicated, the eurozone crisis has led to substantial 
reforms in the role of the Bundestag in EU Affairs, coming into effect 
with the revised EUZBBG in 2013.4 The major ones are: first, from 
2013 on, activities outside the legal EU framework (such as 
responses to euro-crisis EFSF and ESM) are also considered part of 
EU affairs. Second, German MPs get access to unofficial EU 
documents. In addition, 25% of the MPs can oblige the government 
                                                        
3 Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (Law on the Cooperation of 
Federal and State Level in European Union Affairs); Gesetz über die 
Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (Law on the Cooperation of the 
Federal Government and the German Bundestag in European Union 
Affairs); Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz (Act on Responsibility for 
Integration). 
4 For an overview of the changes, see Höing 2015, p. 194.  
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to report on why they deviated from a position of the German 
Bundestag (Höing, 2015, p. 194). 
A short overview of representative democracy in Germany 
and its embeddedness in the EU shows that in the decade of 
multiple crises, the German Constitutional Court and German 
parliamentarians started to rethink the role of the Bundestag as a 
source of democratic legitimacy in the EU’s multilevel system. 
Although some formal improvements have been achieved, it is 
interesting to see how the Bundestag and its members will deal with 
EU affairs in less troubled times. New developments in the 
European Parliament (e.g. loss of informal grand coalition between 
S&D and EPP; or restructuring process in the Eurosceptic camp) 
might give new importance to national parliaments in EU affairs, in 
particular their capacity to scrutinise EU policies.  
10.3 Linking levels of democratic representation: 
German and European democracy intertwined 
10.3.1 Influence of national parliamentary work on EU 
political realities 
While the legal tools for the Bundestag to participate in EU affairs 
have increased substantially since the Treaty of Lisbon and due to 
the accompanying changes in German law, a look at political 
practices and dynamics in the Bundestag shows that this 
development should not be overestimated. Even though the EU 
committee in the Bundestag is one of four (out of 24 committees 
overall) that is explicitly mentioned in the German Basic Law (Art. 
45), it does not often take a leading role in legislative procedures. 
Accordingly, there are hardly any political heavyweights in this 
committee (Höing 2015, p. 196). If specific EU-related topics gain 
political traction, specialist politicians of the relevant committee are 
much more important than members of the EU committee, not least 
the Budget Committee (Abels 2017, p.124). Therefore, tools for 
scrutiny of EU polices provided in the EUZBBG and the Lisbon 
Treaty are not used systematically, e.g. as political leverage to shape 
EU policies. 
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In addition, neither the Bundestag nor the Bundesrat 
participates actively in the early warning mechanism 
(‘yellow/orange cards’) foreseen in 
the EU treaties. The early warning 
mechanism allows national 
parliaments to give reasoned 
opinions to the EU Commission if 
they consider draft legislation to be 
in breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity. If at least a third of national parliaments writes a 
reasoned opinion on time, the Commission has to review the draft 
legislation (yellow card). If it is supported by at least half of all 
national parliaments, the Commission would need to review its 
proposal and justify whether it keeps it in place. Like in all 
bicameral parliamentary systems, both the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat have an individual vote in this early mechanism. 
In practice, however, neither has been an active participant in 
the scheme. Since its introduction with the Lisbon Treaty, the 
necessary threshold for a yellow card was reached three times – and 
in none of these cases did either the Bundestag or the Bundesrat 
send in their reasoned opinion. Their participation in the 
programme has varied. The Bundestag – like many lower chambers 
that prefer to control their own national executive in the Council 
instead of the direct relationship with the EU Commission – has 
been reluctant to divert energy to writing reasoned opinions. 
Between 2010 (when the procedure started to apply) and 2016 only 
four reasoned opinions were issued by the Bundestag, but six in 
2017. Most of these were related to issue areas that the German 
government is also cautious about, such as the further liberalisation 
of the EU services market. The Bundesrat, on the other hand, has 
fluctuated in its use of the early warning mechanism. Shortly after 
its inception, the Bundesrat, together with the House of Lords and 
the upper Swedish chamber, was among the most active national 
parliaments, with those three together accounting for 50 per cent of 
reasoned opinions. Later on, the enthusiasm for the mechanism 
receded, and in 2017 for instance the Bundesrat issued only three 
reasoned opinions.  
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The same is true for COSAC, the Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments, which is not well 
regarded in the Bundestag. In particular, there is a critical view of 
the overall procedure and value added. COSAC, along with other 
interparliamentary assemblies, 
provides additional forums for 
parliamentarians to gather and 
exchange information. While these 
provide added value, in particular for 
smaller parliaments with fewer 
resources, the well-staffed Bundestag 
and its parliamentarians have been less enthusiastic.  
All in all, the main influence of the Bundestag on EU politics 
comes via its control rights vis-à-vis the German government and 
less via the yellow card procedure.  
10.3.2 Going to court: parliamentarians’ legal challenges 
of EU affairs 
Many of the recent changes in the linkages between Germany’s 
representative democracy and political processes at EU level have 
their origins in judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court. The 
judgments on the Lisbon Treaty and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) received particular attention. Members of the 
German Bundestag were among the main initiators of these 
constitutional complaints, which subsequently led to more 
competencies for the Parliament. 
After the Lisbon Treaty had been ratified by the Bundesrat, 
Peter Gauweiler (MP for the conservative CSU party) prominently 
argued that the Lisbon Treaty violates the Grundgesetz and started a 
so-called ‘Organstreitverfahren’ [Court proceedings between 
constitutional actors]. Among other things, he contested a violation 
of Article 38 GG, which regulates the rights of Members of 
Parliament. In addition to his initiative, the left-wing group Die 
Linke also initiated proceedings in which they argued that the 
Lisbon Treaty was incompatible with the Grundgesetz. The BVerfG 
judgment on these (and several other) motions passed on 30 
September 2009 was widely discussed in German politics and 
beyond. While generally arguing that the Lisbon Treaty is in line 
with the Grundgesetz and rejecting the constitutional complaints, the 
The main influence of the 
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BVerfG also formulated several conditions for future EU 
integration. It also demanded further parliamentary control in EU 
affairs for the Bundestag. For instance, it ruled that the German 
government could only consent to the uses of flexibility or 
passarelle clauses of the EU treaties after prior approval by the 
Bundestag. Subsequently, this judgment had a decisive influence on 
the (new) versions of the accompanying laws (IntVG, EUZBBG, 
EUZBLG) to the Lisbon Treaty. 
The two judgments on the ESM also attracted a lot of attention 
during the crisis. For the second constitutional complaint (BvR 
1390/12), the BVerfG numbered more than 37,000 complainants. 
Among them were members of the Bundestag from several parties, 
law professors and the association ‘Mehr Demokratie’ (More 
Democracy). As in the Lisbon judgment, the BVerfG approved the 
European political decision in general, but also requested, among 
other things, stronger participation and information rights for the 
Bundestag. These include a previous approval by the Bundestag (or 
its Budget Committee) for any tranche paid out by the ESM to Greece 
and other programme countries, leading to a tight control of every 
step of the programme.  
10.3.3 German parties at EU level 
With regard to the interactions of the representative forms of 
democracy in Germany and at EU-level, one can identify strong 
connections between German political parties and their European 
counterparts. (Western) German 
parties were founding members of all 
of the major European political 
parties and continue to play a strong 
role in them. Due to the number of 
German MEPs, Germans are centre-
stage in all of the mainstream EP 
parliamentary groups. 
In the parliamentary term from 2014-19, they constitute the 
largest or second largest national group within the EPP, S&D, 
Greens, and GUE/NGL parliamentary groups.  German MEPs also 
hold an above-average number of influential positions in the 
European Parliament (EP), with four Germans as party group 
chairs/presidents: 
Due to the number of 
German MEPs, Germans are 
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• EPP: Manfred Weber (CSU) 
• S&D: Udo Bullmann (SPD) 
• European Greens/EFA: Ska Keller (Die Grünen) 
• GUE/NGL: Gabriele Zimmer (Die Linke). 
By comparison, there is no other member state whose nationals lead 
even two different party groups. This list also illustrates that at least 
until the 2019 European elections, the 96 German MEPs are 
concentrated in the mainstream party groups. This strong role is the 
result of three combined factors: first, due to its population size, 
Germany has the highest number of MEPs, even if – in line with the 
principle of degressive proportionality – the 16.1 per cent of EU-28 
population ‘only’ translates into 12.8 per cent of MEPs (96 of 751). 
Second, however, German MEPs have been concentrated in the 
mainstream political groups in the European Parliament, 
constituting around 16 per cent of parliamentarians in the EPP, 14 
per cent in the S&D and even 25 per cent in the Greens/EFA group. 
On the flipside, they have been underrepresented in the Eurosceptic 
groups and (in this legislature) also within the liberal ALDE, where 
German MEPs accounted for only 8 per cent of members. Last but 
not least, the informal ‘grand coalition’ in the EP overlapped with 
the grand coalition in Berlin, producing a party political overlap 
between the national and European level. 
The influence of German Eurosceptics has so far been limited. 
In 2014, the young Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gained seven 
seats in the European Parliament and 
joined the moderately Eurosceptic ECR 
group. However, many of the elected 
representatives were part of the more 
moderate wing of the AfD. After several 
splits within the party only one AfD MEP is left in the EP in 2019, 
sitting among the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
(EFDD) group. Looking ahead, the party has however committed 
itself to working together with Matteo Salvini to launch a larger 
Eurosceptic group after the EP elections, most likely in the form of 
an enlarged Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF) group together 
with the Italian Lega, the French National Rally, the Austrian FPÖ, 
among others.  Polling at ~13 per cent, which would result in about 
13 seats, this would put a larger German faction within one of the 
Eurosceptic groups of the EP for the first time – though still well 
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below the expected size of, inter alia, the French National 
Movement and the Italian Lega Nord. 
One example of the strong influence of German politicians at 
EU level is the so-called Spitzenkandidaten process for choosing the 
Commission president. Not only its origin, but also the practice of 
the Spitzenkandidaten system has been 
particularly relevant to Germany, 
where it received a lot of media 
coverage, partly due to candidates 
Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude 
Juncker debating in German (cf. Hix 
and Wilks-Heeg, 2014). Even though 
the process had been deemed a 
success and helped to boost voter turnout in Germany, Chancellor 
Merkel was originally hesitant to support Juncker’s nomination for 
the Commission presidency and only endorsed him after public 
pressure. In the run-up to the elections in 2019, attitudes of the 
heads of state and government towards the Spitzenkandidaten 
system are equally lukewarm. However, as both candidates of the 
two biggest European parties speak German (Manfred Weber and 
Frans Timmermans) and German-speaking politicians are also 
promising candidates in other party groups, a strong presence of the 
Spitzenkandidaten in German media is again likely. 
The career paths of German politicians usually still show the 
European Union as an ‘upside-down polity’ in which a lower polity 
level (the national one) – and not the highest polity level (EU) – 
offers the most popular political offices (Hix 2008, pp. 1260–1263). 
In recent years a significant shift has happened. Early on, the EU 
level was regarded as a way to gracefully end a political career, 
following the logic of “Hast Du einen Opa, dann schick ihn nach 
Europa” (“If you have a grandpa, send him to Europe”). In this 
sense, for instance, former German Chancellor Willy Brandt ended 
his political career in the European Parliament. More recently, a 
number of politicians have used their EU career as a stepping stone 
to national political offices, e.g. Martin Schulz who became the 
SPD’s chancellor candidate after having been president of the 
European Parliament. This is made possible due to the links 
between MEPs and their national parties, where MEPs are for 
instance regularly invited to sessions of the EU affairs committee of 
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the Bundestag and the party organisations. Martin Schulz, for 
instance, was a long-term member of the executive of the SPD 
during his time as a MEP long before he became the party’s leader 
and chancellor candidate. Cases in which a leading national 
politician switches to a European career path, like the German 
Justice Minister Katarina Barley leading the SPD into the European 
elections, are still rare. 
10.4 European policymaking at times of crisis 
Despite the strong role that the fathers and mothers of the 
Grundgesetz have ascribed to the German Parliament and despite the 
legal empowerment of parliamentarians through recent treaty 
changes and changes to the EUZBBG, EU policy in Germany 
remains Chefsache (leader’s competence). The chancellor retains the 
competence to guide German EU policy 
with help of the Europaabteilung 
(European department), one of the 
chancellery’s six main departments. The 
department chief acts as the chancellor’s 
sherpa to the European Council. 
In addition, many ministries of the German government have 
a European department or sub-division themselves. Most important 
for German EU policy are the ministry of foreign affairs, the 
ministry of the economy and the finance ministry, all equipped with 
well-staffed European departments and important competencies in 
the European institutional structure. This can lead to controversies 
between chancellery and one of the ministries, particularly in 
coalition governments. Two recent examples were the votes on 
extending the market licence for glyphosate and the EU copyright 
directive. In both instances the German government voted in 
favour, despite one coalition partner arguing publically against it.  
The concentration of EU policy power and EU expertise in the 
government and particularly the chancellery has, for a long time, 
made a lot of practical sense: first, because the EU’s institutional 
structure (and that of international politics more generally) 
favoured national executives. Second, because European 
integration was not a politicised issue, but was rather seen as a 
process of identifying common interests and aligning positions 
among European countries. Giving the chancellor the freedom to 
EU policy in Germany 
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roam in European affairs thus meant a strong negotiating hand to 
pursue German interests. The former reason is still valid to some 
degree – the European Council in particular has gained even further 
importance in setting the EU direction 
and, in part, taking detailed policy 
decisions. However, the latter has 
changed significantly since the 1990s. 
European integration today is much 
more part of public and political debate, making the inclusion of a 
wider audience into EU decision-making much more plausible. In 
Germany, the Bundestag, but also the Länder parliaments and the 
Bundesrat are the natural institutions to demand and achieve more 
of a say. 
Has this development led to a ‘constraining dissensus’ that 
some EU scholars have linked to EU politicisation? Considering the 
increased power for information, control and participation 
mentioned above, the Bundestag was set to play a major role during 
the eurozone crisis. Yet, while the formal power of the Bundestag 
has been increased, there are still strong constraints on its actual 
influence over EU policymaking. First, the EU’s institutional design 
still favours (heads of) governments. Second and increasingly 
important is the rise of ‘emergency politics’ in recent years, i.e. a 
tendency of leading politicians to evoke a sense of urgency and an 
air of the exceptional in policymaking. Even the increased rights of 
the Bundestag, for instance in decisions of the ESM to pay out 
tranches as part of the ESM programme for Greece were of limited 
practical value when the cost of deviating from the government’s 
position – triggering a fresh eurozone crisis – were prohibitively 
high. Thereby delegitimising slower parliamentary methods, 
governments at times managed to reduce parliaments’ role to a 
largely post hoc approver (White 2015). In such circumstances, EU 
policymaking is even more Chefsache than before. The increased role 
of the European Council in recent years is an indicator for this 
development (Puetter 2015). 
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Conclusion 
The German representative model of democracy is characterised by 
bicameralism, strong parliamentarianism and executive federalism. 
The Bundestag is one of the most powerful legislatures in the world 
and provided with a vast range of rights for information, control 
and participation in EU affairs. In this analysis of German 
representative democracy and its relations to EU politics, four 
aspects can be highlighted: 
First, the origin of the strong participatory rights of the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat in EU affairs stems less from political 
than from legal confrontations. A series of legal challenges by 
individual parliamentarians such as on the ratification of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and during the eurozone crisis compelled the German 
government to increase the rights of the Bundestag in EU affairs. 
Only after respective judgments by the German Constitutional 
Court did the Bundestag, Bundesrat and German government agree 
on the respective laws governing parliamentary participation.  
At the same time, it is striking how little use the Bundestag is 
making of EU-level instruments to participate in EU law-making, 
most notably the early warning procedure. Here, the Bundestag has 
participated in none of the successful yellow card procedures, while 
the Bundesrat has switched from an early active participant to a 
much more cautious approach. The strength of parliamentary 
control over the German government and thus its negotiation 
position in the Council therefore seems inversely linked to the use 
of the EU-level procedures. But even here, the strong legal 
mechanisms to control the German government have translated into 
a more limited political control in practice, partly because the series 
of ‘grand coalitions’ had very big majorities, at least until 2017.  
Thirdly, it is important to note the substantial party-political 
links between German political parties and their European 
counterparts. Except in the Eurosceptic mainstream, German 
political parties were among the founders of all mainstream EU 
political parties and have had a strong influence on their shape and 
policies. With the EPP, the S&D, the Greens and the European Left, 
an above average number of EP party groups are led by German 
MEPs, who are also closely interlinked with their national parties. 
Last but not least, the overlap between the grand coalition in Berlin 
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and the informal grand coalition in the European Parliament also 
opened up avenues for informal coordination between German and 
EU politics. 
Finally, a large part of power and expertise still lies with the 
German government, particularly the Chancellery and the 
ministries of foreign affairs, finance and the economy. While the 
politicisation of European politics has increased the interest and 
participation of the parliament, recent modes of ‘emergency 
politics’ have empowered the European Council on the EU level. 
Despite the Bundestag’s improved stance, EU affairs in Germany 
remain Chefsache.  
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11. GREEK PARLIAMENTARY 
DEMOCRACY AS A POST-
REPRESENTATIVE REGIME: 
CONTINUITIES AND 
DISCONTINUITIES DURING 
AUSTERITY 
FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU* 
This chapter discusses the transformation of representative politics in 
Greece during the austerity years. Greece’s post-1974 republican regime 
aimed at ensuring constitutional continuity and stability, making 
parliament the guarantor of democratic legitimacy. Austerity policies and 
politics inaugurated a new period known as ‘post-metapolitefsi’, where the 
political and partisan system has undergone important shifts.  
The chapter first deals with the repercussions of the sovereign debt 
crisis on the parliament’s law-making and scrutiny role, revealing the 
increasingly shrinking space for exercising delegated authority and 
fostering democratic deliberation. Then, it outlines the new features of the 
party system, insisting on how it dramatically alters the political space for 
ideological and partisan competition as well as the relationship between the 
elected and the electorate.  
Introduction 
In just two decades, Greece achieved what took other democracies 
half a century: the triumph and the decline of the idea of 
representative democracy (Manitakis, 2012). Following the first 
institutional legitimacy crisis to strike the system of political 
                                                        
* Valuable research assistance was provided by Konstantinos 
Papanikolaou, ELIAMEP Junior Research Assistant. 
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representation since the end of the 80s (Manitakis, 2012), the forced 
Europeanisation of national economic policies gave rise to 
substantive shifts in parliamentary representativeness and partisan 
identity, thus further weakening national representative 
democracy.  
11.1 The weak safeguards of a ‘depressed’ 
parliamentarism  
The main constitutional footprint of the Metapolitefsi has been the 
reinforcement of the executive branch in the legislative process, 
enhancing the formation of 
parliamentary committees controlled 
by the majority party. During the 
1985-2008 period, the Greek 
parliament failed to react to the 
gradual erosion of its power and to the 
growing popular distrust due to the 
frequent allegations of opaque and 
unfair transactions with economic interest groups. Since the 
outbreak of the economic crisis, public trust in institutions has 
undergone a sharp decline, except for a slight surge of support 
during Syriza’s first term in office (see Figure 11.1). 
Figure 11.1 Rates of public trust in institutions in Greece, 2007-18 (%) 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer surveys, National reports, Greece. 
Since the outbreak of the 
economic crisis, public trust 
in institutions has sharply 
declined, except for a slight 
surge during Syriza’s first 
term in office. 
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The government exercises almost exclusive legislative competence 
via the introduction of bills in a much wider range of issues than 
had been envisaged in the Greek Constitution.1 With this trend, the 
parliamentary space of working 
and debating narrows, both at the 
level of committees as in the 
plenary session, while legislative 
proposals presented by the 
opposition are exceptional. This 
also explains why the Greek Parliament privileges a reactive and ex 
post, instead of anticipative and ex ante scrutiny process of the EU 
draft legislation in the ordinary legislative procedure. The Greek 
Parliament’s working style is mainly oriented towards supportive 
scrutiny in the framework of advisory procedures without 
formulating and/or voting specific instructions.2  
The revisions of the Constitution in 2001 and 20083 as well as 
the initiatives of amending the Rules of Procedures of the 
Parliament (RoP) did not succeed in improving its internal 
functioning and the way in which it exercises its competencies. 
Before 2008, traditional methods of parliamentary control such as 
petitions, queries, or the mechanism of the ‘debates’ agenda’ rarely 
led to discussions with any significant political effect. Moreover, the 
strengthening of the role of parliamentary committees4 in relation 
to the plenary session, both in law-making and parliamentary 
scrutiny, proved insufficient to guarantee the conditions that 
promote democratic and accountable governance within the Greek 
parliament.  
                                                        
1 Art. 73 of the Constitution stipulates this possibility only on pension 
issues. 
2 According to the article 70.8 of the Constitution and the articles 32A, 41B 
of the RoP.  
3 The 1975 Constitution that proclaimed parliamentary democracy was 
revised in 1986, 2001 and 2008. 
4 This includes the competence of parliamentary committees for passing 
bills, the publicity of their meetings and the use of exceptional specific 
parliamentary scrutiny instruments. 
The Greek Parliament 
privileges a reactive instead  
of anticipative scrutiny process 
of EU draft legislation. 
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Austerity policies led to a further significant loss of 
Parliament’s power to legislate and scrutinise government policies. 
Most national parliaments are weakly 
involved with the various phases of the 
European Semester’s workings and 
decisions at national level (European 
Parliament, 2018). During the 
memorandum era, Greece, exempt 
from all European Semester reporting 
processes, was not subject to a macroeconomic imbalances review. 
The country did not have to submit a stability programme, but it 
had to accept the most stringent obligations – this is also the case 
nowadays in the context of the post-memorandum monitoring 
programme – for monitoring the implementation of the adjustment 
programmes that actually covered the policy areas reviewed under 
the Semester.  
Parliamentary structures were not adapted to the new regime 
of external budgetary and financial monitoring for structural 
adjustment – a regime that included at least four Troika review 
missions per year, plus interim missions mainly through 
government channels.  
A series of amendments of the RoP in 2010 brought some 
changes in order to improve parliamentary awareness of the 
government’s work. Τhe National Statistical Office has been put 
under the responsibility of the parliamentary committee on 
institutions and transparency, a State Budget Office has been 
established in parliament to facilitate the evaluation of budgetary 
data from the budget committee and to enhance parliamentary 
control of state finances. Moreover, a compulsory public 
consultation process has been introduced,5 while prime minister’s 
questions and ministers’ topical questions have been reformed in 
order to enhance the immediacy of these processes.  
It is highly debatable whether these procedural changes 
increased parliamentary scrutiny of the Troika’s views – on actions 
to undertake, recommendations and policy priorities provided in 
                                                        
5 In this process, each bill must be accompanied by a report on the public 
consultation and an assessment report on the consequences of the 
regulation. 
Austerity policies led to a 
further significant loss of 
Parliament’s power to 
legislate and scrutinise 
government policies. 
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the MoUs, or on Greece’s national reform programmes. The 
reinforcement of throughput legitimacy has not increased 
parliament’s influence on the policy outcome although, in principle, 
adjustment policies were intended to promote growth and 
employment in line with the Europe 2020 strategy.  
All the above initiatives for amending the rules of the 
parliamentary process failed to mitigate the dominance of 
government parties – despite their progressively decreasing 
majorities after 2011 as we will see below – at the expense of 
opposition parties; on the contrary, they reinforced parliament’s 
dependency on the government. Despite the controversial nature of 
austerity legislation, there have not been any motions of no 
confidence (art. 84 C) over the course of the last decade,6 no increase 
in the number of petitions (art. 69 C) or requests for deposing 
documents, no rise in the number of debates on the initiative of MPs 
or hearings of competent ministers to inform the committees. It is 
worth mentioning ministers’ indifference to parliamentary 
procedures, since they were either absent or responded after a long 
time to submitted parliamentary questions or queries. As far as 
‘prime minister’s time’ is concerned, by reintroducing this 
previously abolished institution selectively and sporadically, the 
Syriza government increased talk time for the prime minister at the 
expense of that for MPs.   
In principle, the President of the Parliament is called upon to 
transmit regulatory acts and consultative documents to the 
competent standing committee and the European Affairs 
Committee. The government has to inform the House about the 
follow-up given to the opinions expressed during hearings from the 
competent or joint committees forwarded to the responsible or 
competent ministers (art. 41Β RoP). However, in the framework of 
parliamentary debates, while austerity legislative measures 
imposed by the MoUs have been accompanied by explanatory 
reports – a report by the General Accounting Office and by the 
                                                        
6 The only exceptions were the Syriza motion against the government New 
Democracy – Pasok in November 2013 after the shutdown of the Greek 
state broadcaster ERT and the New Democracy motion against the Prespa 
agreement in June 2018. 
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Minister of Finance and any other competent minister, and a report 
from the scientific service of the parliament – there was no 
substantial debate, where amendments or additions proposed by 
MPs could have been discussed and eventually accepted within at 
least the existing consultation processes.7  
Effective scrutiny by national parliaments of their own 
governments was deemed extremely important for the credibility of 
the adjustment programmes given the fact that the MoUs were not 
taking into account the practice and institutions for wage formation, 
thus exempting concerned member states from reporting under the 
anti-poverty and social inclusion targets (European Parliament, 
2014).8 Within a parliamentary assembly engaged in genuine 
deliberation, ministers of finance should have been regularly 
reporting and held accountable to the national parliament on what 
was being negotiated between the European and national 
authorities.9 In fact, in the Greek case, formal documents were not 
clearly communicated and considered in due time by Greek MPs, 
nor adequately discussed with the social partners.10  
                                                        
7 The Special Committee for European affairs (art. 32A RoP) in 
collaboration with the sectoral standing committees and, if necessary, the 
sectoral special permanent committees can express advisory opinions by 
submitting a report to the parliament and the government, in which any 
minority opinion is registered. 
8 The EP Report also recalls that the recommendations contained in the 
MoUs were at odds with the modernisation policy drawn up in the Lisbon 
strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy without taking into account the 
national reform programme of the member state concerned in the context 
of the Union’s strategy for growth and jobs as set out in Regulation (EU) 
No 472/2013 (art.7 (1)).  
9 In contrast, the Cypriot parliament rejected the original MoU while in 
Portugal the MoU was not ratified by the national parliament. 
10 “There has been a voluntary downgrading of the role of the parliament, 
thereby not allowing Greek deputies to address issues as sensitive as for 
instance the infrastructure concession agreements imposed under the 
MoUs”, Interview with N. Voutsis, President of the Hellenic Parliament, 
10.01.2019.  
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The EU significantly influences an increasing number of 
domestic processes of agenda-setting, thus covering a wide variety 
of issues that depend heavily on government policies and orienting 
the national parliamentary agenda. Nevertheless, this increasing 
Europeanisation of parliamentary work has neither resulted in a rise 
of awareness about EU affairs among Greek MPs nor a 
strengthening of their European 
‘expertise and competence’,11 nor in 
the effective adaptation of the Greek 
parliament’s structures to the new 
requirements of overlapping and 
interlocking competences within the 
EU.  
Under economic pressure with 
tight deadlines, Greek governments 
abused specific urgent and emergency legislative procedures, thus 
de facto transforming an exceptional way of legislating into the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’. Emergency bills were tabled and 
voted in a short space of time, restricting the public’s access to 
information and neutralising attempts to generate an organised 
response through effective mobilisation.  
Even earlier, the constitutional review of 2001 had already 
introduced derogations from the ‘common’ legislative procedure in 
order to further ease adoption of emergency legislation and tighten 
the way in which amendments and additions are made (art. 76.4 & 
5 C). Emergency bills and draft laws are debated and put to the vote 
in one plenary session with no possibility of a time extension for 
further discussion; if they contain provisions unrelated to their main 
subject, these are not discussed.  
This trend has been reinforced by the amending of the 
parliament’s RoP in 2016. An assessment report, albeit concise, 
should also accompany the emergency legislation and ministers’ 
amendments (art. 87 RoP). At the same time, new time limits are set 
for the submission of bills and amendments, so as to avoid 
                                                        
11 “No more than half of Greek deputies have a relatively good knowledge 
of the EU; their scientific collaborators and the general staff of their 
respective parties are mainly taking charge of the related legislative work”, 
Interview with N. Voutsis, ibid. 
This increasing 
Europeanisation of 
parliamentary work has 
neither resulted in a rise of 
awareness about EU affairs 
among Greek MPs nor a 
strengthening of their European 
‘expertise and competence’. 
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surprises. The one-week margin between the first and second 
reading debate on emergency bills and draft laws has been 
abolished (art. 109.2 RoP).  
Greece’s international commitments, legally and politically 
soft but financially hard, brought with them a marked increase in 
legislative output (see Table 1). This was accomplished mainly by 
way of the emergency legislative procedure, as well as by using 
flexible legislative instruments that are at the exclusive disposal of 
the executive branch in cases of urgent and unforeseen emergency, 
known as ‘legislative acts’12 and regulatory instruments (i.e. Acts of 
Council of Ministers, Ministerial decisions) (see Table 11.1 and 
Figure 11.2).   
Table 11.1 Legislative output under the framework of memorandums, 
2010-18 
Multi-bills  26 
Laws  over 717 
Corresponding provisions of the memorandums over 60,000 
Legislative acts 75 
Acts of Council of Ministers  171 
Ministerial decisions over 300,000 
Source: Οffice of the Secretary General of the Government, 2019 and Directorate 
General of parliamentary work of the Hellenic Parliament, 2019. 
                                                        
12 The bills introduced into parliament on the ratification of legislative acts, 
according to the art. 44.1 of the Constitution, necessarily contain one article 
which automatically ratifies the legislative act (art. 113 RoP). 
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Figure 11.2 Comparative numbers of legislative acts and Acts of Council 
of Ministers in the period of memorandums, per year, 2010-18 
 
Sources: Οffice of the Secretary General of the Government, 2019 and 
Directorate General for parliamentary work of the Hellenic Parliament, 
2019. 
 
However, contrary to what is often said, the unconditional 
implementation of the memorandums’ objectives through 
government policy did not take place in an emergency environment 
(Manitakis, 2012). The delegation of extraordinary legislative power 
to the Council of Ministers, which transformed the parliament into 
an ex post ratification institution, took place in a normal 
constitutional and political context. The new regime of permanent 
coercion became a facilitator for carrying out the legislative work, 
while at the same time exacerbated power asymmetries between 
national parliaments within the EU (Moschella, 2017, Nguyen, 
2018).  
While there was no unpredictable or exceptional danger, 
exceptional legislative processes have been normalised. The fact 
that the Troika was responsible for drafting the legislative measures 
and supervising their implementation13 certainly eliminated any 
                                                        
13 In 2015, there were some discussions, mainly launched by the re-elected 
Syriza government in September 2015, on the possible involvement of the 
European Parliament in monitoring the implementation of the economic 
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potential danger, whereas, on the other hand, it changed the nature 
of domestic political legitimacy. Instead of streamlining and 
improving parliamentary scrutiny, the further ‘executivisation’ of 
parliamentary power during the memorandum and the post-
memorandum eras translated into its 
long-standing weakening.14 While 
these excessive amounts of austerity 
legislative output covered a broad 
spectrum of public policies largely 
exceeding the MoUs’ objectives, they 
failed to provide efficient and 
equitable policies as well as to 
preserve legal sustainability and future legislative stability.  
Low levels of parliamentary expertise on EU affairs and the 
shrinking space for parliamentary debate and legislative initiatives 
are the features of a system that struggles to participate in the 
existing framework of European inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
This low-profile and non-binding cooperation scheme encouraging 
conferences and networks between national parliaments as well as 
between them and the European institutions basically aims at 
exchanging information and discussing matters of common interest.  
However, in the framework of the political dialogue with the 
European Commission, the Greek Parliament demonstrates a 
markedly low institutional capability in comparison with other 
member states as far as the task of monitoring compliance of EU 
legislative proposals with the subsidiarity principle is concerned.15 
Up to now, the Greek Parliament issued a small number of opinions 
                                                        
adjustment programmes of countries under financial assistance, but 
without success.  
14 In the framework of the national parliamentary debate, the Committee of 
European affairs of the Greek Parliament holds formal hearings for 
European Commissioners-designate confined to questions addressed by 
one representative of each political party in a limited amount of time.  
15 “The possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty are exploited. We could 
participate more actively, but this is a political issue”, Interview with Ε. 
Konstantinidou, former Director of the Directorate for European and 
bilateral affairs, Hellenic Parliament. 
 
Instead of improving 
parliamentary scrutiny, the 
further ‘executivisation’ 
during the memorandum 
and the post-memorandum 
eras weakened it. 
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on Commission documents or policy areas and of reasoned 
opinions on draft legislative acts with no involvement in the three 
yellow cards triggered within the early warning mechanism.16 This 
allows us to include the Greek Parliament in the group of national 
parliaments that embrace low-profile activism at the European level 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary and 
Lithuania).  
However, while national parliamentary involvement in EU 
law-making is considered very important, it could not restore the 
problem of competence creep and the need to safeguard domestic 
socio-economic and politico-legal idiosyncrasies. The best way to 
alleviate the (national and European) democratic deficit and boost 
EU legitimacy is to ensure effective national parliamentary 
oversight of the quality of legislative output and the distribution of 
competences according to the principle of conferral of powers 
(Jancic, 2015; Garben, 2017).   
11.2 Shrunken democracy 
After the long post-war period of authoritarian parliamentarism, in 
the Metapolitefsi period Greece built a polarised parliamentary 
system based on a tripartite partisan system (Alivizatos, 1990). This 
partisan system reproduced the inherited opposition of the late pro-
dictatorship period, i.e. the post-civil war opposition between the 
Right (New Democracy) and anti-Right/democratic forces (Pasok, 
Communist party of Greece),17 establishing a bipolar order of 
political competition, which was actually consolidated in the 80s 
(Nikolakopoulos, 1990). The Communist party’s core ideology of 
anti-Americanism and anti-capitalist imperialism became an 
embedded feature of the one pole of the ‘bipolar tripartism’ 
(Nikolakopoulos, 1990).    
                                                        
16 Greek governments issued one opinion in 2017 and in 2016, two opinions 
in 2013, four opinions in 2012 and seven in 2010. 
17 The Communist party of Interior came from the splitting of the 
Communist party of Greece in 1968. In 1989, an electoral coalition named 
‘Synaspismos (Bloc) of the Left’ was established gathering together 
different factions of the Greek Left; much later, following the defection of 
the Communist party of Greece, this coalition evolved into the political 
party of Syriza. 
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Two shifts took place more or less in parallel. From the mid-
80s, there was a progressive break between the two poles 
weakening the right / anti-right structure and moving to a genuine 
polarised tripartite system with two main governing parties. From 
1989 to 1990, the formation of coalition governments reinforced 
bipartisanship (Foundethakis, 2003). The sovereign debt crisis, as a 
catalyst, dramatically shrank the ideological polarisation of the old 
adversarial politics, reinforcing personal leadership, and 
reinvigorated party fragmentation with the appearance of some 
flash parties,18 significantly weakening the long-established 
bipartisanship (see Figure 11.3).  
Figure 11.3 The evolution of bipartisanship through elections, 1974-2015 
(%) 
 
Source: Election data, Greek Ministry of Interior. 
In the election of September 2015, the number of parties in 
parliament shot up to eight, the highest number in the post-
dictatorship period. Indeed, this extreme fragmentation had not 
been seen before in Greek politics. When we observe the fluctuation 
of party numbers in the Metapolitefsi period, we see that party 
fragmentation was quite low in periods of stability, while it was 
higher in periods of political turmoil with shorter parliamentary 
                                                        
18 Small parties with minor ideological differences risk disappearing. 
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terms; this was particularly the case during the years of the 
economic crisis starting with the May 
2012 election, the first election held 
after the implementation of the (first 
and second) bailout programmes (see 
Figure 11.4). 
Figure 11.4 Number of parliamentary 
parties, 1974 – 2015 
 
Note: This chart takes into account parties with at least 5 MPs. 
Source: Elections data, Greek Ministry of Interior. 
 
According to the provocative distinction between competitive 
systems and ‘consociational’ systems, the latter are defined by a 
“non-competitive 'cartelised' 
pluralist pattern” in which “amicable 
agreement" plays the leading role 
(Barber, 2003). The consociational 
model avoids the fractiousness of 
majority decision through a process 
of what we might call holistic 
bargaining. Greece’s political culture has been previously shaped by 
a strong tradition of one-party governments neglecting the issue of 
intra-party democracy. Post-crisis Greece underwent a shift from a 
Party fragmentation was 
quite low in periods of 
stability, while it was 
higher in periods of political 
turmoil with shorter 
parliamentary terms. 
Greece’s political culture has 
been previously shaped by a 
strong tradition of one-party 
governments neglecting 
intra-party democracy. 
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bipolar partisan system to a post-majoritarian political system, 
experiencing considerable pressure due to the ever-decreasing 
government majorities that it produces. This can be seen as a ‘south-
consociational’ model that reinforces its consensual characteristics 
and favours the development of multi-party governments (see 
Figure 11.5).  
Figure 11.5 Number of coalition governments MPs, 2010-1919 
 
Source: Elections data, Greek Ministry of Interior. 
 
Coalition politics increases the volatility of party preferences, 
contributes to the ideological vagueness of parties and jeopardises 
MPs’ partisan identity. Parties’ strategic rapprochements, along 
with their flagrant ideological incoherencies and mutations, further 
increase the growing disengagement of Greeks from parliamentary 
politics. Increasing numbers of MPs switch political party during 
their term or become independent, after either being excluded from 
or because of disagreement with it (see Figure 11.6).  
                                                        
19 Since January 2019, the disagreement of Syriza’s partner ANEL on the 
Prespa agreement led to the break-up of the government coalition. Syriza 
government minority of 145 MPs has the support of 6 MPs (2 members of 
the parliamentary group of ANEL and 4 MPs becoming independent after 
being expelled from their parties (two former ANEL MPs, one former New 
Democracy MP and one former The River MP). 
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Figure 11.6 Number of MPs leaving their party, 2009-19 
 
Source: Hellenic Parliament, 2019. 
 
Currently, the 21 independent MPs compose the ‘third’ party in the 
outgoing parliament. While the Constitution guarantees that MPs 
can decide according to their own conscience (art. 60.1 C), political 
parties have always used disciplinary measures to achieve voting 
unity. Memorandums, but also the recently adopted law for the 
implementation of the Prespa agreement on the Macedonian issue, 
increased MPs’ disloyalty to their party. This general trend may also 
have a deleterious effect on party identification of voters when 
elected members of parliament disregard main party lines and show 
shifting loyalty not firmly rooted in their psychological attachment 
to their party. 
Another aspect of the above trend is the hazy affiliation of 
Greek political parties with the political groups in the EP. Their 
ideological commitments seem ever looser, which leads to 
divergent positioning strategies and political de-alignments within 
the European political spectrum. New Democracy has been 
misaligned with the EPP’s position on the Prespa agreement as well 
as on the prospects for Euro-Turkish relations. The Movement for 
Change – the centre-left alliance of Pasok with other minor centre-
left parties – has been misaligned with the Socialists and Democrats’ 
position on the Prespa agreement. Syriza’s flirting with the group of 
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Socialists and Democrats has been a sign of its gradual convergence 
with centre-left politics.20  
Syriza positioned itself as the best negotiator and executor of 
austerity norms and relevant policy actions embracing EU’s 
protestant, positivist and liberal values; and all this within a public 
space where the margin of acceptable opinion has been strictly 
limited (Chomsky, 1998).  
Three of the seven Greek parties that won EP seats in 2014 
were generally registered as uncritical supporters of European 
integration and committed to keep crisis-
stricken Greece in the Eurozone. The 
remaining four with Eurosceptic 
programmes won 12 of 21 national seats 
in the EP. According to a European 
Parliament survey, the three main issues 
influencing Greek voters were 
unemployment, economic growth and the future of pensions 
(European Parliament, 2014).  
The 2015 referendum further widened the gap between pro-
MoU ‘globalists’ and anti-MoU ‘nativists’. It seemed that those 
voting for the first time and the unemployed had massively chosen 
‘No’. The voting pattern in the referendum was highly polarised, 
revealing the class-based division between pro-Europeanists (high-
education, high-income) and Eurosceptics (low education, low-
income), something that has also been observed historically in other 
relevant referenda on EU issues (Mavris, 2016).21 However, that did 
not prevent Syriza from becoming a prominent pro-European cartel 
                                                        
20 Syriza is invited as an observer to the pre-summit gatherings of the 
political group S&D. In February 2018, J.-L. Mélenchon, the leader of the 
French left-wing party France Insoumise requested that Syriza – one of the 
oldest members of the European Left party – be expelled from the 
European Left party GUE-NGL because of its pro-austerity government 
policies and its rapprochement strategy with the S&D group. However, 
other members of the confederal group GUE-NGL such as the German Die 
Linke were opposed to the idea.      
21 Τhe most important employers’organisations were very active in the 
formation of the Yes Committee which was set up on 1 July 2015 (Mavris, 
2016).  
The three main issues 
influencing Greek voters 
were unemployment, 
economic growth and the 
future of pensions. 
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party, proving once again that Euroscepticism is more a strategic 
position than an ideologically motivated posture (see Figure 11.7). 
Figure 11.7. Greek party positions towards the EU on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour), 2006-18 
 
Note: Calculations updated in 2015 and 2018 on the basis of a qualitative 
analysis of party programmes and positioning using the Bakker et al. numerical 
scale (1-7). 
Sources: Bakker et al. (2015); Eimantas (2016), author’s calculations (2019). 
 
The September 2015 election had a much more direct effect on the 
social and electoral base of the party than the split between the 
leading group and the left-wing faction of the Syriza parliamentary 
group in the summer of 2015. Syriza’s electoral base moved towards 
the centre of the political spectrum, while the complete 
disintegration of the remaining party mechanism of Syriza 
transformed it from a mass party to a cadre party structured around 
the leader and his leading group (Mavris, 2016).  
Greece experienced tremendous social downgrading in much 
more heterogeneous social contexts. Commonly in established party 
systems, party identities are enmeshed with social identities 
erecting macro-partisanship as one of the most stable of political 
attitudes, more resistant to change than major economic or cultural 
policy positions (Converse & Markus, 1979). The progressive de-
194  GREEK PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AS A POST-REPRESENTATIVE REGIME 
 
ideologisation of Syriza disrupted Greece’s traditional political 
geography, breaching the causal link between class and position 
towards the EU, thus defeating Mutz’s idea about the social 
homogeneity of political behaviour (Mutz, 2006). Consequently, in 
a context of low or ‘disembedded’ politicisation, the repositioning 
by partisan actors in the political competition has entailed crucial 
consequences. First, there is a continuing rise in the abstention rate 
at national elections (see Figure 11.8).  
Figure 11.8 Abstention rates in Greek national elections, 2009-15 (%) 
 
Source: Elections data, Greek Ministry of Interior. 
 
Second, there is an increase of unstable voters belonging to cross-
pressured groups22 with no organised political participation by 
membership in a party. Decreasing voter 
loyalty is the result of increasing distrust 
not only in parliamentary democracy but 
also in partisan politics. The current 
electorate is older compared with that in 
the mid-2000s, with a higher educational 
level, mainly composed of retired people. 
Non-privileged people are more likely to 
                                                        
22 Cross-pressured voters express lower levels of political interest and 
participation, while their voting decisions come later.  
Decreasing voter loyalty 
is the result of increasing 
distrust not only  
in parliamentary 
democracy but also in 
partisan politics. 
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abstain or to vote for small or flash parties. Flash parties that rapidly 
emerge on the political stage may be a legitimate expression of 
public interests, but they can also arise from political elites with 
exploitative intentions or be short-term reactions to a dramatic issue 
or event. The partisan dealignment is a persisting decline in the 
public’s level of partisanship (Dalton, 2012). While macro-
partisanship remains for the older or privileged people, the number 
of unattached voters can grow further due to the substantial 
instability of party attachments.23 
After drastically blurring the pro- versus anti-memorandum 
dividing line, Syriza’s main objective now is to absorb centre and 
centre-left parties’ middle-ranking 
cadres, thus becoming a mainstream 
party within a party system that is 
moving rightward. The Prespa 
agreement, in contrast with the issue of 
refugees, has been a good opportunity to 
attempt to reconfigure the political 
spectrum. Syriza followed the French 
LREM’s electoral campaigning strategy 
by tracing a new dividing line in Greek 
politics between ‘progressives’ as they 
now represent cosmopolitanism and Europeanism, and 
‘nationalists’ preaching anti-Westernism, localism and 
provincialism. Nevertheless, whatever the attribution of political 
‘roles’ may be in the future, a more fundamental realignment of the 
party system between liberal progressives and backward-looking 
populists, as is currently taking place in other European countries, 
seems difficult to establish in Greece.  
The economic condition of the country does not make it 
possible to cultivate feelings of economic nationalism and liberal 
sovereignism within Greek society. Unlike other Europeans, Greeks 
seem to be more focused on socio-economic issues rather than socio-
                                                        
23 In the first post-bailout election of 2012, ‘wasted votes’ going to parties 
that did not achieve parliamentary representation climbed sharply to 
19.2%, more than the vote share of the winning party New Democracy. In 
the next three elections, ‘wasted votes’ were significantly higher than 
before 2009 when they hovered below 5% (5.98% in the June 2012 election, 
8.62% in the January 2015 election, 6.40% in the September 2015 election). 
Syriza’s main objective 
now is to absorb centre 
and centre-left parties’ 
middle-ranking cadres, 
thus becoming a 
mainstream party 
within a party system 
that is moving 
rightward. 
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civilisational concerns and identity issues. This aspect is much more 
telling than analyses about populism in Greece. Contrary to what is 
often claimed, the degree of populist politics, despite the intensity 
of the crisis, has been lower than in other countries. Still, while the 
politics of normalisation seem to be gaining ground, there is a high 
risk of further shifts toward authoritarianism and right-wing 
radicalisation, given the fact that the class-based redistributive 
conflict has been largely wiped out.  
Conclusion 
The Syriza government initiative for a constitutional reform that 
could take place in the next parliamentary term intends to 
contribute to the reinvigoration of Greek parliamentarism in order 
to have greater “control of government power by the body”. The 
proposed changes aim to democratise the political system by 
introducing a citizens’ right to propose laws as well as proportional 
representation electoral rules for the parliament. They also stipulate 
that a prime minister should be elected and not appointed. And they 
introduce the ratification by referendum of international treaties or 
agreements transferring sovereign state powers.24 Changes also aim 
to restore the credibility of the political class by limiting 
parliamentary immunity and office to three consecutive terms.  
Furthermore, the recent Kleisthenis decentralisation reform in 
2018 was an attempt to reinvigorate citizens’ interest in politics and 
link electoral democracy with European transnationalism by 
allowing EU citizens to participate in regional elections and the 
election of an EU citizen as a mayor and president of a regional 
council.   
However, a comprehensive reform should first and foremost 
guarantee parliament’s area of competence, facilitate the release of 
and MPs access to information and arguably enlarge its legislative 
powers by introducing new pre-legislative scrutiny monitoring and 
                                                        
24 “While the right-wing New Democracy party proposes that Greece’s 
membership of the EU should be constitutionally entrenched, Syriza 
considers that there is no need for such a constitutional guarantee”, 
Interview with M. Spourdalakis, Professor of Political Science, University 
of Athens and Chairman of the Constitutional Review Committee, 
26.11.2018. 
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evaluation tools, such as the government’s right to take legal action 
before the ECJ on behalf of the parliament in case of breaches of the 
subsidiarity principle. 
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12. DOES ITALIAN BICAMERALISM 
DOUBLE THE CHANCE OF 
INFLUENCING EU DECISION-
MAKING? 
ELEONORA POLI* 
The Italian Parliament is well-informed about European issues and it is 
equipped with the necessary instruments to shape EU policies. With a 
House of Deputies and a Senate sharing the same powers in the legislative 
and non-legislative processes, its ‘perfect bicameral system’1 should in 
theory double the parliament’s chances for influencing the EU decision-
making process. However, differences in intent between the two Houses 
often puts the effectiveness of its actions at risk. When dealing with the EU, 
the Chamber of Deputies tends to reflect the executive’s positions, while 
the Senate acts more autonomously. Limited coordination between the two 
Chambers undermines the parliament’s capacity to influence the EU as 
well as the chance for effective cooperation with other parliaments. At the 
same time, an increasing governmental centralism in Italy, together with 
the greater role assumed by the European Council in recent years, reduces 
the impact and independence of parliamentary actions.  
12.1 The Italian parliamentary system and its 
‘perfection’  
Italy has been a parliamentary democracy with a ‘perfect bicameral 
system’ since 1948, when the Constitution entered into force. At that 
                                                        
* Special thanks to Virgina Volpi for helping with the background research. 
1 The Italian bicameral parliamentary system is technically defined as 
perfect or “paritarian” because it is composed of two chambers holding the 
exact same powers and functions as described by art. 55 of the Italian 
Constitution.  
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time, a new Constitution was necessary not only for providing a 
legal framework to the new Republic’s governance, but also for 
replacing the 1848 Albertine Statute, which had failed to provide 
legal protection from the forceful hollowing out of parliamentary 
governance carried out by the Fascist Party between 1922 and 1943. 
Since then, the parliament has become the guarantee of a state 
system geared towards the defence and promotion of civil, political 
and socio-economic rights. Fearing other authoritarian surges, the 
Founding Fathers promoted a symmetrical bicameral system to 
avoid having a sole chamber holding the legislative power. Within 
this frame, the Senate, defined as a “Chambre de Reflection”, had to 
protect the Constitution and citizens’ individual rights by balancing 
the need for innovation to prevent institutional decay with the 
necessity for stable state institutions (Romaniello, 2017). 
Although several scandals and cases of misconduct and 
corruption involving some members of the Italian Parliament have 
made Italians very critical vis-à-vis national politics and politicians, 
the Constitution and its institutions, such as the parliamentary 
system, have assumed an almost sacred importance. The outcome 
of the 2016 constitutional referendum, promoted by former Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi, partially proves this. The referendum 
consulted the Italians on a number of constitutional changes, one of 
those being the need to overcome the perfect bicameral system by 
reducing the Senate’s legislative competences and the number of its 
members. At the time, 60% of the citizens voted against the 
constitutional reforms, resulting in Renzi’s resignation. Although 
there were many political reasons 
behind such a negative vote, certainly 
the idea of modifying the Constitution 
and the structure of the parliament was 
not welcomed by the electorate.  
To date, the Italian Parliament is 
still composed of the House of Deputies 
and the Senate holding equal powers 
and performing the same functions, namely the legislative one, 
which is its main prerogative, along with that of holding the 
government to account. The two chambers are independent from 
each other and from the other constitutional organs. The main 
difference between the two is related to their structure. Each 
The Italian Parliament is 
still composed of the 
House of Deputies and the 
Senate holding equal 
powers and performing the 
same functions. 
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Chamber has its own speaker (formally known as chairman or 
president), internal regulations and parliamentary Committees. The 
Chamber of Deputies, or the lower house, is composed of 630 
members, elected each five years by universal suffrage in 618 
districts roughly equivalent in population (12 deputies are elected 
by Italians residing abroad following a 2001 constitutional 
amendment). The Senate comprises 315 members elected for five 
years on a regional basis – meaning that each of Italy’s twenty 
regions elects a number of Senators proportional to its population – 
plus up to five Senators-for-life appointed by the President of the 
Republic as well as former Presidents themselves. The difference in 
the ways the members of the two chambers are elected, nationally 
based for the Chamber of Deputies and regionally based for the 
Senate, is not intended in terms of regional or national 
representation, yet it could certainly allow for a better reflection of 
the composition of Italian society. 
12.2 Which cleavages influence the Italian political 
spectrum? 
Like many other EU countries, Italy is still characterised by several 
regional and cultural cleavages. Parliamentary representation 
should have favoured a national process of reconciliation of all local 
and regional issues. Unfortunately, this was not always the case. 
Nowadays, the cultural, social and regional differences 
characterising Italy are not only numerous and relevant, but often 
exploited by political parties to build their electoral success. To date, 
the historical north-south territorial cleavage is certainly less 
discussed, but it is still deeply rooted in Italian society. It is related 
to the economic gap between the wealthy northern regions and the 
south, which has resulted in the former asking for more fiscal 
autonomy from the central state. In the 90s, such a claim found its 
political representation in the regional separatist Northern League 
Party, now the League. The party was able to fuel the discontent of 
wealthier northerners regarding internal economic migration from 
the south of Italy as well as misuse of public resources from the 
State, with the north allegedly paying more taxes than it receives in 
terms of public goods. Although northern regions have not stopped 
asking for more fiscal autonomy (the Veneto and Lombardy regions 
had a referendum on such an issue in 2017 and are now negotiating 
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with the government), their claim has become of secondary 
importance since Italian public opinion has been confronted by 
what is perceived as a bigger challenge.  
External migration from African countries and the Middle 
East has helped in creating a new cleavage between those who 
would like a more lenient policy towards migrants, and the rest who 
think the government should block any form of irregular entry. At 
the same time, such a crisis has to some extent united Italians from 
the south and north. The same northerners, who criticised 
southerners for coming to their regions to allegedly steal their jobs, 
are now united with many of their fellow citizens from the south 
against foreigners, migration and its presumed effect on public 
security, social cohesion and cultural homogeneity. Again, the 
League was the main party to capitalise on such a cleavage (Poli, 
2018). Turning attention from the north-south issue to external 
migration, the League has been able to redefine its nature, becoming 
a nationalist party. Yet, in recent years, the majority of Italian 
parties, even on the left, have been adopting a more rigid approach 
towards migration in order to appeal to the electorate. It was, for 
example, under the left-wing Democratic Party government, in 
2017, that former Minister of Interior Marco Minniti imposed a code 
of conduct on NGOs. His attempt to regulate the rescue of migrants 
in the Mediterranean Sea led to a 30% drop in arrivals from 2014 to 
2017 (UNHCR data).  
The third cleavage is Italy’s membership in the EU. While 
Italy used to be one of the most Europhile countries, European 
institutions have often been used as a scapegoat by Italian 
governments, with increasing frequency, as the reason for whatever 
bitter pills are being meted out – higher taxes or lower public 
spending. Although centre-left governments have been 
traditionally Euro-enthusiastic, even the more Eurosceptical centre-
right coalitions remained committed to 
the mainstream thinking that EU 
membership was in the national interest. 
To date, leaders of the ruling parties, 
Luigi Di Maio for the Five Star Movement 
and Matteo Salvini for the League, are not 
formally questioning Italian membership 
in the EU or even in the Eurozone (Camera, 2018, a). Yet, with a 
With a majority of 
parliamentarians holding 
Eurosceptic positions, the 
Italian approach to the 
EU is increasingly critical. 
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majority of parliamentarians holding Eurosceptic positions, the 
Italian approach to the EU is increasingly critical (Morillas-Poli, 
2018). According to Eupinion, the majority of Italians want more 
political and economic integration. However, the number of Italian 
EU supporters has decreased, going from 79% in 2015 to 69% in 2018 
(Eupionion data, 2018). Rising Euroscepticism in Italy is strongly 
related to a more recent but not less significant divide. It is the one 
between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment’, variously construed 
as mainstream forces, bankers, corporations, intellectuals, and 
‘Eurocrats’, all supporting an agenda comprising open borders, 
multiculturalism and European integration. Both the Five Star 
Movement (M5S) and the League have widened this cleavage 
through a political discourse filled with references to (the people’s) 
sovereignty, of which they claim to be the true representatives. 
While this has enabled both of them to build consensus across 
different political tribes, regional communities and social classes, 
the two parties act differently. The League has built its consensus 
on nationalist discourses to attract all who feel left behind by 
globalisation or threatened by migration flows. The Five Star 
Movement, instead, has coalesced support by claiming to rejuvenate 
democratic representation in Italy, fight corruption and boost social 
welfare. For instance, the party has set out precise internal rules 
whereby candidates should not have any criminal record, are 
selected online by members of the Movement and once elected have 
to voluntarily contribute part of their salary to social causes.  
12.3 What are the instruments that the parliament 
has to control the executive? 
Formally, the parliament sits atop Italy’s constitutional set-up. Not 
only does it wield the legislative power, but it is also the body that 
holds the executive to account, as the latter needs support from a 
(simple) majority of Members of Parliament (MPs) in both houses to 
take office (Art. 94, Constitution). The government is technically a 
Council of Ministers headed by a President of the Council, who is 
appointed by the President of the Republic after consultations with 
the leaders of all parties sitting in parliament. Thus, governments in 
Italy are always an expression of a majority of MPs, organised in a 
coalition of parties (Mezzetti, 2013, 303-304). 
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The parliament can vote down the government or even a 
single minister at any time, through a motion of no confidence 
presented by just ten MPs, discussed by both Houses and voted by 
the majority. The Chamber and the Senate also have other tools for 
addressing the government. The parliament can use a simple 
motion to propose a debate, a resolution that contains a specific 
directive to the government, and generally, it can provide 
instructions for the implementation of laws (Camera, c). In this 
respect, the government is formally dependent on the parliament 
and its majorities.  
Although the aim of the Constitution was to develop a system 
that elevated the parliament to the role of ultimate decider in the 
deliberation process, the political power of the latter has 
progressively reduced stability of governments since 1948. In the 
early days of the Italian Republic, a proportional electoral system 
favoured the development of broader coalitions among diverse and 
conflicting parties, which the government had to reflect in its 
composition. This system increased the role of the parliament in 
decision-making but weakened the cohesiveness of the executive, 
making the latter hostage to parliamentary centralism. As a result, 
from 1948 to 1993, when the first electoral reform was passed, Italy 
changed government around 47 times, an average of almost one per 
year. 
Since the early 90s, the failure of the political and institutional 
system based on pluralism, the ‘First Republic’, and the consequent 
call for stability resulted in the 1993 electoral law, which replaced 
the proportional system with one that mixed a first-past-the-post 
system with a residual proportional component. Since then, various 
electoral reforms followed. In 2005, Berlusconi’s government 
introduced a proportional system with a majority premium and, in 
2017, a new reform enforced the current mixed system, where 
elements of first-past-the-post and proportional systems are 
combined.  
The new electoral systems contributed to guarantee more 
stability to the Italian governments. From 1946 to 1993, five 
governments did not receive the necessary vote of confidence after 
taking office and the governments of the ‘First Republic’ remained 
in office approximately 342 days on average. Since 1993, the 
governments have experienced an average duration of 626 days, 
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and only two were voted down by a no-confidence motion, in 1998 
and in 2008 (Senato della repubblica, a). 
Yet, the condition of political continuity between the majority 
parties and the government, partially 
favoured by the electoral reforms, together 
with an increasing personification of the 
governments by political leaders, risks 
undermining parliamentary independence 
of action and judgment, especially when it 
comes to European affairs (Rizzoni, 2017, 
Politi, 2012; Pisicchio, 2012, Manzella, 
2002). Considering the increasing role of 
the European Council in the European 
decision-making process, the parliament 
should make an extra effort to influence EU political trends. Yet, 
excessive political bonds to government positions often come at the 
expense of parliamentary independence, undermining the chances 
of an effective bipartisan collaboration between majoritarian and 
opposition parties.  
12.4 The European dimension of the Italian 
Parliament  
Although historical parliamentary centralism has been 
progressively replaced by government centralism in decision-
making, the Italian Parliament has achieved greater power in 
dealing with EU affairs since 2012. In the aftermath of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Italian Law 234/2012 “General norms regarding the 
Italian participation in the formulation and implementation of 
European Laws and policies” strengthened the role of both Houses 
in the formation and implementation of EU laws and policies 
(Parlamento italiano, 2018).  
According to article 6 of the Law 234/2012, the Italian Prime 
Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs have to update the 
parliament on legislative acts discussed at the EU level and provide 
technical reports on the potential impacts of these acts at the 
national level. Moreover, every year, the government presents a 
report to the parliament on national priorities vis à vis the European 
integration process (Camera dei Deputati, a; Nesti, 2018; Lupo, 
Political continuity and 
the increasing 
personification of 
governments risk 
undermining 
parliamentary 
independence of action 
when it comes to 
European affairs. 
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2017). The government also needs to inform the Italian Parliament 
beforehand about its general positions at the European Council 
meetings. Yet, details on the progress of negotiations in the Council 
are only given on parliament’s request (art. 4). In this case, the 
parliament can recommend to the government the adoption of a 
specific negotiating position and the latter needs to consider these 
recommendations and respond in case of any deviation (art. 7). 
Moreover, according to article 8 and 9 of Law 234/2012, the Italian 
Parliament can take an active part in the EU legislative process 
through the Early Warning System (EWS) and Political Dialogue 
(PD) mechanisms (Nesti, Grimaledi, 2018).  
While both Houses are fully entitled to use the above 
instruments to express their opinions on EU affairs, the Italian 
Senate has been more active than the Chamber of Deputies in using 
the instruments of political dialogue. This is mainly related to 
procedural differences but also to diverging views on parliamentary 
participation in the EU decision-making process. The Chamber of 
Deputies appears to be more concerned with producing opinions, 
which might diverge from the government’s political line. In 
contrast, the Senate considers the direct dialogue with the 
Commission as an effective tool, up to a certain extent, to act more 
independently from the government (Romaniello, 2017). Similarly, 
when it comes to Italian participation in the Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the 
European Union (COSAC) (Bindi, 2011), there is no coordination 
between the two Houses. MPs normally use inter-parliamentary 
conferences to exchange best practices. Senators instead, believe 
that inter-parliamentary cooperation can increase EU democratic 
oversight by national parliaments (Griglio, 
2017, 212-13). 
If the two houses cooperated, they 
could have greater impact over the EU 
decision-making process. Yet, data shows 
that they rarely do so, having adopted a 
reasoned opinion on the same issue only 
If the two houses 
cooperated, they could 
have greater impact on 
the EU decision-
making process. 
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once in 2014.2 Lack of coordination between the two houses, 
together with increasing centralism of government, undermine the 
capacity of the parliament as a whole to influence European affairs 
effectively at a time when EU issues have become increasingly 
relevant in parliamentary debates.  
12.5 EU affairs in the Italian government and 
parliamentary debates 
The current government reflects a very heterogeneous electorate, 
with different visions when it comes to economic and foreign policy. 
The League combined nationalist positions with neo-liberal 
economic policies. For instance, its main political goal is to stop 
migration and protect the interests of companies by lowering taxes. 
The Five Star Movement has a more undefined nature. On economic 
policies, it has a radical left-wing approach, which is exemplified by 
the introduction of a citizens’ income to reduce poverty. Yet, on 
migration, it has followed in the League’s footsteps. On foreign 
policy, the League winks at Russia, but acts within the traditional 
set of alliances Italy has developed, such as NATO and the US. The 
M5S is more disruptive. For instance, it strongly supported the 
recent agreement on the ‘Belt and Road’ project signed with China, 
although the League, in line with the US and the EU, was more 
sceptical. Within this framework, Prime Minister Conte often has to 
mediate different and conflicting positions on internal and external 
affairs. Yet, when it comes to the EU, the situation is quite different. 
With EU matters mostly relegated to a couple of points on the 
coalition agreement and the idea of exiting the euro area 
abandoned, the coalition government has found some solid 
common ground on the need to reform 
and revitalise the EU. This idea is 
shared by the majority of European 
leaders. Yet, according to Prime 
Minister Conte and his government, 
such a revitalisation should come by 
                                                        
2 On the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of member states concerning the manufacture, presentation and 
sale of tobacco and related products. 
The rising number of 
national parliamentarians 
with Eurosceptic ideas has 
at least contributed to 
more general interest in 
the EU. 
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devolving more power to member states.  
As far as the role EU affairs play in the Italian Parliament is 
concerned, the rising number of national parliamentarians holding 
Eurosceptic ideas has at least contributed to increasing general 
interest in the EU. Moreover, the extent of the multiple global crises 
of recent years, such as the ‘Credit Crunch’, ‘Great Recession’, 
unprecedented migration flows, terrorist attacks or instability in the 
Middle East, which transcend any national problem-solving 
capacity, has highlighted the impossibility for national parliaments 
to manage them without coordinating their actions at EU level. In 
this respect, EU affairs are central in many parliamentary debates. 
Yet, they are often used to fuel a sort of anti-European propaganda 
machine, with the EU and some allegedly pro-EU member state 
governments, like France, being blamed for the problems affecting 
Italy (i.e. lack of solidarity when it comes to rescuing migrants). 
Some EU issues are predominantly framed as national 
matters with a European dimension. For instance, the Italian 
Parliament supports the development of a European defence system 
to promote the security of Italian citizens. On the other hand, 
national issues, such as meagre Italian economic performance, are 
often Europeanised. For instance, while Italian economic issues are 
mostly related to its huge public debt, corruption, tax evasion and 
low productivity, the EU, the euro and austerity policies are often 
referenced as the main and unique cause of poor economic growth. 
When it comes to EU economic governance, the Italian Parliament 
criticises the institutional structure of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. The majority of Italian MPs agrees on the need to introduce 
some exceptions to the Fiscal Compact and the deficit-GDP 
parameter to allow more public spending and boost economic 
growth (Camera dei Deputati, 2018a; Alcaro-Poli, 2017). Moreover, 
Italian MPs agree on the need to reform euro area governance 
through a revision of the budgetary law, to foster social inclusion 
and employment and share common risks. In this respect, the 
Banking Union should be completed with a deposit insurance 
guarantee and an effective fiscal union (Camera dei Deputati, 
2018b).  
Likewise, migration is also a relevant EU-related topic. 
However, the perceived lack of European solidarity together with 
the failure, by previous Italian governments, to push forward a 
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revision of the Dublin Treaty, has reduced trust in a European 
capacity to solve the migration issue. To date, the Italian Parliament 
has welcomed EU initiatives for an EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa and it has called for European shared management of 
migratory flows via the central Mediterranean route (Parlamento 
italiano, 2018; Camera, 2018). Yet, when it comes to the Dublin 
Treaty and the need to introduce a binding acceptance of migrant 
quotas by member states, the current Italian Parliament, with the 
majority of members belonging to the Five Star Movement and the 
League, has not implemented any specific action. Indeed, Five Star 
Movement MPs believe in the need for a more ambitious reform 
than the simple shared management of arrivals and asylum 
requests. In contrast, according to League MPs these reforms are not 
“good enough”. Migration flows have simply to be stopped and if 
the EU cannot do it, it is time for member states to act. 
12.6 Italian parties and European political families 
in the EP elections 
With EU matters of little import in their coalition agreement and 
with quite different political agendas, M5S and the League are not 
going to run together during the electoral campaign for the next EP 
elections. On the contrary, both parties seem willing to promote 
‘change’ at the EU level by building new and competing coalitions. 
The leader of the League, Matteo Salvini aims to develop an 
alliance with other European Eurosceptic nationalist parties to 
challenge EU bureaucratic institutions that undermine national 
governments. The new political group will likely be called the 
European Alliance of People and Nations (EAPN) and might 
include former members of the Europe of Nations and Freedom 
Group such as Le Front National and the Dutch Freedom Party 
together with other right-wing parties such as Alternative for 
Germany, the Danish People’s Party and the Finns party. 
In contrast to Salvini, whose newly branded European group 
has a clear right-wing ‘sovereignist’ position, the Five Star 
Movement appeals to various political families. The only 
commonality of potential M5S allies is to be relative new comers in 
the European or national political space and to have a very thin 
ideological background. Indeed, beyond ideologies, the Movement 
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aims at building a coalition to challenge old EU institutions and 
traditional political parties. To do that, Deputy Prime Minister Luigi 
Di Maio has been in contact with several parties and movements 
such as the far-right Polish Kukiz’15, the Croatian Human Shield, 
the pro-market Finnish Movement Now and even the French 
Yellow Jackets movement. To date, however, it is not clear whether 
the Five Star Movement will succeed in creating a new European 
political group. 
As far as traditional Italian parties and their political groups 
are concerned, on the centre-right, Berlusconi has declared he will 
run for the EP elections without mentioning his party’s European 
group, the European People’s Party (EPP). Moreover, the economic 
and social policies it supports are often closer to those of the League 
than those of the EPP (Elif Lab, 2016). On the centre-left, the 
Democratic Party (PD) currently has the largest share of seats in the 
Social and Democrats (S&D) group, and the S&D symbol is on the 
PD electoral manifesto. Yet, there is a clear voting misalignment at 
the EU and national level, with PD members of the Italian 
Parliament sharing a greater number of positions with traditional 
right-wing parties (Elif Lab, 2016).  
Conclusion 
The Italian Parliament, with its ‘perfect bicameral’ parliamentary 
system and two Houses holding the exact same powers and 
functions, should have a greater chance of influencing EU decision-
making processes. Especially in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Italian Parliamentarians have several instruments to 
oversee EU policies and institutions. Yet, although both Houses are 
very active, the effectiveness of their actions is often undermined by 
a lack of cooperation. This can be noticed at both a vertical and 
horizontal level. From a horizontal point of view, different 
interpretations of how independently the parliament should act 
from the government contributes to jeopardising cooperation 
between the two Houses. The Chamber of Deputies very rarely 
contradicts a position put forward by the government when it 
comes to EU affairs, while the Senate seems to act more 
autonomously. At the vertical level, the personalisation of political 
power by government leaders has contributed to establish a type of 
continuity between majoritarian parties in parliament and the 
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government itself, undermining the chances for developing 
bipartisan positions on EU affairs, which would better reflect Italian 
society as a whole. Hence, although the parliament has the 
instruments necessary to be more involved in EU affairs, there is 
wide room to increase the effectiveness of its actions. Certainly, the 
increasing governmental centralism experienced in Italy, especially 
at a time when the government is very critical towards the EU, 
together with the growing importance of the European Council in 
recent years, might well undermine the parliament’s role and 
capacity to positively and actively influence the EU decision-
making process.  
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13. POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE 
EU IN LATVIA’S 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
RASMUSS FILIPS GEKS,  
ELIZABETE VIZGUNOVA, KARLIS BUKOVSKIS & 
IVETA KAZOKA  
Latvia’s representative democracy is not set up along the traditional basis 
of left and right ideologies. The ethnic division between ‘Latvian’ and 
‘Russian’ parties still plays a major role in determining the agenda of the 
Saeima (parliament). All the major political parties in Latvia support the 
European Union, although they sometimes object to specific policies 
proposed by EU institutions, especially relating to EU budgetary and 
migration policies. Even though issues related to the EU were almost 
irrelevant in domestic politics for several years, Latvia’s political parties 
have increasingly aligned themselves with European political groups. 
However, the process of integrating into European political families has 
not yet resulted in clearer ideological affiliations.  
13.1 Saeima and ideologies: where does the EU fit 
in? 
The divides in the Latvian political system are along ethnic and 
geopolitical rather than traditional left-right lines, based on 
economic premises1 – the role of economic ideologies has not been 
widely developed in the modern Latvian democratic period. It is 
substituted by a ‘catch-all’ approach, where parties pick and choose 
                                                        
1 A. Cheskin and L. March (2016), “Latvia’s ‘Russian left’: trapped between 
ethnic, socialist, and social-democratic identities”, in L. March and D. Keith 
(eds), Europe’s Radical Left: From Marginality to the Mainstream?, London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 231-252. 
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the agenda items best suited for a momentary appeasement of the 
electorate, regardless of their belonging to a traditionally rightist or 
leftist political spectrum; this is widely recognised as populist 
politics.2 This chapter explains in depth the most recent current 
trends in Latvian politics, considering the increasing divisions 
between socially liberal and conservative political streams, as well 
as the related trend of a growing debate surrounding 
intergovernmentalism versus federalism in Latvia’s attitude 
towards the European Union. It then illustrates the management of 
EU affairs at a parliamentary and governmental level, before 
proceeding to an in-depth analysis of the influence of EU affairs on 
domestic politics and political parties. 
13.1.1 The divides in Latvia’s representative model 
Latvia’s electoral system is proportional with a 5% electoral barrier 
and open party lists. This means that voters vote for the party list as 
a whole, but can then make adjustments by using their personal 
preference voting option. All elections over the last decade have 
demonstrated that Latvian voters use this instrument actively to 
influence the results, and hence the results are tailor-made. To a 
considerable extent, this option allows the democratic system of the 
country to absorb the general trend of people voting for 
personalities rather than for parties. Party allegiance among voters 
is not a widespread phenomenon in modern Latvian politics, and 
therefore open party lists allow people to vote for specific 
candidates and their policies. Moreover, it increases accountability 
and puts the burden of active campaigning on individual 
politicians.  
The 5% electoral barrier was introduced after Latvia regained 
independence to prevent the extreme parliamentary fragmentation 
that occurred between the world wars. Although this has 
dramatically reduced the number of political parties able to gain 
public support, it has not brought a parliamentary majority to any 
of the elected political parties – coalition governments formed of no 
less than three political parties have been the norm. Moreover, a 
                                                        
2 K. Bukovskis and I. Brug ̧e (forthcoming 2019), “The Financial Crisis and 
the Curse of Latvian Left Parties”, in K. Roder and M. Holmes (eds), The 
European Left and the Crisis, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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single party has only seldom managed to acquire significantly more 
seats than the others. Therefore, majority coalition governments in 
Latvia (and some minority coalition governments, such as during 
the 9th Saeima) create a situation in which the political process needs 
to be based on consensus and political bargaining.  
The level of unpredictability in voter turnout and allegiances, 
alongside the electoral system and the fact that politics is divided 
along geopolitical and ethnic party 
lines instead of economic ideologies, 
makes government formation 
extremely difficult. Coalition-building 
often involves most of the political 
parties elected to parliament, and it can 
be a lengthy process if the election 
outcome does not result in a clear 
winner. The most recent government 
formation process, following the 13th Saeima elections on 6 October 
2018, involved a record-breaking period of coalition-building. All 7 
political parties won between 8 and 20 seats in the 100-person 
unicameral parliament, which vividly demonstrates the volatility of 
the Latvian party system and coalition governments. Moreover, the 
Latvian state has had 14 prime ministers and 21 governments in less 
than 30 years.  
Government volatility and the bargaining process is further 
complicated by the fact that individual politicians frequently tend 
to change their political parties both before the elections and 
afterwards during the coalition-building process. Individual 
politicians switching political parties or establishing new ones 
before every election, political parties being dissolved and renamed, 
and electoral associations (vēlēšanu apvienība) being created before 
each election are a regular trend at municipal, national and 
European Parliament levels. This situation exacerbates the situation 
of grand political and economic ideologies mattering very little.  
And as a result, the bargaining process over Latvian 
government ministries during the coalition-consolidation process 
takes place with little influence of political ideologies. “Obstructions 
of coalition partners” are often brought into the equation. 
Personalities, party financiers and interests, the electoral base, and 
bargaining power matter much more than ideologies do, and often 
The fact that politics is 
divided along geopolitical 
and ethnic party lines 
instead of economic 
ideologies makes 
government formation 
extremely difficult. 
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even more than having concrete positions on specific issues. 
Outspoken differences tend to be ‘reconciled’ when the coalition-
building process takes place. Consequently, coalition parties, 
ministers and ministries continue to struggle over the interpretation 
of and priorities of agreements made in the coalition-building 
process.  
A notable exception to general coalition-building trends has 
been the role of the Social Democratic Party Harmony (officially 
translated as “Concord”). In spite of winning the most votes in 
national elections for the past 10 years, Harmony has never been 
part of any national government. The fact that it is seen as a ‘Trojan 
horse’ for Russia in Latvian politics has it a sizeable party that is 
nevertheless ‘unacceptable’ in coalition negotiations. Harmony is 
the leading ‘ethnic’ party, and it has a major stake in questions 
relating to linguistic rights, non-citizens’ rights and ‘friendly’ 
relations with Russia. However, it plays its cards wisely and rarely 
instrumentalises these questions in its rhetoric. Although smaller 
parties such as the Latvian Russian Union are more pro-Russian in 
the political spectrum than Harmony, they have not garnered 
sufficient public support to be elected to the national parliament. 
However, neither of the pro-Russian parties are anti-EU, and 
Harmony even has a federalist position on the future of the EU. On 
the other side of the spectrum is the right-wing National Alliance, 
which espouses the idea of “Latvia for Latvians”. Meanwhile, other 
mainstream political parties are situated between these two 
extremes. 
This demonstrates the original core structure of Latvian party 
politics – political divides based on ethnicity (pro-Russian speaking 
versus pro-Latvian speaking) and geopolitical positioning (pro-
Russian Federation versus pro-West). The primary divide in Latvia 
is ethnic, and this spills over into centre-right and centre-left 
ideological stances. For this reason, whereas the overall 
representation of the opinions and values of Latvia’s society has 
been well in line with most of the categories reviewed in the 
European Values Study,3 there is an ongoing discussion about the 
                                                        
3 Social Sciences of GESIS – Leibniz Institute in Cologne (2008), “EVS 2008 
- Variable Report Latvia” (https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/file.asp?file= 
ZA4767_cdb.pdf). 
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lack of representation of the interests of Harmony voters in Latvia’s 
parliament and about finding a viable alternative to the party.  
13.1.2 Party ideologies and the Saeima agenda 
Overall, the party programmes and agenda play a minimal role in 
defining the parliamentary agenda, which thus far has arisen out of 
political bargaining and compromise. The issue of party platforms 
can be viewed through two prisms. First, in the pre-election period, 
party programmes cover long-standing issues related to the rule of 
law and governance, the legal status of minorities, strengthening the 
judiciary’s powers and independence, patriotism, education reform 
(including a transition to the Latvian language, decreasing the 
number of schools and enhancing education quality), tax reform 
(implementing a progressive tax), a united property tax, families, 
various administrative reforms, increased health and retirement 
benefits, families, patriotism, etc. The issues that serve as a ‘glue’ for 
the coalition have largely remained unchanged from 2014 to 2018. 
The second phase follows in the post-election period. Judging 
from the work the last parliament carried out, several substantive 
issues can be seen in this phase: education reform, pension 
indexation, tax reform, administrative reform, and healthcare 
reform. Despite the fact that the previous coalition, led by the 
Greens and Farmers Union, referred to themselves as the 
“champions of good deeds”, many of the tasks remain incomplete 
and will now be carried over to the current coalition. These issues 
are widely recognised as especially important in the face of high 
emigration rates, which make optimising the management of 
Latvia’s welfare system an urgent matter. Recently elected parties 
have expressed concern over the status of the rule of law and 
governance, the size of the administration, ‘payday loans’, closing 
gambling halls, raising the minimum wage, doubling pensions, 
increasing child benefits, paying higher salaries to doctors, and 
cancelling the ‘green energy’ surcharge (which is widely unpopular 
and considered fraudulent).4 
                                                        
4 Re:Baltica, “Who is who in the upcoming Latvian parliamentary 
elections?”, 14 August 2018 (https://en.rebaltica.lv/2018/08/who-is-who-
in-upcoming-latvian-parliamentary-elections/). 
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It is interesting to note that the current coalition agreement 
includes article 2.8., which stipulates that:  
The cooperation partners respect each other’s right to 
direct the draft laws and the right to vote differently in 
such cases as: 
2.8.1. granting citizenship to minor children of non-
citizens born in Latvia; 
2.8.2. extending the rights of unmarried spouses; 
2.8.3. the Cohabitation Law; 
2.8.4. the restitution of the property rights of Latvian 
Jewish communities lost as a result of the Holocaust; 
2.8.5. the Council of Europe Convention on Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence. 
The coalition agreement is not legally binding, but rather an 
‘unwritten’ political tradition in Latvian politics, and as it usually 
includes clauses similar to this one, this situation is not 
unprecedented. However, the array of issues on which the 13th 
Saeima ‘agree to disagree’ is much wider and exemplifies the 
breadth of disagreement the coalition partners must bridge to reach 
a consensus. 
13.1.3 The relevance of EU issues in Saeima party politics 
Although for a long time the traditional divisions and specific 
character of the Latvian political party system meant that many 
initiatives related to any of the categories of social diversity were 
often omitted, new issues dealing with narrow topics and the 
entertainment value of politics are emerging as dominant in 
political discussion. Some of these could potentially create serious 
new divisions if there is enough political charisma, talent and drama 
to elevate them to the level of national and fully fledged political 
debates. For instance, the clash between the ‘catch-all’ parties, which 
advocate for the demolition of old institutions and elites, and the 
introduction of a “just state” is now becoming more relevant (as 
could be seen, for example, in the aftermath of the October 2018 
elections). However, the “struggle against oligarchs” has been a 
recurring theme in Latvian political rhetoric. With actual 
indictments and court cases pending, many of the former (and 
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recently elected) politicians/political forces could be forced to exit 
politics. 
Extremely low levels of public trust in the national parliament 
and ministries (according to Eurobarometer, only 19% of the 
population trust the parliament and 28% 
trust the government),5 together with a 
high index of corruption perceptions 
among the Latvian population 
(Transparency International’s CPI put 
Latvia in 41st place in 2017 and 2018), 
create the perfect grounds for a “justice 
against corruption” theme to become a 
serious topic in many future elections. However, the real concern in 
Latvia, as in rest of Europe, lies in the fact that the reputation or 
qualifications of politicians is losing all relevance; it is their ability 
to orate and appeal to the masses in expressing popular views (such 
as that the media and the state administration are engaged in 
conspiracies to cover up large-scale corruption scandals) that 
matters in the new game of Latvian politics. 
Here, it should be briefly mentioned that Latvia’s 
investigative media platform Re:Baltica has been highly engaged in 
the pre-election process by uncovering promises unsupported by 
evidence and untruthful information in the election campaign, most 
of which came from the new populist party KPV. This episode was 
clearly an example of discrediting ‘fake news’ promulgated by 
political forces. Various online media tools created by public 
broadcasters or liberal media – such as ir.lv, Ir Politiskajā Tinderī 
(Political Tinder)6 or LSM’s Partiju šķirotava (Party Sorter) – were 
good examples of attempts to make sense of Latvia’s political 
spectrum by offering comprehensive questionnaires to the ‘better 
                                                        
5 Portal “Tvnet.lv”, “Kritusies iedzīvotāju uzticība politiskajām partijām” 
[Decrease in people’s trust in political parties], 17 June 2018 
(https://tvnet.lv/4518329/kritusies-latvijas-iedzivotaju-uzticiba-
politiskajam-partijam). 
6 Portal “IR.lv”, “Ar kuru partiju tev ir pa ceļam, noskaidro “Ir Politiskajā 
Tinderī”” [Which party is heading your way? Find out in Political Tinder], 
11 September 2018 (https://ir.lv/2018/09/11/ar-kuru-partiju-tev-ir-pa-
celam-noskaidro-ir-politiskaja-tinderi/). 
 
Extremely low levels of 
public trust together with  
a high index of corruption 
perceptions create the 
perfect grounds for a 
“justice against 
corruption” theme. 
222  POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE EU IN LATVIA 
 
connected’ electorate to direct them to the best-suited party. 
Following the election, leading internet news portals Delfi.lv and 
Tvnet.lv started to show TV debates (“20 minutes in the TVNET 
studio” or “Delfi TV with Janis Domburs”),7 which enable the 
electorate to become acquainted with the programmes of individual 
politicians and political forces in greater detail.  
Socio-political issues and the juxtaposition of liberal against 
conservative values has been another increasing trend that is 
expected to continue to grow. Same-sex marriage, the legalisation of 
marijuana and sex education in schools are increasingly commonly 
discussed topics among politicians and in broader society. 
However, it is unlikely these will become strong positioning points 
for individuals or entire political parties. Although individual 
politicians will continue centring their careers on these issues, none 
of these are clear-cut enough to become decisive. Moreover, strong 
categorical positions and divides go against the political logic of a 
‘catch-all’ approach adopted by a growing number of political 
parties and politicians. Hence, categorical politics based on new 
ideologies is almost impossible to market unless a strong catalyst 
appears, for example in the form of an external enemy or a dire 
situation. As a result, populism, both in form and substance 
(demagogy), has been and will continue to be a visible part of the 
Latvian political scene. 
The fact that categorical positioning can do electoral damage 
is also visible in the fact that the traditional ethnic divide has been 
slowly fading out of fashion. Recent political developments brought 
about by the parliamentary elections of October 2018 demonstrate 
this dynamic. Although the coalition-
building process and repeated 
exclusion of Harmony indicated that 
the ‘ethnic question’ has not fully 
disappeared from the picture, there 
was significantly less electoral rhetoric 
about ‘Latvian’ versus ‘Russian’ 
parties and instead a greater focus on the rule of law and oligarchy, 
                                                        
7 Portal “Tvnet.lv”, “Mārtiņs Daugulis” (https://www.tvnet.lv/ 
author/115947); Portal “Delfi.lv”, “Delfi TV ar Jāni Domburu” [Delfi TV 
with Janis Domburs] (https://www.delfi.lv/delfi-tv-ar-jani-domburu/). 
One of the most important 
trends has been that 
political parties are 
becoming more outspoken 
about the European Union. 
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particularly in terms of the elite operating against the interests of 
the masses.  
Nevertheless, one of the most important trends has been that 
political parties are becoming more outspoken about the European 
Union. After years of silent acceptance (permissive consensus) in 
Latvia’s firm pro-EU stance, both in general society and 
consequently also among Latvian politicians, since 2015 there has 
been a rise of voices openly critical of EU policies. Attitudes towards 
the role of the European Commission and supranational EU 
institutions in general could become a new (or just an additional) 
divide in Latvian politics.  
At the same time, it is imperative to point out that Latvia does 
not have strong or popular Eurosceptic parties or politicians (that is 
to say, those who are advocating detachment from the EU, or a 
‘minimising’ of Brussels power). This is clearly visible in all the 
election results. In spite of 
intergovernmentalist positions 
appearing among mainstream 
political parties, they still support 
Latvia’s membership in the EU and 
the EU integration process. All Latvia’s governing parties have 
increasingly been expressing a stronger interest in EU-related 
issues, although for many years it has been the Unity party and its 
members that have devoted themselves to foreign policy and to EU 
issues. After Unity lost many of its places in parliament, the party 
still managed to acquire the posts of prime minister and minister of 
finance, and it has retained its long-time position of being in charge 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Another pro-EU political party, Development/Pro, took over 
the chairmanship of the European Affairs Committee in the Saeima 
and obtained the office of Minister of Defence. It is largely due to 
the activities of these two political parties, as well as some 
politicians with EU expertise from other political parties, that EU 
issues have prominently entered the public sphere and have gained 
substantial media interest. Some recent examples of this include 
biological farming, the intensive versus sustainable farming debate, 
and migration issues (including Latvia’s contribution to the EU 
Africa fund and FRONTEX). However, these issues have been 
Latvia does not have strong 
or popular Eurosceptic 
parties or politicians. 
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primarily mobilised as domestic issues with an EU dimension, as 
that makes them easier to ‘sell’ to the population.  
The 2019 European Parliament elections were expected to 
make debates surrounding EU issues even more prominent, as 
highly knowledgeable candidates had been chosen as frontrunners 
in the current election campaign. Latvian parties submitted 16 lists, 
of which 6 appeared to be serious contestants. According to polls, 
Harmony (15%), Development/Pro (10.6%), New Unity (11.7%), 
National Alliance (8.1%), Latvian Russian Union (5%) and 
Progressives (4.5%) were all likely contenders for seats in the EP.8 
Many of these Latvian EP candidates were considered political and 
diplomatic ‘heavyweights’ with international experience. In 
previous EP elections, the ability to show credentials from past 
achievements has largely been the key to success; this election seems 
to present an array of polarised candidates who hold strong 
opinions on Latvia’s presence in the EU and the future shape of the 
Union. Despite these discussions remaining largely low-key, for the 
first time they seemed to be more about Europe and less about 
internal political quarrels. This should be counted as a significant 
‘Europeanisation’ achievement. 
13.2 Shaping EU policies at a national level 
The Latvian system of managing EU affairs and coordinating the 
decision-making process was established in 1995, when Latvia 
officially submitted its bid for EU membership. Shortly after the 
submission, the European Affairs Committee was established with 
the task of overseeing and coordinating parliament’s involvement 
in the transposition of the acquis communautaire into Latvian 
legislation. Parliamentary scrutiny and the active involvement of 
the European Affairs Committee is a standard that has been 
retained beyond 2004, with slight adjustments to the procedures 
during the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European 
                                                        
8 Jānis Geste, “Partiju reitingi: pirms Eiroparlamenta vēlēšanām līderos 
“Saskaņa” un “Jaunā vienotība” [Party ranking: prior to EP elections, 
“Harmony” and “New Unity” in the lead], 18 April 2019 
(https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/partiju-reitingi-pirms-
eiroparlamenta-velesanam-lideros-saskana-un-jauna-vienotiba.a316480/). 
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Union.9 The system involves all line ministries, social partners and 
other NGOs, as well as other state institutions like the Bank of 
Latvia, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Saeima.10 If the co-
responsible institutions, local governments and social partner 
organisations, associations and foundations fail to agree on a 
national position in accordance with the procedure provided for in 
cabinet regulations, then the different opinions are indicated in the 
national position. 
The division of responsibilities between ministries and 
government institutions is determined by Cabinet Regulation No. 
141,11 which defines and maintains a list of competences. The 
“Procedure for the development of the Republic of Latvia's national 
position in the EU and related instructions and information 
circulation” of 2009 defines the procedure for adopting a national 
position. It explains that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main 
‘hub’ that ensures the smooth circulation of information between 
social partners (such as trade unions, depending on the sector), local 
governments, the ministries and the Cabinet of Ministers, and, 
eventually, the Saeima.  
Every line ministry, in cooperation with other institutions and 
social partners, develops national positions for the issues in their 
field of competence. The ministries maintain structures for 
coordinating EU issues – these can include specific departments for 
coordinating EU issues, as well as individuals who supervise the 
procedure. Furthermore, the positions are coordinated in meetings 
between senior ministry officials and are confirmed either by the 
                                                        
9 Likumi.lv, Kārtība, kādā izstrādā, saskaņo un aktualizē mandātus un 
nodrošina to izpildi Latvijas prezidentūras Eiropas Savienības Padomē 
laikā [Procedures for the Establishment, Coordination and Updating of 
Mandates and their Enforcement during the Latvian Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union], 2014 (https://likumi.lv/ 
doc.php?id=269235). 
10 The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ES jautājumu koordinācija 
Latvijā” [Coordination of EU matters in Latvia], 01 March 2018 
(https://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/eiropas-savieniba-arpolitika/es-
jautajumi-arlietu-ministrijas-kompetence/es-jautajumu-koordinacija-
arlietu-ministrija/es-jautajumu-koordinacija-latvija). 
11 Regulation No. 141 of 28 March, 2018, “On Ministry Competence 
Division on European Union Issues”.  
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responsible minister or by the Cabinet of Ministers, depending on 
the issues covered by the position. The national position is then 
adopted via a vote in the Cabinet of Ministers.  
The role of presidential powers (veto power and decree 
power) and executive powers (some role in cabinet formation, 
cabinet dismissal and the dissolution of parliament) has not been 
exercised in relation to EU affairs aside from occasional comments 
or representative involvement. Although President Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga was active on the international scene – including pushing 
for Latvia’s EU membership – sitting presidents have generally been 
reluctant to engage with and actively participate in EU-related 
matters. The visible exception to this was the signing of ratified EU 
treaties, but those have not been contentious points. Therefore, on 
EU affairs, despite the overall ‘representative’ (and relatively weak) 
role of the president, the relationship between the parliament and 
the president has been positive and has not been marked by 
obstruction. 
13.2.1 The Saeima European Affairs Committee 
When it comes to overseeing the actions of ministers in the Council, 
the Cabinet of Ministers must obtain a mandate from parliament via 
the ‘parliamentary scrutiny process’ before it is able to take a 
position on an EU issue; as part of 
this process, positions are reviewed 
by the European Affairs Committee 
of the parliament.12 Its functions 
include the ex ante review and 
adoption of Latvian national 
positions, monitoring of investments from EU funds, ensuring the 
closer involvement of NGOs and civil society in the EU’s legislative 
processes, as well as monitoring cooperation with the EU’s 
neighbouring countries. This stands in contrast to other member 
states, where the parliament has the ability to issue mandates or 
                                                        
12 Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS, EUROPEUM Institute of European 
policy, Institute of Public Affairs (2014), “Opportunities for the Organized 
Civil Society to Influence EU Decision-Making via National Positions”, 
Riga (http://providus.lv/upload_file/Projekti/Eiropas%20politika/ 
2014/EU_decision%20making_petijums.pdf). 
The Cabinet of Ministers must 
obtain a mandate from 
parliament before it is able to 
take a position on an EU issue. 
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resolutions (and must be given adequate time to do so). The 
parliament scrutinises not only the activities of representatives of 
the Council of the European Union, but also the European Council. 
European Affairs Committee meetings take place once or twice a 
week depending on the number of national positions that need to 
be evaluated.  
The framework of the Saeima European Affairs Committee is 
legally established by the parliament’s order roll (Saeimas Kārtības 
rullis), in which Article 104 highlights the roles of committees, in this 
case that of the European Affairs Committee: 
104. (1) After examining all the proposals, the president 
shall put to a vote the bill as a whole, with the adopted 
proposals. 
(2) If the Saeima adopts the bill in this way, it shall be 
returned to the responsible commission for preparation 
for the third reading. After the adoption of the bill in the 
second reading, the Saeima shall decide on a deadline for 
the submission of proposals. This time limit may not be 
less than five days. 
(3) If the Saeima does not accept the draft law in the second 
reading, it shall be returned to the responsible committee 
and may be re-submitted for a second reading in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 94 and 96. 
Therefore, in Latvia, executive-legislative relations are primarily 
based on a model where the mode of interaction between the 
parliament and the government is balanced in favour of the 
parliament. Parliament enjoys both non-partisan control powers 
and ‘penalty’ powers over the executive branch. Furthermore, 
within the European Affairs Committee, opposition representatives 
are granted the same rights to question the line ministers and to vote 
for or against a position. But since the opposition will not vote 
against national positions unless the parliamentarians have clear 
and strict objections to the document, this does not often lead to 
noticeable disagreements. 
Yet the European Affairs Committee often clashes with line 
ministries on national positions, and line ministries do not regard 
the parliamentary scrutiny process as a mere formality. Although 
ministers and ministry representatives tend to be able to explain 
their arguments to the members of the European Affairs Committee 
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in a convincing way, political approval is only given by a majority 
vote in the committee. As a consequence, suggested amendments 
are usually included in the final national position for the minister 
that represents Latvia at the respective Council formation. 
13.2.2 EU topics and the Saeima 
The European Affairs Committee is often the main arena for debates 
on EU issues. As the committee meetings are in most cases open to 
the public, members of the committee tend to appeal to the NGOs 
and mass media that are occasionally present. Despite this, the 
parliament of Latvia has been relatively inactive in sending 
opinions to the European Commission.13 Nevertheless, it has 
experience in engaging in both yellow-card (subsidiarity check) and 
green-card (sending proposals to European Commission) 
procedures.14 
Migration and the refugee crisis have become exceptional 
issues due to the activity of some members of the Saeima – this led 
to a ruling that mandates measures on these matters to be adopted 
not only at the committee level, but also after plenary discussions. 
Most debates on EU positions happen on several foreign policy 
issues, most notably in terms of positions on Russia, Belarus or 
Ukraine-related issues that are presented by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for the Foreign Affairs Council. The often conservative 
positions put forward by the Ministry of Justice tend to be 
challenged not only by committee members from opposition 
                                                        
13 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, The Role of National Parliaments 
in the EU after Lisbon: Potentialities and Challenges, pp. 21–23 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583126
/IPOL_STU(2017)583126_EN.pdf). 
European Commission, Annual report 2017 on relations between the European 
Commission and national parliaments, p. 6 (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/ 
info/files/law/law-making_process/documents/annual-report-2017-
relations-between-european-commission-national-parliaments_en.pdf). 
14 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, The Role of National Parliaments 
in the EU after Lisbon: Potentialities and Challenges, pp. 27 and 38 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583126
/IPOL_STU(2017)583126_EN.pdf). 
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parties, but also by representatives of coalition partners. Similar 
challenges are faced by the Ministry of Agriculture in its support for 
intensive farming. 
General parliamentary discussions on important EU topics 
take place during annual parliamentary debates on foreign policy. 
The content of these discussions follows the annual report by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,15 which covers key EU-level issues. 
Historically, issues related to migration or the country’s stance on 
Russian aggression have caused the most polarisation among 
parliamentary parties. Party ideologies are also more visible in these 
discussions, as individual members of the coalition government 
parties are not afraid to scrutinise the stance of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In this way, the debate in 2018 featured 
disagreements on Latvia’s stance regarding the EU’s future and a 
multi-speed Europe, priorities for the EU’s multi-year budget, 
support for the diaspora, the reaction to Russian military exercises, 
and the EU’s stance on Catalonian independence.16 
The most recent debate at the start of 2019 saw sharp clashes 
on the stance towards the EU’s transatlantic relationship. The 
opposition, in line with their ideological position, criticised reliance 
on a partnership with the US for geopolitical security. Furthermore, 
the debate covered the topics of Brexit, China’s political ambitions, 
the future of the EU, the role of NATO in the context of defence and 
security, and others.17 Somewhat similarly to previous years, the 
issue of migration saw disagreements between government parties. 
                                                        
15 The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019), Annual Report of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and further work with respect 
to national foreign policy and the European Union (https://www.mfa.gov.lv/ 
en/news/latest-news/62322-annual-report-of-the-minister-of-foreign-
affairs-on-the-accomplishments-and-further-work-with-respect-to-
national-foreign-policy-and-the-european-union-2018). 
16 Jolanta Plauka, “No šaha partijas līdz cirkam” [From a chess party to a 
circus], Diena, 28 January 2018 (https://www.diena.lv/raksts/latvija/ 
zinas/no-saha-partijas-lidz-cirkam-14189722). 
17 Portal “LSM.lv”, “Opozīcija kritizē tradicionālo ārlietu ministra 
ziņojumu” [Opposition criticises the traditional annual report of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs], 24 January 2019 (https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/ 
zinas/latvija/opozicija-kritize-tradicionalo-arlietu-ministra-arpolitikas-
zinojumu.a307142/). 
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Given the broad spectrum of parties that position themselves as 
conservative, and the fact that the newly elected parliament had 
already decided not to join the UN Global Migration Pact, the 
debate saw criticism towards the stance of (and specific actions of) 
the foreign minister, who represents the New Unity party. 
Overall, ideologies play a part in these discussions in two 
ways. In line with their ideological position, the opposition often 
criticises positions with a favourable stance towards NATO and 
Western partnerships. Among political parties that mostly 
represent ethnic Latvians, the biggest clashes have occurred 
recently between liberal and conservative viewpoints, especially on 
migration. 
13.2.3 International cooperation 
Latvia and its decision-makers have not been shy of international 
collaboration at the parliamentary level, and even at the level of 
large municipalities. At the same time, the lack of English-language 
skills often become a trivial reason for limited collaboration with 
other EU member states. Again, with a younger generation of 
politicians coming to the stage, the intensity of contacts is 
increasing. Overall, Latvia also sees itself as a frequent user of the 
Early Warning System, and it is engaged in political dialogue and 
inter-parliamentary cooperation.  
The European Parliament elections and EU-level political 
parties are becoming a significant tool and channel for the 
integration of Latvian politicians. Many of Latvia’s political parties, 
as will be further elaborated below, 
have established connections with 
and membership in EU-level 
political parties and are attending 
common events. This 
‘internationalisation’ of Latvian 
politicians and political parties lays 
the foundation for further 
engagement on EU issues – however, as will be demonstrated 
further, the devil is in the details.  
European Parliament 
elections and EU-level 
political parties are becoming 
a significant channel for the 
integration of Latvian 
politicians. 
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13.2.4 Overall expertise on EU issues 
The level of skills and knowledge about the EU have been increasing 
throughout Latvia’s EU membership. The overall positive attitude 
of Latvia’s population towards the EU in the 1990s was related to 
modernisation and promises of security and welfare for the country. 
An understanding of the functioning of the Union was limited to 
experts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state 
institutions, as well as a few politicians, academics and journalists. 
Since gaining EU membership, the trend of increasing expertise has 
been growing. An increasing number of people with both practical 
and academic experience in EU affairs are becoming visible in the 
media and the skillsets of decision-makers have increased 
dramatically.  
A major turning point that increased expertise was the 
Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2015. 
This can be considered to be a membership test for the country, 
which only joined the EU in May 2004. The mobilisation of national 
administrative and expert resources was most prominent during the 
six-month period, and this provided a successful result. Due to 
recurring issues such as the Multiannual Financial Framework, 
Eurozone membership, or the future of the European Union, the 
level of expertise and skills continues to increase. Brexit discussions 
are expected to increase EU awareness not only among decision-
makers, but also in the wider population. Finally, and maybe most 
importantly – the younger generation of politicians, experts, 
decision-makers and the general population is becoming more 
visible. The number of ‘millennials’ educated since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and in the first EU-related study programmes 
(which were opened in 1998), with or without additional experience 
in western universities, has been significantly increasing. This has 
created a substantial pool of EU-skilled people on which to draw.  
In the Latvian expert community, academia and think tanks, 
the traditional trends have been to think in terms of “islands of 
competence”, where people often focus on single-question issues. 
Latvia’s foreign affairs expertise also has a strong Russia/Central 
Asia focus, taking attention away from EU issues. This is gradually 
changing, and many think tanks are more visible on EU issues – for 
instance, Providus, which has a strong focus on migration issues, 
citizen engagement and strengthening the influence of Latvia at the 
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EU level; the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, which covers 
EU-Latvia relations in various sectors, including the future of the 
EU, the EU budget, Brexit, and shifts in the Economic and Monetary 
Union, in addition to having a strong eastern focus (in terms of 
transatlantic security, EU-China relations, EU-Russia relations, and 
EU-ENP relations); and the Baltic International Centre for Economic 
Policy (mostly focusing on EMU-related issues). 
13.3 The Euro-integration of Latvian political 
parties 
As mentioned earlier, policy-making and government has 
historically been dominated by Latvian-identifying parties, while 
the Russian-speaking minority is represented by a limited number 
of other parties that work in the opposition.18 The Latvian-
identifying parties have seen a significant fragmentation within the 
centre-right, resulting in parties aligning with similar political 
families on the EU level. As a consequence, the consolidated 
Russian-speaking party has aligned itself with the centre-left. The 
October 2018 parliamentary election saw new parties with clearer 
ideological positions gain prominence, which seemingly had the 
potential to alter previous alignments with European political 
parties.19 Nevertheless, centre-right fragmentation remains severe, 
and the leaders of four out of the seven political parties currently 
represented in Latvia’s parliament have expressed their desire to 
join the European People’s Party or are already members thereof 
(this includes New Unity, the New Conservative Party, KPV.LV and 
the Greens and Farmers Union). 
  
                                                        
18 R. Nakai (2014), “The influence of party competition on minority politics: 
A comparison of Latvia and Estonia”, JEMIE, 13, 57. 
19 I. Ijabs (2018), 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Latvia, Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/baltikum/14739.pdf).  
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Table 13.1 Party affiliations at the EU and national levels 
EP 
group 
Associated 
Latvian 
party 
(elected 
MEPs) 
EU 
political 
party 
(associated 
MEPs) 
Latvian 
members 
(national 
MPs, of 100) 
Expressed some 
interest / 
application in 
process 
(current national 
MPs of 100) 
EPP 
Group 
New Unity 
(4) EPP (211) 
New Unity 
(8) 
Green and 
Farmers’ Union** 
(11) 
New Conservative 
Party (16) 
KPV.LV (16) 
S&D  
Group 
Harmony*** 
(1) PES (182) 
Harmony (23) 
LSDSP (0) 
Progressives (0) 
ALDE 
Group 
Green and 
Farmers (1) ALDE (49) 
For Latvia’s 
Development* 
(0)  
Latvian Regional 
Alliance (0) 
Proud to serve 
Latvia/Riga (0) 
Development/Pro* 
(13) 
ECR 
Group 
National 
Alliance (1) ACRE (44) 
National 
Alliance (17) 
 
Greens/ 
EFA 
Group 
- EGP (36) Latvian Green 
Party** (0) Progressives (0) 
Greens/ 
EFA 
Group 
- EFA (6) 
Latvian 
Russian 
Union (0) 
- 
ECR 
Group - ECPM (2) 
Christian 
Democratic 
Union (0) 
For Latvia From 
the Heart (0) 
Represented in the national parliament / In parliament from 2014-2018 / 
Between 2% and 5% in 2018  
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* Development/Pro is a party alliance that consists of the liberal For Latvia’s 
Development and the centre-left Movement Pro. The former is a member of 
ALDE. 
** The Latvian Green Party is a member of the Green and Farmers Union. 
*** The currently elected MEP no longer officially represents Harmony, and 
has instead joined the Latvian Russian Union. 
 
An analysis of political party platforms for the EP 2019 elections 
shows that 9 out of 16 parties running in Latvia have indicated their 
preferred European party affiliation,20 while the various 
dimensions of current EU-level alignment are shown in Table 13.1. 
Parties with the longest parliamentary history also have the most 
visible ties with their EU families. However, most experts 
acknowledge that the impact of European political parties on 
national politics in Latvia is very limited. A compilation of survey 
responses on interactions between European political parties and 
their current full-member Latvian counterparts (see Table 13.2) 
provides a general overview of the impact they have had. On the 
one hand, all of them use European political parties as platforms for 
political engagement, and European political parties have had an 
influence on the national positions of the parties on important 
policy questions – for example, the quota system for asylum seekers. 
On the other hand, almost none of the parties found European 
political foundations to be significant actors – instead, Latvian 
parties have closer ties, with political foundations, with parties in 
Germany and the Scandinavian countries. These have contributed 
significantly more, especially in terms of support for youth political 
engagement. 
  
                                                        
20 Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS (2019), “Analysis of the Latvian 
political party programs for the 2019 EP elections”, Riga 
(http://providus.lv/article_files/3548/original/PARSKATS_-
_EP_v%C4%93l%C4%93%C5%A1anu_Latvijas_partiju_programmu_anal
%C4%ABze.pdf?1556633251).  
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Table 13.2 An evaluation of cooperation between European political 
parties and the associated Latvian national party 
 Unity 
Party 
Harmo-
ny 
Natio-
nal 
Alli-
ance 
For 
Latvia’s 
Develop-
ment 
Involvement with the European 
political party 3 2 3 3 
Involvement with the European 
political party foundation 1 0 1 0 
Impact on national positions 2 1 3 3 
Impact on party programmes 2 1 1 3 
Access to funding 2 1 2 1 
Platforms for political 
engagement 3 3 3 3 
Influence on organisational 
development 1 1 1 3 
Notes: (3 – significant, 0 - not significant). The assessment was made by the 
author based on semi-structured interviews with four party representatives. 
 
Table 13.1 also shows that previously existing ideological gaps are 
now being filled by newly established parties, which has the 
potential to further facilitate EU-level alignment in the future. This 
is visible, for example, in Development/Pro, a largely liberal 
coalition that is represented in the national parliament, or the 
Progressives, who are engaging in a more active campaign on green 
issues.  
Yet this also highlights some ideological conflicts that prevent 
new parties from engaging in European-level politics. As 
mentioned earlier, two of the largest newcomers to the national 
parliament, the New Conservative Party and KPV.LV, have both 
indicated a desire to join the EPP. Similarly, the Progressives, which 
have modelled themselves on the socioeconomic traditions of the 
EU, would prefer to join PES, but, in light of the position held by 
Harmony, the party has chosen to highlight their European Green 
identity instead. Since none of the parties holding a full membership 
have indicated an openness to other Latvian parties joining, they 
could continue to block this kind of alignment, which highlights an 
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important barrier of entry for new political parties into the EU 
political families.21  
While the general ideological positions for these parties are 
clear, specific stances on various EU-level issues are barely available 
for some of the parties. Since Development/Pro includes a party 
that is a member of ALDE, it has already begun to develop its EP 
election campaign based on the published ALDE manifesto. The 
stance of other new parties is less clear, with the only available 
information being some early indications from surveys conducted 
during the national elections (see Table 13.3). 
Table 13.3 Party responses to a survey prior to the national elections 
 
Suppor
t for 
same-
sex 
civil 
unions 
Voluntary 
acceptanc
e of 
asylum 
seekers 
from 
conflict 
zones 
Suppor
t for an 
EU 
army 
Stricter EU-
level money 
laundering 
regulations 
at the cost of 
Latvian 
banks 
Prioritisati
on of 
domestic 
issues 
rather than 
EU issues 
Development/Pro
* (13) 5 3 4 5 1 
New 
Conservative 
Party* (16) 
1 1 4 4 5 
New Unity (8) 5 3 1 5 4 
KPV.LV* (16) 4 3 3 4 5 
Latvian Russian 
Union 1 4 2 2 4 
Latvian Regional 
Alliance 1 1 4 3 4 
National Alliance 
(13) 1 1 1 5 4 
Progressives* 5 5 5 5 1 
Harmony (23) 3 3 5 3 3 
Greens and 
Farmers (11) 1 1 2 4 5 
                                                        
21 Interviews with party representatives during 2018. 
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Notes: Parties could pick an answer between 1 and 5, where 5 – fully agree, 4 – 
agree, 3 – agree and disagree, 2 – disagree, 1 – fully disagree). An asterisk (*) 
indicates political parties that ran in the national elections for the first time. The 
numbers following the party names indicate the number of MPs they have in 
parliament (out of 100). 
 
This indicates some initial political positioning for the parties. For 
example, Development/Pro and the Progressives are the only 
parties that clearly stand for deeper EU integration. Similarly, 
parties are split on the issue of same-sex civil unions, and hold 
mixed positions on asylum seekers and on decision-making in 
national parliaments versus the EP. And while KPV.LV, branded as 
the populist party of Latvia, has demonstrated some conservative 
leanings when opposing the UN Global Migration Compact,22 their 
answers to the survey are less ideologically clear. These positions 
will, of course, become clearer during and after the 2019 EP 
elections, but, at least for the New Conservative Party and KPV.LV, 
this stance is currently unlikely to be significantly influenced by 
European political families.  
Overall, it can be concluded that alignment with European 
political families is becoming stronger. Nevertheless, it is unusual 
that four political parties that are perceived to be highly dissimilar 
by Latvian voters and the media have all chosen the European 
People’s Party as their preferred political family.  The barrier for 
national parties to be included in the major families, given the close 
ideological positions of parties, will, therefore, remain an important 
obstacle to transcend.  
Conclusions 
In the Latvian political system, major ideological disagreements 
mostly occur between parties representing ethnic Latvians or ethnic 
Russians. This is supplemented by discussions dealing with their 
geopolitical stance towards the West and/or Russia. A relatively 
new trend has been disagreements between parties identifying as 
liberal and conservative, and an even newer trend is to see divisions 
                                                        
22 Portal “LSM.lv”, “Saeima rejects UN migration compact”, 6 December 
2018 (https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/saeima/saeima-rejects-un-
migration-compact.a302055/).  
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between a federalist or intergovernmentalist stance on the EU and 
the powers of the European Commission. Despite their divisions, 
there is traditionally a fairly broad coherence on most EU issues 
among coalition parties due to very low levels of openly anti-
European sentiment. As for Latvian parties and their relationship 
with European politics, the alignment of these parties with 
European political families is becoming stronger, although many of 
the current frontrunners have still not formed alliances with EU-
level political parties and will make their bids only after achieving 
victory at the EP elections. This means that while established parties 
have already begun this process, newly elected parties are just now 
starting to initiate new partnerships on a European level.  
The Latvian system has a strong parliamentary scrutiny 
process for establishing national positions for both the Council and 
the European Council, conducted by the European Affairs 
Committee of the Saeima. The system was originally introduced to 
give Latvia’s EU accession process additional political legitimacy – 
the parliamentary dimension has been preserved and has turned 
into an important forum for debating EU issues and national 
positions due to its accessibility. The drafting of national positions 
and the coordination process offers a significant number of 
opportunities for it to be influenced by civil society and social 
partners.  
Therefore, it is clear that not only has the overall state of 
Latvia’s democracy matured over the years, it has grown to 
encompass a wider representation of ideological views (i.e., moving 
beyond identity politics). It has also become more open and active 
regarding EU issues and problems. But just as in other member 
states, the ‘catch-all’ approach and the use of populist methods for 
attracting an audience are prevalent and continue to secure 
victories. Voters searching for charisma and personalities, in 
addition to modern technology and the media, are turning politics 
into a volatile theatre. The volatility in voter support for parties is 
greatly influenced by the popularity of preferential candidate 
voting, leading to the discontinuity of political coalitions and 
programmes and difficulties in forging new governments. It is 
evident that the Euro-integration of the Latvian political party 
system is part of an overall learning curve and continued 
Europeanisation. 
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14. POLAND’S POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE ON EUROPE 
WOJCIECH BIAŁOŻYT, JACEK KUCHARCZYK, 
ROMAIN LE QUINIOU & FILIP PAZDERSKI 
Since the beginning of Poland’s political and economic transition of 1989, 
democratic reforms have been underpinned by values and ambitions that 
can best be expressed as the country’s ‘return to Europe’. Continuing 
public support for EU membership had laid the foundations of political 
consensus around the integration process and, perhaps more importantly, 
the democratic and institutional reforms necessary for successful EU 
accession. But this democratic and pro-European consensus came under 
strain with the victory of the Law and Justice (PiS) party in presidential 
and parliamentary elections in 2015. Since coming to power, the PiS 
undertook a series of radical changes targeting the judicial system and 
other democratic checks and balances. These reforms gave rise to even more 
conflict with the EU institutions, notably the European Parliament and 
the Commission, and the unprecedented triggering of Article 7 of the 
Treaty on the European Union. At the same time these systemic changes 
and the ruthlessly majoritarian way of legislating them caused deep social 
and political polarisation. While the overwhelming majority of society 
continues to support EU membership and democratic governance, there are 
serious divisions when it comes to more specific political issues and their 
interpretation. These divisions have been exploited by the ruling party to 
maintain public support in the face of growing domestic and international 
criticism. This chapter argues that Poland’s current politics could have 
severe consequences for both the condition of representative democracy and 
the country’s EU membership.  
Introduction 
“Return to Europe” was one of the guiding ideas of Poland’s 
transition from communism to democracy and a market economy. 
In the early 1990s, it found concrete expression in the signing of the 
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Europe Agreement establishing the Polish association with the 
European Communities in December 1991. Notably, the agreement 
recognised “the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a 
member of the Community”. Poland’s membership perspective was 
confirmed at the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen. The 
same Council laid down the so-called Copenhagen Criteria 
requiring that a country seeking EU membership “has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, respect for and protection of minorities”. After 
Poland started its membership negotiations in 1997, the European 
Commission carefully monitored its progress in fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria in annually published reports. Thus, the 
process of building democratic institutions in Poland became 
closely associated with the country’s desire to join the European 
Union, even though no specific model of democratic governance 
was prescribed by EU membership criteria. Crucially, in spite of 
deep political and social divisions in the first decade of transition, 
EU membership enjoyed the support of a vast majority of Poles as 
well as all key political parties and actors. For this reason, the 
accession process, as well as EU membership, has had a stabilising 
effect on Polish democracy. The resilience of Polish democratic 
institutions and the economy after the economic and financial crisis 
of 2008 encouraged many Polish and European politicians and 
opinion makers to name Poland as a poster boy of democratic 
transition and a role model for struggling democracies in the EU’s 
Eastern Neighbourhood.  
However, following the victory of the authoritarian populist 
Law and Justice party (PiS) in Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections in 2015, the new government has embraced a series of 
systemic reforms, which (as critics claimed) aimed to dismantle key 
checks and balances and other crucial elements of democratic 
governance. These policies set the Polish government and the ruling 
party on a collision course with the EU, which for the first time in 
history evoked Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
against Poland for rule of law infringements. The state of Polish 
democratic institutions has thus become a crucial issue in Poland’s 
relations with Brussels. Significantly, in this conflict, both sides, the 
Law and Justice government on one side, and the European 
Commission and Parliament (as well as Polish opposition parties 
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and civil society) claim to defend democratic principles. PiS claims 
that its victory in parliamentary elections and the majority it has in 
the Polish Parliament allows it to implement whatever systemic 
changes it deems necessary as an expression of the popular vote. PiS 
critics, on the other hand, claim that taking political control of the 
judiciary system and public media directly contradicts the 
principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU. What is at stake is clearly the 
definition of representative democracy, which both sides of the 
conflict claim to endorse. 
14.1 Poland’s constitutional model 
Bronisław Geremek once said ‘the path for liberty is open, the one for 
democracy remains uncertain’ (Mink, 1990). This symbolic sentence 
expresses as much the pride in Poland 
rediscovering freedom as the need to 
build a long-standing democratic 
system. The uneasy political transition 
from communism to democracy in the 
1990s along with Polish historical 
legacies are the sources of the current 
Polish political system (Cole, 1998). 
The system is seen today as a semi-
presidential regime centred around the Prime Minister and 
characterised by a bi-cameral Parliament. The Sejm – 460 deputies 
elected through universal, equal, direct and proportional elections 
– being preponderant over the Senat – 100 senators elected through 
universal and direct elections every four years.  
14.1.1 From communism to democracy: the provisional 
constitution 
At the end of the 1980s, the social situation in the country became 
unmanageable and the communist government accepted 
negotiations with the opposition – namely Solidarność and its leader 
Lech Wałęsa. Both sides were inclined to find a measured and 
consensual agreement that would allow for a peaceful system 
transition (Kennedy & Porter, 2000). On 5 April 1989, the Round 
Table Agreement was signed. It led to the legalisation of Solidarność, 
the holding of partially-free elections and the creation of new 
The uneasy political 
transition from communism 
to democracy in the 1990s 
along with Polish 
historical legacies are the 
sources of the current 
Polish political system. 
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political tools (the function of president and re-establishment of 
bicameralism with the Senat).  
The outcome of the elections – organised on 4 June 1989 – 
minimised the Communist political advantage and contributed to 
speed up the political transformation (Matthes, 2006). Solidarność 
won every competed seat in the Sejm (35%) and all except one in the 
Senat (99%). Tadeusz Mazowiecki was tasked with forming a 
government – becoming the first non-communist prime minister 
since 1946. Mazowiecki’s government had an essential aim: to build 
a modern Poland and re-unite with Europe through the 
establishment of a democratic political system and a liberal and free-
market economy.  
The first step was to modify the basis of the existing 
Constitution (1952) in order to allow fast-acting political and 
economic transformations. As such, in December 1989, the 
Parliament voted through an amendment removing all references 
to Communism and introducing the principles of rule of law, 
private property and diverse political freedoms. Simultaneously, 
deputies were working on the constitutional draft. However, the 
process was disturbed by many events such as the crisis of 
legitimacy of the Sejm (followed by its significant political 
fragmentation after the 1991 parliamentary elections), the 
competition between the Constitutional Committee of the Sejm and 
that of the Senat or the interference of President Wałęsa in the 
constitutional drafting process (Górski, 2014). On December 8, 1992 
the Small Constitution, a short-term constitutional document aimed 
at fixing the immediate political instability (McMenamin, 2008), was 
implemented. As such, 1992’s Constitution emphasised the semi-
presidential character of the Polish political regime and the idea of 
compromise between presidential and parliamentary regimes 
(Cole, 1998). The main added value of this document was a clearer 
definition of the relations between the president, the government 
and the parliament, which had been a source of conflict since 
regaining independence.  
14.1.2 Finally, a definitive Polish Constitution 
After a few years of instability, a favourable political context 
following the 1993 parliamentary elections and the election of A. 
Kwaśniewski to the post of President of Poland in 1995, work was 
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initiated on the new Constitution. The main objective of the 
deputies was now to gain the legitimacy and efficiency for the final 
constitution needed for its future approved by the Parliament and 
in a popular referendum. Consequently, the Constitutional 
Commission decided to enlarge its spectrum through the 
involvement of civil society either by active (legal experts) or 
passive (Catholic Church representatives) representation. To create 
legitimacy around the Constitution, the leftist coalition also needed 
to create a political consensus involving extra-coalition parties in the 
Constitutional process and hence to accept some political 
concessions (Garlicki & Garlicka, 2010). The Constitutional 
Commission was finally able to present the ultimate version of the 
Constitutional draft to the parliament on 16 January 1997. The 
Constitution was finally adopted by parliament on 2 April 1997, 
followed its approval in the referendum with 52.7% of positive 
votes despite a weak participation of 42.86%.  
The adopted Constitution was directly inspired by modern 
European democratic constitutions (Cole, 1998). Consequently, the 
Polish political system is currently based on the division and 
balance of power between its four political pillars, namely the 
legislative power (Sejm and Senat), the executive power (prime 
minister and government), the representative power (president) 
and the judiciary power (Supreme 
Court). The system is also based on 
the principle of law as its Article 7 
underlines: “The organs of public 
authority shall function on the basis 
of, and within the limits of, the law.” 
In this semi-presidential system, the 
prime minister has a central role, benefitting from the dominance of 
the government –the core of executive power – over both the 
president and the parliament. The president, elected in general 
elections, retains a relatively strong influence in this system. Finally, 
the parliament – in which the Sejm is preponderant – also retains 
considerable power in this system. In fact, the Sejm exercises a 
certain power over the executive as the government engages its 
responsibility, has to answer questions from deputies and can be 
dissolved after a constructive motion of no confidence (for its 
nomination and during its term). The Sejm also has an important 
The prime minister has a 
central role, benefitting from 
the dominance of the 
government over both the 
president and the parliament. 
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role in relation to the president as it can override a presidential veto 
simply through a 3/5 majority and is liable to dissolution only in 
two specific cases. Furthermore, the Sejm plays a significant role in 
the management of the budget through its functions of voting and 
reporting. With the implementation of its constitution in 1997, 
Poland was then ready to engage with its ultimate objective – 
accession to the European Union. 
14.1.3 EU accession: constitutional and political 
arrangements  
The process of adoption of the new constitution was conducted to 
meet the objective of accession to the EU and of compliance with EU 
criteria (Matthes, 2006). It allowed Poland to present a concrete 
request for accession without an obligation to substantially modify 
its Constitution, even if some modifications were necessary on 
specific issues. Moreover, Article 90 of the 1997 Constitution was 
written in order to guarantee the possibility for EU Law to have 
preponderance over Polish law when it is required (Matthes, 2006). 
However, even if the Polish Constitution was designed to 
comply with EU law, the latter has been in permanent evolution. As 
such, Polish law has had to adapt to these modifications and also to 
make changes, even after the country’s accession. Regarding this 
issue, constitutional amendments (Article 235, 1) are necessary, e.g. 
in the case of the future adoption of the European currency. In fact, 
a proposal of amendment can be made by a group representing at 
least 1/5 of deputies, by a group representing the majority of 
senators or by the president. Then, it has to be approved by 2/3 of 
the Sejm (with 50% present) and by the majority of the Senat (also 
with 50% present), which is difficult to obtain in Poland due to the 
high polarity of political life (Osiński, 2010). One positive example 
is the amendment made in 2006 to comply with the European Arrest 
Warrant legislation. Some issues raised by the EU can be more 
controversial for the Polish political system and would not be able 
to be handled by an amendment (the adoption of the euro for 
example).  
Amending the Constitution is not the only way to comply 
with EU requirements. It is also possible to implement legislative 
acts in order to modify and adapt economic, social, political or 
administrative systems in relation to EU requirements 
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(Tomaszewski, 2015). The best example of legislation prepared to 
adjust to EU requirements is probably the 1999 Polish Public 
Administration Reform, which led to a large scale decentralisation. 
Its objective was to reform the territorial administration to adapt the 
Polish system to the concept of ‘European regions’ and its strategy 
of trans-border cooperation. At the end of the 1990s, Poland was on 
its way to joining the EU, so in order to be effective, an adaptation 
of its institutional system was therefore necessary.  
14.2 Poland’s institutional system: formal aspects of 
the EU dimension  
In Poland, European policy is treated as a special branch of foreign 
policy. It is primarily under the control of the government, which 
conducts Poland’s foreign policy, 
supported by the president, the 
parliament and the Committee for 
European Affairs. In addition, the 
principle of presumption of 
competence of the Council of Ministers contained in the 
Constitution is of particular significance in this matter – according 
to which, the Council of Ministers includes matters of state policy 
not clearly reserved for other state bodies (Wiesław, 2013).  
The role of the President in this field is special, as he is the 
highest representative of Poland. However, the Constitution 
requires his cooperation with the prime minister and the minister 
for foreign affairs. The president’s competences in representing the 
state in external relations, including European ones, are included in 
accordance with their traditional representational scope (Wiesław, 
2013). The provisions of the Constitution are not unequivocal in the 
division of competences in foreign and European policy between 
the government and the president. In the recent past, this led to 
open competence disputes, culminating in 2008, when there was a 
conflict between President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk about who had the right to represent Poland at the 
European Council summit (Żaczkiewicz-Zborska, 2008). The 
dispute turned in favour of the Prime Minister.  
There is also a special political role for the Secretary of State 
for European Affairs. Until 2010, the deputy minister served as the 
European policy is treated 
as a special branch of 
foreign policy. 
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head of the Office of the Committee for European Integration, thus 
acting as the secretary of the Committee for European Integration. 
In 2010, the European Integration Committee was incorporated into 
the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and exists as a 
specialised department servicing the Committee for European 
Affairs (Wiesław, 2013). The Committee for European Affairs is a 
specialised institution serving cooperation among members of the 
Council of Ministers and other government administration bodies 
in matters related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in 
the European Union (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2009).  
Also, within the internal structure of both chambers of the 
Polish Parliament – the Sejm and the Senat, there are specialised 
committees for foreign policy and the EU that deal with matters 
related to EU membership. In particular, their tasks include taking 
positions and expressing opinions on draft EU legal acts, drafts of 
international agreements, work plans of the Council of the 
European Union, annual legislative plans or formulating 
recommendations for the government. The principles of 
cooperation between executive organs with the Sejm and the Senat 
in matters related to EU membership are currently regulated by a 
special Act. Their competences include the following areas: 
information from the Council of Ministers on the participation of 
the Republic of Poland in the work of the EU, including in the 
sphere of the presidency; cooperation in the field of EU law making; 
cooperation in amending the treaties; cooperation in the 
implementation of EU law; cooperation in bringing complaints to 
the Court of Justice of the EU; cooperation in the field of issuing 
opinions on candidates for certain positions in the EU (Sejm, 2011). 
Overall, this specific institutional organisation has allowed Poland 
to interact with the EU, an interaction which has evolved 
considerably from 1991 to the present day.  
14.3 Poland’s European policy in practice 
14.3.1 1991-2004: Association Agreement to membership 
The political changes in Poland after 1989 paved the way towards 
association with the European Communities, concluded with the 
signing of the Europe Agreement in 1991. Throughout the period 
after 1989, European integration, along with accession to NATO, 
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became strategic goals in Polish foreign policy, based on a strong 
social consensus and a consistent policy of political elites, regardless 
of the change of government (Zięba, 2017). 
In 1994, the Government of Poland submitted a formal 
application for membership of the European Union at the 1994 
European Council Summit in Essen. In 1996, the Office of the 
Committee for European Integration commenced its activity, 
coordinating all ministries and institutions directly involved in the 
process of Poland’s integration with the EU (Łastawski, 2012). 
In 1997, the National Strategy for Integration was adopted. It 
formulated specific tasks on the road to full membership in the EU 
and the time sequence of their implementation. Adaptation 
measures in view of membership were implemented within the 
framework of the National Programme of Preparation for 
Membership in the EU prepared by the government. The 
membership and the Programme were directly linked to the 
implementation of the adjustment priorities set by the European 
Commission. By 1 May 2004, around 270 laws were adopted that 
adapted Polish law to EU law (Osrodek Informacji i Dokumentacji 
Europejskiej, 2004). For the purposes of negotiations in Poland, 37 
task sub-assemblies were appointed, which were responsible for the 
development of positions in specific areas. The adoption of the 
accession treaty in Poland took place in the form of a nationwide 
referendum on 7-8 June 2003. The accession treaty was signed on 16 
April 2003 in Athens. On 1 May 2004, Poland became a full member 
of the European Union. 
Membership in the EU as a ‘civilisation choice’ became 
Poland’s basis for strengthening democratic values, security and 
freedom, the driving force for modernisation, raising the standard 
of living and accelerating economic development.  
14.3.2 Polish parties within European political families 
The current composition of the political scene was shaped in the 
early 2000s, shortly before Poland’s 
accession to the EU, and has not 
changed much since. The two major 
political parties are Civic Platform 
(PO), pro-European, Western-style, 
moderate centre-right led by 
The current composition of 
the political scene was 
shaped in the early 2000s and 
has not changed much since. 
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Donald Tusk until 2014 and Law and Justice, conservative and 
sceptical towards the EU, which radicalised further during the 
2010s. Other include the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a 
modernised post-communist party that led the government 
between 1993-1997 and 2001-2005 and the Polish People’s Party 
(PSL), rooted in rural areas, and known for its capacity for political 
swings – it was minor government partner in 1993-1997, 2001-2005 
(with the post-communist SLD) and 2007-2015 with Civic Platform. 
Since joining the EU, other minor parties (e.g. liberals, anti-
European radicals) were also represented in the European 
Parliament.  
The European agendas of the four parties mentioned above 
have been consistent since the early 2000s, with EU affairs included 
in their programmes on the margins of their internal policy focus.  
Both PO and PSL joined the European People’s Party (EPP), 
with particularly PO gaining influence as witnessed by the 
nominations for Jerzy Buzek as president of the European 
Parliament (2009-2012) and for Donald Tusk in 2014 as European 
Council President.  
Since its creation, PO has certainly been a major pro-European 
force in the country, seeing Poland as an active and constructive 
contributor to the European project. It supported the adoption of the 
European Constitution (while being sceptical towards the 
abolishment of the Treaty of Nice voting weights), enhancement of 
the European foreign and defence dimension. Throughout the 
2000s, it has also been supporting further enlargement of the EU 
(e.g. to Turkey).  
SLD has also been clearly pro-European, though with limited 
political strength, and has been a member of the Party of European 
Socialists.   
PiS has been sceptical towards the EU since its creation. Since 
Polish accession to the EU, PiS has not 
joined the EPP as opposed to the two 
centre-right Polish parties, PO and 
PSL, as well as the Hungarian Fidesz 
party that mirrors the PiS reticent 
attitude towards the EU project. It 
initially joined the Union for a Europe of the Nations and then the 
European Conservatives and Reformists set up by the UK’s Tories. 
PiS initially joined the 
Union for a Europe of the 
Nations and then the 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists. 
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PiS has become the second major political force of the third largest 
European political party. However, with the ongoing Brexit process 
that has occupied Tories exclusively with UK-EU matters, the 
Group has been less influential than expected. While PiS can rely on 
the support of the majority of the Group (for instance regarding 
resolutions against the judicial laws), it is expected it may try to 
increase its influence in the next EU Parliament, notably through the 
setting-up of new partnerships (e.g. Vox, Lega Nord, True Finns, 
AfD or Danish People’s Party).  
PiS has been steadily highlighting its preference for the 
nation-state concept of EU composition and has seen itself as 
defender of Europe’s Christian roots and values that, in PiS opinion, 
have been abandoned throughout the European integration 
process.  
Between 2005-2007, when PiS was biggest party in the 
Parliament (while lacking the majority) it was seen as radically 
Eurosceptic and having an instrumental approach to the 
membership in the EU focusing on economic benefits.  
The PSL, with major part of its electorate being based in rural 
areas, shares with PiS a social conservatism and lack of enthusiasm 
towards deepening European integration. However, it was PSL 
that, being part of the government between 2001-2005, co-
negotiated crucial elements of the Accession Treaty and has held on 
to its legacy placing itself in the EU mainstream through 
membership in the EPP and a constructive approach to the EU 
project.  
14.3.3 Key areas of political discourse on the EU (2004-15) 
The European debate in 2003 concerning the Constitution for 
Europe did not resonate much in Poland, apart from the unanimous 
criticism from all political parties to the proposed voting system in 
the Council of the European Union that was to replace that in the 
Treaty of Nice considered to be advantageous for Poland. This 
criticism was reflected in the delayed and hesitant ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty by the President of Poland L. Kaczyński. Eurosceptic 
parties, including PiS, used the modification of the voting system as 
proof of domination of big countries in the EU, and this remains an 
important part of their narrative until today.  
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Since the 2004 EU accession, most European debate in Poland 
was centred around the Eastern dimension of the EU (e.g. 
supporting Ukraine in its turbulent attempts to move closer to the 
EU), energy policy in the context of Russian supplies and securing 
a substantial inflow of structural funds.  
The arrival to power of the PO-PSL coalition headed by 
Donald Tusk in late 2007 brought Poland back to a constructive role 
within the EU with an ambition to position the country in the 
decision core of the EU. The new majority claimed Poland would 
become a key actor on the European scene, announced its intention 
to enter the euro zone quickly and flagged the EU structural funds 
as key to the economic success of Poland. The pro-European 
narrative that the PO-PSL coalition conducted in its first term was 
fuelled by the Presidency of the Council of the EU that Poland was 
to hold in 2011. 
Since accession to the EU, Poland has considered itself as a 
natural supporter of the European ambitions of Ukraine. Polish 
general public interest in the democratic and European transition of 
Ukraine peaked during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and 
particularly with regards to the successful mediation in which 
President of Poland A. Kwaśniewski managed to engage Javier 
Solana, at the time High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.  
The most ambitious Polish set of proposals to reform the EU 
was presented by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski on 28 
November 2011 during the Polish Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union at the German Council on Foreign Relations. 
Sikorski proclaimed that Poland was no longer the source of 
European problems but of European solutions. He proposed 
reshaping the European Commission, enhancing the competences 
of the EU institutions and merging the posts of presidents of the 
Commission and the European Council, vowed for the European 
Parliament to have a single seat and called for pan-European lists of 
candidates in the EP elections. Sikorski called Germany an 
indispensable nation and stated that what he feared most was 
German inactivity.  
The moment of the highest exposure of Poland as a leading 
member of the EU was its 2011 presidency of the Council of the 
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European Union, for which the Polish Solidarity movement’s 
heritage became the leitmotif. 
Structural funds were a major issue in the Polish European 
debate. In 2013, it was announced that 
Poland would receive €105 billion for 
2014-2020. The final size of the 
allocation for Poland was a clear 
success, however the way in which it 
was communicated to the general public very much reflected the 
simplified and instrumental way of treating EU membership – 
Prime Minister Tusk posed for pictures in front of a big layer cake 
in the shape of piles of euro notes.  
The Sejm’s Committee for European Affairs has not played a 
significant role in the process of shaping Polish European policies 
since accession. It has been chaired by political lightweights who 
have been unable to impose themselves and counterbalance the 
executive in legal proceedings. Since 2015, the role of Sejm 
committees in the process of law making has been in further sharp 
decline and they have become just another area in which the PiS 
majoritarian way of policymaking has reached its full potential. The 
most striking example here was the extraordinary way substantial 
judiciary measures proceeded through the Sejm’s Justice and 
Human Rights Committee, being approved by the PiS majority 
within hours with discussion time limited to minimum.    
Since EU accession, Polish political parties have not proposed 
any specific, original vision of the future of Europe. The EU debate 
is conducted instrumentally by the political parties; the longer the 
membership lasts, the less political parties talk about the 
significance or future of Europe, focusing instead on technical, 
specific issues, most often economic.   
14.3.4 Rule of law and the perception of the EU since 2015 
The key strategic goal of the political elite after 1989 was leaving the 
‘grey zone’ of instability by anchoring Poland in the Western 
security system (NATO) and in the legal, political and economic 
structures of the EU. The goal of Europeanisation has been 
implemented by all political parties, regardless of their ideological 
affiliations. Polish foreign policy has been defined and conducted 
by all governing parties on the basis of a national consensus on a 
Structural funds were a 
major issue in the Polish 
European debate. 
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pro-West orientation. This consensus and the ‘myth of the West’ 
that largely dominated public discussions was a narrative that 
drove Poland’s political, economic and social transition forward. It 
constituted above all the major civilisation and modernisation 
direction of Poland. This approach recognised that Poland had 
different interests in minor issues with various European partners, 
but it was based on negotiating and seeking compromise to protect 
Poland’s long-term strategic interests. This was over and above 
Poland’s ambition and goal to be present at the centre of European 
policy (Balcer et al., 2016). 
This direction changed after the 2015 parliamentary elections 
when PiS prioritised internal policy over strategic foreign policy 
goals and the party has not been 
eager to take institutional obligations 
and the opinions of Poland’s 
European partners into 
consideration. In the view of PiS 
leader Jarosław Kaczyński, internal 
policies conducted on his part are targeted by a “European 
establishment” hostile to his party and to himself.  
The most significant redefinition of Polish foreign policy is the 
party’s deep pessimism about the future of the European project. 
PiS presents the EU as a disintegrating structure and destined for 
failure in its current shape. This vision is deeply rooted in the 
intellectual environment of PiS and has strongly influenced the 
direction of Polish foreign policy since 
2015. Accordingly, PiS has been 
attempting to redefine the perception 
of the EU as a risk, not a chance for 
Poland as was the case from 1989 to 
2015. In its pessimistic perception, PiS 
thinks that the EU needs to become an 
alliance of equal nation-states in order 
to survive. The major assumption of 
PiS presented to the public is that the 
EU project, considered as “utopian” is inevitably declining and that 
Poland has no interest in defending the current model of European 
integration. The criticism and pessimism of PiS towards the EU 
project has not only been about questioning the future direction of 
This direction changed when 
PiS prioritised internal 
policy over strategic foreign 
policy goals. 
The criticism and 
pessimism of PiS has not 
only been about questioning 
the future direction of EU 
integration, but about 
liberal democracy perceived 
as a danger for “traditional 
Polish values”. 
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EU integration, but more importantly about questioning the model 
of liberal democracy and the values embodied in Western Europe, 
perceived by PiS as a danger for “traditional Polish values” (Balcer 
et al., 2016). 
14.4 Consensus and political polarisation – public 
opinion on EU membership and policies 
14.4.1 Attitudes towards EU membership and its 
potential future developments 
Traditionally, Polish public opinion has supported EU membership 
– both before and after accession. This support has remained 
remarkably stable since the electoral 
victory of PiS in 2015, in spite of anti-
EU narratives, which this party has 
employed on a number of issues 
(migration, rule of law) both before 
and after the elections. According to surveys of the Social Opinion 
Research Center (CBOS), the share of Poles who support EU 
membership reached 88% in April 2017, compared to 85% in 
February 2017 and 81% in February 2016 (Roguska, 12.2018: 1). 
Moreover, the supporters of Poland’s membership in the EU 
dominate in all socio-demographic groups and in the electorates of 
all political parties currently enjoying the greatest support. It is even 
popular with 87% of declared voters of both anti-EU political actors 
– the ruling PiS and the Kukiz’15 movement. This finding seems 
contradictory with the stances of both parties on Europe, since both 
political actors endorse policies of opposing the EU and emphasise 
the overriding principle of the sovereignty of nation states. 
However, as explained below, strong pro-EU attitudes in Polish 
society compel them to endorse the continued presence of Poland in 
the EU, while attacking ‘Brussels’ for alleged infringement of 
national sovereignty.  
Thus, support for leaving the EU, promoted by some right-
wing politicians, remains low, if not negligible. If anything, the 
experience of Brexit negotiations seems to discourage possible 
‘Polexit’ proponents further. This was confirmed in IPA own 
research carried out in mid-2018. Asked about the preferred future 
relation between Poland and the EU, the vast majority of 
Polish public opinion has 
supported EU membership in 
spite of anti-EU narratives. 
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respondents supported remaining in the EU (79%). At the same 
time, the largest group of respondents wished to maintain the 
current state of integration (44%). A little over one third of Poles 
supported reforming the Union (35%). Only 4% opted for leaving 
(see Figure 14.1; Łada, 2018: 1). 
Figure 14.1 What should the future of Poland look like in relation to the 
EU? 
 
Source: Institute of Public Affairs 2018. 
 
The continued support for EU membership is grounded in the 
perception of many Poles that their country has benefited from 
membership in the EU on many levels. According to a survey 
conducted on the tenth anniversary of Polish membership in the EU, 
these benefits do not just include freedom of movement (especially 
free flow of labour) and the transfer of EU funds to Poland. 
According to the same poll, most Poles believe that accession to the 
EU has strengthened the country’s international security (72%) and 
Poland’s position in Europe (74%) (Roguska, 2014: 26).  
Such strong support for membership makes it hard for any 
party to advocate leaving the EU and Polexit remains a taboo in the 
mainstream public debate. The conflicts with Brussels over refugee 
quotas and the rule of law prompted the opposition to accuse the 
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governing party of aiming to take Poland out of the EU, a charge 
vehemently denied by PiS politicians. Instead, PiS politicians argue 
that by criticising the government in Warsaw, Brussels is abusing its 
powers and infringes on Polish sovereignty. Consequently, they 
speak of the need to reform the EU by which they mean a 
repatriation of EU powers back to member states, e.g. by giving 
national parliaments the power to veto Brussels legislation. Despite 
the generally positive appraisal of the EU, the “sovereignty instead 
of cooperation” approach of PiS appears to resonate with parts of 
the Polish electorate. IPA original polling conducted in late 2016 
shows that while only 8% of Poles supported leaving the EU, 
another 32% supported staying in and trying to reduce the EU’s 
powers (see details in Table 14.1 below), which is the official policy 
of the PiS government (Kucharczyk et al., 2017: 329). Thus, where 
European matters are concerned, PiS is actively shaping the views 
of its followers, talking tough about the “Brussels elite”, but 
vehemently denying it wants Poland out of the EU. 
Table 14.1 Public opinion on European integration 
Do you think Poland's long-term policy should 
be... 
Total PiS PO 
(1) To leave the European Union 8 13 1 
(2) To stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s 
powers 
32 46 23 
(3) To leave things as they are 21 12 40 
(4) To stay in the EU and try to increase the EU’s 
powers 
14 10 17 
(5) To work for the formation of a single European 
government 
10 6 10 
Don’t know 15 12 8 
‘Eurosceptics’ (answers 1+2) 40 59 24 
‘Euro-enthusiasts’ (answers 4+5) 24 16 27 
Source: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, YouGov polling for Demos/IPA, 
2016/2017. 
 
According to these figures, 40% of Polish citizens (the 8% who want 
to leave the EU and the 32% who want EU powers to be reduced) 
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can be defined as at least to some degree Eurosceptic. As seen in the 
table above, views on the preferred future for the EU are strongly 
correlated with party affiliation, with a slight majority of PiS 
supporters opting for hard or soft Euroscepticism. 
Thus, Polish opinions on the shape of European Union are 
more complex than their recognition of the benefits of European 
integration. However, other studies reveal significant support for 
deeper integration. For example, CBOS 
research indicates that support for this 
idea has somewhat increased under the 
current government. According to data 
from November 2018, almost half of the 
respondents (45%) believe that Europe 
should unite more. At the same time, the conviction that integration 
went too far is expressed by just over one-fifth of respondents (21%), 
the lowest figure since 2009. In comparison to July 2016 data, the 
share of respondents convinced that the integration of Europe has 
already gone too far decreased by 7 percentage points. At the same 
time, the number of those supporting further integration increased 
by 4 percentage points (Roguska, 12.2018: 4).  
The same CBOS study reveals decreasing support for the key 
narrative of the PiS government, namely the need to return more 
competences to nation states. In November 2018, such a statement 
was chosen by just 14% of respondents, while maintaining the status 
quo and deepening integration are each preferred by 35% of the 
respondents. Regarding the different approaches to the future 
shape of the EU that are presented in the discourse of Polish political 
parties (as discussed in previous sections of this chapter), Poles are 
even more diversified in their opinions. Although different studies 
indicate various levels of support for both more Eurosceptic and 
Euro-enthusiastic attitudes towards the future directions of the EU 
(often depending on the precise wording and number of pre-
defined policy choices), all preferences are significantly 
differentiated by political orientation (left-right) and party support. 
The conviction that 
integration went too far is 
expressed by just over one-
fifth of respondents. 
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Although support for the EU is generally considered to be 
fairly stable, diverging tendencies can be observed among younger 
Poles. Young adults (aged 18-24) are nowadays more sceptical 
towards Europe than they were a few years ago. Whereas in 2008, 
support for the EU was the highest in 
this age group (93%, compared to 
88% of the general public) (Roguska, 
04.2008), and in 2012, young Poles 
still favoured the EU more than the 
general population (88%, compared 
to 83%) (Hipsz, 05.2011), the situation has changed with the current 
generation of Poles reaching adulthood. Today’s young Poles seem 
to be less pro-European than the rest of the society. CBOS research 
shows that 79% of Poles aged 18-24 support Poland’s EU 
membership, significantly less than the general population (87%) 
(Roguska, 12.2018: 16). Moreover, it is an age group with the lowest 
support for the EU in Polish society 
According to the 2017 IPA and Bertelsmann Stiftung survey, 
the majority of Polish youth positively assess Poland’s EU 
membership: 76% generally consider membership in the EU a good 
thing, whereas 22% think the opposite. Young people are 
encouraged by the benefits of membership – freedom of movement 
and possibility to work abroad, but also the belief that it maintains 
peace (Kucharczyk, Łada, and Wenerski, 2017: 15-17).  
Young adults (aged 18-24) are 
nowadays more sceptical 
towards the EU than they 
were a few years ago. 
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Figure 14.2 How important for you personally are the following benefits 
of European integration?  
 
Note: Responses of “very important” and “important” are added together (in 
%). Data for Poland compared to results in 6 surveyed countries (Austria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Institute of Public Affairs, 2017. 
 
The same study indicates that young women are more pro-
European than young men. Although young Poles in general see EU 
membership in a positive light, they believe that reforming the EU 
is the most desirable scenario for the future. Almost two-thirds of 
Polish youth (64%) confirm that the best option for Poland is to stay 
in the EU and work to reform it. One-fifth (21%) are ready to remain 
in the EU and leave things as they are, while 15% of young Poles 
would opt to leave the community (Łada and Wenerski, 2017: 122-
123). 
Another IPA study on young Poles’ political attitudes 
indicates their broad identification with Europe (80% of Poles aged 
16-29), although less strong than identification with the Polish 
nation (92%). Identification with Europe is stronger than the 
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identification with the Catholic religion (declared by 74%) or local 
community (chosen by 71%) (Pazderski, 2018: 22-23).  
While the Polish public and its key segments broadly support 
EU membership, the views on preferred future developments are 
varied and strongly dependent on political orientation. At the same 
time, even voters for the ruling PiS do not entirely follow the party 
line in its soft Euroscepticism by rejecting Polexit. Nevertheless, the 
majority of Poles do not see Polexit as a possible scenario and think 
that the voices on the opposition warning that PiS will take the 
country out of the EU are motivated by political expediency (51%) 
rather than genuine concern for Poland’s future in Europe (31%). 
The opinions are strongly connected with party affiliations 
(Roguska, 11.2018).  
14.4.2 Opinions regarding EU policies present in national 
party political discourse 
Despite the large and stable Euro-enthusiasm of Polish society, a 
number of studies show significant sceptical pluralities or majorities 
on some policy issues where the position of the current Polish 
government significantly differs with the official policies and 
opinions of the EU institutions. This concerns the issue of refugee 
relocation and migration in general as well as the alleged violation 
of the European values as defined by Art 2 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (rule of law and democracy) by the PiS 
government. Another, although less politically urgent, issue is the 
adoption of the common European currency, which Poland is 
obliged to do by its EU accession Treaty of 2004 (albeit with no 
particular deadline).  
Migration and accepting refugees 
The scheme for relocating and resettling refugees adopted by the 
EU in the midst of the so-called refugee crisis in autumn 2015 split 
the Polish political scene and society at large at the crucial moment 
of the 2015 parliamentary elections. The outgoing PO government 
reluctantly supported the scheme against the tsunami of anti-
refugee and anti-Brussels rhetoric from both the PiS (already poised 
to win the elections) as well as the anti-establishment Kukiz’15 
movement and a plethora of smaller far-right groups. As a result, in 
262  POLAND’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON EUROPE 
 
the last three years there has been a steep increase in public 
opposition to receiving refugees: from a mere 21% in May 2015 to 
60% in July 2018 (see Figure 14.3). Poles are opposed to the 
relocation of refugees from other European countries more affected 
by the refugee crisis. Only one in five Poles agrees to such a solution 
(see Figure 14.4). Significantly, there is a clear hierarchy of refugees 
from different countries of origin: refugees from Ukraine (perceived 
as culturally close to Poland) are much more welcome than refugees 
from the Middle East and Africa. 32% of those who claim Poland 
should not receive some of the refugees coming to the EU say ‘yes’ 
to receiving Ukrainian refugees (Bożewicz, 07.2018: 7-8).  
Figure 14.3 Dynamics of support for receiving refugees  
 
Source: CBOS 87/2018.  
Note: The question was: “Should Poland accept refugees from countries torn 
by military conflict?” 
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Figure 14.4 Changing support for relocation of refugees  
 
Source: CBOS 87/2018.  
Note: The question was: “Due to considerable inflow of refugees from Middle 
East and Africa some EU member states are not able to deal with this problem. 
Do you think that Poland should accept some of the refugees coming to 
Europe?” 
 
Moreover, Poles are opposed to receiving refugees from Muslim 
countries even under a hypothetical threat of losing part of EU 
funds. Only 16% of Poles agree to receive refugees in order to avoid 
such a threat, while 75% are set against it (ibid.: 1-4).  
Aversion to immigrants and a lack of understanding of their 
role in society are even higher among the youngest Poles. Only a 
quarter of 16-29 year-olds believes that immigrants make a positive 
contribution to their society (70% are of the contrary opinion) 
(Pazderski, 2018: 34-35). They are also unenthusiastic about the role 
played by immigrants. A majority of Poles aged 15-24 (60%) see 
them as a burden to the social welfare system and a threat to public 
safety and security (Łada and Wenerski, 2017: 128-130). 
The data seem even more striking in view of the fact that 
Poland receives very few refugees in any case. In 2017, the total 
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figure of officially recognised refugees was 742 people, and 567 in 
2016.1  
As before, the key division lines regarding the attitudes 
towards refugees and the EU relocation programme are political, 
with supporters of the ruling parties significantly more opposed to 
both than supporters of the opposition parties. The latter also tend 
to see these issues as less politically salient. Although the 
widespread opposition to refugee relocation has not weakened 
public support for EU membership so far, it continues to fuel 
support for political forces using anti-EU rhetoric, not just related to 
migration and refugees, and contributes to the deep political 
polarisation of Polish society. 
EU actions concerning the rule of law and the state of 
democracy in Poland 
Another EU-related issue that definitely resonates within Polish 
society is related to disputes between the Polish government and 
European institutions, which accused Poland of systematic 
violation of democratic values, such as the rule of law. The criticism 
followed the PiS government’s assault against the political 
independence of the Constitutional Tribunal, which it ultimately 
staffed with party loyalists, and later legislation aimed at curbing 
the independence of the judiciary, including the country’s powerful 
Supreme Court. These policies incited widespread and systematic 
social protests and were criticised by a number of international 
organisations, including the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission (Fomina and Kucharczyk, 
2016). The situation in Poland was also a subject of debates in the 
European Parliament. Finally, the European Commission decided 
to trigger the TEU Article 7 procedure against Poland.2 Moreover, 
the EC decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU due 
to the violations of the principle of judicial independence created by 
the new Polish Law on the Supreme Court (case filed on the 24 
September 2018).3 The Polish government consistently rejected EU 
                                                        
1 See https://migracje.gov.pl/statystyki/.  
2 See https://www.dw.com/en/european-commission-triggers-article-7-
against-poland/a-41873962.  
3 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5830_pl.htm.  
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criticism and actions as “interference in the affairs of a Member 
State” and “infringement of sovereignty” and yet gave in and 
modified at least some of the controversial legislation when ordered 
by the CJEU.  
Polish society has remained divided in its response to the 
criticism of the PiS government by international institutions (CoE, 
EC and EP). According to CBOS polling, the percentage of 
respondents who oppose the decision of the European Commission 
to start rule-of-law procedures against Poland more or less equalled 
the number of those who assess it positively (36 vs. 37%) and the 
results were clearly correlated with political preference, with a fairly 
large group of respondents unwilling or unable to form a clear 
opinion on the matter (Roguska, 02.2016).  
So far, there is scarce evidence that criticism from EU 
institutions has significantly changed 
Poles’ attitudes to EU membership or 
trust in EU institutions. Public trust in 
the European Commission, which is 
Poland’s main international critic, 
remained unchanged compared to 
the situation before the elections.4 
Although trust in EU institutions is not very high, it nonetheless 
remains higher than trust in Polish national institutions, the 
government and the parliament. According to IPA research in 2016, 
60% of Poles declared moderate or high levels of trust in the 
European Commission and 59% in the European Parliament, 
whereas just 42% and 38% respectively declared moderate or high 
levels of trust in the Polish government and the Polish Parliament 
(Kucharczyk et al., 2017: 336).  
  
                                                        
4 Eurobarometer, May 2016: 45% trust, 34% do not trust, November 2015 – 
42% trust, 32% do not trust, May 2015 – 46% trust, 27% do not trust. 
Although trust in EU 
institutions is not very high, 
it remains higher than trust 
in Polish national 
institutions. 
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Table 14.2 Public trust towards national and European institutions 
(average score on a 0-10 scale) 
Polish Government 3.31 (low trust) 
Polish Parliament 2.98 (low trust) 
European Parliament 4.45 (medium trust) 
European Commission 4.51 (medium trust) 
Source: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, YouGov polling for DemosDemos/IPA, 
2016/2017. 
 
Later studies also confirmed that, on average, Poles give higher 
ratings to EU institutions than to corresponding national 
institutions. The IPA survey conducted in mid-2018 shows that 
while a majority of Poles positively evaluate the work of European 
Commission and European Parliament (respectively 53% and 56%), 
the numbers are significantly lower in the case of the Polish 
government and Parliament (respectively 37% and 36%). As both 
studies reveal, the differences are enhanced if we take the political 
affiliations of respondents into consideration. Thus, the supporters 
of the opposition both trust and rate EU institutions well above 
average, whereas declared supporters of the ruling PiS party have 
more trust in national institutions and give them a better rating than 
European institutions (Łada 2018: 3). 
Such differences in attitudes to European and national 
authorities are thus clearly influenced by current political debates 
on the quality of democracy in the country. This also seems to be 
confirmed by the figures presenting the levels of trust towards the 
most important institutions of public life in all Visegrad countries 
(V4). What is significant is the difference in trust towards the EU 
institutions in the countries, where the EU is one of the main 
enemies of local populist, ruling political actors, which in the 
meantime implement policies – that in Poland and Hungary are 
recognised by majority of internal and external experts as violating 
the rule of law (see Table 14.3 below). 52% of Poles (58% of 
Hungarians) trust the European Commission and 51% of Poles trust 
the European Parliament (57% of Hungarians) (Penno Hartlová, 
Bútorová, Wessenauer and Pazderski, 2018: 28). In a similar vein, in 
both countries, the perception of non-governmental non-profit 
organisations is visibly better than in the rest of the V4. Almost 60% 
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of Poles and 58% of Hungarians declare having trust towards NGOs. 
This seems especially important given the fact that in both countries, 
inhabitants were exposed to smear campaigns defaming part of the 
non-governmental sector and other activities aiming to undo the 
bonds rooting NGOs in the society (Pazderski, 2017: 181). It appears 
that official propaganda against EU institutions (and domestic 
NGOs) may paradoxically enhance public trust in such institutions 
among opponents of the government, while it diminishes trust 
among government supporters, thus leading to deeper social 
polarisation. 
Table 14.3 Levels of trust/distrust in public institutions compared for the 
V4 area  
 
Levels of trust/distrust in public 
institutions (average) 
V4 Czech Rep. 
Slova-
kia Poland 
Hun-
gary 
Fireman 1.36 1.31 1.35 1.39 1.39 
Police 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.3 2.4 
Local authorities in your 
village/town 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 
Non-governmental 
organisations 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.4 
President 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 
Courts 2.7 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.6 
Public media (radio & TV) 2.7 2.5 2.3 3.0 3.0 
European Commission 2.7 3.2 2.9 2.4 2.3 
European Parliament 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.4 
Church 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Government 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 
Parliament 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 
Political parties 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 
Note: Average results; scale: 1 – greatest trust, …, 4 – greatest distrust. 
Source: Civic participation in the Visegrad countries, 2017 & 2018, 
STEM/IVO/Political Capital/IPA. 
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Poland’s membership of the European Monetary Union 
The adoption of the European common currency is opposed by 71% 
of adult Poles and supported by only 22% of respondents. 
Acceptance of adopting the euro in Poland was the strongest in the 
pre-accession period and peaked again around the time of 
Slovakia’s accession to the euro area in 2009 (at that time 52-53% of 
Poles supported it). The public turned against the euro in the wake 
of the Greek financial crisis and the prevailing political narrative 
became for Poland to wait until the “Eurozone is fixed”. Ever since 
that time, a majority of Poles has remained in opposition to 
adopting the euro, with this opposition prevailing across all 
analysed socio-demographic groups (Roguska, 12.2018: 5-6).  
Figure 14.5 The zloty or the euro?  
 
Note: Question: Would you agree to replace the Polish currency (zloty) with the 
currency common to many EU countries – the euro? Only positive answers 
presented, in %.    Source: CBOS 166/2018.  
Since the PiS government came to power in 2015, political discourse 
in Poland has started to change, with opposition parties 
increasingly articulating the disadvantages of Poland’s staying out 
of the euro area. Opposition politicians and numerous experts 
regularly issue warnings that such a policy will lead to Poland’s 
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exclusion from the crucial part of the integration process and 
relegation to the position of ‘second class membership’. This has so 
far failed to change the negative views of the majority. Nevertheless, 
research indicates that attitudes to the introduction of the common 
European currency in Poland are most strongly differentiated by 
political orientation rather than by other factors.  
14.4.3 Attitudes towards EU policy issues among 
political party electorates 
It is clear that Polish attitudes to the EU may further evolve as a 
result of the deep political polarisation in society. The already-
mentioned research conducted in 
the Visegrad countries also shows an 
interesting influence of public 
debates on people’s perception of 
the most important democratic 
institutions in Poland. Thus, there is 
a correlation between the level of 
distrust towards particular public 
institutions and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the current 
political situation in Poland. People dissatisfied with it also declare 
greater distrust towards all central authorities (parliament, 
government and the president), church, public media, political 
parties and even the police. On the other hand, distrust towards the 
European Commission and Parliament is much higher amongst 
people who are satisfied with the current political situation. The 
same group of respondents distrust slightly more their local 
authorities and (very slightly) the courts (see Figure 14.6). Such 
features might be one of the factors of the pronounced division 
within Polish society and might be a sign of the influence of the 
public debates inspired by the main political actors. 
There is a correlation 
between the level of distrust 
towards particular public 
institutions and satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with the 
current political situation. 
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Figure 14.6 Levels of distrust towards public institutions correlated with 
satisfaction with political life in Poland 
 
Note: Average answers and figures are provided for people dissatisfied with 
thepolitical situation (scale: 1 – I definitely trust; …; 4 - I definitely do not trust). 
Source: Civic participation in the Visegrad countries, 2017 & 2018, 
STEM/IVO/Political Capital/IPA. 
 
However, political discourse and political affiliations strongly 
influence people’s opinions on several EU-related policy issues. In 
comparison to 40% of all Polish citizens who could be identified as 
Eurosceptic (hard or soft), they make up the majority of the PiS 
electorate (59%) (Kucharczyk, J. et al., 2017: 330). At the same time, 
they constitute only 22% of PO voters. In another poll from October 
2015, the IPA obtained similar results: one third felt that the EU’s 
competences should be reduced (51% of PiS supporters and 26% of 
PO voters) (ibid.). Looking at these results, one can assume that the 
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PiS sovereignty narrative has been accepted by a majority of their 
supporters. 
Not just party affiliations, but also the respondent’s political 
self-identification (left, centre or right) is strongly connected with 
attitudes towards European integration. Further integration of 
Europe is supported by two-thirds of respondents identifying 
themselves with the left (66%), 50% placing their political views in 
the centre and just two-fifths (37%) supporters of the right, among 
whom a relatively large group (31%) inclines to the opinion that the 
unification of Europe has already gone too far (Roguska, 12.2018: 3).  
Opponents of joining the euro prevail in the electorates of 
most important political actors. But the level of support for adopting 
the common currency differs depending on the respondent’s 
political affiliation. While among PO voters the group of euro 
supporters is only slightly smaller than its opponents, people 
rejecting the euro constitute a huge majority in the PiS electorate 
(see Table 14.4; ibid.: 6-7). 
Table 14.4 Would you agree to replace the Polish currency (zloty) with 
the currency common to many EU countries - the euro? (in %) 
Potential electorates* Yes No Hard to say 
PO (Civic Platform) 43 47 10 
SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) 37 49 14 
PSL (Polish People's Party) 35 62 3 
Kukiz’15 23 76 1 
PiS (Law and Justice, with its allies) 8 87 5 
*Based on the voting declaration in possible parliamentary elections 
Source: CBOS 166/2018. 
 
Therefore, despite consistent and broad support for European 
integration and Poland’s EU membership, there are significant 
political divisions within Polish society as regards both the future 
of European integration as well as Poland’s place in the EU. Hard 
and especially soft Eurosceptics are strongly represented in the 
electorates of right-wing political actors, including the ruling PiS 
and Kukiz’15 movement. There are also certain specific policy 
issues in which a significant part of Polish public opinion is at odds 
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with the EU. This refers to the migration/refugees protection policy, 
especially linked with the threat to public security, as well as 
disputes over how democratic values are understood, related to the 
ruling party sovereignty discourse. Both issues may be used to 
deepen the polarisation of Polish society in its attitude towards 
European integration. 
Conclusions 
1989 changed the path of Poland’s history, driving the country 
towards Western Europe-style liberal democracy and the free 
market model. The major transformational effort on the country has 
led to it achieving its major goals in security and foreign policy: 
membership of NATO and the European Union. However, since 
2015, the values and cornerstones of Poland’s European policy have 
been put in question with the Law and Justice party following 
Hungary’s trajectory towards illiberalism. The potential success of 
PiS in the parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn 2019 
would most likely reinforce current majoritarian tendencies in 
Poland and further undermine the representativeness of the Polish 
political system. PiS is likely to follow the path of majoritarian 
democracy, which would automatically contribute to the 
reinforcement of political tensions and polarisation within Polish 
society. PiS practices, for instance seizing control over institutions 
such as the Constitutional Tribunal with the objective of preserving 
its influence on Polish society and its political system, could 
undermine both the societal and legal foundations of Poland’s 
membership of the European Union. The 2019 European and 
parliamentary elections in Poland will therefore have consequences 
far beyond a standard political struggle for power and shape 
Poland’s European future for many years to come. 
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15. THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN ROMANIA 
MIHAI SEBE, BOGDAN MUREȘAN & ELIZA VAȘ 
Romania has experienced a gradual ‘Europeanisation’ of its representative 
democracy model since joining the European Union. We therefore focused 
our research on describing the changes since 2007 in Romania and 
analysing the EU dimension of the national parliament and the 
relationship between EU politics and national representatives. Among our 
findings are that EU subjects are a key component of the parliamentary 
agenda, but they are still treated as second- or third-order issues, classed 
as ‘foreign affairs’ issues rather than internal or national ones. We also 
noted the absence of Eurosceptic mainstream parties in Romania’s political 
landscape. 
Introduction 
Romania’s representative democracy model has evolved since the 
country joined the European Union in 2007. Starting with the legal 
provisions that govern the relationship between the executive 
power and the legislative branch in the field of European affairs, we 
have seen changes in the parliamentary debate both internally and 
at the European level. By following what is happening in the EU 
legislation and acting in accordance with the ‘competences’ taken 
on, the national parliament has become a source of expertise 
(through its EU affairs committees) and an open forum for debate 
on European issues.  
15.1 The post-2007 national context 
Romania’s integration into the European Union brought with it a 
much-needed constitutional reform in 2003. Law no. 429/2003 on 
the revision of the Constitution of Romania established the 
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appropriate constitutional framework and the legal grounds for 
Romania’s envisioned Euro-Atlantic integration. It harmonised 
provisions with the main regulations of the European Union and 
underlined the right of Romanian citizens to elect and be elected to 
the European Parliament (Constitution of Romania). 
Romania is a semi-presidential republic whose president is 
elected by universal suffrage and has important powers; 
complementary to this role are the prime minister and ministers 
who have executive and governmental power and can remain in 
office as long as parliament does not oppose them. There is an 
indirect (representative) democracy model in which people control 
the government through elected political representatives. All 
citizens elect their representatives on a regular basis (e.g. every four 
years for parliamentary elections). 
In accordance with constitutional provisions, the president 
represents the Romanian state and is the safeguard of the nation’s 
independence, unity and the territorial integrity. The prime minister 
steers the government’s actions and coordinates the activities of its 
cabinet, while Parliament is the supreme representative body of the 
Romanian people and the sole legislative authority of the country, 
consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 
This semi-presidential government is reflected in the fact that 
the president appoints a candidate for the prime minister office, as 
a result of consultations with the party having obtained absolute 
majority in the Parliament, or if not the case, with the parties 
represented in Parliament. In this situation, the parties seek to form 
a governing coalition.  
A characteristic of Romania’s electoral system, from the 2008 
legislative elections on, is that no political party has achieved a 
majority in Parliament, so all governments have been coalition-
based. According to the Freedom House reports, Romania’s 
multiparty system has ensured regular rotations of power, while 
civil and political liberties are generally respected (Freedom House, 
2018).  
The only exception to the coalition-based government was 
Dacian Cioloș’s cabinet (November 2016 – January 2017), appointed 
in the aftermath of the Colectiv nightclub fire and the subsequent 
protests that led to the resignation of the socialist Victor Ponta’s 
cabinet. No member of the Cioloș cabinet was politically affiliated, 
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making it the first entirely politically independent cabinet in 
Romanian history, composed only of technocrats. Yet expected 
risks, such as selective parliamentary support or the government’s 
failure to adopt projects and policies endorsed by parliament were 
real. Furthermore, the timeframe 
proved to be beneficial for the Socialists 
& Democrats, who had enough time to 
re-form and win the 2016 
parliamentary elections (Sebe, 2016). 
Another specificity of Romania’s 
political system is the absence of mainstream Eurosceptic parties. 
Neither the members of the national Parliament, nor the 
representatives elected for the European Parliament were declared 
Eurosceptics: 
the good thing as regards the Romanian attitude towards 
the European Parliament elections is just the lack of 
interest for populist themes with a European impact. We 
are still dealing with a very parochial debate, where the 
accent is put mainly on domestic and local issues that 
don’t have a European impact. (Sebe, 2014).  
This observation also stands for the 2019 European Parliament 
elections as the lessons of Brexit debate show that any such stance 
(e.g., a RO-Exit political platform) is a recipe for political failure. 
What has changed in the meantime is that, unlike the 2014 
campaign, political discourse is more critical of the EU, notably on 
issues such as rule of law; Brussels’ ‘interference’ with the national 
judicial system; the accusation of ‘double standards’, and so on. Yet 
despite these issues, we can say that the above-mentioned 
observation still stands: no mainstream party promotes itself as 
having an openly Eurosceptic agenda. 
15.2 The EU dimension of the national parliament 
As with any democratic system, the European Union in its post-
Lisbon form promotes formal equality among citizens regardless of 
their country of origin, benefiting from the same rights and equal 
treatment by EU institutions and specialised bodies. National 
parliaments, which are the ultimate expression of the national 
sovereignty of European citizens (a notion introduced by the Treaty 
on European Union) are now more actively engaged in defining and 
A specificity of Romania’s 
political system is the 
absence of mainstream 
Eurosceptic parties. 
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running the Union than ever before, through their enhanced role in 
the decision-making process, especially when it comes to legislation 
where the EU does not have exclusive competence and the principle 
of subsidiarity applies. This marks an increase in the 
representativeness of national parliaments in the Union’s activities 
and of the democratic control of its citizens (Treaty on European 
Union, 1992). 
15.2.1 Overview of the legal provisions 
Law no. 373/2013, the Act on cooperation between the Parliament and the 
Government in the field of European affairs sets out the obligation of the 
government to notify the Parliament on all matters concerning 
legislative acts, as follows:  
The Government shall forward without delay to the two 
Chambers of the Parliament the draft legislative acts of the 
European Union featuring on the Council’s agenda, along 
with accompanying documents. (Article 5) 
At the beginning of every rotating Presidency of the 
Council, the Government shall submit the following 
documents to the two Chambers of Parliament: a) the 
programme and priorities of the respective Presidency; b) 
the list of general mandates to be defined, for remarks and 
proposals. (Article 7) 
The Government shall regularly submit the following 
documents to the two Chambers of Parliament: a) 
information note on the results of participation in the 
European Council; b) regular reports on activities carried 
out and the results of Romania’s participation in the 
decision-making process of the European Union, at 
Council level; c) bi-annual reports on the fulfilment of 
obligations to transpose EU legislation into national law. 
(Article 8). 
Therefore, while the Parliament must be notified on a regular basis, 
it also has the right to request any relevant document on EU affairs, 
if needed. Moreover, “within 10 working days prior to the meeting 
of the European Council, the Government shall present to the two 
Chambers of Parliament the proposal for mandate which the 
delegation of Romania aims to put forward.” (Article 18). The 
Parliament also plays an important role with regards to the persons 
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appointed or named by the government to hold offices in the 
European Union institutions:  
(1) The Government shall notify the Parliament of 
Romania about the appointment of persons to hold offices 
in the European Union institutions. (2) The responsible 
standing committees of the Parliament shall hear the 
person appointed by the Government to hold the office of 
member of the European Commission. (Article 19) 
15.2.2 The parliamentary debate 
Just by looking at the legal provisions, we can see that EU affairs 
have their own place on the parliamentary agenda. However, 
sometimes the political discourse does not reflect this well enough. 
There are differences in how EU 
affairs are promoted and the actual 
work in plenary sessions, 
parliamentary committees and all the 
related structures. For the average citizen watching the news, only 
information about national legislation gets prime-time coverage, 
while European issues are of second or even third order.  
As an indication of the nature of parliamentary debate about 
European issues, a data search using the keyword ‘European’ on the 
official website of the Chamber of Deputies (2019) returned 301 
records corresponding to 93 plenary debates from 2016 to present. 
A statement delivered in the sittings of the Chamber of Deputies on 
6 February 2019 addresses the close cooperation that should be 
pursued with the high representatives of the European institutions 
so that Romania might promote its vision on the future of Europe. 
Another three statements delivered in the sittings of the Chamber 
of Deputies on 19 December 2018 focused on solidarity and equal 
treatment for Romanians and Romania in the European Union; 
agriculture in the Netherlands is cited as an example for the 
European Union; and there is the European Parliament’s 
recommendation in favour of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to 
the Schengen area.  
15.2.3 How EU issues are mobilised 
To see how EU issues are deployed in a formal framework, we 
analysed the Annex to the 27th Bi-annual Report of COSAC, 
European issues are of second 
or even third order. 
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showcasing official written positions on the topic and how EU 
related-work is ‘mobilised’ in the domestic arena, namely the two 
chambers of the Romanian Parliament.  
First, we will look how the Chamber of Deputies proceeds in 
this specific field:  
• The EU proposals selected for parliamentary examination by 
the European Affairs Committee are submitted to the 
European Affairs Committee and the relevant sectoral 
committees. Then, sectoral committees pass on their 
opinion/reasoned opinion to the European Affairs 
Committee. The Committee is then charged with adopting its 
own opinion by taking or not taking into consideration the 
opinions of the sectoral committees. The latter is then subject 
to debate and adopted by MPs in the Chamber’s sittings;  
• In terms of the relationship between the Chamber and the 
national government regarding the scrutiny of EU proposals, 
the latter sends explanatory memoranda outlining its position 
on selected EU proposals to the Chamber;  
• Scrutiny of the government’s position on EU proposals by the 
European Affairs Committee or any other relevant sectoral 
committee happens on a weekly basis;  
• As for the tools the Chamber uses to monitor or scrutinise the 
government on the implementation of EU law, members may 
table a debate in the plenary or in the relevant committee;  
• Answers to the question “How could national parliaments 
further promote the European project?” focused on: a more 
effective scrutiny process throughout the legislative process; 
developing a set of instruments to support the Union, such as 
issue political documents in favour of the EU or react to 
actions against EU, engage in related debates at national and 
EU level, ensure access to information for citizens and swiftly 
counter fake news or anti-EU actions, collect citizens’ requests 
regarding EU politics/policies and transpose them into 
legislation or political action, combat anti-EU trends in the 
country and especially populist movements.  
Second, if we look at the answers related to the Romanian Senate, a 
couple of things are worth mentioning:  
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• As regards the relationship between the Senate and the 
national government with regard to scrutiny of EU proposals, 
the government needs a parliamentary mandate before taking 
a position in the Council. Moreover, it should brief the 
Parliament before taking any step; 
• Answers to the question “How could national Parliaments 
further promote the European project?” focused on: discussing 
the impact of the four freedoms on national economies; 
running impact assessments on legislative packages, 
specifically keeping in mind the four freedoms; proposing 
ways in which the European Commission and other 
European institutions ensure the observance of the four 
freedoms; discuss how national parliaments could secure and 
promote the development of the four freedoms during 
COSAC meetings.  
15.2.4 How scrutiny works in the Chamber of Deputies 
and in the Romanian Senate 
According to the Act on Cooperation between the Parliament and 
the Government in the field of European affairs, both the Romanian 
Chamber of Deputies and the Romanian Senate scrutinise the 
annual work programme of the European Commission with the 
purpose of identifying a list of draft European acts that will be 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny procedure during that year.  
According to the above-mentioned pieces of legislation, the 
EU Division delivers the necessary expertise to all bodies of the 
Chamber involved in the process. Since its creation, back in 2009, 
through its subdivisions it provides professional expertise (i.e. 
background notes, documentation, syntheses, analyses and studies) 
in the field of European policies and legislation. Starting in April 
2011, the main recipients became the selected Committees, and the 
European Affairs Committee of the Chamber, involved with either 
the scrutiny process of the EU acts taking place within the Chamber, 
or the domestic legislative procedure on the European directives to 
be implemented in the national legal framework, as well as the 
parliamentary delegations attending parliamentary events on EU 
matters. All in all, the Division offers support and information to 
the MPs exercising their participatory rights in the parliamentary 
deliberations on EU matters. 
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In order to analyse the scrutiny process, we searched the 
Chamber of Deputies’ website to see which topics were scrutinised 
and assessed in the past year.  
The official website presents 48 EU official documents on 
various subjects corresponding to the work programme of the 
Commission.  
Among these, we can mention: circular economy, working 
conditions in the EU, impact of EU research and innovation, 
completion of the Capital Markets Union, access to social protection 
for workers and the self-employed, FinTech Action Plan, European 
Agenda on Migration, digital transformation of healthcare in the 
Digital Single Market, Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-
2027, artificial intelligence, EU Enlargement Policy, role of youth, 
education and cultural policies.  
Almost all documents (43 out of 48) were completed by the 
beginning of February 2019 (Figure 15.1), leaving five other non-
legislative documents open for scrutiny. The remaining topics refer 
to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the European 
Union framework on endocrine disruptors, the single market and 
the European strategic long-term vision for a climate neutral 
economy, and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Figure 15.1 Number of EU documents submitted to scrutiny – Chamber 
of Deputies, Romanian Parliament 
 
Source: Own calculus, based upon the data publicly available on the Chamber 
of Deputies website. 
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A similar process takes place in the Senate to scrutinise documents 
from the European Union and monitor compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity (Table 15.1). 
Table 15.1 Scrutiny applied by the Romanian Senate 
Stage Time frame Type of action 
1 President of the Romanian Senate 
 After the 
Standing 
Bureau’s session 
The President informs the competent 
committees in order to scrutinise the 
legislative acts 
2 Competent committee 
 Within approx. 4 
weeks 
Discusses and adopts a decision regarding 
the compliance of the draft legislative act 
with the principle of subsidiarity  
The Committee on European Affairs is 
always asked for an opinion on legislative 
acts 
3 Senate Assembly in plenary meeting 
 End of the 
procedure 
(within one to 
two weeks 
depending on 
plenary sessions) 
If the decision complies with the principle 
of subsidiarity, the competent committee 
forwards it to the Senate Assembly for tacit 
adoption.  
The decision shall be placed on the first 
next agenda of the Senate Assembly. 
4 Transmission by the Commission or the Council 
to Romanian Senate 
Received by the European Affairs Division 
of the Romanian Senate 
 Day 1 Transmission of the legislative proposal by 
the Commission or the Council with “lettre 
de saisine” 
5 European Affairs Division 
 Within approx. 
one week 
The EU documents (legislative acts 
pursuant to Article 4 of Protocol N° 2 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) 
are proposed for referral to one or more 
committees. The proposal sets out which 
286  THE EUROPEANISATION OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN ROMANIA 
 
committees should be involved and the 
deadlines for each committee’s 
deliberation. 
6 Standing Bureau 
 The first next 
meeting after 
“direct 
transmission” of 
the EU 
legislative 
proposal 
The proposal for referral drawn up by the 
European Affairs Division is approved by 
the Standing Bureau 
7 Senate Assembly in plenary meeting 
  If the decision is an Opinion or a Reasoned 
Opinion, the committee forwards it to the 
Senate Assembly for debates and votes on 
the proposal and eventual amendments. 
If the decision complies with the principle 
of subsidiarity but there are some remarks 
made by the competent committee, the 
committee adopts an Opinion. 
If an infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity is established (by the 
competent committee), the committee 
adopts a Reasoned Opinion. 
8 President of the Romanian Senate 
 End of the 
procedure 
(within one or 
two weeks, 
depending on 
the plenary) 
The President of the Romanian Senate 
sends the Opinion of the Senate to the 
European Institutions (European 
Commission, European Parliament, 
Council of the European Union) 
The President of the Romanian Senate 
sends the Reasoned Opinion to the 
European Institutions (European 
Commission, European Parliament, 
Council of the European Union) 
Source: Own table based upon the data publicly available on the IPEX website. 
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15.3 Relationship between EU politics and national 
representatives 
15.3.1 Influence of EU politics on political realities at 
national level  
Currently, Romania is represented by 32 MEPs, the majority of them 
being members of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D, 14) and the European People’s Party (EPP, 13) 
groups in the European Parliament. In terms of national parties, the 
best represented are the Social Democratic Party (PSD, left-wing, 13) 
and the National Liberal Party (PNL, right-wing, 8), while eight 
MEPs are independent or non-affiliated. The turnout for Romania 
in the 2014 European elections was 32.44% (an increase from the 
27.67% which went to the ballot box in 2009).  
All PSD MEPs are part of S&D and all PNL MEPs are 
members of EPP, which shows that on a European level the 
proverbial left-right divide across the Romanian political spectrum 
is driven by seemingly common interests and converging political 
ideas. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, although the left-right 
divide may be described as a division between social identities 
based on race, class, gender or region, it is far from being a fierce 
struggle between contrasting political creeds, either inside the EP or 
in Romania. 
As a symbol of how European and national politics are 
intertwined, in March 2019 Manfred Weber, the EPP’s lead 
candidate for the President of the European Commission, was in 
Bucharest to publicly express his support for PNL’s list of 
candidates and to launch his bid as head of the next EC (Calea 
Europeană, 2019).  
It is worth mentioning that the May 2014 EU election saw the 
lowest voter turnout (42.61%) since 1979, when such elections were 
held for the first time. Turnout is seen as a litmus test for the 
Parliament’s democratic legitimacy, but it has constantly fallen, 
from 62% in 1979 to 43% in the 2009 election (European Parliament, 
2014). And, with recent developments hinting at broader trends of 
political fragmentation and volatility across the continent, 
disinformation campaigns both from within and outside the EU, 
and an overall inward-looking sentiment present in most member 
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states, there seems to be little chance of reducing the ‘democratic 
deficit’. 
According to a snap assessment of the situation at the 
beginning of the 2017 autumn season, Ioan Mircea Pașcu (PSD), 
member of the S&D, was the most influential Romanian MEP at the 
time (Vote Watch, 2017). However, in a move that sparked 
controversy, Pașcu, who at the time of writing is one of the Vice-
Presidents of the European Parliament, was excluded from his 
party’s list for the 2019 EP elections. Referring to the VoteWatch 
assessment, he was followed by Adina-Ioana Vălean (PNL) and 
Siegfried Mureșan (PNL), both members of EPP. Siegfried Mureșan, 
Vice-Chair of the Parliament's Budgets Committee, also features 
high in Politico’s list of 19 “key Romanians you need to know from 
Brussels”, in the context of Romania’s EU Council Presidency, 
published in January 2019 (Politico, 2019). The fellow MEPs Marian 
Jean-Marinescu (PNL/EPP) and Cristian-Silviu Bușoi (PNL/EPP), 
joined him in the first batch of MEPs Romania sent to Brussels after 
its accession to the EU in 2007. 
An interesting fact about the dynamics of alliances among 
national parties at the European level and the increased importance 
of transnational political networks may be observed in the debate 
on the rule of law in EU countries. Mainstream political groups have 
a strong incentive to protect their political family members from 
Brussels’ criticism, and a track record 
of doing so (Verfassungsblog, 2019). 
For example, while the S&D has been 
very vocal in criticising the 
Hungarian (EPP, Fidesz) and the 
Polish (ECR, PiS) government’s 
actions, it adopted a softer tone when 
it came to the Romanian and Maltese 
governments (Social Democratic) faced with similar accusations. 
The Romanian ruling party, the PSD has been subject to various 
forms of criticism from Brussels for its reforms of the Romanian 
legal system and its anti-corruption legislation, prompting MEPs to 
urge the Romanian government to do more to promote European 
values by being more consistent. As such, in November 2018, no 
pro-PSD alliance seemed to matter when the European Parliament 
The Romanian ruling party, 
the PSD has been subject to 
criticism from Brussels for 
its reforms of the Romanian 
legal system and its anti-
corruption legislation. 
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passed a non-legislative resolution on the rule of law in Romania, 
declaring itself  
deeply concerned with the revision of the judicial and 
criminal legislation in Romania, especially because of the 
possibility that it could lead to the structural undermining 
of the independence of the judicial system and the latter's 
capacity to efficiently fight corruption in Romania, as well 
as to the weakening of the rule of law. (European 
Parliament, 2018) 
In a common statement earlier that year, Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker and First Vice-President Frans Timmermans 
voiced their concern about developments in Romania “regarding 
the independence of Romania’s judicial system and its capacity to 
fight corruption” (European Commission, 2018). On a similar note, 
the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, in an opinion adopted 
in October 2018, expressed its grave concern about draft 
amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure 
Code in Romania, which it felt had the potential to seriously weaken 
the effectiveness of the country’s 
criminal justice system to fight 
corruption offences (Venice 
Commission, 2018). 
For this reason, in recent years, 
civic movements have focused on the 
perceived threats concerning the fight 
against corruption. In February 2017, 
nearly half a million citizens took to 
the streets, all over the country, to express their discontent at the 
passage of an emergency decree to decriminalise several low-level 
corruption offences. It is worth noting that, unlike in other member 
states plagued by populism and anti-systemic Euroscepticism, 
Romania’s protest movements have so far not challenged the very 
foundations of the political system, including the basic principles of 
representative democracy. Nevertheless, they did challenge the 
alleged attempts of the governing majority to modify the criminal 
legislation without an open dialogue with all relevant stakeholders. 
There, it was not about protests against the institutional framework 
per se, but against specific parties and politicians.  
In February 2017, nearly half 
a million citizens took to the 
streets to express their 
discontent at the passage of 
an emergency decree to 
decriminalise several low-
level corruption offences. 
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15.3.2 Influence of national parliamentary work on EU 
political realities 
Within the Early Warning System procedure, we observed that the 
Romanian Parliament has used and politicised the public debate 
concerning the ‘yellow card’ procedure in 2016, namely in the case 
of the Posted Workers Proposal on the grounds of conflict with the 
right to subsidiarity. The main focus of criticism the proposal’s 
principle of equal pay for equal work, which would apply to posted 
and local workers. Romania and other opposing member states 
believed this impinged on national jurisdiction in setting wage 
levels, and wanted the text to be withdrawn (Eurofound, 2016). 
The proposed directive was one of the most debated in the 
recent years within the Romanian Parliament, the European Affairs 
Committee within the Chamber of Deputies, which made it its 
‘flagship’ case throughout 2016, a year that was also marked by 
national parliamentary elections. 
It was also a high-level media case that gained traction not 
only in the political sphere but also among an ad hoc coalition of 
trade unions and other interest groups that ran intensive advocacy 
campaigns both at the national and European level, either being for 
or against the directive. 
A rare unanimous vote was also registered in the Chamber of 
Deputies on this occasion, on 13 April 2016, in favour of the negative 
Opinion issued, which was later sent to the Romanian government 
(Chamber of Deputies, 2016). Following the feedback of the 
European Commission, which disregarded this position, the then 
head of the European Affairs Committee of the Chamber of 
Deputies, Ms Ana Birchall, put forward an even more proactive 
proposal on this issue than before; namely, to sign a common letter 
(by the parliaments that were opposing) to send to the European 
Commission. 
This was coupled with an active campaign by the Romanian 
Parliament along with other member states to secure a blocking 
minority. In the words of Ms Birchall, “we, in the Parliament, we 
have done our duty as we were supposed to do and drawn attention 
to the dangers concerning the EU’s fundamental principles” 
(Birchall, 2016). 
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Another, earlier use of the yellow card procedure was in 2013 
when the Chamber of Deputies used it against the European 
Commission’s proposal on the establishment of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘EPPO proposal’). The Reasoned 
Opinion argued that criminal investigations and prosecutions are a 
matter of national sovereignty and EPPO would limit the national 
competence,  
…believes that, as a fraud is committed at national or local 
level, fighting appropriately against this fraud depends 
mainly on measures taken at these levels; in this 
framework, the exclusive competence of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office in investigating, prosecuting, 
and bringing to judgment the perpetrators of offences 
against the Union’s financial interests and ancillary 
competence of prosecuting linked offences rise 
uncertainties concerning the compliance with the 
principle of legal certainty as this competence is not 
subject to any review. (Chamber of Deputies, 2013) 
This is not a common procedure for Romania as the general 
perception issued from national reports was that “the European 
Union integration led to the relativization of the national 
sovereignty”. The same study recommended in 2016 the creation of 
a ‘late card’ through  
which national parliaments would keep control even after 
the closure of the European legislative procedure, as 
currently they only control the European Commission’s 
proposal and not the result of the negotiations. The 
rationale of such a card resides in that, following 
negotiations, a new modified text is born, compared to 
that examined by national parliaments, and the latter is no 
longer presented to them in its final form. (Chamber of 
Deputies, 2016) 
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Figure 15.2 Reasoned opinions regarding compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle sent to the European Commission by the Romanian 
Parliament 
 
Source: Own calculus based upon Subsidiarity and Proportionality – Annual 
reports on Better law-making (European Commission, 2017). 
 
The Romanian Senate also proved to be an active stakeholder in this 
process. Although this might not seem obvious from just looking at 
the official website, the Romanian Senate ranked among the top ten 
of the 41 parliamentary chambers that submitted the highest 
number of opinions in 2016 and was also considered to be one of the 
most active in 2017.  
Ms Gabriela Creţu, Chair of the European Affairs Committee, 
stressed in this context that "the record does not consist of the 
number of opinions sent, but in the constant effort to define our 
interest here in the country for each field. Transmitting to the 
European institutions is only the final step. Sometimes we like to 
cultivate our frustrations and complain that we have no voice in the 
Union. The work of the European Affairs Commission - together 
with the specialized committees involved - wants to say something 
else. To be heard, you have to talk! We will do this further, 
especially since the parliamentary dimension of the Romanian 
Presidency also offers us the microphone to talk to and to make us 
heard. " (Creţu, 2018) 
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Figure 15.3 Projects of EU legislation under subsidiarity control at the 
Romanian Senate 
 
Source: Own calculus, based upon the data publicly available on the Romanian 
Senate website. 
 
Conclusions 
The chapter offers an overview of how the Romanian representative 
democracy model was Europeanised after 2007. We structured our 
research along three main areas: the changes in the national context 
after 2007; the EU dimension of the national parliament; and the 
relationship between EU politics and the national representatives 
(Brussels and Bucharest-based).  
First, we considered the legal provisions that govern the 
systems of EU affairs in Romania from a parliamentary point of 
view and concluded that although the parliamentary agenda often 
focuses on debating EU subjects, they are mostly seen as second-
order issues and are not framed in a national perspective. 
Second, we looked at concrete political realities and analysed 
the influence of EU politics on the national representatives based in 
Brussels and on the Bucharest-based MPs. One conclusion deriving 
from the analysis is that in Romania we did not have any 
Eurosceptic party currently winning elections and, while being in 
office, challenging the core values of the EU and the democratic 
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foundation of our state. And, as the latest Standard Eurobarometer 
confirms, Romanians are among the most Europhile citizens in the 
EU.  
With all this in mind, there are still important challenges 
characterising the political spectrum that define Romania as a 
flawed democracy (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit Limited, 2019). The 
passing in Parliament of acts 
decriminalising low-level corruption 
offences is a case in point and has 
attracted much public ire. Romania’s 
score for civil liberties also fell as a 
result of the implementation of several laws that have a negative 
impact on the judiciary system. Therefore, considering the 
improvements that have characterised the parliamentary dimension 
(e.g. the professionalisation of the parliamentary committees and 
subsequent structures), there is room for improvement when it 
comes to transparency, civic consultations and democratic 
accountability. 
  
There are still important 
challenges characterising the 
political spectrum that 
define Romania as a flawed 
democracy. 
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16. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN SLOVAKIA: PARTY POLITICS 
DOMINATES 
ANETA VILÁGI & PAVOL BABOŠ 
This chapter looks at Slovakia and assesses how its representative model 
functions and if it interferes with EU dynamics. Formal institutions, such 
as the constitution and other legal norms regulating democratic processes 
in Slovakia, give the parliament supremacy in the system. When it comes 
to EU matters, parliament can direct and legally bind the government and 
its members to certain positions. However, political dynamics and informal 
institutions and practices favour the dominance of political parties, and 
especially the party leadership, over the independence of MPs and the 
parliament in the exercise of their functions. We use multiple sources of 
data, including primary documents, statistical data, and semi-structured 
interviews with representatives from political parties and parliament 
administrative personnel responsible for EU affairs, to develop and support 
our argument. First, we look at the characteristics of political parties in 
Slovakia and institutional arrangements shaping the model of 
representative democracy. Second, we focus on EU affairs and the interplay 
between the national model and the supranational policymaking system.  
Introduction 
Legal institutional arrangements in Slovakia have established a 
representative model of democracy that assumes the dominant 
position of the Slovak parliament within the political system. 
However, whether it effectively enjoys this prerogative depends on 
two factors: (1) parliamentary capabilities to conduct supervision (a 
structural condition) and (2) the distribution of political power 
within parties (a political condition). The latter is particularly 
important as the centralisation of political parties and disciplines of 
party caucuses reduce accountability in practice, because it is the 
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party leadership that controls members of parliament (MPs) both in 
parliament as well as in the government.  
We argue that, due to the 
electoral system and party 
centralisation, the representative 
model in Slovakia favours political 
parties over people in the sense that 
individual MPs are more accountable 
to their respective political party than 
to their constituency as elected 
representatives. This has consequences for the dynamics of the EU.1 
16.1 Democratic representation: the political 
landscape 
Slovakia is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral 
system and a single district encompassing the whole country. In 
practice, this means that citizens vote for political parties in 
parliamentary elections which usually result in coalition 
governments (except for a single-party government between 2012 
and 2016). However, it is not always the electoral winner who can 
form a government. After the elections of 1998, 2002, and 2010, the 
winning party was not a part of the government coalition due to its 
lack of coalition potential.  
Since the formation of an independent Slovakia in 1993, 
several cleavages and issues have shaped political competition. The 
fact that there is a considerable minority of ethnic Hungarians (over 
8% of the population and mostly living in southern Slovakia) has 
led to a stable ethnic cleavage producing several political parties 
representing the Hungarian minority. These parties have even been 
part of numerous government coalitions: Dzurinda I and II (1998–
2006), Radičová I (2010–2012), Fico III (2016–2018), and Pellegrini I 
(since 2018). There have also been rather nationalistic parties 
claiming to represent the national interest and those of ethnic 
Slovaks. Probably the second most influential cleavage was the 
                                                        
1 For the purpose of this study, we conducted interviews with 
representatives of political parties responsible for EU affairs as well as with 
the administrative personnel of the Slovak parliament responsible for the 
corresponding agenda.  
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urban-rural divide (Krivý, 2005; Gyárfášova and Krivý, 2007). In the 
1990s, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar’s party, the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia, drew its support from rural areas. More 
recently, it has been the main coalition party, Direction-Social 
Democracy (Smer-SD), that relies on support from the rural 
electorate.  
In addition to the ethnic and urban-rural divides, there are 
religious and socio-economic cleavages at play in Slovak politics. 
However, they overlap to a considerable extent. Put simply, the 
rural electorate has more religious values and left-leaning economic 
positions, while urban voters are generally more socially liberal and 
economically right-leaning (Hloušek and Kopeček, 2008; Krivý, 
2012; Baboš and Malová, 2015a).  
Structural cleavages have not been the only dominant factors 
shaping the political scene in Slovakia; other issues have been 
crucial both during and between elections. The anti-corruption fight 
and state capture are present in daily politics and have become an 
important part of both parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Some argue that unresolved problems with corruption have led to 
the emergence of a dominant dividing line in Slovak politics that 
relates to “justice in all possible meanings” (Baboš and Malová, 
2018, p. 5). Governments led by Smer-SD have been labelled as 
“corrupt” and responsible for the ruining of public trust in the 
courts and the police, the embezzlement of European structural 
funds, and effective political control of the judicial system.  
In the 1990s, the prospects of European Union membership 
played a role, contributing to the defeat of Vladimir Mečiar in 1998. 
Political parties and society were heavily polarised, with pro-
democratic and pro-European forces on one side and anti-democrats 
and anti-Europeans on the other. After Slovakia was invited to join 
the EU under Dzurinda’s government, 
EU-related matters became much less 
present in public discourse, giving 
way to domestic issues such as 
economic reforms, healthcare, and the 
pension system.  
However, since the global 
financial crisis, the issue of European integration has been slowly 
returning to the national political arena, mostly thanks to members 
Since the global financial 
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of the government highlighting the importance of the EU for 
Slovakia. Following the 2016 parliamentary elections, the Fico III 
government promoted Slovakia’s deeper EU integration with the 
prime minister’s statement that Slovakia needed to be “in the core” 
of the Union. For the opposition, and especially for populist and 
anti-system political parties, taking a different stance on the EU 
from mainstream parties has become a tempting way to mobilise 
voters.   
16.2 The institutional perspective 
Constitutional rules give the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic (NRSR), the supreme legislative body, considerable 
powers to control the government. The 
strongest tool the parliament has at its 
disposal is the procedure of a ‘no 
confidence vote’ against either 
individual ministers or the prime 
minister. It takes only one fifth of MPs 
(30 out of 150) to trigger the procedure, 
and a parliamentary session debating the matter must begin within 
seven days. This power makes government members accountable to 
the parliament. However, even in the case of a successful vote of no 
confidence, the actual end of a (prime) minister’s term in office 
depends on the president’s decision whether to keep that 
government member in office temporarily, especially if this is 
agreed to by the prime minister.  
In addition to the possibility of removing government 
members from office, MPs have two other options to control the 
executive. Firstly, they have the right to send a formal request for 
answers to members of the government, who must reply within 
thirty days. The constitution affords the possibility to debate the 
answer in the parliament and connect this debate with a no 
confidence vote in the government. Secondly, MPs have the right to 
conduct a parliamentary investigation: for instance, by personally 
visiting a ministry or other governmental body and seeking 
documents as well as answers from representatives of the inspected 
bodies. 
In regard to European affairs, the relationship between the 
parliament and government is regulated by Constitutional Act 
Constitutional rules give 
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397/2004 Coll. The European Affairs Committee (EAC) was 
established as a standing committee of the NRSR. The EAC has the 
power to control the government in two ways. The government has 
an obligation to submit drafts of legally binding documents that are 
discussed in European Union bodies. More importantly, the EAC 
has the power to control the government’s positions and bind the 
government (or its members) to a position. This procedure obliges 
the government to submit proposals of positions to the EAC, which 
can either approve the proposal, reject it, or not discuss it at all. In 
the case of approval or no discussion, a member of government is 
bound by his or her original proposal. In the case of rejection, the 
EAC can adopt a different position, which the member of 
government then has to present as the official position. In theory the 
EAC could thus assume the executive role in determining the 
government’s positions and how it votes in the European Council. 
However, in practice, the EAC almost never uses its power to do so. 
During the European Parliament’s eighth term, the EAC exercised 
this power pre-emptively twice, both times in relation to refugee 
relocation quotas. 
Officially, the parliament has rather strong powers to control 
and even steer government positions and policies in European 
affairs. However, given the fact that it is usually a coalition 
government with a majority of MPs in both the parliament and the 
EAC, the powers of parliament remain mostly on paper, whereas 
active policymaking is in the hands of the government. 
16.3 EU affairs in the Slovak Parliament 
As mentioned above, the NRSR has authorised the EAC to execute 
the full scope of competencies related to EU matters (Act 350/1996 
Coll., para. 58a). Besides approvals of binding mandates for 
government members representing the Slovakia in an EU body, the 
committee is also entrusted with additional powers, including 
assessment of the compliance of draft EU legislative acts with the 
principle of subsidiarity and the approval of reasoned positions 
(EWS mechanisms).  
However, in the case of the Slovak parliament, such 
instruments have so far been more theoretical than real. Since the 
beginning of the eighth legislative term (2014 to 2019), the European 
Parliament (EP) has received 370 draft legislative acts, 178 reasoned 
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opinions, and 1,176 contributions (European Parliament, 2018). The 
Slovak parliament has issued three reasoned opinions and eleven 
contributions, out of which two were initiated by the Slovak 
parliament and nine were issued in cooperation with parliaments of 
other member states, mainly as joint contributions by the Visegrad 
Four (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).  
Our research shows that the relatively low intensity of 
parliamentary initiatives in EU affairs (EWS) might be explained by 
institutional factors. As the parliament has stronger formal tools to 
control the government in EU affairs, 
the NRSR has not perceived the 
necessity to raise concerns using EWS 
mechanisms. Constitutionally vested 
powers provide parliamentarians 
with sufficient control over the 
decision-making process in EU 
affairs. If the Slovak Parliament joins 
EWS initiatives, it is to show solidarity with the parliaments of other 
member states rather than to push its own interests forward 
(Interview No. 1).  
Of the three reasoned opinions, two of them raised concerns 
about violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
regarding migration issues (COM 2015/0286 and COM 2016/270),2 
and one concerned the issue of the posting of workers (COM 
2016/0128).3 These positions were adopted by the parliament only 
after the official positions of the government were announced, and 
thus they served as the parliamentary legitimisation of government 
positions rather than initiatives determining government policy. 
Looking at the substance of the reasoned opinions, MPs supported 
                                                        
2 COM 2015/0286: Proposal for a council decision establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece. COM 2016/270: Proposal for a regulation of European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person. 
3 COM 2016/0128: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services. 
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the stances of the Slovak government that went against the EU 
mainstream. As the government had a majority in the parliament 
and EAC, the parliament’s positions were consistent with that of the 
government and provided legal arguments with which government 
representatives could persuade their European partners.    
Another way for national parliaments to influence the EU 
political landscape is to debate and decide on issues of common 
interest in the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs (COSAC). EAC members have been active participants at 
COSAC meetings since 2004. However, this has not drawn any 
serious attention in the media or the public sphere. Due to the 
Slovak presidency of the EU Council, involvement in COSAC 
became more intense and visible in the second half of 2016. Within 
the parliamentary dimension of the presidency of the EU Council, 
the NRSR organised seven (COSAC-related) inter-parliamentary 
conferences and meetings. Most of the political parties we 
interviewed saw little added value in such meetings in terms of their 
influence. Instead, they perceived them as a way for “national MPs 
to experience European politics” (Interview No. 6). After the Slovak 
presidency, COSAC engagement returned to the previous level of 
activity. The EAC members maintained active participation in 
COSAC, but this had a rather low salience among the public or even 
in the Slovak parliament. The official web page of the NRSR is rather 
illustrative of this as the last mention of COSAC refers to the April 
2017 Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments.4 
16.4 The EU’s influence on national politics 
Slovak national politics has been relatively detached from EU 
matters for several years since Slovakia’s accession. EU affairs were 
considered to be international affairs and were at the “periphery of 
interest” of political parties (Gyárfášova, 2014). The only exception 
worth considering was the Christian Democrats’ negative position 
on the possibility of Turkey’s accession. Slovakia voted in line with 
the mainstream in the EU Council. Despite Slovakia having once 
been a somewhat problematic EU candidate, it soon became a loyal 
EU member (Malová, Láštic and Rybář, 2005). 
                                                        
4 Checked on 11 March 2019, available at https://www.nrsr.sk/web/ 
?sid=skpres&lang=en. 
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The declining interest in EU issues at parliamentary level draws 
attention to two aspects. First, institutional arrangements vest 
power to adopt positions on EU affairs solely in the EAC (except for 
national legislative proposals linked to 
EU membership). Unlike other standing 
committees that submit their stances for 
approval at plenary sessions, the EAC has 
the prerogative to adopt the position 
directly on behalf of the NRSR. 
Parliamentary debate on governmental 
positions towards EU affairs or NRSR positions towards EU 
legislative proposals thus takes place in the EAC itself. Second, 
based on our thematic analysis of the parliamentary agenda during 
the current electoral term, legislative proposals linked to EU policies 
constituted 8.4% of all legislative proposals (see Table 16.1). 
National politics therefore predominate in plenary sessions and 
parliamentary debates.  Even if parliamentarians occasionally take 
up EU issues, they do so as national matters with an EU dimension 
rather than in their own right. 
Table 16.1 Legislative proposals in the NRSR from 2016 to 2018 
Legislative 
proposals 
2016 2017 2018 TOTAL 
Domestic issues 275 451 301 1027 
EU-related issues 8 56 35 99 
Other issues 
(international but 
not EU-related) 
5 21 7 33 
TOTAL 288 533 352 1173 
Note: The data for 2018 are current up to October of that year. 
Source: Authors.  
 
Looking at the public debate on EU affairs, two distinctive features are 
present in Slovakia: there is a concentration on the national 
perspective and a predominance of politicians in shaping the 
discourse.  
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A specific national angle on EU matters was clearly visible 
during the last EU migration crisis. Discussion on the EU agenda 
related to migration was reduced to a re-allocation mechanism and 
rejected by Slovak politicians on account of three main concerns. 
First, migrants were seen as a security threat; second, the integration 
of immigrants was not seen as feasible because of significant 
cultural diversity, and, even if immigrants were incorporated into 
society, this posed a threat to Slovak culture and values; and third, 
the majority of immigrants were economic immigrants not in need 
of international protection. The concerns themselves became the 
centre of discussion rather than the re-allocation mechanism itself 
and its necessity from the EU perspective or other aspects of the EC 
migration agenda. Similarly, in the 2011 parliamentary debate on 
the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) connected to the 
Eurozone crisis, the prevailing arguments had focused on the 
internal policy consequences of ESM support or refusal by Slovakia 
rather than the international consequences or subject-related 
arguments (Javorek, 2013). The process of ratification for the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) marked the shift of EU 
matters into national politics. The government linked the EFSF 
ratification with a confidence vote in parliament. Freedom and 
Solidarity (SaS), a Eurosceptic party and part of the coalition 
government, voted down the EFSF and caused the government’s 
downfall. This was the first time an EU-related issue had dominated 
public discourse for a considerable time, but the specifically 
national point of view on this issue was unquestionable.   
Additionally, politicians, and government members in 
particular, are key influencers of EU-related public discourse. The 
largest coalition party usually appoints the minister for foreign and 
European affairs and acts as a successful agenda-setter. This is 
particularly the case when it comes to EU matters that are 
traditionally perceived as the government’s responsibility. Another 
reason is the fact that media attention on the EU is triggered by 
important decisions made by the Council of Ministers or the 
European Council. Executive officials are also responsible for the 
preparation of national positions and their negotiations at the EU 
level. The state administration clearly dominates over the 
parliament in regard to both expertise and personnel in dealing with 
EU affairs (as a consequence of path dependency). As soon as 
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accession negotiations began in 2000, the EC twinning programme 
aimed at strengthening administrative capacity to adopt the acquis 
helped Slovakia build up the EU affairs expertise and capability of 
government bodies. European structural funds targeting the 
increase of public administration efficiency were allocated even 
after the accession of the country to the EU. EU departments were 
established at each ministry, and an EU affairs unit consisting of five 
people was set up in the parliament. They provide administrative 
support and expertise for the parliamentary EAC, which consists of 
fifteen MPs with various professional backgrounds. In terms of the 
expertise and capabilities of personnel, the executive branch and 
civil service clearly overshadow elected representatives and 
parliamentary staff.  
Looking at governmental performance on the EU level, Slovakia 
can be considered to be a loyal member of the Union. According to 
VoteWatch.eu, there were 384 votes in the Council of Ministers 
between July 2014 and December 2018, 
and Slovakia dissented with the 
majority in only nine of these votes.  
Whether as a single-party 
government (2012 to 2016) or in a 
coalition (2016 to 2018), the Slovak 
governments led by social democrats have been rather pro-
European. The Brexit referendum happened just days before 
Slovakia assumed the presidency of the Council, which most likely 
contributed to the fact that Robert Fico as prime minister became a 
promoter of deeper integration with his statement that Slovakia had 
“to be in the core of Europe”. When it came to voting behaviour in 
the Council, the government was never against the mainstream 
European position in any key areas except regarding the asylum 
seeker relocation system.  
On the other hand, Fico and some other members of the 
government were happy to criticise the EU when given the 
opportunity, particularly for applying double standards in various 
areas. In 2017, double standards in food quality became a subject of 
heated national debate. Various producers of food, cosmetics, and 
cleaning products were accused of supplying lower quality 
products for higher prices to Eastern European markets. This issue 
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became politically sensitive after the Visegrad Four focused on it 
and turned to the European Commission to demand action.  
While the double standards of food quality issue disappeared 
from public discourse in 2018, migration and the future of Europe 
remained regularly debated political topics. The murder of 
journalist Jan Kuciak brought another EU-related topic to wide 
public attention. One of the articles Kuciak was working on just 
before the murder was the abuse of European structural funds by 
various mafia-style organised groups in the agricultural sector. 
Subsequently, several EP delegations visited, expressing concern 
over the misuse of these funds. 
Several times the issue of double standards was connected to 
allegations of the division of EU members into two categories of first 
and second-class members. The importance of this issue was 
highlighted by the fact that it made its way into the 2017 State of the 
Union speech by Commission President Juncker. 
Government members have repeatedly suggested that 
countries like Slovakia are treated as second-class members because 
of their lack of representation in terms of the EU in Slovakia and 
Slovakia in EU structures. The Slovak government had a prominent 
interest in having the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) relocate to 
Bratislava from London following 
Brexit. The government argued that 
Slovakia was one of the last member 
states without an EU agency. After 
the decision was made that the EMA 
would move to Amsterdam instead, 
with Bratislava ending up fourth on the list, Tomáš Drucker, the 
Slovak Minister of Health, said to a public broadcaster: “Big 
countries want to send the signal that their individual interests are 
more important than delivering on promises and commitments” 
(SME, 2017). Two days later, Fico criticised the EU for its decision. 
In his opinion, a geographical balance should have been 
maintained. “The criteria were set clearly on how to resettle 
agencies from the UK to Europe. They ignored it totally. Big players 
made fools out of the little ones. Now it is clear that these practices 
will keep dividing Europe” (ibid.). 
Government members have 
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members because of their 
lack of representation. 
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The lack of representation of small countries from Eastern 
Europe in EU structures was also raised after the selection of the 
Eurogroup president. The Slovak candidate was Peter Kažimír, who 
was the minister of finance; he was defeated by Mário Centeno from 
Portugal. After the vote, he told the press: “If you look at the map 
of Europe you find that the representation of new member states is 
very small” (Topky, 2017). A similar divide appeared to be present 
in selecting the social democrats’ leading candidate in the 2019 EP 
elections. Slovakia’s Maroš Šefčovič announced his intention to run 
as the Spitzenkandidat for the social democratic grouping and 
gathered support from nine national parties. However, all of them 
were from Central and Eastern Europe. Frans Timmermans secured 
support from twelve parties, mostly west European ones. We do not 
claim that this is the only reason behind the final selection of Frans 
Timmermans. However, we argue that such outcomes contribute to 
the perception of the relatively low representation of small east 
European states in the EU.  
Latent feelings of second-class membership and the lack of 
representation in the EU is present in society and were expected to 
play a crucial role in the 2019 EP elections. Since accession in 2004, 
Slovakia has seen the lowest electoral 
turnout in the entire EU (16.97% in 
2004, 19.64% in 2009, and 13.05% in 
2014). Ahead of the 2019 EP elections, 
various surveys have shown very 
similar intentions among voters to 
(not) participate as five years earlier (in 2014, several polls showed 
around 25% of voters intending to cast a vote, but the real turnout 
was only slightly more than a half of the measured intent). 
The process of leading candidates intended to add personality 
to the EP elections and make them more attractive is not widely 
supported by political parties in Slovakia. The majority of parties 
doubt that leading candidates from other nation states could attract 
more voters in Slovakia. Some of the parties use legal arguments 
when opposing the Spitzenkandidat system. They point out that, 
according to the rules, commissioners should be nominated by 
member states and the President appointed by the European 
Council, a principle they support. All parties in our research rejected 
the idea of transnational lists in EP elections. Some parties argued 
Since accession in 2004, 
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that transnational lists would decrease the accountability of MEPs 
towards voters. Others argue that transnational lists would harm 
national sovereignty and interests and particularly those of smaller 
EU members. 
According to various opinion polls, there are ten political 
parties with a strong chance of obtaining at least one seat in the EP. 
Currently, there are seven national political parties represented in 
three party groups in the EP.  
MEPs representing Slovakia are relatively well aligned with 
their national parties. From 2014 to 2018, there was only one 
indication of disagreement between 
MEPs and their national party. After 
numerous scandals mostly concerning 
corruption, MEPs Monika Beňová and 
Boris Zala openly criticised the 
leadership of their home party, Smer-SD 
led by Fico. While still prime minister, Fico responded by repeatedly 
criticising MEPs for receiving too much money and being detached 
from reality. However, the main point of disagreement was the style 
of governance and not EU-related issues.  
Table 16.2 shows the loyalty of MEPs to their political group 
in the EP based on voting behaviour. Except for three ECR 
members, the rest of the MEPs voted in line with their political 
group in more than 90% of the votes, with some reaching almost 
97% vote loyalty. The least aligned MEPs are the ECR members. As 
there are MEPs considerably above and below the average of 
political group loyalty, we conclude that the Slovak EP 
representation as a whole is not an exception in this regard.  
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Table 16.2 The loyalty of MEPs to their political group 
Member of 
Parliament 
Loyalty 
to 
Political 
Group 
Party Group 
/ National 
Party 
National Party 
Beňová, 
Monika 
91.82% 
(499th) 
S&P  Direction-Social 
Democracy / Smer-
Sociálna Demokracia 
Csáky, Pál  94.00% 
(389th) 
EPP  Hungarian Coalition Party 
/ Strana maďarskej 
koalície  
Kukan, 
Eduard 
97.14% 
(117th) 
EPP, 
Independent  
Slovak Christian 
Democratic Party, 
Independent / Slovenská 
demokratická a 
kresťanská únia, nezávislý 
Maňka, 
Vladimír 
96.99% 
(127th) 
S&P  Direction-Social 
Democracy / Smer-
Sociálna Demokracia 
Mikolášik, 
Miroslav 
94.31% 
(360th) 
EPP  Christian Democratic 
Movement / 
Kresťanskodemokratické 
hnutie 
Nagy, 
József 
96.76% 
(161st) 
EPP  Bridge / Most- Híd 
Škripek, 
Branislav 
85.23% 
(611th) 
ECR  Ordinary People and 
Independent Personalities 
/ Obyčajní Ľudia a 
nezávislé osobnosti 
Smolková, 
Monika 
96.08% 
(238th) 
S&P  Direction–Social 
Democracy / Smer-
Sociálna Demokracia 
Štefanec, 
Ivan 
96.42% 
(192nd) 
EPP  Christian Democratic 
Movement / 
Kresťanskodemokratické 
hnutie 
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Sulík, 
Richard 
88.20% 
(581st) 
ECR  Freedom and Solidarity /  
Sloboda a Solidarita 
Záborská, 
Anna 
92.94% 
(457th) 
EPP  Christian Democratic 
Movement / 
Kresťanskodemokratické 
hnutie 
Zala, Boris 96.94% 
(140th) 
S&P  Direction–Social 
Democracy / Smer-
Sociálna Demokracia 
Žitňanská, 
Jana 
89.01% 
(568th) 
ECR  New Majority / Nová 
Väčšina 
Note: The data presented include all votes in all policy areas since the eighth 
electoral term started up to 11 June 2018 (the latest update). On average, this 
represents more than seven thousand votes.  
Source: VoteWatch.eu 
 
Although the vote alignment of Slovak MEPs with EP party groups 
is relatively high (measured as a share of individual votes that were 
in line with the majority of votes of the corresponding European 
party group), this cannot be taken for granted. The rise of populist 
and extremist parties may increase electoral turnout, but may also 
increase fragmentation in the EP and negatively affect the alignment 
of MEPs. 
 
Conclusion 
Formal institutions regulating democratic processes in Slovakia, as 
they are embodied in the constitution, constitutional laws, and other 
legal norms, give the parliament supremacy in the system. The 
parliament’s approval is necessary for the government to stay in 
power, it can monitor the government’s activities, and it can 
demand answers to any question. When it comes to EU matters, the 
parliament can effectively direct and legally bind the government 
and its members to certain positions.  
However, the political dynamics and informal institutions 
(i.e., patterns of government formation and governance) are not 
exactly in line with the written rules. Parties forming coalition 
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governments usually form a coalition council, an informal body 
with no legal background, where the main government- and 
governance-related issues are decided. As it is possible to become a 
member of parliament only by being on a party list of candidates, a 
coalition government can usually rely on a majority of relatively 
disciplined MPs. In practice, the parliament has thus become a tool 
for legitimising government action decided by the coalition parties. 
This also has consequences for the dynamics of the EU. 
Positions on various EU policies and issues are not always 
dependent on established long-term national interests, strategic 
documents, or the capacities of the corresponding ministry. In 
general, it is the strength and political power of the largest coalition 
party that ultimately defines the dynamics among coalition leaders, 
which subsequently shapes Slovakia’s positions and actions in EU 
matters. 
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17. SPAIN’S WEAK PARLIAMENT, 
GROWING FRAGMENTATION 
AND PRO-EU CONSENSUS 
IGNACIO MOLINA & ILKE TOYGÜR 
The bicameral Spanish parliament (Cortes Generales) has never been 
significantly involved in the initiation and control of the national EU 
policy process, even if a series of legal developments have somewhat 
improved its participation. The reasons for this limited profile are twofold: 
first, the relative consensus among Spanish parties with respect to the 
European integration process (one of the few issues of agreement in a rather 
confrontational democracy) and, secondly, the weakness of the Cortes in 
relation to the executive. This weakness is not only the result of a number 
of institutional arrangements aimed at providing stability to the executive 
(such as the strong agenda-setting power of the Prime Minister, the 
irrelevance of the Senate as a second chamber and other rules curtailing the 
parliament’s capabilities), but also the political consequence of the 
dominant majoritarian style of policy making that characterised Spain 
until 2015. Since then, the executive has no longer enjoyed the same 
privileged position and the party system has evolved from a two-party 
system to a fragmented one, after the emergence of various new successful 
political forces. This chapter goes through the Spanish model of 
representation, the role the Cortes plays in EU policy and the ongoing 
transformation of the political system.   
17.1 Introduction: The Cortes Generales and 
Spanish democracy 
The Cortes Generales is an asymmetrical bicameral parliament, 
constituted by the Congreso de los Diputados (Congress, the lower 
house) and the Senado (Senate, the upper house). Even if they share 
legislative power, the Congress holds the power to ultimately 
override any decision of the Senate by a majority. The Spanish 1978 
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constitution, on the other hand, entrusts the executive with the 
leading role in policy making while other institutional rules and 
implicit political practices provide several tools available to the 
Prime Minister to settle and control the legislative agenda (Ajenjo 
and Molina, 2011). This decisively contributed to the notable 
stability of politics and policy style in Spain from the early 1980s 
until at least 2015. During this long period, the majoritarian bias of 
the electoral system and the strength of the left-right cleavage has 
led to a political landscape dominated by two large moderate and 
pro-European parties: the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and 
the social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).  
The Spanish executive employs several ordinary procedures 
(for instance, decree power, emergency procedures, the call of 
extraordinary sessions, etc.), leading to a dominance of the agenda. 
To be sure, the limited role of the Cortes during the law-making 
process does not mean that it plays a minor political role. The 
Congress, in particular, performs several functions: appointment of 
the Prime Minister, holding the entire government to account 
(ministers are regularly summoned by the committees overseeing 
their policy areas), recruitment of politicians and the general 
legitimation of the system through deliberation, control and formal 
approval of legislation. 
However, these relevant political functions are not matched 
with adequate administrative and human resources (Molina et al. 
2018), which demonstrates how limited is the actual policy power 
of the Cortes. For example, even if every parliamentary group is 
assigned funds to hire personnel, with the size of budgets 
dependent on the party’s electoral results, the parties prefer to save 
a portion of this money, using it for other purposes and hiring 
unexperienced staffers with low salaries instead. Individual 
legislators even lack a single exclusive assistant, as the small 
number of staff members is shared across the parliamentary group 
(typically with an assistant for every two deputies or senators). 
Economic resources for policy analysis, whether performed 
internally or externally, are also very scarce and there are no real 
parliamentary research units or think tanks. 
There are also limitations to the capacity of the Cortes to obtain 
documents or summon experts. Although information and 
documentation requested from the executive must be made 
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available to the parliament within a period not exceeding 30 days 
and in the manner most suitable to the applicant, there are “legally 
justified reasons preventing the supply of such information” that 
allow the government to avoid delivering some important 
documents (for example, on the grounds of secrecy), or enable it to 
deliver the documents incompletely 
or late. Furthermore, the limited 
staffing and financial resources 
prevent systematic involvement in 
the policymaking process by 
university scholars, think-tank 
analysts and other experts. 
According to the Congress website, fewer than 100 experts are 
summoned in an average year by the almost 30 standing committees 
and the several sub-committees.  
The truth is that, regardless of the size of the governing party 
in Parliament, Spanish executives have tended to behave as if they 
hold absolute majorities, even if this has only been the case during 
four terms since 1982 (see Table 17.1). This permanent pattern of 
behaviour also reveals that, even without an absolute majority and 
without need to form coalitions, minority governments are able to 
set and control the agenda with the use of procedural rules, high 
internal party discipline and several other advantages. 
Notwithstanding this, since the mid-2010s the political 
landscape has profoundly changed 
with the emergence of new parties 
(the anti-austerity Podemos, the 
liberal Ciudadanos or the right-wing 
nationalist Vox) and the subsequent 
electoral volatility, fierce competition 
and higher levels of polarisation. The 
effective number of parliamentary 
parties in the Congress (a common way of measuring fragmentation 
created by political scientists Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera) 
has grown from 2.6 in the 2011-2015 term to 4.9 after 2019 election.  
These developments are also transforming many of the well-
established attributes of the national representative model, such as 
the patterns of straightforward government formation and its 
Regardless of the size of the 
governing party, Spanish 
executives have tended to 
behave as if they hold 
absolute majorities. 
The political landscape has 
profoundly changed with the 
emergence of new parties, 
electoral volatility, fierce 
competition and higher 
levels of polarisation. 
320  SPAIN’S WEAK PARLIAMENT, GROWING FRAGMENTATION & PRO-EU CONSENSUS 
 
capacity to control law-making or to protect itself from the 
opposition.  
Table 17.1 Majorities in the Spanish Congress, 1982-2019 
Term Government 
party (seats) 
Main 
opposition 
party 
(seats) 
Effective 
number of 
parliamentary 
parties  
% votes 
two 
main 
parties 
% seats 
two 
main 
parties 
1982-
1986 
PSOE (202)* PP (107) 2.3 74.8 88.3 
1986-
1989 
PSOE (184)* PP (105) 2.7 70.5 82.6 
1989-
1993 
PSOE (175) PP (107) 2.8 65.8 80.6 
1993-
1996 
PSOE (159) PP (141) 2.7 74.1 85.7 
1996-
2000 
PP (156) PSOE (141) 2.7 77.2 84.9 
2000-
2004 
PP (183)* PSOE (125) 2.5 79.9 88.0 
2004-
2008 
PSOE (164) PP (148) 2.5 81.6 89.1 
2008-
2011 
PSOE (169) PP (154) 2.3 84.7 92.3 
2011-
2015 
PP (186)* PSOE (110) 2.6 74.4 84.6 
2015-
2016 
PP (123 PSOE (90) 4.1 51.1 60.9 
2016-
2019** 
PP (137) 
PSOE (85) 
PSOE (85) 
PP (137) 
3.8 56.1 63.4 
2019- PSOE (123)  PP (66) 4.9 45.4 54.0 
Notes:  
* Highlighted cells show when the government enjoyed an absolute majority in 
the Congress (> 175 seats). 
** Mariano Rajoy (PP) lost a no-confidence vote in 2018. Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) 
became prime minister. 
Source: own elaboration with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior and 
Rama and Santana (2019). 
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Both the share of seats held by the governing party and the two 
main traditional parties combined have dropped sharply. More 
than 90% of deputies in Congress were members of the PSOE or PP 
in 2011, but that figure is now reduced to only 54 percent. It is still 
too early to assess the impact of these changes in legislative-
executive relations and the role of the parliament in EU affairs but 
it will be difficult for the government to maintain its privileged 
position in European policy. 
17.2 Reasons behind the (limited) participation of 
the Spanish Cortes in Spanish EU policy  
According to the 1978 Constitution, the Cortes Generales has an 
important formal role in ratifying all international treaties (with 
special requirements for EU primary law) and in the development 
and control of all EU secondary law. But, even if the legislature has 
transposed hundreds of EU directives into domestic legislation 
since 1986, neither the Congress nor the Senate have been 
significantly involved in Spain’s relations with the EU. There are 
two main reasons to explain this low profile. 
The first, and most important, is the aforementioned low 
institutional strength of the Cortes in the overall political system, in 
particular regarding policy-making 
capacity. The second factor is the 
relative consensus among parties 
with respect to Europe; one of the 
few issues of agreement in a rather 
confrontational democracy. For 
historical reasons, EU membership 
has generally been perceived in Spain as an anchor for democracy 
at home, a fundamental factor for economic prosperity and the most 
effective tool for gaining international influence as a mid-sized 
power. A positive narrative about European integration is widely 
shared by all political and social actors in the country. Despite the 
recent economic crisis (2008-2014) and some related developments 
(erosion of trust in political institutions or the Catalan crisis), the 
country remains one of the most pro-EU member states. But this 
consensus has had consequences for the role of the Cortes on EU 
affairs, making parliamentary debate on the issues fairly 
uncontroversial and, therefore, not politically interesting.  
Relative consensus among 
parties with respect to Europe; 
one of the few issues of 
agreement in a rather 
confrontational democracy. 
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Lacking strong power, the Spanish parliament seeks to have 
a certain influence through plenary and committee debates which 
primarily provide domestic support for the government’s 
negotiation position at the EU level. Nonetheless, a Joint Congress-
Senate Committee on European Affairs (Comisión Mixta para la 
Unión Europea), which facilitates coordination to avoid the 
duplication of work in both houses, was created at the time of 
accession. This European Affairs Committee (EAC) is the principal 
body in charge of coordination and all parliamentary groups are 
represented. In addition, plenary debates after European Council 
meetings are held, thus gradually making the executive accountable 
to the Cortes (Closa, 1996). Specialised scrutiny of EU legislation has 
also been reinforced thanks to the gradual Europeanisation of all the 
other parliamentary standing committees. After a series of legal 
reforms in 2009/2010 (see below), the Cortes gained some policy-
shaping capacity as well, notably through the early warning system 
(EWS) to monitor subsidiarity (Piedrafita, 2012). 
The EAC has clearly improved procedures and engagement 
yet without adopting a confrontational pattern of operation. Its 
main role is to reinforce consensus behind a national common 
position to be defended in Brussels. Actually, the Spanish 
Parliament lacks political power to impose binding mandates 
against the opinion of the government. It also lacks the 
administrative resources necessary to process alternative sources of 
information, to follow the activity of all the sectoral EU Councils, to 
produce authoritative reports or even to make its political views 
fully known under a truly comprehensive EWS subsidiarity 
control.1 Furthermore, the involvement of the Cortes in inter-
                                                        
1 The scrutiny of European policymaking is a good illustration of the lack 
of resources of the Spanish Parliament: the joint European Affairs 
Committee (EAC) of the Congress and the Senate has only two legal clerks 
at its disposal, a librarian and three administrative personnel. And despite 
growing demands for greater parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, budgetary restrictions have 
prevented any change with regard to human and financial resources. This 
means that Spanish deputies and senators in charge of monitoring EU 
activities can draw on a set of resources that, while adequate for some 
selected government activities in Brussels, are insufficient for effective 
oversight of all dimensions of Spain’s EU policy (Molina et al. 2018). 
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parliamentary dialogue (such as the COSAC mechanism) or with 
the EU institutions is quite modest and it was actually the last 
national parliament to open an office in Brussels. 
A comparison of all national legislatures allows to define five 
not mutually exclusive ideal types of parliamentary participation in 
EU decision-making (Hefftler et al. 2015): a public forum focusing on 
communication with the voters, a government watchdog dedicated to 
hold the executive accountable, a policy shaper trying to influence 
national government positions, an expert that produces proper 
expertise on EU projects, or a European player who acts directly at 
the EU level. The typology derives from the analysis of six elements: 
the timing of the input (early in the process, during or after the 
decision is taken in Brussels), the sources of information 
(independent, the EU or the national executive), the instruments 
used (mandates, opinions, reports), the parliamentary body in 
charge (specialised committees, plenary), the level of transparency 
and the audience (decision makers or rather citizens). 
As Table 17.2 shows, the Spanish Parliament has been – and 
still it is – a public forum aimed to influence the general public and 
tends to intervene ex post, with information provided by the 
government, through mainly open door oral debates on the floor of 
the Congress and, to a lesser extent, within the EAC. Yet, the only 
feature in which Spain has traditionally failed to meet the 
expectations of the public forum model (holding debates ex ante) has 
increasingly been fulfilled in recent years. The transformation of the 
Spanish party system leading to a more fragmented parliament may 
encourage the opposition to act increasingly as a government 
watchdog on European affairs. However, again, the consensus on 
EU matters and the lack of resources limit both the potential of real 
politicisation and the capacity for effective policy scrutiny. 
 
Table 17.2 Assessing the Spanish Cortes Generales according to the five 
ideal-types for parliamentary activities in EU affairs 
 Public forum 
Govern-
ment 
watchdog 
Policy 
shaper Expert 
European 
player 
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Overall 
assessment Yes Limited 
Not 
much No 
Definitely 
not 
Meets  
expectations 
Plenary debates ex 
post  
(European Council) 
significantly 
institutionalised. 
Much less activity on 
sectoral EU Council 
meetings 
EWS has 
increased 
the role of 
the 
European 
Affairs  
Committee  
  
Fails to meet 
expectations 
In 
principle 
no ex 
ante 
debates 
on the 
floor but 
this is 
changing 
with 
minority 
govern-
ments 
and a 
higher 
salience 
of EU 
issues   
Limited 
capacity of 
the 
opposition 
for effective 
scrutiny 
due to lack 
of 
information 
No 
binding 
opinions 
of the 
European 
Affairs 
Committee  
Reports are 
unusual. 
Lack of 
resources. 
Experts are 
not 
summoned. 
No 
alternative 
information 
to 
government 
Last national 
parliament to 
open an 
office in 
Brussels. 
Limited 
involvement 
in the EWS 
and COSAC 
Some 
selected EU 
member state 
national 
parliaments 
France 
Italy 
UK 
Denmark 
Germany 
Italy, NL 
Poland 
UK 
Denmark 
Germany 
NL 
Poland 
France 
UK 
Denmark 
Italy 
NL 
Poland 
Source: Kölling and Molina (2015) and Hefftler et al. (2015). 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  325 
 
17.3 The evolution of the Spanish Parliament’s 
involvement in EU affairs (1986-2019)2 
Until 1994, control of the government in EU affairs mainly consisted 
of the voluntary appearance of the Prime Minister before the 
Congreso or irregular hearings of members of the government before 
the EAC on the conclusions of the European Council or Councils of 
Ministers meetings. In fact the Prime Minister´s address was 
initiated as an informal custom by Felipe Gonzalez after accession 
and became institutionalised at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the government had to inform both houses only on 
the main lines of its European policy and only on legislative 
proposals that would explicitly affect fundamental rights and 
freedoms. However, the EAC also had certain ex ante functions and 
could revise legislative projects for regulations, directives and 
decisions. Nevertheless, the parliament limited its activities to 
sporadic questions to the government – in particular about the 
transposition of EU law – and the follow-up and elaboration of 
reports on issues related to Spain’s membership (Delgado-Iribarren, 
2011). During this time period, the rest of the parliament hardly 
gave indications of any activity at all and only the EAC played a 
minimal rule in the ex ante scrutiny process. The reports elaborated 
by the EAC had only very limited added value for the government’s 
EU policy and EU affairs were mainly handled behind closed doors. 
The second step forward to improve the scrutiny process took 
place within the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. Act 
8/1994 strengthened the EAC and extended its competences to 
request hearings, to collect information regarding specific 
legislative proposals and the subsequent negotiations in the 
Council. The EAC was also empowered to set up sub-committees 
for the elaboration and adoption of specific reports. These ad hoc 
sub-committees have been working on specific topics with 
increasing intensity. Nevertheless, the operations of the sub-
committees underline the consensual nature of the Spanish EU 
policy (e.g. the reports mainly supported the government’s 
position), as well as involving only a tight network of people among 
                                                        
2 For a further explanation, see Kölling and Molina (2015). 
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a small group of officials and politicians (Closa and Heywood, 
2004). 
Since 1994, the government was obliged to send all EU 
legislative proposals at an early stage of the negotiation process to 
the EAC and to specify this information if requested. Act 8/1994 
also institutionalised the hearings with the Prime Minister before 
the plenary of the Congreso following European Council meetings 
and the obligation for the executive to send in advance reports about 
the progress of each of the rotating presidencies of the Council. 
While the control function was still focused on ex post scrutiny of the 
decisions of European Council meetings, from 1994 important steps 
in the direction of an improved ex ante control were in evidence. 
Act 8/1994 regulating the European Affairs Committee was 
modified by Act 24/2009 of 22 December to reinforce the capacity 
of the EAC to check and influence government actions in the 
Council. Although the initial proposal was to render the hearings 
with government members before and after EU Council meetings 
obligatory, the final law was less ambitious. The fact that Spanish 
deputies and senators are quite pro-European and usually believe 
in the benefits of giving more leeway to the national government in 
negotiations might have influenced the resolution of the ‘collective 
dilemma’ in favour of more ‘efficiency’ (Piedrafita, 2014). Finally, 
Act 38/2010 improved both ex ante and ex post control. The most 
substantial improvement related to ex ante control of government 
actions in the EU Council through the introduction of hearings with 
the relevant ministers before Council meetings. But the ex post 
control was also improved. 
Usually, the government is interrogated orally on legislative 
acts under negotiation at a plenary or committee session, whereas 
queries about the implementation of EU law are in written form. 
Written questions are mainly submitted by opposition parties. 
Besides the reform of the scrutiny system, the establishment in 2010 
of a representative in Brussels for the Spanish Parliament was a 
further effort to adapt the Cortes to the new requirements. The 
representative facilitates independent information related to 
legislative proposals to both houses.  
The most important modification of the scrutiny system is 
related to the monitoring of compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity through the EWS. According to Act 24/2009, the EAC 
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is the competent body to elaborate and adopt reasoned opinions on 
behalf of the Cortes Generales. Nevertheless, both chambers retain 
the possibility to take over the debate and make the final adoption 
of any resolution related to the compliance of the draft legislative 
acts with the subsidiarity principle. According to the procedure, as 
soon as the draft legislative act is received, the Secretariat of the 
EAC sends it via email, together with accompanying documents, to 
the Parliamentary Assemblies in the Autonomous Communities. 
Moreover, an electronic index, listing all the received draft 
legislative acts, is sent at the beginning of a sitting week to the 
bureau of the EAC and the spokespersons of the political groups. In 
addition, the permanent representative of the Spanish Parliament to 
the European Union elaborates a weekly report on the subsidiarity 
alerts from other national parliaments, this report is also sent to the 
bureau and spokespersons of the EAC in order to inform them 
beforehand of the decisions on initiatives that will be scrutinised. 
If the EAC´s bureau decides to hold a debate, a representative 
of the executive is invited to explain the basic content of the 
proposal and debate it with the different parliamentary groups in 
the EAC. Afterwards, the parliamentary groups have two days to 
table draft resolutions, which will be examined and put to a vote 
before the EAC. The draft resolution may include a request for a 
debate in the Plenary or for the Committee to draw up a report. The 
rapporteur is appointed by the bureau. The criteria to allocate the 
rapporteurs between the different parliamentary groups is not 
regulated, the bureau and the spokespersons are thus allowed to 
decide freely on this issue. In practice, the two main parliamentary 
groups (Popular Group and Socialist Group) appoint their members 
as rapporteurs in more initiatives than members of smaller 
parliamentary groups. This may change after 2019 since the PP and 
PSOE together only comprise 54% of deputies in the Congress. 
After the proposal of a report or reasoned opinion by the 
rapporteur has been tabled, a debate and vote of the proposed 
report or opinion is scheduled in the EAC. Finally, the proposal, 
with any agreed amendments, is voted. A simple majority is 
required for the proposal to be accepted. After its approval, the 
report or reasoned opinion is published in the Official 
Parliamentary Bulletin as well as being sent to the European 
institutions and the Spanish government. 
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Although the workload of the EAC has increased 
considerably because of the introduction of EWS, the number of 
meetings has not increased very significantly, which could indicate 
EAC’s focus on very specific proposals and a continuing consensual 
approach on EU affairs despite the growing fragmentation of the 
Spanish party system. On a few occasions, the rapporteur submitted 
a reasoned opinion stating that the draft in question did not comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity. In these cases, the government 
had previously sent a negative opinion concerning a breach of the 
subsidiarity principle. In this sense opinions on compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle of the draft legislative acts reflected the 
government’s position (Piedrafita, 2012). Thus, it does not seem that 
the structurally weak position of the Spanish Parliament in EU 
affairs is really changing as a consequence of this growing 
participation via EWS. 
The Treaty of Lisbon not only reinforced the role of national 
parliaments in EU affairs through the control of subsidiarity, but it 
also introduced new information exchange channels between the 
national parliaments and the European institutions. The most 
visible is the political dialogue with the European Commission. This 
dialogue, however, is managed bilaterally between the Commission 
and each national parliament. The involvement of the Spanish 
Parliament in the political dialogue with the Commission is still 
very limited. The total number of opinions sent by the Spanish 
Cortes Generales to the political dialogue with the European 
Commission demonstrates that the parliament is still very reluctant 
to engage with EU institutions and top officials, even if several 
Commissioners, the president of the ECB or the negotiator of the 
Brexit talks have been invited by the EAC to provide an update 
about their portfolios and tasks. 
Similarly, the Spanish Parliament has not been very active in 
inter-parliamentary cooperation within the EU. Direct contact with 
the European Parliament is still very little and on several occasions 
concentrated on inter-party contacts. With regard to the interactions 
of the Cortes with other national parliaments, through the COSAC 
or bilaterally, there has been some improvement in recent years, but 
formal inter-parliamentary cooperation is still very restricted. This 
could be explained by the lack of administrative and financial 
resources. 
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17.4 The complex transition to a fragmented multi-
party system and its impact on the EU  
Like other countries in southern Europe, the long 2008-2013 
economic recession and the social unrest as a consequence of 
austerity measures entirely reshaped Spanish politics. As 
mentioned above, an imperfect two-party system, consisting of the 
PP and PSOE has recently been converted into a multiparty system. 
The 2019 general election (the second snap election in three years) 
has produced the most fragmented and polarised Spanish 
Parliament ever. Nevertheless, a high turnout (75.8% – well up from 
66.5% in 2016) has allowed the PSOE to end up winning the election 
(123 seats out of 350), followed by the centre-right PP (66) and 
Ciudadanos (57). All three parties are clearly pro-European and 
represent more than 60% of the votes. The left-wing coalition 
between Podemos and the post-communist United Left came fourth 
with 42 seats (down from 71) and 14.3%. It may be considered as 
‘soft Eurosceptic’, but it does not have an anti-EU stance and it will 
probably become the junior partner of the PSOE in the future. 
Despite the economic crisis, high immigration figures and 
dissatisfaction with the political elite, no significant populist radical 
right parties emerged in Spain up until 2018 (Alonso and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2015).3 However, the intensification of the Catalan 
dispute and the bid for unilateral secession provided the necessary 
environment for the rise of Vox, Spain’s first contender for a 
populist radical right party. Vox is not explicitly Eurosceptic, but it 
promotes Spanish nationalism, is against multiculturalism, 
irregular migration and what they term “radical feminism”. Vox 
obtained 10.3% of the vote in the 2019 election and 24 seats in 
Congress, thus becoming the fifth Spanish party. While, with its 
media visibility, it will have some capacity to exert an impact on the 
agenda, the effect is expected to be marginal for now. 
Even if domestic issues dominate political discussion and the 
national parliament does not play a significant role in EU matters, 
Spanish political parties are readying themselves to play an 
important role at the EU level. As shown in Table 17.3, PSOE may 
                                                        
3 According to Mudde (2007), this kind of party rails against immigration 
and opposes the process of European integration. 
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become the largest national party of the Socialists and Democrats 
(S&D) group in the European Parliament. This observation can also 
be made for the role of Unidas Podemos in the Group of the 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). For its part, 
the liberal Ciudadanos will become one of the three most powerful 
political parties of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE) group. The Spanish Popular Party might also end 
up as one of the top three political forces in the European People’s 
Party (EPP). 
Table 17.3 Spanish parties and the European Parliament (2019-2024) 
National party  Group 
affiliation in 
the European 
Parliament 
Predictions for 2019 EP 
election 
Poll4 Projection 
from April 
general 
election results 
Socialist Party (PSOE) S&D 18 16 
Partido Popular EPP 13 10 
Ciudadanos ALDE 7 9 
Unidas Podemos GUE/NGL 
and Greens 
8 8 
Vox None 6 6 
Left-wing Catalan and 
Basque nationalists (ERC + 
EH Bildu) 
EFA and 
GUE/NGL 
2 3 
Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV)  
ALDE 0 1 
Right-wing Catalan 
nationalists (JxCAT) 
None 0 1 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
                                                        
4 The report of the European Parliament titled “European Elections 2019” 
is available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-
heard/eurobarometer/2019/political-landscape-developments/en-ee19-
national-report-18-april-2019.pdf 
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Conclusion 
Spain has been one of the most pro-European member states since 
its accession to the EU in 1986. Even if the Spanish Parliament has 
not played a significant role in EU policy making so far (as a 
combined result of the consensus on European affairs and the strong 
role of the executive regarding the policy process), it has been able 
to increase its involvement in recent years. The ongoing 
transformation of Spanish democracy from an imperfect two-party 
system into a fragmented one, the subsequent erosion of power of 
the executive and the emergence of soft Eurosceptic parties (both 
left-wing populist and radical right) may reinforce the role the 
Cortes currently plays on EU matters. In parallel, Spanish parties 
are expected to play an important role in their respective groups in 
the European Parliament following the May 2019 election.  
After Brexit, Spain will be the fourth largest member state and 
this might be an opportunity for their pro-European parties and 
other actors (including the national parliament) to increase their 
impact on European politics. Notwithstanding this, the relative 
level of domestic agreement on the European integration process, 
the lack of electoral interest among voters about EU issues, and the 
limited political or administrative resources of the parliament and 
parties reduce the potential of real politicisation and the capacity for 
effective involvement of actors other than the executive. 
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18. NOT SUCH A CLEAN BREAK: 
WESTMINSTER’S CONTINUOUS 
OVERSIGHT OF EU AFFAIRS 
POST-BREXIT 
AGATA GOSTYŃSKA-JAKUBOWSKA* 
This chapter assesses the state of representative democracy in the UK and 
how British parliamentarians have dealt with EU affairs in the course of 
the UK’s membership of the European Union. First, it briefly analyses the 
flaws of the British representative democracy as revealed by the 2016 
referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU. Second, it looks at 
Westminster’s past scrutiny of the government’s European policy and asks 
whether parliamentarians’ increased interest in the future EU-UK 
relationship could translate into more effective parliamentary oversight of 
European matters post-Brexit. Third, the chapter makes a series of 
recommendations for improving cooperation between parliament and 
government in the next phases of the Brexit talks, and looks at how 
Westminster might remain plugged into EU decision-making.  
                                                        
* An earlier version of this piece was published by the Centre for European 
Reform on 12 April 2019, see: https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/ 
policy-brief/2019/not-so-fast-westminsters-continuous-oversight-
european; this publication is the product of teamwork and the author is 
grateful to Beth Oppenheim for her research assistance. The author is also 
grateful to all the officials who offered their time to talk off-the-record to 
the CER and share their views on Westminster’s scrutiny of Brexit and on 
plugging the UK Parliament into EU decision-making after Brexit. 
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18.1 Brexit: a stress test for the UK’s representative 
democracy 
In 2018, Britain was one of the 20 countries in the world ranked as a 
‘full democracy’ in which there is an effective system of democratic 
checks and balances (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). The Brexit 
process has since exposed the flaws in the UK’s democratic system, 
however. The UK is one of the very few parliamentary democracies 
in the world that still uses a ‘first-past-the-post’ voting system in 
general elections and that treats elections “as the sum of individual 
contests” (Gamble, 2018). The system translates a small percentage 
of lead in terms of votes into a majority in seats, and rewards 
geographic concentration of support 
(Institute for Public Policy Research, 
2015). As a result, the first-past-the-
post system favours two big parties 
and discriminates against smaller 
political movements whose votes are 
spread across many constituencies. 
In the 2015 general election, UKIP 
won 12.6% of the vote (The House of 
Commons Library, 2017), but obtained just one seat. A year earlier 
UKIP sent the largest delegation to the European Parliament after it 
had won the European elections which, unlike general elections, are 
held in accordance with the proportional representation system. 
First-past-the-post also creates two types of seats: ‘safe’ and ‘swing’. 
Parties focus their energy, time and funds almost exclusively on 
swing seats, making voters living elsewhere feel ignored.  
Proponents of the current voting system would argue that it 
was designed for the two-party system and aimed to deliver stable 
majorities in parliament. In 2017, the government argued that the 
current system provides a clear link between the constituents and 
their MPs and that voters had already rejected the idea of ditching 
first-past-the-post in the 2011 referendum on altering the voting 
system to an ‘alternative voting’ one (Johnston, Uberoi, 2019). But 
‘alternative voting’ can lead to even more unrepresentative results 
than the current system. Voters were thus given a choice between 
two systems that have serious flaws (Full Fact, 2011).  
The UK still uses a ‘first-
past-the-post’ voting system 
that favours two big parties 
and discriminates against 
smaller political movements 
whose votes are spread 
across many constituencies. 
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The first-past-the-post system does not take into account the 
fact that British society has changed and people no longer vote for 
only the Conservative or Labour parties. Post-industrial society is 
more disparate and its voting intentions are less determined by class 
or occupation than they were in the past (Gostyńska-Jakubowska, 
Schuette, 2019). The first-past-the-post system adds to voters’ sense 
of alienation because it does not always give them the opportunity 
to send to Westminster a candidate whom they really like and 
produces governments that have not gathered majority of the 
popular vote.  
This is perhaps one of the reasons why the 2016 referendum 
on the UK’s membership in the EU attracted the attention of people 
disillusioned with politics. The 
referendum, in which almost 52% 
of the votes were cast in favour of 
the UK’s departure from the EU, 
put the ‘will of the people’ on a 
collision course with their elected 
representatives (Gostyńska-
Jakubowska, Oppenheim, 2018). 
For the first time in the history of British parliamentary democracy, 
citizens voted in a nationwide referendum for an outcome that the 
majority of MPs disagreed with. The referendum was advisory but 
MPs decided to honour the outcome of the vote and authorised the 
prime minister to notify the UK’s intention to leave the EU. 
However, this did not prevent tabloid media from accusing the 
Commons of ignoring the ‘will of the people’ whenever MPs 
attempted to seize greater parliamentary control over the 
government’s Brexit strategy.  
The hostile tabloids and the 
demographic makeup of 
Parliament does not help MPs to 
make the case that they have 
acted in accordance with UK’s 
national interest during the Brexit 
process. The Commons largely 
consists of middle-aged MPs who went to university (Runciman, 
2019). This is in stark contrast with the demographic of the general 
public: according to the Office for National Statistics only 42% of the 
Tabloid media accused the 
Commons of ignoring the ‘will 
of the people’ whenever MPs 
attempted to seize greater 
parliamentary control over the 
government’s Brexit strategy. 
The Commons largely consists 
of middle-aged MPs who went 
to university, in stark contrast 
with the demographic of the 
general public. 
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British population aged 21-64 had higher education in 2017 (Office 
for National Statistics, 2017). This rift only adds to the public 
disillusionment with the political elites and the way they have 
handled Brexit. According to the latest Hansard Society audit of 
political engagement in the UK “72% of the respondents say that the 
system of governing needs ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of 
improvement (…) and 50% think that the main parties and 
politicians don’t care about them” (Hansard Society, 2019). 
This growing tension between the outcome of the 2016 
referendum and the current nature of the UK’s representative 
democracy creates momentum for rethinking the way the British 
have elected their representatives. On April 23rd the Commons held 
a debate on proportional representation for general elections, 
sponsored by MP Angela Smith (who used to oppose proportional 
representation but changed her mind in 2017 after the general 
elections produced a hung parliament (House of Commons 
Hansard, 2019)). The debate, together with other seismic shifts in 
the tribal British political system could be a harbinger of change 
towards a more representative Westminster and a more honest 
parliamentary debate about European matters, which until recently 
was dominated by Tory and Labour Eurosceptics.  
It may be anathema to many Brexiters but leaving the EU will 
not mean a clean break from the EU and its laws; EU legislation will 
continue to have an important impact on the UK regardless of 
whether it leaves with a withdrawal agreement. Westminster will 
want to assess EU legislation but will have to adapt its current 
scrutiny structures to an as yet unknown post-Brexit reality.   
18.2 Looking back: Westminster’s scrutiny of EU 
affairs  
Ironically, given the strength of many Brexiter views, EU affairs have 
generally had a low profile in the House of Commons. Unless the 
government of the day was focused 
on a specific EU matter, such as a 
new treaty, British MPs tended to 
pay little heed to European affairs. 
Members of Parliament have tended 
to take the view that the key to re-
Ironically, given the strength 
of many Brexiter views, EU 
affairs have generally had a 
low profile in the House of 
Commons. 
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election was a good track record of working on domestic issues rather 
than on the EU. They were reluctant to sit on the 16-member 
European scrutiny committee (ESC), which examines the 
government’s EU policy and considers EU documents, or even to take 
part in debates when the ESC decided an EU document needed more 
discussion (Gostyńska, 2015). In his oral evidence to the House of 
Lords’ constitution committee in January 2019 David Lidington, 
Prime Minister Theresa May’s de facto deputy, complained that 
when he was Europe Minister he found it difficult to get 
departmental select committees (which shadow the work of 
individual government departments) to focus on the European 
dimension of their business (House of Lords, 2019). The ESC can ask 
departmental select committees for an opinion on an EU document, 
but the committees are not legally obliged to provide one. 
This limited interest in European matters among neutral or 
even pro-EU MPs allowed staunch Eurosceptics such as the 
Conservative Sir William Cash or Labour’s Kate Hoey, who used 
their membership of the ESC to express their distaste for European 
integration, to dominate the debate. Ten out of the 16 current 
members of the ESC are reported to have voted to leave the EU in 
2016 (calculation from TheyWorkForYou, 2019). Unlike most chairs 
of select committees in the Commons, the chair of the ESC is not 
elected by the whole House of 
Commons but by the committee 
members; Cash has held the 
position since 2010.  
But this inadequate interest 
in EU affairs is not entirely down 
to MPs’ apathy. In British 
parliamentary practice it is the government – not parliament – that 
determines what is debated in Westminster.1 And, the government 
has often deprived pro-EU MPs of the chance to confront 
Eurosceptics by refusing to allocate time for EU-related debates in 
the Commons. 
                                                        
1 According to the Commons Standing Orders government business has 
precedence at every parliamentary sitting (The House of Commons, 2018), 
Standing Orders, UK Parliament). 
In British parliamentary 
practice it is the government – 
not parliament – that 
determines what is debated in 
Westminster. 
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The approach of MPs to EU affairs contrasts sharply with the 
attitude of the House of Lords. They tend to have more time to delve 
into EU matters than MPs, who also have constituency 
responsibilities. The Lords EU select committee is renowned for its 
expertise and high quality reports (Smith, 2015). To a certain extent 
this is because, unlike MPs who are directly elected, peers are 
appointed or are hereditary members of the UK Parliament, or senior 
members of the clergy. Yet no matter how knowledgeable the Lords 
may be they enjoy no democratic legitimacy. As a result, MPs stand 
a greater chance of influencing the public debate about European 
affairs and also the government’s actions. For this reason this chapter 
mainly focuses on parliamentary oversight of EU matters in the 
House of Commons.  
18.3 Westminster’s interest in the UK-EU 
relationship: late to the party? 
The UK’s referendum in 2016 has forced pro-European MPs to 
engage in the public debate about European matters, even if that 
means going head-to-head with Eurosceptics. Two thirds of the 
MPs on the Commons exiting the European Union committee voted 
to remain in the Union in 2016 (calculation from TheyWorkForYou, 
2019). While many of them accept the vote to leave the EU, they 
have argued for a softer Brexit than 
their Eurosceptic colleagues.  
The referendum has also 
resulted in an increase in select 
committee inquiries into European 
matters. Written evidence 
submitted on March 14th to the Commons Liaison Committee, 
which is composed of the chairs of the various select committees 
and takes evidence from the prime minister, showed that select 
committees have conducted 67 inquiries and produced 58 Brexit-
related reports (24% of the total) during this parliament. That 
compares with just 22 reports (3% of the total) between 2010 and the 
2016 referendum (Lynch, Whitaker and Cygan, 2019). The 
referendum has led to a broader distribution of EU business across 
the House. Today, the ESC is just one of many Commons 
committees scrutinising aspects of the UK’s relationship with the 
EU.  
Two thirds of the MPs on the 
Commons exiting the European 
Union committee voted to 
remain in the Union in 2016. 
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However, Westminster’s interest in Brexit should not be 
seen as increased interest in the day-to-day business of the EU, 
rather in all things Brexit. The overall attendance of ESC members 
has never been very impressive – reaching 66.9% in the 2015-16 
session. But the latest attendance statistics published by the ESC 
show that in the 2017-19 session the turnout was even lower at 
58.6% (House of Commons, 2019). The spike in Brexit-related 
activity has not yet translated into a greater understanding in the 
Commons of how the EU operates.2 Because public interest in the 
EU has surged as a result of Brexit, MPs’ pronouncements on 
Europe have had a higher profile in the media, regardless of 
whether they have done their homework on the implications of 
leaving the EU.  
But it would be unfair to say that Brexit has not brought any 
change to Westminster.  
Since the referendum Westminster has become increasingly 
assertive about its role in holding the government to account for its 
Brexit strategy. It has been helped in this process by a series of legal 
challenges by various individuals, perhaps the most famous being 
Gina Miller’s case to force the government to seek parliament’s 
authorisation before triggering Article 50 – the legal process for 
exiting the EU. May’s efforts to control the Brexit process have seen 
MPs resort to all sorts of arcane parliamentary conventions to 
influence the government’s negotiating position.  
There are two reasons behind parliament’s increased 
assertiveness over the Brexit process. First, since the 2016 
referendum, many MPs have been acting contrary to their own 
previously stated beliefs. Most MPs backed remain in the 
referendum, but the Commons, fearing a public backlash if it 
seemed to be resisting the referendum result, voted by an 
overwhelming majority in 2017 to authorise the prime minister to 
notify the UK’s intention to leave the EU. Nevertheless, since then 
numerous MPs – including Conservatives – have tried to obstruct 
the government when they thought its plans for exiting the EU 
would harm the national interest – or their preferred version of 
Brexit. 
                                                        
2 Author’s interviews with Westminster officials. 
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This is rare in British politics. MPs almost always represent a 
specific party, support its manifesto and obey its leaders. But the EU 
issue has always transcended party lines and loyalty. The outcome 
of the referendum has only deepened these divisions and made the 
government’s job harder. The cracks in Westminster’s tribal political 
system have been highlighted by a number of MPs quitting the two 
main parties to form a new party called 
Change UK – The Independent Group, 
and by many others rebelling 
repeatedly against their party’s 
instructions on Brexit-related votes.  
Second, this change in relations between parliament and 
government has been facilitated by May’s ill-advised decision to 
hold a snap general election in 2017. May lost her majority and was 
forced to form a minority government propped up by the Northern 
Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). With no reliable majority, 
she has found it incredibly difficult to push through her Brexit 
plans, with the Northern Ireland backstop being a particular 
problem (Springford, 2018). One of May’s biggest mistakes has been 
her failure to appreciate the need for cross-party consultations over 
Brexit. 
18.4 Westminster in the Brexit talks: bystander or 
veto player?  
Under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRAG), the 
British government needs to lay the final text of any international 
treaty before the Commons and the Lords 21 days before it intends 
to ratify it (Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010). It has, 
however, no formal obligation to inform the UK Parliament about 
progress in international negotiations. But the Brexit talks are like 
no other international negotiations that the UK has carried out 
before; their outcome will have far-reaching implications for the 
British economy and UK citizens. Under pressure from MPs, the 
then-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David 
Davis, pledged that the UK Parliament would get a so-called 
‘meaningful vote’ on the withdrawal agreement and the political 
declaration on future relations. He also promised that Westminster 
would be able to scrutinise the exit talks to the same degree as the 
European Parliament. But to meet that commitment, the 
The EU issue has always 
transcended party lines 
and loyalty. 
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government would not only have had to share its negotiating 
objectives with MPs, but also to provide them with confidential 
information about progress in the talks, and take their 
recommendations on board (Gostyńska-Jakubowska, 2017). 
The government failed to deliver on this promise. It 
repeatedly misled MPs on whether it had 
made assessments of the impact of Brexit 
on different sectors, and refused to share 
its full legal advice. As a result, for the first 
time in modern history, in December 2018 
the Commons found the government in 
contempt of parliament. The prime 
minister also withdrew a parliamentary vote on the withdrawal 
agreement in December 2018 after many MPs had already spoken 
out in a debate against the agreement.  
When the prime minister finally decided to put the agreement 
to a vote in January, parliamentarians showed their teeth. May lost 
by 230 votes, the largest ever defeat suffered by a British 
government. MPs also instructed the government to replace the 
current Irish backstop with alternative solutions – another rare 
move by the parliament.3 When May put the withdrawal agreement 
to a vote for a second time, with additional reassurances from the 
EU-27 that they did not intend to keep the UK trapped in the 
backstop forever, MPs still remained unconvinced. The government 
was defeated again for the second time on March 12th, albeit by a 
reduced margin of 149 votes. On March 14th the Commons agreed 
that the prime minister should ask the EU-27 to extend the Article 
50 deadline from the original exit date of March 29th. In response the 
European Council agreed to postpone the UK’s departure until May 
22nd if the Commons voted in favour of the withdrawal agreement 
by March 29th, or until April 12th if the Commons failed to approve 
the agreement by March 29th (European Council, 2019a). The 
government held another vote on its withdrawal agreement on 
                                                        
3 The Irish backstop was the biggest bone of contention in the divorce talks 
between the EU and the UK. It serves as an all-weather insurance policy for 
Dublin and provides that, unless both parties conclude the agreement on 
future relations that would obviate the need for a hard border on the island 
of Ireland, the UK will remain in a customs union with the EU, and 
Northern Ireland will remain part of the EU’s regulatory area. 
For the first time in 
modern history, the 
Commons found the 
government in contempt 
of parliament. 
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March 29th but it was defeated again, this time by a margin of 58 
votes. Fearing a no-deal exit, MPs also passed a law giving 
parliament the legal ability to compel the prime minister to seek an 
extension of the Article 50 talks. This law (which began life as the 
so-called ‘Cooper-Letwin Bill’) reduces the risk of the UK crashing 
out of the EU. The Commons also held two series of indicative votes 
to see if there was a majority for any other method of avoiding a no-
deal Brexit. None of the options secured a parliamentary majority. 
Theresa May then started consultations with the Labour opposition 
and asked the EU for a further extension. 
Parliament’s repeated rejection of the withdrawal agreement 
complicated the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU. It also irked 
European institutions and capitals who had long wanted to turn the 
page in the EU’s relationship with the UK. EU leaders worried that 
extending talks would only prolong uncertainty about the UK’s 
direction of travel and complicate the EU’s decision-making 
process. But the EU-27 did not want a no-deal Brexit either, and so 
on April 10th they gave the UK another extension, this time until 
October 31st (European Council, 2019b). The ‘flexible’ extension 
allowed the UK to leave before that date if it ratified the withdrawal 
agreement earlier.4 If, however, the UK failed to hold European 
Parliament elections in May, then it needed to leave the EU with no 
deal on May 31st (though the EU left itself some room to offer a 
further extension). 
18.5 Learning lessons from the past: parliamentary 
oversight of EU affairs in the future 
Something positive can still come out of parliament’s confrontation 
with the government over Brexit, if those in power now and in the 
future learn lessons from it. May argued for a long time that 
thorough parliamentary oversight of the government’s stance 
would weaken its negotiating hand. But this approach has damaged 
May’s chances of success. Parliamentarians are more likely to give 
their consent to an agreement that they have helped to shape rather 
                                                        
4 At the time of writing the chances of the UK ratifying the withdrawal 
agreement before the European Parliament’s elections were rather slim and 
UK political parties were gearing up for the European elections planned in 
the UK for May 23rd.  
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than one they get to see at the last minute. A government with 
parliamentary backing for its negotiating objectives would have 
represented a much more formidable and persuasive force in the 
eyes of the EU-27 and might have found it easier to achieve its aims. 
May realised this too late and engaged in cross-party consultations 
only after the Commons voted against the withdrawal agreement 
three times.  
There are several ways that cooperation between parliament 
and the government on EU matters might be organised in future. 
Irrespective of whether the UK leaves the EU with or without a deal, 
the EU and its laws will continue to have 
an impact on the UK. The UK’s legislature 
and executive should work together to 
ensure the EU-UK relationship is as 
effective as possible. At the time of 
writing the next steps in the Brexit 
process remain unclear. The UK was set 
to hold European Parliamentary 
elections, which are seen by many as a way to express public 
frustration with the government’s Brexit policy. The outcome of the 
elections could influence the discussion on how to break the current 
Brexit deadlock in the British Parliament. This chapter assumes, 
however, that the most likely outcome is that the UK leaves the EU 
at some stage on the basis of the present withdrawal agreement. 
Leaving the EU on the basis of the renegotiated withdrawal 
agreement is not an option because the EU has refused to re-open 
the text and it is very unlikely that it will change its mind. But the 
EU has argued on many occasions that it is willing to work together 
with the UK on a more ambitious political declaration concerning 
the future EU-UK relations if some of London’s red lines shifted. 
However, other possible outcomes such as a no-deal Brexit or no 
Brexit are also worth looking at in terms of what they might mean 
for parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs.  
18.5.1 Exiting with an agreement 
MPs and peers will soon discover that leaving the EU is just the 
beginning of the Brexit process (Lowe, 2019). Parliamentarians will 
need to oversee the implementation of the withdrawal agreement, 
negotiations on the future relationship with the EU-27 and the 
Irrespective of whether 
the UK leaves the EU 
with or without a deal, 
the EU and its laws will 
continue to have an 
impact on the UK. 
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application of EU law in the UK in the transition period and 
afterwards.  
Parliamentary scrutiny of the implementation of the 
withdrawal agreement 
The withdrawal agreement establishes a joint committee, 
comprising representatives of both the EU and the UK, which will 
decide, among other things, on whether the transition period should 
be extended or whether the backstop is still needed. These decisions 
will have implications for the UK, and parliament will want to hold 
the government to account for them. The Exiting the European 
Union Committee argued in a report in March 2018 that a decision 
by the EU-UK withdrawal agreement joint committee to extend the 
transition period should be subject to parliamentary approval 
(House of Commons, 2018). In order to take an informed view, 
however, Westminster would have to know what the UK and EU 
positions were. According to the withdrawal agreement, the 
meetings of the joint committee will be confidential (unless the 
committee chairs decide otherwise), so the government will 
probably resist providing MPs and peers with detailed information 
about the talks. In the past, Westminster could put pressure on the 
government to compromise by refusing to clear an EU document 
from scrutiny (House of Commons, 1998; House of Lords, 2010). 
With some exceptions, the government cannot agree to a proposal 
in the Council of the EU while parliament is still considering the EU 
document concerned (the so-called ‘scrutiny reserve’). But post-
Brexit, parliamentarians will no longer be able to use that leverage 
over the government because the UK will no longer be a member of 
the Council of the EU or the European Council. Rather than 
abolishing the scrutiny reserve completely, parliamentarians 
should try to retain it in a modified form by amending the 
procedure to reflect the new post-Brexit institutional architecture. 
Ministers might be more inclined to engage in dialogue with 
parliament before joint committee meetings if Westminster could 
potentially delay its decisions. 
Parliamentary oversight of the future EU-UK negotiations  
After May lost her first vote on the withdrawal agreement on 
January 15th, she promised that if the Commons gave her another 
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chance and approved the deal, she would consult parliament on the 
government’s negotiating mandate for the future talks. She 
promised that she would give MPs a progress report before each 
biannual high level EU-UK stocktaking conference which is 
envisaged in the political declaration attached to the withdrawal 
agreement (Government UK, 2019a). MPs should push the 
government to enshrine that framework in law – perhaps in the 
‘Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill’ which will give 
force to the provisions of the withdrawal agreement in British law. 
Parliament could also insist that the scrutiny reserve should apply 
to any decisions taken at the EU-UK stocktaking conference. The 
government might want to oppose this idea. It will argue that the 
talks will require quick decisions, so parliament should not tie the 
government’s hands with a scrutiny reserve. But ministers need to 
understand that scrutiny is not a zero sum game and parliament is 
not necessarily the enemy: it can often improve on the government’s 
policy proposals. Besides, the scrutiny reserve always offered room 
for manoeuvre; ministers could override it if rapid EU action was 
needed, but had to justify this to parliamentarians. A similar system 
could apply after Brexit, as long as the government does not abuse 
it to circumvent scrutiny.  
Parliamentary monitoring of the application of EU law in 
the transition period and beyond 
If the UK leaves the European Union with a withdrawal agreement 
it will also be bound by existing and new EU laws at least until the 
end of December 2020. The longer it takes Westminster to approve 
the divorce deal the shorter the initial transition period. And, if the 
backstop kicks in after the transition period is over, the UK would 
have to apply new rules concerning goods in Northern Ireland. The 
British government has committed itself, therefore, when EU rules 
apply to Northern Ireland, to voluntarily apply them also across the 
whole of the UK, so as to avoid intra-UK regulatory divergence. EU 
law would also have a continued impact on the UK if it decided to 
pursue a softer Brexit, either in the form of customs union or in the 
form of European Economic Area membership. 
The UK would not be able to take part in shaping new EU 
legislation under any of these scenarios, because it will be a third 
country. Parliament should, therefore, ensure that the government 
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continues to present draft EU legislation in both houses, together 
with thorough impact assessments. UK parliamentarians should 
also monitor the success of any government attempts to influence 
EU law-making. London should follow the example of Norway, 
which does not participate in EU decision-making but implements 
new acquis pertaining to the single market of the EU. To maximise 
its influence on EU decision-making, Oslo has intensified bilateral 
contacts with individual member-states (Haugevik, 2017).  
Ministers in the May government have tried to downplay the 
need for thorough parliamentary oversight of EU law post-Brexit. 
They argued that very few new EU legal acts would be applied to 
the UK in the transition period (Raab, 2018). It takes the EU at least 
17 months to approve legislative acts at the first reading, and 39 
months at the second reading (European Parliamentary Research 
Service Blog, 2018). Dominic Raab, the then Brexit secretary, argued 
in September 2018 that due to the lengthy EU legislative process, 
new laws taking effect during the transition would almost certainly 
have been scrutinised by the UK when it was still a member state. 
But Westminster should not be fooled. Brexit has shown that the EU 
can rapidly adopt legislation when it is confronted with serious 
challenges. On 25 March 2019 the European Commission argued 
that, since 2017, the EU had adopted or agreed 17 out of 19 draft 
laws designed to mitigate the negative consequences of a no-deal 
Brexit (European Commission, 2019b). 
18.5.2 No-deal Brexit or no Brexit 
The European Council decision to extend the deadline for the UK to 
leave the EU does not formally take no-deal off the table. If the UK 
leaves without an agreement there 
will be no transition period and the 
UK will no longer be bound to apply 
EU law. But it will still not be able to 
make a clean break. EU legislation 
has constituted the legal basis for the 
functioning of the UK’s own 
businesses for the last four decades and the UK could not afford to 
abandon all EU laws at once. The EU is a regulatory superpower – 
it regulates global markets, setting rules in areas such as food safety, 
chemicals, competition and data protection. In order to mitigate no-
EU legislation has 
constituted the legal basis 
for the last four decades and 
the UK could not afford to 
abandon all EU laws at once. 
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deal uncertainty in various UK sectors, the government would have 
to maintain continued alignment with EU law, at least in the short 
term.5  
The disruptive nature of a no-deal Brexit would probably force 
the British government to seek bilateral agreements in areas such as 
social security coordination with individual member states and – in 
parallel – London would probably be back at the EU negotiating 
table, albeit on the opposite side, trying to get back to something very 
similar to the existing withdrawal agreement. In such a scenario 
Westminster would no doubt like to ask for the same access to 
information as it would have if the UK departed with a withdrawal 
agreement. 
In the event that the UK does not leave the EU by October 31st 
and secures an even longer extension, or withdraws its notification 
to leave the EU altogether, MPs and the government will be tempted 
to maintain the current model of parliamentary oversight of EU 
affairs. But this would be a mistake. The referendum did not end 
divisions over the UK’s relationship with the EU. European issues 
would continue to be as divisive as ever if the UK remained in the 
EU. Parliamentarians should push for a departure from old scrutiny 
procedures based on the work of the ESC, which failed to provide a 
balanced debate about the EU and the UK’s place within it.  
Post-Brexit parliamentary scrutiny structures: a new EU 
affairs committee? 
The structures created to deal with European matters and with the 
Brexit talks have many flaws. MPs and peers have rarely discussed 
Brexit with each other, which has led to duplication in the work of 
individual committees. Such an overlap at times results in 
committees making contradictory recommendations on the same 
issues, despite the hard work of officials in both houses to 
coordinate Brexit-related work.6 This parliamentary cacophony 
                                                        
5 The government is for example reported to have decided that the UK 
would align with EU food safety and animal health regulations for at least 
nine months in the event of an unmanaged Brexit (Foster, 2019). 
6 The House of Lords established an informal group in November 2016 that 
oversees committees’ Brexit activities and liaises with the House of 
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makes it easier for the government to cherry-pick the committee 
recommendations it likes and ignore the rest.   
Assuming the UK leaves the EU with a withdrawal 
agreement, parliamentary oversight of European issues after Brexit 
will be more difficult than when the UK was a member of the Union. 
In the short term at least, MPs will have more on their plate. 
Whereas before they sifted EU documents and at times 
recommended further parliamentary debate on EU proposals, after 
Brexit MPs will have to oversee all three key EU-facing areas: the 
application of the withdrawal agreement, monitoring of the 
application of new EU legislation in the UK, and oversight of the 
negotiations on future EU-UK relations, not to mention the 
evolution of the relationship itself. Parliamentarians will need to 
develop new dynamic structures that would enable them to shift the 
balance of their work between these three elements of 
parliamentary oversight, depending on how the UK-EU 
relationship develops.  
So far, parliament has paid little attention to its role in the 
future, focusing instead on day-to-day Brexit developments.7 But 
MPs and peers need to start thinking about this. After the snap 
elections in June 2017 it took the Commons three months to 
reconstitute the exiting the EU committee, and as a result two rounds 
of the Brexit negotiations went by without any parliamentary 
scrutiny (Lynch, Whitaker and Cygan, 2019).  
The Commons and Lords should jointly devise constructive 
recommendations on adjusting scrutiny procedures for this new 
post-Brexit reality. The Commons Liaison Committee has launched 
an inquiry into the effectiveness of departmental select committees, 
and the House of Lords is reviewing its own committee system. MPs 
and peers could exchange insights from these ongoing inquiries. 
                                                        
Commons, which created its own post of Brexit liaison manager only in 
December 2017. 
7 The Exiting the EU Committee has recently launched an inquiry into the 
role of UK Parliament in the transition period, in the EU-UK negotiations 
and in the event of no deal, but most evidence so far has focused on issues 
such as the Irish backstop or the extension of Article 50 (House of 
Commons, 2019). 
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Parliamentarians could consider creating a joint committee on 
European affairs. A number of such joint committees already exist.8  
This, however, may be easier said than done (Gostyńska, 
2015). MPs and peers have rarely exchanged views on EU legislative 
proposals or coordinated their objections to draft legislation from 
the European Commission (making use of the right of national 
parliaments to send so-called ‘reasoned opinions’ to the 
Commission). There is little reason to think that MPs and peers 
would be willing to change this 
approach for the sake of developing 
new parliamentary oversight 
structures. 
If MPs and peers disagree on 
creating a joint committee, the 
Commons should nevertheless push 
for a change to the way it has 
scrutinised EU affairs. MPs should 
abolish the European scrutiny committee, which has demonstrated 
Eurosceptic bias, and put all post-Brexit scrutiny functions in the 
hands of one committee. This would reduce possible duplication in 
the committees’ work and give MPs a stronger voice vis-à-vis the 
government. Initially, these scrutiny functions would have to be 
performed by the Exiting the EU Committee. As long as the 
government’s department for exiting the EU exists (DExEU), the 
committee, currently chaired by Labour MP Hilary Benn, would 
have to shadow its work. Once DExEU is abolished the exiting the 
EU committee would evolve into a new European affairs 
committee.9 
This committee, like other select committees, would have the 
power to create ad hoc sub-committees. If the committee members 
thought that juggling the three main scrutiny tasks was too much, 
they could delegate some of these roles to sub-committees. That 
                                                        
8 The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy was established in 
the 2005-10 Parliament and includes members from the House of 
Commons and the Lords.  
9 The official name of the new Commons committee should avoid referring 
to the ‘European Union’. This would play into the hands of the 
Eurosceptics who would claim that the UK has left the EU in name only.  
MPs should abolish the 
European scrutiny 
committee, which has 
demonstrated Eurosceptic 
bias, and put all post-
Brexit scrutiny functions in 
the hands of one committee. 
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would also give the committee the flexibility to respond quickly to 
any new, possibly sudden, developments in EU-UK relations 
without getting in the way of any of its regular tasks. If the future 
talks between the EU and the UK stalled – say over arrangements to 
replace the free movement of EU workers – the committee could 
create a sub-committee to investigate this problem. Because of the 
scope of its responsibilities, the new committee would have to be 
bigger than an average 11- member Commons select committee, and 
would also need more staff and research resources.  
The new European affairs committee would be useful even if 
the UK found itself temporarily outside the EU without a deal or if 
it remained in the club. In the first scenario, it would oversee 
government negotiations with the EU and its member states to 
mitigate the consequences of no-deal. And in the second, it would 
scrutinise EU draft legislation and the government’s position in the 
EU decision-making bodies – the role that is currently carried out 
by the European scrutiny committee.  
There are limits to what lawmakers can do, however, without 
the support of the government of the day. The government might 
be reluctant to abolish the European scrutiny committee, which has 
so far provided oversight of EU documents, and set up a new and 
potentially influential European affairs committee. Instead, it might 
want to parcel out responsibility to departmental select committees 
with plenty of other work to do and with less access to specific EU 
expertise. But given the make-up of the European scrutiny 
committee, if it was retained it would probably focus on making the 
government’s job difficult and seek to block any new EU laws during 
the transition period on the grounds that they are undemocratic. An 
effective European affairs committee, with a chair elected by the 
entire house (as with other select committees) rather than by the 
committee’s members, would encourage moderate and pro-
European MPs to join and facilitate a more balanced approach to 
European matters – an objective that the government should support.  
Assuring Westminster’s role in EU decision-shaping  
It is also important for the UK Parliament to develop and nurture 
its own network of contacts in Brussels and EU capitals. The British 
government pledged that it would cooperate closely with the 
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Parliament in the next Brexit phases, but it has often backtracked on 
its own promises, and Westminster needs a back-up plan.  
After Brexit, the UK Parliament will be unable to exert direct 
influence on EU decision-making, either by raising objections or by 
offering positive feedback on Commission legislative proposals.10 It 
will also cease to be a full member of all the inter-parliamentary 
conferences that have provided a platform for parliaments of 
individual EU member-states to interact with each other and with 
the European Parliament.  
Westminster should devise its own cooperation structures 
with national legislatures and with the European Parliament. Any 
agreement on the future EU-UK relationship will be put to the 
European Parliament, and the Commission is also likely to consult 
MEPs during the talks. The European Parliament also decides, 
along with the Council of the EU, on the majority of new EU laws, 
including those which would apply to the UK post-Brexit. The 
political declaration that establishes the framework for the future 
EU-UK relationship provides for an EU-UK parliamentary 
cooperation forum. Westminster should press the government (by 
means of modified scrutiny reserve as described in the previous 
section of this chapter) to take account of parliamentarians’ views 
when it negotiates this aspect of the future relationship with the EU. 
In 2017, the majority of committees responsible for European 
affairs in the EU member-states indicated their willingness to 
continue to invite Westminster representatives to inter-
parliamentary conferences post-Brexit (COSAC, 2017). The UK 
Parliament should exploit this support to request participation in 
these inter-parliamentary forums. It could follow the example of 
Norway’s Parliament, which has attended the Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the 
EU (COSAC). Norway is not a member of the EU but its Parliament 
expresses its interest to incoming COSAC presidencies to 
participate in inter-parliamentary meetings.  
                                                        
10 National parliaments can object to Commission’s legislative proposals on 
the basis of the subsidiarity principle (a so-called ‘reasoned opinion’). They 
can also submit opinions within the framework of the so-called political 
dialogue with the Commission. 
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But the various inter-parliamentary conferences usually take 
place only a couple of times per year. That is not frequent enough 
for Westminster to remain up to date with developments in the EU 
and its member states. The work of the UK national parliament 
office, which until recently was staffed by two officials who 
represent the Commons and Lords at the EU level, will therefore be 
even more important after Brexit. The UK Parliament should 
maintain the two officials to act as Westminster’s eyes and ears in 
Brussels. While the UK government was doing its best to keep 
parliamentarians in the dark about the progress of the withdrawal 
talks, these officials provided useful insights into the EU’s 
negotiating position.  
Westminster’s engagement in Brussels should go beyond 
inter-parliamentary cooperation. British parliamentarians have 
occasionally conducted evidence sessions with EU commissioners 
in Brussels, to better understand the EU’s rationale for its legislative 
actions. Westminster should keep this practice up, and use those 
trips to flag up the findings of its own inquiries in policy areas in 
which the UK will continue to align itself with the EU. The 
European Commission could make good use of these findings when 
it opts to review relevant EU legislation. 
 
Conclusion 
The outcome of the EU referendum has revealed serious flaws in 
British representative democracy. The makeup of the Commons, 
which is elected on the basis of the first-past-the-post system, does 
not reflect the current demographic of the British public and adds 
to the public’s frustration with Westminster. This growing divide 
between the public and its representatives also made it difficult for 
MPs to decide whether they should act in accordance with their own 
previously stated beliefs or whether they should honour the 
outcome of the 2016 referendum. MPs’ unease about pushing for 
Brexit has also put the Commons on a collision course with the 
government – a rare thing in British politics.  
But this is not the only change the referendum has brought to 
Westminster. Whereas before the 2016 referendum MPs were 
occasionally drawn into dealing with European affairs, leaving the 
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EU has become an all-consuming affair. Since the 2016 vote, one-
sixth of the time on the floor of the House has been spent on matters 
related to Brexit (Lloyd, 2018). This increased interest, combined 
with Westminster’s greater assertiveness in holding the government 
to account, presents an excellent opportunity to improve 
parliamentary scrutiny of European matters.  
Whether MPs like it or not, leaving the EU is just the 
beginning of a long process of redefining the UK’s place in Europe. 
Westminster will find it easier to navigate these uncharted waters if 
it revamps its current scrutiny procedures and maintains close ties 
with the national chambers of EU member states and with the EU 
institutions. 
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19. CONCLUSIONS 
STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
19.1 Challenges to representative democracy 
Citizens’ political participation in regular voting on decisions that 
affect them is a core element of democratic processes. Robert Dahl 
(1989) defined representative democratic processes as 
the most reliable means for protecting and advancing the 
good and interests of all the persons subject to collective 
decisions. 
Systems of representative democracy are supposed to safeguard 
pluralism, the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and 
minorities alike, and to empower citizens to remove governments 
that fail to fulfil their expectations or needs. Yet, there is something 
rotten in the state of representative democracy in Europe. A poll by 
the Pew Research Center (2017) shows that, despite the strong 
commitment to representative democracy in the EU (37%), 42% of 
the population is less committed to democracy than it used to be 
and 10% support non-democratic forms of government. Our 
research supports findings that this is not an East-West or a North-
South divide. It is a divide between those systems in which citizens 
feel represented and those in which they do not. 
In their contribution to this book, Dídac Gutiérrez-Peris and 
Héctor Sánchez Margalef have identified four challenges to the 
notion of representative democracy in Europe: 
- external drivers, namely a fear of losing economic status due to 
technological change and growing inequality, and the alleged 
loss of traditional forms of identity due to increasing 
migration flows into (and out of) member states. Whether real 
or perceived, the internet and social media are amplifying 
these drivers; 
- external actors who question the association between 
representative democracy and economic success, and/or 
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offer an alternative model of government. China and Russia 
have always seen the promotion of democracy as defended 
by the US and the EU as a way to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of third countries and expand their own influence and 
geopolitical goals; 
- internal actors in the form of political parties or civil society 
movements that subvert representative democracy while 
using the rules that underpin it. Radical right parties in 
government are attempting to dismantle constitutional 
checks and balances, curtail the freedoms of press and 
association, control judiciary power, and demolish the 
opposition. This brand of political force has always existed in 
EU member states. What has changed is that anti-EU forces 
do not want to openly ‘destroy’ or ‘end’ the EU any more. In 
fact, the uncertainty created by Brexit is a powerful deterrent 
and a boost for EU support (Grabbe and Lehne, 2018). Instead, 
these forces will continue to take advantage of the system to 
gain more funds, more visibility and, in due course, more 
political power. Their ultimate goal is to ‘take back control’, 
by repatriating decisions now taken at EU level, and reclaim 
sovereignty for the nation state so as to make it easier to 
implement an illiberal agenda; 
- the increasing number of users of democracy who do not see 
living under a democratic regime as indispensable: the 
‘middle class’ blame both the elites – for the loss of their 
former economic status (or that of their children in the future) 
– and the disadvantaged, whom they see as benefitting from 
special attention. Millennials are also “more likely to express 
hostile views of democracy, [and] vote for anti-establishment 
parties and candidates that disregard long-standing 
democratic norms in ever greater numbers” (Foa and Mounk, 
2016). 
As a result, representative democracy is being eroded in ways that 
go beyond mere citizen dissatisfaction with their governments 
(Pew, 2017; Eurobarometer, 2018). 
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19.2 Symptoms of democracy fatigue 
Our research shows that this phenomenon is partly the result of the 
weaknesses in the governance system itself: 
- Coalition negotiations are taking longer than ever, not just in 
countries whose constitutional set-up requires complex 
arrangements (e.g. across the geopolitical and ethnic divides 
of Latvia’s political landscape), but even in member states 
such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden that once 
prided themselves on the speed of new government 
formation. 
- Parliaments often require months to take long-term strategic 
decisions, for instance on investment in emerging 
technologies or choosing the right energy mix to combat 
climate change. 
- Governments appear powerless in the face of acute crises and 
in the implementation of policy. The loss of economic 
sovereignty in the eurozone explains why even a radical left-
wing party buoyed by a popular mandate was unable to 
define Greece’s course without defaulting on debt. And the 
lack of solidarity in the Schengen area over the redistribution 
of refugees explains why Italy was unable to deal with 2015-
16 migration crisis on its own. 
- Basic values, principles and procedures of constitutional 
democracy are often undermined or openly violated by 
powerful political and oligarchic actors. In their chapter on 
Romania, Mihai Sebe, Bogdan Muresan and Eliza Vas make 
the point that this phenomenon is not related to there being a 
nationalist, populist or Eurosceptic party in power. 
Unfortunately, it is habitual, not accidental. The deficiencies 
and loopholes in legislation or institutional performance are 
often intended and purposeful, not a side-effect of a rapid top-
down Europeanisation process. As the Czech Constitution 
does not set precise time limits for the steps to follow a failed 
vote of confidence, dubious politicians, in particular the 
president, have been experimenting with keeping alive a 
government without parliamentary backing. Worse, more 
than a decade after their EU accession, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
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Romania remain defective and semi-consolidated 
constitutional democracies (Freedom House, 2019). 
Wojciech Białożyt, Jacek Kucharczyk, Romain Le Quiniou and Filip 
Pazderski examine the tension between continuing public support 
for EU membership and the Law and Justice (PiS) party, despite its 
sniping at the democratic checks and balances (press, judiciary) that 
have been the bedrock of Poland’s ‘return to Europe’ since 1989. 
They find that these systemic changes and the ruthlessly 
majoritarian way of legislating them has engendered deep social 
and political polarisation. These cleavages are successfully 
exploited by the ruling party, which has used them to maintain its 
public support in the face of growing domestic and international 
criticism. The authors argue that, if 
not turned around in the 2019 general 
elections, this trend in Polish political 
life could threaten its representative 
democracy and the country’s EU 
membership.  
In short, representative democracy in Europe is suffering 
from a crisis of efficiency that further affects its legitimacy. As 
intolerance for due process and deliberative rationality grows, 
political patience wanes. If left unaddressed, bigger problems will 
arise. 
19.3 Instruments to mobilise EU affairs 
In this book, we investigate how the relationship between the 
democratic institutions of the member states and the EU has 
changed as a result of a decade of crisis. Rather than assessing the 
state of collective government (Van Middelaar, 2019), we focus on 
the role of parliaments. We zoom in on the constitutional and 
institutional frameworks, practical procedures and mundane 
interfaces that citizens and politicians use to make democracy 
happen. The underlying assumption for this approach is that 
instruments can shape results. 
Politicians submit their claims to authority to voters in the 
public ritual of elections, but this ritual must be transparent. 
(O’Neill, 2002; Raz, 1986). Recent examples of instruments geared 
Representative democracy in 
Europe is suffering from a 
crisis of efficiency that 
further affects its legitimacy. 
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towards increasing transparency in Europe’s systems of 
representative democracy include: 
- in political parties: introduction of full transparency of 
funding and advanced forms of internal democracy, such as 
primaries and online consultations with members on all 
major topics; 
- in parliaments: a move towards ‘open parliaments’ that 
promote legislative openness through efforts to increase 
access to public information and promote citizen 
participation in decision-making; 
- in expert bodies: online coverage of the meetings and setting 
up of consultative ‘citizen councils’, and monitoring their 
performance. 
In their chapter, Daniel Smilov and Antoinette Primatarova subject 
four transnational Voting Aid Applications (VAAs) designed for the 
2014 EP elections to critical assessment, particularly of their purpose 
and the informative value of the questionnaires that constitute the 
core element of their design. They 
find that VAAs create a perception 
that the voter is in the driving seat of 
politics: that political parties are 
turned into transparent menus of 
policy options from which the 
rational voter makes an informed 
choice. This perception may be 
misleading, however. VAAs cannot 
function as a remedy for the ‘representative deficit’, i.e. the 
mismatch between the issue preferences of voters and the offers of 
parties. Nor can they affect the major trends in contemporary 
European politics such as low trust in political parties and 
politicians, and poor turnout for elections. The potential for their 
success, according to Smilov and Primatorova, lies primarily in their 
use as tools to address the ‘information deficit’ regarding European 
policies and EP elections. 
While recognising that the European Parliament is a sui 
generis assembly – one established in parallel and supranational to 
the (federal) parliaments of member states – with its own peculiar 
kind of instruments, the tendency is nevertheless to base any 
assessment of the representativeness of the EP on the same criteria 
The potential for success of 
Voting Aid Applications lies 
primarily in their use as 
tools to address the 
‘information deficit’ 
regarding European policies 
and EP elections. 
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applied to national assemblies. The European Parliament is 
composed of representatives of EU citizens (Article 14 TEU) who 
are, of course, also citizens of their respective member states. 
Despite the growing importance of the Parliament as a co-legislator 
of European laws addressed to natural or legal persons and 
institutions of the member states, Sophia Russack reminds us that 
EP elections continue to suffer from the traditional ‘second order’ 
election syndrome, characterised by notoriously little interest on the 
part of citizens in European issues, little name recognition of EU-
level politicians, and thus low turnout. Despite the usual drama 
preceding any type of vote, the 2019 EP elections were not expected 
to be any different, for two reasons. More salient issues (such as 
government corruption) than the crisis topics of yesteryear 
(sovereign debt, migration) were not advocated by populist parties 
on the far right in Central and Eastern Europe (Krastev, 2019), and 
the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidate) procedure has failed to create 
waves beyond the Brussels bubble. 
Above all, the disconnect between first, national parties and 
Europarties; second, the EU’s legislative and executive; and third, 
MEPs and their constituencies opens up 
a schism between the EP and EU 
citizens. Russack finds that this division 
is so wide that it prevents the EP from 
properly representing the European 
electorate. The Spitzenkandidaten system was introduced to improve 
the representative character of the EP but has largely remained 
without effect as it has not increased the visibility of EP elections or 
created a greater electoral connection. A mechanism which remains 
largely untested is that of transitional lists. 
The dual weakness from which the EP suffers is its distance 
from the voter and the absence of substantive opposition. This may 
change though, with the rise in support for parties that reflect an 
anti-EU sentiment. In the absence of suitable instruments, it is 
thanks to the injection of conflicting passions into the debate that 
the European Parliament can develop into a more visible political 
arena and thus – perhaps counter-intuitively – gain more public 
authority as an EU-level democratic institution. 
The Spitzenkandidaten 
system has largely remained 
without effect. 
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Yet there remains a significant misalignment of national and 
Europarties. Party groupings in the European Parliament show a 
high degree of cohesion (Hix, et al., 
2007). MEPs constitute autonomous 
units in their national political 
parties, being heavily influenced by 
the EU’s context and, conversely, 
having limited impact on national policymaking. Jan Kovář, Petr 
Kratochvíl, Zdeněk Sychra make the point that Czech MEPs are 
sometimes even seen as dissidents within their own parties when 
they disagree with their parties’ critical attitudes towards the EU. 
This is aggravated if the value orientation of the national party 
differs considerably from the values of the European group to 
which it belongs, as is the case with the governing ANO party, a 
member of ALDE. But European political families are broad 
churches, seemingly only interested in the numbers game to keep a 
hold on power. Cynically, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor 
Orbán’s semi-authoritarian political agenda only led to the 
suspension of his Fidesz party by the EPP party leadership after its 
vitriolic campaign against European Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker, éminence grise of the EPP.1 Notwithstanding 
comparable policies undermining the EU’s fundamental principles 
and values, Bulgaria’s governing GERB party rather 
opportunistically supported Manfred Weber as the lead candidate 
of the EPP in the 2019 European Parliament elections and has thus 
avoided strongly worded criticism, and suspension.  
The ‘Europeanisation’ of national debates is rather uneven 
across the continent. For most national parties, EU issues remain of 
a second order. If they become relevant, they are discussed mostly 
in terms of their impact on the national political agenda and are 
removed from the wider European context. While EU issues are 
rarely debated in the plenary of member states’ lower houses, the 
upper houses tend to focus more on the EU agenda. This can be 
explained by several factors: 
                                                        
1 At the same time, the EPP didn’t have the courage to expel Fidesz for its 
“illiberal democracy” (a contradiction in terms). But Orbán may leave it 
anyway to join the far-right grouping that is being set up by Italy’s Minister 
of the Interiro, Matteo Salvini. 
There remains a significant 
misalignment of national 
and Europarties. 
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- First, there is limited interest in EU affairs on the part of the 
general public and media. This means that debating EU 
matters does not bring electoral benefits.  
- Second, the chairs of EU affairs committees often argue that 
the most urgent action is required on the EU agenda, which 
leaves insufficient time for the plenary to discuss them, 
especially when the committee can speak for the entire 
chamber.  
- Third, there is generally a lack of deeper EU expertise, which 
is, as said, often provided only by the parties’ MEPs whose 
positions and influence are limited at home.  
- Fourth, majority politics in the lower houses tend to reflect the 
executive’s positions, while the upper houses act more 
autonomously (even in Italy’s ‘perfect’ bicameral system, 
according to Eleonora Poli).  
- Finally, while EU affairs are more politicised at the plenary, 
this is usually not related to the specifics of the given dossier 
but rather to the clash between government and opposition. 
When ownership is claimed for the implementation of 
popular EU proposals while unpopular ones are vilified and 
blamed on ‘Brussels’, national politicians widen the gap by 
stoking Euroscepticism.  
The result is a paradox: while national politicians continuously call 
for a greater involvement in EU policy, the above-mentioned 
shortcomings stymie these efforts 
from the very beginning. 
Even if, in recent years, EU 
issues have increasingly permeated 
national public discourse, this has 
largely been due to burning crises 
(Greece, Italy) or member states 
holding the rotating Presidency of 
the Council (Bulgaria, Finland, 
Romania). Besides these moments of 
increased political intensity, EU issues and EP elections are, 
generally speaking, of a second order. Yet national differences do 
not split along East-West or Europhile-Eurosceptic lines; rather the 
National differences do not 
split along East-West or 
Europhile-Eurosceptic lines; 
rather the division is 
between systems that cater 
for deliberation on  
EU affairs and those that  
do not. 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  367 
 
division is between systems that cater for deliberation on EU affairs 
and those that do not. 
In their chapter on Slovakia, Aneta Vilagi and Pavol Babos 
show that formal institutions, such as the constitution and other 
legal norms regulating democratic processes render its parliament 
supreme in the system. When it comes to EU matters, parliament 
can form and legally bind government and its members to certain 
positions. However, political dynamics and informal institutions 
and practices favour the dominance of political parties, and 
especially the party leadership, over the independent performance 
of MPs and the Slovak Parliament. 
Erik Brandes, Nicolai von Ondarza and Felix Schenuit argue 
that, in legal terms, the German Bundestag is one of the most 
powerful legislatures in the EU. The instruments at its disposal to 
control the government, obtain information and participate in 
decision-making are vigorous, particularly in EU affairs. Since the 
Treaty of Lisbon, rights have been strengthened even further, 
notably through a series of legal challenges against the German 
government and the decisions it took during the eurozone debt 
crisis. This Bundestag role has been accompanied by an increasing 
integration between German national parties and their European 
counterparts. The robust legal mechanisms to control the German 
government have, however, translated into a more limited political 
control in practice, partly because the series of ‘grand coalitions’ had 
very big majorities, at least until 2017. Apart from political power, 
expertise also still lies with the German government, particularly 
the Chancellery and the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and the 
economy. While the politicisation of European politics has increased 
the interest and participation of the parliament, EU-level crisis 
politics have empowered the European Council. Despite the 
Bundestag’s improved stance, EU affairs in Germany thus remain 
Chefsache. 
The Danish Parliament is often perceived as keeping a tight 
rein on the government, especially where EU affairs are concerned. 
In spite of its opt-outs and ostensibly Eurosceptic population, 
Denmark tops the chart when it comes to its implementation record 
of EU directives and its mandate-based (ex ante) EU scrutiny system. 
As Maja Kluger Dionigi notes in her contribution to this volume, the 
country’s tradition of minority governments has increased the role 
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of the Folketing (parliament), because the government is obliged to 
seek support from opposition parties to establish parliamentary 
majorities for its EU positions. In practice, however, Denmark might 
not be the textbook example of parliamentary control, as its 
parliament often gets involved too late in the process, suffers from 
the low number of parliamentarians who are active on EU matters, 
and a European Affairs Committee (EAC) that does not take 
advantage of the substantial expertise to be found in the sectoral 
committees. As a result, EU politics are not mainstreamed in the 
Danish Parliament, but confined to the pro-integrationist EAC. 
What is more, the government sometimes forgets to come back to 
secure a new mandate later in the process. The increasing tendency 
to reach early agreements and the lack of transparency surrounding 
discussions in the Council’s preparatory bodies and trilogue 
meetings both put the Danish model under strain. 
In view of these practices it is paradoxical, perhaps, that the 
Bundestag or the Folketing have only made sparse use of the EU-level 
instruments at the disposal of national 
parliaments, such as the early 
warning mechanism. Yet, as Brandes, 
von Ondarza and Schenuit suggest, 
the strength of parliamentary control 
over the government and thus its 
negotiation position in the Council 
seems inversely related to the use of 
EU-level procedures. This 
notwithstanding, the Danish European Affairs Committees and its 
counterparts in assemblies of Poland, Sweden, the UK and other 
member states have long promoted the introduction of a green card 
for national parliaments, with which they can suggest ideas for new 
legislation to the Commission. 
In Austria, the two chambers of parliament also have a strong 
say in EU matters in principle, but only make partial use of it. As in 
Germany and elsewhere, it is foremost the governmental majority 
that defines the country’s EU agenda. In recent years, the Austrian 
Parliament has nevertheless positioned itself as a bridge between 
the national and the EU levels by strengthening inter-parliamentary 
cooperation (for instance through the Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs – COSAC) or granting MEPs the right 
The strength of 
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to speak in dedicated sessions. Stefan Schaller, Paul Schmidt and 
Susan Milford-Faber point out that there is still untapped potential 
to boost the deliberation of EU affairs in the Austrian Parliament: 
more resources could be mobilised to raise its level of involvement 
and more effort could be made to demonstrate to citizens the impact 
an active national parliament can have in shaping the European 
integration process. In fact, the EU Committee of the Federal 
Council has been an active proponent of more efficiency in the 
functioning of the EU, a stronger application of the principle of 
subsidiarity across Europe, and an intensified dialogue between the 
European Commission and the parliamentary chambers of the 
member states. Alongside representatives from Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, France and Germany, the Chairman of the Permanent 
Subcommittee on EU affairs of the 
National Council of the Austrian 
Parliament played a prominent part 
in the European Task Force on 
Subsidiarity, Proportionality and 
“Doing Less More Efficiently”, which 
presented its final report to the 
European Commission in July 2018. 
The Task Force concluded that a new 
way of working on subsidiarity and 
proportionality is needed for local and regional authorities and 
national parliaments to make a more effective contribution to EU 
policymaking and to the design of new legislation. Among the 
proposed changes are: design and introduction of a specific 
subsidiarity and proportionality checklist as part of the legislative 
procedures, as well as, in the future, an increase in the time available 
for national parliaments to contribute their opinions on draft EU 
legislation from 8 weeks to 12 weeks (European Union, 2018). 
The Finnish Parliament too is deeply involved in decision-
making on EU matters. This is due to its constitutional right to 
determine Finland’s position on EU issues falling within the 
parliament’s competence. While parliament’s significant role 
provides a context favouring the ‘domestication’ of EU affairs, the 
politicisation of this trend remains rather weak in Finland, 
according to Juha Jokela. The main reason for this has been a 
relatively strong national consensus on EU matters. While the 
A new way of working on 
subsidiarity and 
proportionality is needed for 
local and regional 
authorities and national 
parliaments to make a more 
effective contribution to EU 
policymaking. 
370  CONCLUSIONS 
 
consensus broke down at the height of the eurozone crisis, a new 
consensus seems to be forming despite the emergence of a major, 
openly populist and Eurosceptic party in the country. This is largely 
due to the worsening security climate in Europe and concerns about 
the EU’s future amid Brexit. 
The United Kingdom is facing the most acute and potentially 
most devastating crisis of representative democracy in Europe. The 
root causes are multiple and by now all too well known to observers 
elsewhere in Europe – even if, it seems, they still elude swathes of 
the British electorate. They include constant EU-bashing by political 
leaders, the unchecked power of the Eurosceptic media, fears of 
splits in the two parties that have dominated UK politics for 
centuries,2 among other causes. Not the least of which is the absence 
of a written constitution. This might have provided the subtle 
checks to hedge against the monumental failure of British politics to 
deal with the consequences of a non-legally binding referendum, 
and to protect the strategic and socio-economic interests of 
UK/European citizens. It may be anathema to many Brexiters but, 
as Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska points out, leaving the EU will not 
mean a clean break from the EU and its laws. EU legislation will 
continue to have an important impact on the UK irrespective of 
whether the UK leaves with a withdrawal agreement or not. 
Westminster will want to assess EU legislation and will have to 
adapt its current scrutiny structures to an as yet unknown post-
Brexit reality. 
19.4 Final observations 
Perhaps Britain (and the rest of Europe) has something to learn from 
the southern periphery. Economic recession and a spike in irregular 
migration have blown politics apart in Mediterranean Europe. They 
have transformed the polite depoliticisation of post-dictatorial 
Greece and Spain into major crises of legitimacy and devastated 
traditional centrist parties in Italy and France.  
                                                        
2 Note the curious narrow rectangular shape of the House of Commons 
when compared to the architecture of parliaments elsewhere in the EU: the 
location of seats for political parties other than the two biggest ones is 
irrelevant in the architecture of the hall, lumped together as they are with 
‘the opposition’. 
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As noted in the chapter by Filippa Chatzistavrou, Greece 
achieved in two decades what other democracies achieved in half a 
century: the triumph and the decline of the idea of representative 
democracy. The loss of economic sovereignty and supranational 
‘diktat’ gave rise to dramatic shifts in parliamentary 
representativeness and partisan identity, thus weakening national 
representative democracy. It has led the so-called ultra-left Syriza 
party of Prime Minister Tsipras to float a proposal for constitutional 
reform intended to, inter alia, introduce proportional representation 
electoral rules for the parliament, reinvigorate the assembly’s 
control of government, limit parliamentary immunity and office to 
three consecutive terms, and create a citizens’ right to propose laws. 
In Spain, the bursting of the real estate bubble shattered a 
political consensus based on the alternation of power between two 
majority parties whose programmes were basically the same on 
essentials such as the deregulation of the labour market and the 
limitation of redistributive policies.  
As in Greece and Spain, high-level corruption cases in Italy 
and France were viewed by the electorate as the symptom of a deep 
institutional crisis induced by connivance between political and 
economic elites. The migration crisis did the rest, and brought about 
a surge of the radical right.  
Also, the emergence of movements that have managed to 
channel discontent and indignation into a claim to deepen 
democracy has transformed the traditional discourse of the left to 
reach out to a social majority. The spectacular rise of the Five Star 
Movement in Italy is a case in point. Ignacio Molina and Ilke Toygür 
reflect on the recent elections in Spain, where we have not only seen 
the collapse of support for the corruption-riven Partido Popular but 
also a tentative normalisation of positions that until recently were 
only on the periphery of social movements such as 15M (the 
indignados) and Podemos. Today, social economics, feminism and 
participative democracy have much greater public visibility than 
before the polycrisis. The ideas and dynamism of these movements 
have caught on in other member states too (cf. Czechia, Slovakia), 
with Emmanuel Macron’s unabashedly pro-European En Marche 
reshaping the political landscape in France and lifting the EU out of 
its existential crisis after the UK’s devastating 2016 Brexit 
referendum.  
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Given global economic, political and security trends, the 
choices for our European societies are becoming starker, more 
momentous. As noted by Van Middelaar (2019), we can no longer 
pass them on to the rest of the world, 
nor push them forward: the future no 
longer comes to the rescue. The 
weaknesses of our representative 
democratic systems cannot just be 
attributed to the polarising breathlessness of social media. Tougher 
choices have to be made in shorter timeframes and on a smaller 
playing field. We cannot simply wish greater powers of persuasion 
on our politicians. We must decide how to improve the way we do 
democracy. Our research shows that procedures and instruments 
differ considerably between member states, and that there is very 
little momentum towards greater convergence. Finding ways to 
change this will be the gambit for the last volume of our triptych 
Towards a Citizens’ Union. 
  
We must decide how to 
improve the way we do 
democracy. 
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